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ABSTRACf 
This thesis aims to examine some aspects of Algerian state capit-
alism and to situate it within a theoretical context derived from 
similar experiences in the Third World. The main emphasis has been 
placed on the state's policies towards agriculture, the most socially, 
economically, and politically important sector in Algerian society. 
The thesis looks at state capitalism in general as a transitional 
phase which, although involving approaches identified by some writers 
as 'socialist', leads ultimately to the development of 'conventional' 
capitalism. Algeria is viewed as a country which, despite having had 
the opportunity to erase much of its past and to reconstruct its 
economy on entirely new lines, has ended up developing according to 
capitalist laws. 
This development is traced to the nature of the socio-political 
forces that took over the leadership of the anti-colonial struggle and 
subsequently of the Algerian state. The analysis extends to include 
various aspects of the National Liberation Movement under colonialism 
and its development after independence. The thesis then describes the 
main characteristics of the economy immediately before and after 
independence and the major steps taken towards social and economic 
reconstruction. 
The state's agrarian policies are considered in the context of the 
social and political objectives of the ruling strata. These include 
attitudes to the self-management movement as a whole and in agriculture 
in particular, and the various measures of agrarian reform applied in 
the private sector. The reform is viewed as an essential precondition 
of the full incorporation of the agricultural sector into the state 
capitalist economy. 
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ABREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY 
AARDES Association Algerienne pour la Recherche Demographique, 
Economique, et Sociologique. 
AD 
ALN 
AML 
ANP 
APC 
APCE 
APW 
'Arsh 
Azil 
Algerian Dinar; the basic unit of currency in Algeria. In 1978, 
the official rate of exchange was four AD to one United States 
dollar. 
Armee de la Liberation Nationale. 
Amis du Manifeste de la Liberte. 
Armee Nationale Populaire. 
Assemblee Populaire Communale. 
Assemblee Populaire Communale Elargie. 
Assemblee Populaire de Wilaya (province). 
Refers to both tribal land and a form of property based on the 
actual labour invested in the land. Arsh property may be 
inherited but cannot be alienated. 
Turkish public domain which was also used as spoil. The Azil 
can also refer to the permission given by the Turkish govern-
ment to the local Algerian notables to collect taxes. 
Beni- Oui-Oui Abusive name for Arab Caid collaborating with the French. 
Bey 
BCA 
BNA 
BNASS 
CAEC 
Caid 
CCAA 
CAP AM 
CAPCS 
CAPRA 
Provicial representative of the Turkish government. 
Banque Centrale d'Algerie. 
Banque Nationale de l'Algerie. 
Bureau National d'Animation du secteur socialiste. 
cooperative Agricole d'Exploitation en Commun. 
A local administrator used by both the Turks and the French at 
the begining of the colonization of Algeria. 
Conseil Communal d'Animation d'Autogestion. 
Cooperative Agricole de Production des Anciens Moudjahidins. 
Cooperative Agricole Polyvalent de Commercialisation et de 
Service. 
cooperative Agricole de Production de la Revolution Agraire. 
CCE Comite de Coordination et d'Execution. 
CNRA Comite Nationale de la Revolution Algerienne. 
CNRA Commission Nationale de la Revolution Agraire. 
CNRS centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. 
COFEL Cooperative de Commercialisation des Fruits et Legumes. 
Commune A village or local community; it is both a residential and an 
administrative unit. 
CORA 
CRESM 
CRUA 
Daira 
Cooperatives de la Reforme Agraire. 
Centre de Recherche et d'Etudes sur les Societes 
Mediterraneennes. 
Comite Revolutionaire d'Unite et d'Action. 
An administrative unit at a level midway between the local 
community and the province; the equivalent of a county. 
Dey Title of the commanding officers of the Janissaries who from 
the 18th century onward became governors of the Regency of 
Algiers. 
Dour 
ENA 
FLN 
FNRA 
GEP 
GI 
GMV 
GPRA 
Habus 
Hill vilage. 
Etoile Nord-Africaine. 
Front de la Liberatione Nationale. 
Fonds National de la Revolution Agraire. 
Groupement d'Entraide Paysanne. 
Groupement Indivisaire. 
Groupement Pre-Cooperative de Mise en Valeur. 
Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne. 
Pious donation of property for the benefit of a foundation 
devoted to religious activity or a charitable and cultural 
institution. 
Hectare The basic unit of land area measurement. One hectare equals 
2.471 acres or 100 sq. metre. 
Khammes (plural Khamamis), farm tenants who received, in turn for 
their labour, land tools, seeds, animals, one-fifth of the 
harvest. 
Makhzen Refers to tribes who, in turn for their allegiance to the 
MARA 
Melk 
Turkish government, received land and tax compensation. 
Ministere d'Agriculture et de la Revolution Agraire. 
Private property similar to European freehold. However, it 
was less easily alienated than freehold. 
MNA Mouvement National Algerien. 
Moudjahid: Guerrilla fighter, derived from tl1e term the holy war. 
MTLD Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques. 
OAIC Office Algerien Interprofessionel de Cereales. 
OFLA Office des Fruits et Legumes d'Algerie. 
ON ACO Office National de Commercialisation. 
ONRA Office Nationale de la Reforme Agraire. 
OPU Office des Publications Universitaires. 
OS Organisation Speciale. 
OAS Organisation de l'Armee Secrete. 
PCA Parti Communiste Algerien. 
PPA Parti du Peuple Algerien. 
RADP Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire. 
SAP Societe Agricole de Prevoyance. 
SEP Secretariat d'Etat au Plan. 
SE-SEMPAC Societe Nationale des Semoules, Pates Alimentaires, et 
Caseous. 
SNED Societe Nationale d"Edition et de Diffusion 
SONATRACH La Societe Nationale pour la Recherche, la Production, le 
Transport, la Transformation at la Commercialisation des 
hydrocarbures. 
UDMA 
UGTA 
Ulama 
UNPA 
Union Democratique du Manifeste Algerien. 
Union Generale des Travilleurs Algerien. 
The plural of the Arabic 'alim, educated man. In the Algerian 
context it designates the religious reformers around Ben Badis 
and his followers from 1930's. 
Union Nationale de la Paysannerie Algerienne. 
USTA 
Wali 
Wilaya 
Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algeriens. 
Head of administration at the district level. 
Military zone during the Algerian war. There were six wilayas: 
Aures, North Constantine, Kabylia, Algiers area, Oran area, 
and Sahara. Today the term refers to an administrative dis-
trict. 
To~ Frumily and to Ebtihaj 
PART I 
AGRICULTURE AND THE STATE SOMm THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
aiAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
The importance of analysing the state, its relations with social 
classes, and its impact on the processes of economic and social trans-
format!on taking place in contemporary Third World societies derives 
not only from the state's expanding role and involvement in economic, 
social, and political activities in these societies, but also from the 
fact that the experience since independence over the last two or three 
decades has produced few of the results for which many people had 
hoped, and indeed fought for, namely an independent and sustained 
socialist or egalitarian development. 
Thus country after country where hopes were so high and which only 
few years ago were described as "socialist'' or, more prudently, "having 
a socialist orientation", "progressive" etc. have proved their inabili-
ty to avoid total submission to what was always represented by the new 
rulers as the principal enemy, international capital, let alone even 
supporting what they had claimed to have set for themselves as a sup-
reme aim, the achievement of sustained economic, social, and political 
development. 
In comparison with the hopes that were raised and the promises 
that were made before and after independence with regard to the aims of 
development, the elimination of social inequalities, and the granting 
of liberty and democracy, the results are extremely disappointing. 
Despite the "progressive" nature of the various measures of nationali-
zation, land reform, development programmes, and the expansion of 
education and health and other social services, the overall outlook 
seems bleak. Economic imbalance, total submission to and dependence on 
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multi-national corporations and capitalist enterprises and organiza-
tions remain the dominant features in almost all yesterday's "progres-
sive" countries. Social inequalities, reflected by the acceleration of 
impoverishment at one end of the scale and the accumulation of wealth 
in few hands at the other (usually those who manage to dominate politi-
cal power) are accelerating. Political repression and coercion is 
unparalleled in the history of many of these countries. 
Algeria is one of the few countries in the Third World where it 
was hoped and believed for some time that it not only had the opportun-
ity to erase its colonial past and to build a new, even socialist, 
society in its place, but that this process was actually happening. 
Such hopes and beliefs were sustained mainly by the events that 
surrounded the achievement of independence in 1962. 
First, independence was accompanied not only by the withdrawal of 
French troops and the establishment of a sovereign state, but more 
importantly by the mass departure of the colonial bourgeoisie. In the 
process, factories, estates and properties of different sorts and sizes 
were suddenly abandoned by their former owners. The workers moved in to 
control these properties and established their own Comites de Gestion, 
promising that Algeria would follow a path of development different 
from that of most other post-colonial societies. 
Secondly, the particular nature of the colonial regime, and the 
fact that it functioned primarily to cater for the needs and interests 
of a minority of European settlers and to exploit the country's resour-
ces in order to promote the process of the capital accumulation in the 
metropolis, led to the alienation of almost all the indigeneous popula-
tion. This was one of the main reasons for the adoption of a unified 
,stand ·by· ·t-he "independence movement after 1954. 
2 
The nature of colonialism and its impact on the socio-economic 
structure of the country gave considerable importance to the inter-
mediary strata (which will be termed the 'petty bourgeoisie' in the 
course of this study), which came to spearhead the struggle for 
independence. The breadth of popular involvement in the national move-
ment, together with the constraints on upward mobility produced by the 
colonial system combined to ensure that the indigenous Algerian petty 
bourgeoisie adopted a genuinely anti-colonial position. However, its 
social and economic heterogeneity was reflected in open factionalism 
and eventually in struggles for the leadership of the newly independent 
state. Each faction tried to win the support of wider sections of an 
already radicalized and politically involved population. These factors 
played a significant role in strengthening the process of social and 
economic transformation in Algerian society, or at least the potential 
for such transformation. In fact, in the eyes of some sympathetic 
observers, Algeria appeared at one stage to be an 'African Cuba'. 
However, this impression seems to have been based on a superficial 
evaluation of the socio-economic development of Algerian society rather 
than on any deep understanding of the social nature and political 
character of the strata in control of the state apparatus. Not only 
did the later history of the country prove that Algeria was developing 
along capitalist lines, but this development was deeply rooted in the 
way in which French colonialism had affected the social structure and 
the nature of the anti-colonial struggle. In other words Algeria's 
failure to achieve many of its declared objectives lay in the inherent 
limitations and inabilities of the social groups which ruled the 
country. 
· Ill the immeqiate aftermath Of independence, the populcation was 
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still predominantly rural. The principal economic transformation 
brought about by the French had been the creation of agrarian 
capitalism, as the agricultural sector constituted the backbone of the 
economy. Moreover, although led by forces based in the cities, the 
struggle for independence was carried out essentially by the rural 
population. While it lacked a coherent and defined programme during the 
armed struggle, one of the FLN's most publicised objectives apart from 
the achievement of independence itself was an extensive agrarian reform 
to enable the rural population to regain its lost land. These factors 
combined to make the agricultural sector of preeminent importance in 
the economy and society of independent Algeria. 
Therefore, a study of state capitalism in Algeria and the impact 
and nature of the socio-political forces involved must be primarily 
concerned with the agricultural sector. State agrarian policies vis a 
vis the agricultural sector and their relevance to the latter's 
division into self-management and private sectors are essential for an 
understanding of Algeria's development within the framework of state 
capitalism. These policies reveal the nature of the ruling social 
strata and their incapacity to bring about 'socialism'; they also 
enable us to understand the character and limitations of state 
capitalism in general. 
The aim of this study is to analyse the origin, character, and 
impact of state capitalism as a socio-economic phenomenon which 
developed out of the specificities of post-colonial society. Algeria 
provides an example of this phenomenon and its development. Hence, in 
the context of Algerian state capitalism, considerable emphasis will be 
placed on the impact and nature of the social and political forces in 
control of t'he independent state :apparatus, by examj_ni.ng. .the conditions 
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under which they emerged and which shaped their political conscious-
ness. The importance and specificities of the Algerian agricultural 
sector and its rural population will be examined at various stages of 
this study, and the events surrounding the achievement of independence 
and their influence on contemporary political forces will also be 
analysed. The thesis is based primarily on the official publications of 
the Algerian government since independence, and a variety of secondary 
source materials in Arabic, English and French. Two visits to Algeria 
were made for a few weeks in 1984, but bureaucratic obstruction at a 
number of levels made it impossible to carry out the programme of field 
research which had been envisaged. 
Chapter Two, which follows this introduction, will present a 
general theoretical framework of the state structure in post-colonial 
societies and the nature of state capitalism in these societies. It 
emphasizes the impact of the state structure and its autonomy upon 
those who staff this vital apparatus and thus the influence that the 
ruling socio-economic strata is able to exert on social and economic 
development in general. It looks at state capitalism as a specific 
socio-economic phenomenon which finds its roots in the nature of the 
social forces from which the state bureaucracy emerged in the course of 
the anti-colonial struggle. The main characteristics and tendencies of 
state capitalism and its relation to the economy in general and to the 
private sector in particular will be demonstrated. It shows that state 
capitalism is likely to produce new contradictions that necessitate 
major rearrangements in the role of the state in the economy and 
society. Finally, there is a brief discussion of the nature of 
capitalist penetration in agriculture and the likely effect of state 
~italism upon th~ agricu~tural &~ctor. 
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Chapters Three and Four provide the background of the impact of 
colonialism on the Algerian socio-economic structure and the develop-
ment of the national movement. After a brief discussion of the major 
characteristics of pre-colonial Algeria, Chapter Three concentrates on 
the changes that the colonial system had made in Algerian society. 
Colonialism's main characteristics, development, and trends in being a 
settler one together with the consequences upon the agrcultural sector 
and the rural population will be discussed in this chapter. Chapter 
Four gives a description of the political developments in Algeria 
leading up to independence in 1962. It traces the emergence of the 
National Movement from early 20th century until independence. It also 
discusses its major political and ideological divisions and parties 
together with the effect of the colonial political order upon its 
operation and later its radicalization. The factional conflict that 
erupted within the FLN immediately before and after independence is 
described. 
The rise of the 'petty bourgeoisie' in Algerian society 
and the impact of colonialism upon its structure, composition, and 
political consciousness, together with the origins of its anti-
colonial stand and the extent and limitations of that stand, are 
discussed in Chapter Five. Its factional divisions and struggle after 
independence is linked to its social and economic heterogeneity. The 
effects of this struggle on the functions of the FLN as the single 
Party of independent Algeria and on the ascendence of the Army and the 
Bureaucracy are discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter Six deals with the social and class struggle which erupted 
immediately after independence and centered around the properties left 
vacant -by- the colons.-·The- -petty bourgeoi-s state•s--a-t.tit-u-de t-owards the 
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workers' self-management movement and the constitution of the latter 
are also discussed. The political change of 1965 is seen as a direct 
outcome of the need to have the state superstructure corresponding to 
the concrete social development. 
Chapter Seven contains a brief description of the Algerian economy 
at the end of the colonial period. It also discusses the major economic 
trends and policies undertaken during the regimes of Ben Bella and 
Boumedienne. 
Chapters Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven and Twelve provide an analysis 
of the agricultural sector and the agrarian policies of the state 
towards it. Chapter Eight traces the major characteristics of Algerian 
agriculture and its inherited division into modern and traditional 
sectors and the contrasts which result from this at many levels. It 
also depicts the state's attitude towards the self-management movement 
in the agricultural sector and the latter's gradual erosion in favour 
of state control. 
Chapter Nine situates the agricultural sector within the general 
framework of Algeria's development strategy. The main aims of this 
strategy and the role assigned to agriculture within it are discussed. 
It examines the general situation of agriculture before 1971 in the 
light of the function that it was expected to play in the development 
of the country, and shows that agrarian reform had to be undertaken 
in order to achieve the aims of the strategy. Chapter Ten examines the 
implementation of the agrarian reform, which the government of the day 
described as an 'Agrarian Revolution'. It shows how far the reform was 
used by the state to enhance its political legitimacy while at the same 
time those landlords most likely to be affected were often able to 
evade the nationalization or limitation of their properties in a 
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variety of ways. The bodies charged with the implementation of the 
reform and the concrete results are also described. 
Chapter Eleven tries to evaluate the general impact of the 
agrarian reform on the agricultural sector. Through a discussion of 
the main changes it brought to the structure of rural employment, the 
politics of the implementation of the reform, and the establishment of 
the cooperative system in the private sector, a general picture is 
drawn of the impact of the reform upon the agricultural sector in 
general. The nature of the ruling strata and the capitalist incorpora-
tion of the agricultural sector are also discussed. Finally, Chapter 
Twelve analyses the principal agricultural policies implemented after 
the agrarian reform in the fields of investment, credits, marketing, 
and pricing. The resulting difficulties produced by these policies 
which crystallised later in the policy of liberalization and the encou-
ragement of the private sector are also described. 
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OIAPTER 1W> STATE, STATE CAPITALISM, AND AGRICULTURE 
A TIIEORET I CAL FR.AME\\ORK 
One of the keys to an understanding of the socio-economic develop-
ment of the post-colonial societies lies in the analysis of the state, 
its specificities and characteristics, and its impact on social classes 
and the economy. The social classes and strata that play an active role 
in dominating the state apparatus,their class connections and interests 
are also very important here. However, to tackle this problem it is 
useful to examine classical Marxist theory on the state and to see what 
it offers in the context of Third World societies. 
Classical ~rxist Theory of the State 
It is often stated by authors who have traced the development of 
the concept of the state in Marx's writings (l) that Marx never attem-
pted to develop a single, coherent, and comprehensive theory of the 
state. Hence his ideological legacy in this respect is usually derived 
from an uneven and unsystematic collection of excerpts from his philo-
sophical analysis of particular historical and political conjunctures, 
such as the 1848 Revolution in France and Louis Napoleon's dictatorship 
or the Paris Commune of 1871. However, it is beyond doubt that Marx 
alone deserves the credit for clearing away much of the mystification 
that has always surrounded the concept of the state. 
For Marx, the material conditions of a society are the basis and 
determinant of its social structure and of human consciousness. The 
state, as part of the superstructure, is a product of the development 
of these material conditions. It is not a creation of the human m~d or 
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of the collective will of men. Nor does it stand above society and 
express the collective interests of the individuals within it. Rather, 
it is created, determined, and conditioned by the material conditions 
of society. This view finds its expression in the famous statement in 
the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: 
"Legal relations as well as forms of the state are to be 
grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called 
general development of the human mind, but rather have their 
roots in the material conditions of life, the sum total of 
which Hegel. .••. combines under the name "civil society", 
that, however, the autonomy of civil society is to be sought 
in political economy •••.. The general result at which I 
arrived and which, once won, served as a guiding thread for 
my studies, can be briefly formulated as follows: In the 
social production of their life, men enter into definite 
relations that are indispensable and independent of their 
will, relations of production which correspond to a definite 
stage of development of their material productive forces. The 
sum total of these relations of production constitutes the 
economic structure of the society, the real foundation, on 
which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which 
correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode 
of production of material life conditions the social, politi-
cal, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the 
contrary, their social being that determines their conscious-
ness" (2). 
Marx connected the emergence of the state, as the product of a 
certain mode of production, with the division of society into conflict-
ing classes, a division inherent in the emergence of private property. 
The state is , therefore, a product and expression of class struggle, 
in that it is a tool in the hands of the economically dominant class 
for the subjugation of the dominated classes. It does not represent the 
general will of society but is instead an active participant in the 
class struggle, serving the interests of the dominant class. The 
Marxist view of the state is summed up in Engels' often quoted state-
ment: 
"The state is therefore by no means a power imposed o.n so~.i~- . 
-.. ty. fr.om without; ..••• ~.A:•- Rather it -is a proouct -of society at 
a particular stage of development~ it is the admission . .that-. 
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this society has involved itself in insoluble self-contradic-
tion and is cleft into irreconcilable antagonism, classes 
with conflicting economic interests, shall not consume them-
selves and society in fruitless struggle, a power, apparently 
standing above society, has become necessary to moderate the 
conflict and keep it within the bounds of "order"; and this 
power, arising out of society but placing itself above it and 
increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state" (3). 
Engels also goes on to add that: 
"As the state arose from the need to keep class antagonisms 
in check, but also arose in the thick of the fight between 
the classes, it is normally the state of the most powerful, 
economically dominant class, which by this means becomes also 
the politically dominant class and so acquires new means of 
holding down and exploiting the oppressed class" (4). 
Regarding capitalist society, on which his work concentrates, Marx 
showed that since it is a class society dominated by the bourgeoisie, 
the state is the political expression of this domination and is thus 
simply a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie to assure its domination 
over the working class. Hence the state "is nothing more than the form 
of organization which the bourgeoisie necessarily adopt both for inter-
nal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property 
and interets" (5). In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels stated 
that: "The Executive of the modern state is but a committee for mana-
ging the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (6), and that "poli-
tical power •.••. is merely the organized power of one class for oppres-
sing another" (7). 
This is what Miliband calls the primary Marxist view of the state, 
as "there is to be found another view of the state in his (Marx') work, 
which is none the less of great interest ...•. This secondary view is 
that the state as independent from and superior to all social classes, 
as being the dominant force in society rather than the instrument of a 
dominant class" (8). But before discussing this case, Miliband drew 
attention to the fa~t that Marx noted that _in certain circumstances 
ll 
"thoe who actually run the state may well belong to a class which is 
not the economically dominant class" (9). This is a very important 
point for it is quite relevant to the situation of many post-colonial 
societies. 
It is often the case that conflicting classes in a society become 
too weak or too strong to permit one of them to assume state power on 
its own and to direct it towards achieving its own interests. In such 
circumstances the state plays an independent role and ceases to be the 
instrument of a single class. Marx demonstrated this kind of state in 
his analysis of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's empire (1852-1870) (10). In 
such instances bourgeois rulers amd laws themselves can develop into a 
threat to the bourgeoisie's own interests and power, and thus render it 
impossible to continue to preserve the bourgeois social order. In this 
respect Marx wrote that the bourgeoisie "confesses that its own 
interests dictate that it should be delivered from the danger of its 
own rule; that in order to restore tranquility in the country, its 
bourgeois parliament must, first of all, be given its quietus, that in 
order to preserve its social power intact, its political power must be 
broken" (11). Marx also demonstrated that no matter how independent the 
state becomes and how representative it claims to be, its function 
remains, at the last resort, the preservation of a social order based 
on private property. Thus in 1848 in France, the Bonapartist state carne 
into being for the purpose of maintaining and strengthening the exist-
ing social order and the domination of capital over labour. 
Finally, although his main interest was the study of European 
capitalism, Marx devoted some of his work to analysing the social 
system of the "Asiatic Mode of Proouction" which, he considered, had 
one outstanding characteristic, the absence of private landed property. 
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In this mode of production, he wrote, "there is no property, but 
individual possession: the community is properly speaking the real 
proprietor". In this system, he wrote, the direct producers are not 
"confronted by a private landowner but rather, as in Asia, (are) under 
direct subordination to a state which stands over them as their land-
lord and simultaneously as sovereign .... the state .•.. is then the 
supreme lord" (12). The state has to perform this role largely because 
of a variety of physical circumstances including the climatic and 
territorial factors which require it power to organize public works, 
particularly in hydraulic societies, in a centralized manner. This 
analysis is useful in understanding an important feature of the state 
in post-colonial societies; the major economic role that it has always 
performed in society, which it has inherited from the colonial or pre-
colonial period. 
The State in Post-Colonial Societies 
1-State Centrality 
Since the state is the product of the specific underlying material 
conditions of a particular mode of production and is affected and 
conditioned by these material conditions, there is bound to be a great 
difference in the role and nature of the state in post-colonial socie-
ties from that in the European capitalist countries on which classical 
Marxist theory is based. This is because of the historical specificity 
which characterizes all post-colonial societies, a "specificity which 
arises from structural changes brought by the colonial experience and 
alignment of classes and by the superstructure of political and admini-
strative institutions which were established in that context~ .and 
secondly from radical re-alignments of class forces which have been 
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brought about in the post-colonial situation" (13). This has produced a 
form of social and economic development and, concomitantly, a relation-
ship between state and socio- economic structure that is not paralleled 
in, and is in many ways more complex than, that of the classical bour-
geois societies of Europe. 
Here we are faced with a mode of production which contains a 
multiplicity of forms of production, each with its specific socio-
economic structure and its specific laws for the creation and appro-
priation of economic surplus. The result of this is that "the class 
structures of the Third World differ from those of the advanced coun-
tries in two principal ways: they are more complex, and the classes 
themselves are usually weaker" (14). Thus unlike class formation in the 
advanced capitalist countries, where, at least in abstract terms, 
society contains two fundamental classes (the bourgoisie and the prole-
tariat), the picture is quite different in post-colonial societies. 
Varying from country to country in accordance with the differences in 
their pre-capitalist social formations, their different encounters with 
colonialism, and the extent of their subsumption by peripheral 
capitalism, post-colonial societies are generally characterized by a 
plurality of social classes belonging to different and conflicting 
social formations, a reflection both of colonial penetration and the 
survival of pre-capitalist formations. As far as the indigenous society 
is concerned, none of these classes can be easily singled out as the 
dominant class. 
Hence class antagonisms and interests are not coterminous with 
modes of production, with two fundamentally conflicting classes, 
exploiters and the .exploited. Instead a plurality of forms of produc-
tion and, in. turn, of classes, exists, none of which iS su·tfici'ently 
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powerful to dominate society and to impose its mode of production. This 
is reflected by the role of the state in these societies, a role which 
underlies the structural differences between advanced capitalist and 
post-colonial societies, in which the state plays a more important role 
than being simply the instrument or "manager" of "the common affairs" 
of a single class. Here it acts as an institution capable not only of 
creating economic surplus but also of coordinating between the various 
scattered and independent forms of production and of concentrating and 
directing the surplus in such a way as to enable one form of production 
to become dominant (15). Thus the state possesses much more power vis a 
vis the underlying social structure than envisaged in classical Marxist 
theory , which enables it to intervene more directly and more visibly 
in the organization of economic, social, cultural, and political 
processes. 
One of the outstanding contributions to the study of the role and 
nature of the post-colonial state is that of Hamza Alavi. In his analy-
sis of Pakistan and Bangladesh, he emphasizes the particularly signifi-
cant relationship of the state to social structure. He attributes this 
to two main factors; the first is what he calls the "overdevelopment" 
of the state in comparison to the socio-economic structure. This is 
summarized as follows: 
"The bourgeois revolution in the colony, insofar as that 
consists of the establishment of a bourgeois state and the 
attendant legal and institutional framework, is an event 
which takes place with the imposition of colonial rule by the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie. In carrying out the tasks of the 
bourgeois revolution in the colony, however, the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie has to accomplish an additional task which was 
specific to the colonial situation. Its task in the colony is 
not merely to replicate the superstructure of the state which 
it had established in the metropolitan country itself. 
Additionally it-has to create a state apparatus through which 
it can exercise ~minion over all the indigenous social 
_:classes.in the colony. It might be said that the · 
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•superstructure' in the colony is therefore 'overdeveloped' 
in relation to the 'structure' in the colony, for its basis 
lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from which it is 
later separated at the time of independence. The colonial 
state is therefore equipped with a powerful buraucratic-
military apparatus and mechanisms of government which enable 
it through its routine operations to subordinate the native 
social classes. The post-colonial society inherits that 
overdeveloped apparatus of state and its institutionalized 
practices through which the operations of the indigenous 
social classes are regulated and controlled" (16). 
In this thesis the state apparatus in post-colonial societies 
comes essentially from outside, having been imposed by the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie on a relatively undifferentiated social structure with weak 
indigenous classes. This superimposition involves a process of 
replicating the superstructure of the state as it exists in the 
metropolis in order to subsume the indigenous social classes, and it is 
thus overdeveloped in relation to the social structure of the native 
society. Thus the state is a reflection of the domination of the 
metropolis rather than the product of the internal class situation. The 
second major aspect of te significance of the state apparatus in post-
colonial society is that it "directly appropriates a very large part of 
the economic surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically-directed 
economic activity in the name of promoting economic development" (17). 
For Alavi these two points explain the centrality and the importa-
nee of the state in post-colonial societies. Saul, on the other hand, 
while accepting the significance of the post-colonial state within the 
structure of post-colonial society and its relevance in the context of 
East Africa, considers another factor particularly significant. He 
argues that the state in post-colonial society has a very crucial 
ideological function to perform: 
"the state's function of· providing an ideological cement for 
the capitalist sys-tem· is· -ene-·Vffii~tta&:~lcved, s~owl<y.,anc ... 
s~rely in the imperial centr€s, in step with the latter's 
economic transformation. In post-colonial societies, on the 
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other hand, and particularly in Africa, this hegemonic posi-
tion must be created, and created within territorial bounda-
ries which often appear as quite artificial entities once the 
powerful force of direct colonial fiat has been removed. 
Peripheral capitalism, like advanced capitalism, requires 
territoral unity and legitimacy, and the post-colonial 
state's centrality to the process of creating these condi-
tions (like its centrality in 'promoting economic develop-
ment') further reinforces Alavi's point about the state's 
importance" (18). 
Moreover, Saul observes that in the East African context the colonial 
state "became 'overdeveloped' not so much in response to a need to 
•subordinate the native social classes' as a need to subordinate pre-
capitalist, generally non-feudal, social formations to the imperative 
of colonial capitalism" (19). 
Alavi's and Saul's essays have aroused a great deal of discussion 
on the subject of the state in post-colonial societies. Much of this 
has centred around the significance of the idea of the relative autono-
my of the state and its implications and impact for those who staff it 
and upon society as a whole. However, some objections have been raised 
to their hypotheses of the inherited 'overdeveloped' state apparatus 
and its subsequent implications. Colin Leys, for example, finds the 
overdeveloped state a contradictory, and even inaccurate explanation, 
for if the phenomenon is based on the need to subordinate pre-capita-
list social formations "why should this call for a particularly strong 
state if there were no strong classes to defend their interests in the 
old social formation?" (20). He considers that Alavi's approach to the 
question of post-colonial society is misleading; 
"it is reallY that this whole way of approaching the question of 
the significance of the state i.e. starting from its structure or 
scope, whether inherited from an earlier situation or not, is a 
mistake. In order to understand the significance of any state for 
tbQ.,class.-struggle -we must-start out-from the class struggle, not 
~:rom .. tll.~: .state" . { 21-) . - . -. =--:-=--=--=---- ---
.. Leys .wen.t..even. -furt-her-to question th-e plausibility Of the centrality 
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of the post-colonial state by pointing the "relatively low share of 
national income taken by government revenue and expenditure in underde-
veloped countries" in comparison with the developed ones. 
While admitting the centrality of the state and its significance 
in peripheral societies, Ziemann and Lanzendorfer echo similar critici-
sims of Alavi and Saul. They argue that such an approach "can lead 
neither to a materialist-based account of the position of the state in 
peripheral societies, nor of possible socialist development initiated 
by the state apparatus, nor even of the role played by those who staff 
the state apparatus" (23). They emphasize the importance of analysing 
the social and economic structure of society itself, its dynamic, and 
its position vis a vis international capitalism in order to come to a 
satisfactory explanation of the role of the state apparatus. Otherwise, 
"if the 'overdeveloped' state is inherited, how to explain the compara-
ble state formations in societies which have been independent for over 
150 years (e.g. Latin America) or never colonised (e.g. Ethiopia, 
Turkey, Afghanistan)?" (24). 
For Ziemann and Lanzendorfer the state undoubtedly occupies a 
central position in peripheral society. This position should be under-
stood in terms of factors relating to the society's social and economic 
structures. "The possibility and necessity of economic activity by the 
peripheral state are (more likely to be) structurally rooted in the 
historical disruption of the economic structure of peripheral society, 
i.e. the partially in deficit, and relatively stagnant expanded repro-
duction" (25). This fact brings about some specificities and contradic-
tions in peripheral societies and states. The state becomes the engine 
that..DJL the one hand introduces capitalist development by breaking up 
pr~capit.ali$t formations Q.nd, on the a.ther, secures structural hetero-
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geneity as a specific condition both for the world market and for 
national reproduction (26). To fulfil these functions the state becomes 
an instrument of economic and political reproduction at the same time. 
Furthermore, the ideological function of the state "derives far more 
from the fact that capitalist commodity relations have not been 
generalised - on the one hand there is the semblance of formal freedom 
and equality for all commodity owners which derives from the mystifica-
tion inherent in capitalist production, on the other, the social 
integration by means of commodity and financial ramifications is 
incomplete" (27). 
Goulbourne also admits the centrality of the state in post-
colonial societies, stating that "it is not enough to assume that this 
centrality is part of the general behaviour of the state .••• there are 
certain factors prevalent in the economic and social context which are 
forcing these states towards greater and greater 'centrality' within 
their specific functions" (28). He cites, for example monopolism and 
the increasing internationalization of capital as one factor in "for-
cing contemporary capitalist states of all kinds to intervene directly 
in social and economic arrangements". Another factor is the nature of 
social classes in post-colonial societies, and their weakness, which 
tends to accentuate and reinforce the central role of the state. Also 
"the contradictions that emerge between national and foreign capital, 
tend to pull the state more into the economic field, thus enhancing the 
already existing economic power possessed by these states" (29). 
Finally, Frank also asserts the centrality of the state in the 
peripheral countries, arguing that the weakness of social classes in 
general and tile local bourgeoisie in particUlar often P_llShe& the latter 
inte an_ increasingly pro:found incorporation. and-' 'dependence on the world 
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capitalist system. Therefore the state becomes the mechanism whereby 
the bourgeoisie makes the resources of the periphery available to 
international capital; hence it must intervene relatively often to 
repress resistance to, and facilitate, this exploitation. "The periphe-
ral state becomes much more crucial to the whole development (underde-
velopment) project in the periphery than the metropolitan state is to 
development in the metropolis" (30). 
However, Frank also talks about the "weak character of the Third 
World state (as) dependent financially, technologically, institutional-
ly, ideologically, militarily, in a word, politically, on the interna-
tional bourgeoisie(s) and its metropolitan states" (31). For Frank, the 
state in the periphery is conditioned by a process of underdevelopment 
that is set in motion and controlled by the meteropolitan bourgeoisies 
and the power of the metropolitan states that these bourgeoisies com-
mand. It is they who define the international division of labour and 
hence the development possibilities on the periphery. If there is any 
centrality attached to the role played by the state in the periphery it 
is because of the position that the periphery occupies in the world 
capitalist system, and because of the incorporation implied in this 
position. The state is only weak as far as its relation to its master 
is concerned; this weakness does not rule out its central role in the 
periphery's own socio-economic structure and the considerable impact 
that it can bring to bear on future development. 
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2-State Autonomy 
However the problem of the state in post-colonial societies is 
analysed, the fact remains that in such societies, in the light of the 
superimposition of the state apparatus on social formations with weak 
indigenous social classes, especially the bourgeois class (32), the 
state has considerable freedom to direct and condition social develop-
ment by intervening directly in the appropriation and distribution of 
the economic surplus. Thus it can exhibit a great deal of centrality, 
for it is the most organized economic and political force or institu-
tion able to control and regulate social and economic development and 
the process of social differentiation. Especially in countries where it 
is very strong economically, the state becomes a major force both in 
the formation of new classes and strata and enhancing established ones 
through its overall control of income distribution. 
This brings us to Alavi's second point, that against a background 
of relatively weak social classes "the state in post-colonial society 
is not the instrument of a single class. It is autonomous and it 
mediates between the competing interests of the three propertied clas-
ses, namely the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie, 
and the landed classes, while at the same time acting on behalf of them 
all to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, 
namely the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as 
the dominant mode of production" (33). 
Taking the first part of this statement, and given the state's 
centrality in relation to the social classes, it is quite plausible 
that it shoui:d assume a role in which it does not act according to the 
interests of a particular ctass, si:nce -its role -±s in inverse propor-
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tion to the capacity of the social classes. All social classes will 
strive for maximum representation under a variety of forms in the state 
apparatus, since without it their social promotion and interests cannot 
easily be attained. In such circumstances the greater representation of 
a particular class will lead to the state becoming the focus of the 
class struggle (34). 
However, regarding Alavi's second point, that the state is a 
mediator between the propertied classes and acts on behalf of them, it 
seems that this particular feature is mainly relevant to specific 
countries and that it cannot be generalized to all post-colonial 
societies. In fact the economic laws of colonial capitalism are the 
same everywhere, but the consequences for society differ in accordance 
with the socio-economic and historical conditions in which the laws 
operate (35). The relationship between the state and the social classes 
depends more on the specificity of the particular society's pre 
colonial social formation, the extent of the transformations brought 
about by colonial penetration, the way in which independence was 
achieved, and the extent of the decolonization process. 
Therefore in countries like Pakistan or Bangladesh where relative-
ly established social classes already existed, and where independence 
did not involve a radical restructuring of the relationship with the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed 
classes could join forces with the metropolitan bourgeoisie to bring 
about a situation of class balance in which no single class could 
dominate either the state apparatus or society as a whole. Each class 
was powerful enough to prevent the other from dominating the state 
apparatus and at the same time not strong enough to control the state 
by- -i:t'Se-lf. -The indigenous -bourq~oisie has .been,able. ,to develop in 
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situations where it has managed to establish the necessary relationship 
with the state bureaucracy, but it is still not strong enough to 
eliminate the domination of a large part of the economy by the metro-
politan bourgeoisie, whose economic and political presence and activi-
ties did not come to an end at independence. At the same time the large 
landowners still held sway over the countryside and were represented 
within the political parties and the army. Class interests dictated 
that these classes found more ground for alliance than for conflict as, 
especially after independence, they found themselves interconnected at 
many levels. In these circumstances the state and the people who staff 
it emerged as the arbiter between the classes. They enjoyed a large 
degree of autonomy from the social classes, an autonomy which sometimes 
enabled the "bureaucratic-military oligarchs" to dispense with the 
politicians and political parties if their activities went beyond 
providing a "mantle of legitimacy", absorbing public discontent and 
channelling grievances, and came to constitute a real danger for the 
stability of the social system. 
There are other societies, especially in Africa and the Middle 
East, on which our analysis will now concentrate, where the colonial 
experience inhibited the creation of distinct social classes or where 
independence disrupted the existing social structure and resulted in 
the total or partial elimination of the established bourgeoisie 
(Algeria is a case in point). Here the imbalance between the state and 
the social classes is more apparent (36). 
In these circumstances the state is directly confronted with the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie while it exerts relatively great power over 
the. indigenous social 'formation. This powerstr_engthens_..tiie- position of 
t-hose directly in c9ntrol of tne state apparatUS:. and....enables ±hem to 
23 
become the direct determinants of the development and direction of 
society. On them and their social composition, their class origins, 
their class affiliation and interests, their ideology and political 
orientation, their relations with the social classes (especially the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie), will depend the direction, method, and speed 
of future capitalist penetration. Their cardinal importance derives not 
only from the inherited centrality of the state, but also from the fact 
that the post-colonial state and its superstructure are in a continuing 
process of formation, in the sense that the newly forming relations of 
production have not yet reached a level where they could constitute a 
major obstacle to the specific direction of the development of produc-
tive forces. In such circumstances, "the radical transformation of the 
traditional relations of production does not start from the 'bottom' 
i.e. by the forces of production, in as much as from the 'top' i.e. by 
the impact of the superstructure" (37). This means that the state 
acquires an additional role in the future development of society, which 
in its turn will make those who control the state apparatus the effec-
tive determinants of which mode of production is to be established in 
this or that country and which economic laws are to become dominant. 
Without denying the importance of this aspect of the state's role, 
and by extension of the influence of those who staff it, its autonomous 
nature should not be exaggerated. To do so would make it seem as if the 
state was somehow above the social formation and possessed some sort of 
omnipotence over the social classes. Implicit in this belief is that 
the state is able to enhance, or even create the dominant class, which 
in its turn is subordinate to it. Hence the way in which society is 
moving is .regarded.;_simply as .one option among others;. for. -its supper-
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leaders, while critics represent it as a premeditated plot or 
'conspiracy' to direct society towards a particular goal (38). In fact 
the opposite is the case, since the extent of the state's autonomy and 
its freedom of manoeuvre are functions of the existing social order. 
Again this should not be regarded as diminishing the importance of 
those who staff the state apparatus, since their background together 
with the existing social structure has very important implications for 
the future direction of the process of social reproduction. 
It is therefore essential to examine the socio-political nature of 
the social forces in control of the state administration in order to 
assess their impact upon the future development of society. One manife-
station of the complex nature of the socio-economic structure of under-
developed societies and its transitional character is the relatively 
large socio- political weight exerted by the intermediate strata. In 
most cases they were the major power behind the anti-colonial struggle 
and became established within the ranks of the 'new' bureaucracy which 
emerged after independence. 
Our analysis will be restricted to situations where the struggle 
against colonial control was spearheaded by the petty bourgeoisie, and 
where the state bureaucracy has emerged from within this stratum. It 
will exclude societies in which the leadership after independence was 
taken by the 'national' or comprador bourgeoisie in such a way that 
economic and social development has become controlled and supervised by 
international capital. It also excludes societies in which political 
power was taken by revolutionary forces which immediately opted for the 
scientific socialist theory of the working class. 
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The Petty Bourgeoisie 
The term petty bourgeoisie is used by Marx and Engels to describe 
small-scale producers and owners: 
"In countries where modern civilization has become fully 
developed, a new class of petty bourgeoisie has been formed, 
fluctuating between the proletariat and bourgeoisie and ever 
renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society. 
The individual members of this class, however, are being 
constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of 
competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see 
the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as 
an independent section of modern society, to be replaced, in 
manufactures, agriculture and commerce, by overlookers, 
bailiffs and shopmen" (39) 
In this sense the petty bourgeoisie includes that form of small 
business in which the same person is both a worker and the owner of the 
means of production, generally without employing paid workers or doing 
so only occasionally, and where surplus is derived directly from the 
work of himself and his family. It also includes small traders operat-
ing in a similar way (40). This form of production is analysed by Marx 
as a transitional stage from which fully fledged industrial capitalism 
would eventually emerge. It follows from this that the petty commodity 
producers or the petty bourgeoisie are also transitional and fated to 
disappear. This process accelerates as a result of competition and is 
exemplified by the promotion of a part of the petty bourgeoisie into 
the ranks of the bourgeoisie and the gradual sinking of large numbers 
of the same stratum into the ranks of the proletariat (41). 
Basing his argument on the notion that "relations of production 
alone are not sufficient, in Marxist theory, to determine the place a 
social class occupies in a mode of production and to locate it within a 
..:.social formation", Poulantzas emphasizes the vital importance of 
ideological and political -relations in determining social class: "In a 
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given social formation, a class which is capable of constituting itself 
as a social force can only be located when its place in the relations 
of production produces 'pertinent effects' at the political and 
ideological level" (42). Following this, Poulantzas also includes 
certain groups which have quite different places in the economy from 
the category mentioned above, as part of the petty bourgeoisie. Unlike 
the small-scale producers and owners these groups are not fated to 
disappear. He calls them the 'new' petty bourgeoisie and defines them 
as non-productive salaried employees. As well as those employed in the 
circulation of capital (salaried employees in commerce, banking, 
insurance, sales, advertising etc.), they include civil servants work-
ing in the various branches of the administration. These groups only 
share with the small-scale producers and owners the 'negative' 
characteristic "that they belong neither to the bourgeoisie nor to the 
proletariat,; (43). But on the ideological level both groups share very 
similar objectives, embodied in their "status quo anti-capitalism"; an 
anti-monopoly outlook that wishes to reform the system without changing 
it, "the myth of the ladder"; belief that they can join the bourgeoisie 
through the rise of the 'best' and 'most able' individuals, and "power 
fetishism"; the belief in a 'neutral' state which is above classes. 
These are the main ideological aspirations shared by both groups 
of the petty bourgeoisie, which derive from the economic situation and 
the exploitation of each group by the bourgeoisie; in production as far 
as the small-scale producers and owners are concerned, and in matters 
affecting their legal situation as far as non-productive employees are 
concerned. The situation of the petty bourgeoisie here and its 
___i_deological and political object_i ves emerge-· frotn, th~··ex-istenee of two 
__ pel-arized and es.tablished classes; the bourgeoisie and' tlle "}:>roletariat. 
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The colonial experience not only created new economic conditions 
but also new social structures and new forms of social and class diffe-
rentiation in the colonized societies. One of the most important 
aspects of colonial penetration was the destruction of the foundations 
of the indigenous social formation, and the subsequent articulation of 
the economy of the colony with the capitalist mode of production in the 
metropolis. The result was the creation of a new type of social and 
economic formation which, although linked directly and indirectly to 
the capitalist mode of production in the metropolis, differed signifi-
cantly from the one existing in capitalist Europe (44), since it was 
based almost entirely on agricultural and mineral exports, and often 
involved the destruction of traditional agricultural and artisanal 
activities. This implied large scale rural to urban migration; the 
migrants were uprooted from their previous rural and agricultural 
occupations and were obliged either to gain their livelihood in the 
marginal services sector created by the colonial economy or to remain 
unemployed. Thus a large lumpenproletariat emerged in the course of the 
establishment of the colonial economy. 
However, the construction of this economy implied the creation of 
various economic and services activities that could absorb larger 
numbers of the native population. Such activities were expanded far 
beyond the industrial sector which absorbed only an insignificant part 
of the labour force. Various socio-economic groups came into existence 
including small traders, the owners of small workshops, white collar 
workers, and civil servants, all of whom were connected in one way or 
another with the colonial economy or with the creation and expansion of 
_t;he CO-lonial stat-e. 
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colonial and post-colonial societies. In contradistinction to its 
composition and structure in advanced capitalist societies where it 
constitutes a transitional class absorbed gradually by the fundamental 
classes, the petty bourgeoisie in post-colonial societies is not 
located in the centre between the two polarized classes. It constitutes 
a relatively large socio-political force and is second in size only to 
the peasantry. In particular it dominates in the urban centres, and 
greatly influences the course of the development of the whole society. 
secondly, it is heterogeneous not only in terms of its division into 
'traditional' and •new' petty bourgeoisie, but also in the sense that 
both categories consist of many different strata and groups, experienc-
ing varying degrees of exploitation and fears of proletarianization and 
different political and ideological outlooks. 
Some groups within the petty bourgeoisie owe their existence to 
the small-scale artisanal and commercial activities which existed in 
the urban centres and their surrounding areas well before colonial 
penetration. This applies to small-scale production units based on 
family ownership, producing the goods for the subsistence requirements 
of the community. Colonialism had varying effects on these units, 
generally destroying those linked to the subsistence economy and 
encouraging those linked to the colonial economic and services sector. 
Many small-scale individual petty producers now working in the cities 
and towns of underdeveloped countries originally acquired their skills 
in capitalist wage employment. Their enterprises are usually very 
small, to the extent that many of them are in reality 'self-employed 
workers' (45). With little or no prospect of upward mobility for most 
cc=·= Df-'--t-hemr-' they are' in a state Of constant --Insecuri-ty, in that their 
_li.velihood-depetuis ~t:irely-:orr tne occasional and temporary opportuni-
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ties provided by the colonial or post-colonial sector and they are 
constantly threatened with being squeezed out by the expansion of 
capitalist production. Hence this section of the petty bourgeoisie is 
economically very weak and fragmented and it has not established deep 
economic roots. Although colonial domination has encouraged the crea-
tion of some parts of this stratum, it has also destroyed its most 
effective elements and slowed down its reproduction (46). 
The above attempt at an analysis of the various economic groups 
constituting the 'petty bourgeoisie' highlights the difficulties 
inherent in the use of concepts and terms for developing societies 
which were originally developed for the analysis of the advanced 
capitalist societies of Europe. The incorporation of these non-European 
societies into the capitalist world market after colonisation triggered 
off a process of rapid social differentiation which affected all 
sections of society and which is still continuing. However, in contrast 
with the situation in developed capitalist societies, where two antago-
nistic classes emerged - the bourgeoisie and the proletariat - the 
process of social differentiation in developing societies was blocked 
for a variety of reasons, and the 'bourgeoisie' and 'proletariat' never 
developed into fully fledged classes. In addition these societies were 
characterised by a high degree of social fluidity as a result of the 
uprooting of a significant proportion of the rural population which 
migrated into the urban centres and engaged in the various activities 
described above. Hence an important feature of these societies is the 
numerical dominance of the 'middle strata', which include very diverse 
social groups, to which we refer - for the lack of any more precise 
--- term- ·as •petty bourgesoisie'. Similarly, the terms 'bourgeoisie' and 
_.• pr"Oletariat' are used in the specific sense o£ their. manifes.tations· in 
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colonial and post-colonial society. 
We saw that colonial penetration resulted in the creation of a 
large state apparatus with substantial coercive and administrative 
powers to facilitate externally-generated capitalist development. This 
is what has been referred to as the 'overdeveloped' state "in the sense 
that the excessive enlargement of the powers of control and regulation 
which the state has accommodated and elaborated extend far beyond the 
logic of what may be necessary for the orderly functioning of the 
social institutions of the society over which the state presides" (47). 
The expanded state provides permanent employment for a significant 
number of those privileged enough to possess the education required to 
occupy government (civil and military) salaried jobs. By virtue of 
their education they are the most politically influential within the 
petty bourgeoisie and within society as a whole (48). Concentrated in 
large urban centres, relatively better organized than other groups, 
with developed lines of communication, they provide the political 
cadres necessary to mobilize the rest of society in the struggle for 
independence. However, their very education distances them from the 
rest of society and renders them a special group within the petty 
bourgeoisie whose "conception of the world is largely shaped by the 
administrative milieux in which they are located" (49). To a far 
greater extent than any other group in peripheral capitalist societies, 
they are subject to influences and ideas emanating from the metropoli-
tan countries. Members of this group represent the upper strata of the 
petty bourgeoisie whose link with the lower groups derives from their 
belonging neither to the bourgeoisie nor to the proletariat, and their 
.fundamentally anti-colonial attitude whi~h ~?ables them to spearhead 
Ule 'anlt:;i,...co:lonia:i ~tr.ugq-le .---However, --sinc:e -the· S·tat:e- i-s--the -largest- aoo 
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best paying employer the thrust of their political demands is often 
directed towards acquiring positions of power in the state apparatus 
(50). Even when some members of the salaried upper strata find their 
interests and position secure within the framework of the colonial 
order, and became supportive of this order, independence does not 
necessarily mean that they can be dispensed with, since their services 
are vital for the smooth running of the new political order. 
We can see, therefore, that the petty bourgeoisie is heterogeneous 
and that the political weight of its leadership lies substantially 
within its most organized group, the military and civilian employees of 
the state, with their literate, administrative and managerial capaci-
ties which can control or organize the popular anti-colonial struggle 
and will dominate political power during and after independence. The 
state bureaucracy emerges from within this group as the avant garde of 
popular aspirations in so far as political independence is concerned, 
although independence itself often does not result in any radical 
alteration of the domination of metropolitan capital over the native 
economy and society. It is at this point that the complexity of the new 
state bureaucracy emerges in the context of the new relationship 
between metropolitan capital and the indigenous social classes. 
- -
. -- 4-·-- --------- .. ·- ... ______ .. _ ------------ --------~------- -----
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The State Bureaucracy 
Like the state itself, the nature, composition, and impact of the 
state bureaucracy varies from one society to another in accordance with 
the extent and form of colonization, the way in which it came to an 
end, and the balance of social forces on the morrow of independence. 
The centrality of the state apparatus and the expanding role that it 
comes to play in economy and society means that it is natural that 
those who staff the state apparatus acquire major responsibility for 
the determination of the future development of society. This becomes 
particularly apparent and is felt much more strongly in situations 
where colonial penetration did not result in the creation of a defined 
and established bourgeois class or where independence has undermined 
that class. 
This centrality of the state bureaucracy and its relative autonomy 
within society and its key role for future capitalist penetration has 
led to two different theoretical views of its nature and of the 
implications which this may have for both state and society. First, 
there are those who see the state bureaucracy as a group emanating from 
the petty bourgeoisie in a situation in which there is no significant 
indigenous grande bourgeoisie, a small proletariat, and a proportiona-
tely large and influential petty bourgeoisie. As well as representing 
all strata of the petty bourgeoisie the bureaucracy is also supposed to 
represent the aspirations of the poor masses. It is exposed to a 
variety of contradictory influences, national and international, which 
are reflected in internal struggles within its ranks, whose outcome 
cannot be predicted in advance (51}. 
This view takes as its poi~t of departure the belief that post-
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colonial social formations are generally characterized by having 
•unformed' classes, especially with regard to the strata which control 
the state after independence. Accordingly the class character of the 
post-colonial state is not only undetermined but there is even the 
possibility that the petty bourgeois leadership may use state power as 
the means to make the transition to Marxist-proletarian socialism. This 
phenomenon is referred to as 'revolutionary democracy'. 
"In the course of the futher development of national libera-
tion revolution, under the influence of the theory and 
practice of world socialism, many petty-bourgeois theories 
and policies in developing countries are undergoing signifi-
cant changes. Revolutionary democracy emerged in consequence. 
Revolutionary democrats not only express the interests of 
small proprietors, but take into account the aspirations of 
the workers. the working peasants, and the ervolutionary 
intellectuals and officers in their countries". (52) (Emphasis 
in original). 
In this view different historical alternatives are possible even 
including socialist transformation, depending on the balance of forces 
and on the victory of the 'revolutionary• wing of the petty bourgeoi-
sie, which will identify itself with the interests of the working 
class. "Many revolutionary democrats choose the socialist orientation 
because they have come to accept the principles of scientific socia-
lism" (53). In other words, the newly independent 'Third World' country 
dominated by a petty bourgeois leadership is supposed to have a 'choice 
of paths of socio-economic development' towards either capitalism or 
socialism. The choice of path seems to be mainly influenced by the 
tastes and preferences of the particular persons in power (54). Accord-
ing to this theory an alliance may develop between the petty bourgeois 
leadership and the revolutionary forces, and a policy of persuasion and 
criticism then becomes necessary in order to push towards the process 
of socialist transformatien. 
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This view, which was widely popular in the socialist countries and 
particularly among Soviet scholars, was associated with what became 
known as the theory of the •non-capitalist road of development'. It 
envisaged the possibility of socialist development in the course of a 
process in which the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist attitudes of 
the petty bourgeoisie would be radicalized and become anti-capitalist 
through the enhancement of the role of (the representatives of) the 
most disinherited sections of this stratum. The 'progressive• measures 
and policies pursued by independent states such as nationalisation, the 
expansion of the state economic sector, and the struggle with foreign 
capital were seen as evidence of shifts in the balance of power in the 
direction of the more radical elements of the petty bourgeoisie (55). 
The second view, associated mainly with the dependency theory, 
sees the state bureaucracy as a stratum or even as a class that finds 
its interests and cohesion through the control of the 'central' state 
apparatus, whose interests "in the longer run coincide with the 
interests of imperialism as a whole" (56). 
"A vehicle of the dependent local state capitalism, the petty 
bourgeoisie becomes the transmission belt of imperialist 
domination, thus taking the place of the latifundiary compra-
dor bourgeoisie that was the vehicle of the dependent private 
capitalism of the previous period" (57). 
The control of the most effective machinery in society, i.e. the state, 
will give the bureaucracy (already distanced from the rest of society 
by virtue of its education and administrative capacities) the impetus 
to establish a place for itself in the existing relations of production 
and to act as a distinct class. 
Members of the state bureaucracy are drawn essentially from the 
upper levels of the petty bourgeoisie, from groups of intellectuals, 
teachers, higher civil servants, prosperous traders, and military and 
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police officers who are of overwhelmingly urban origin. However, given 
the weakness of the indigenous classes and the continuing presence of 
foreign capital which independence was unable to expel, the post-
colonial bureaucracy falls much more directly under the thumb of the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie, which has by now become internationalised. 
Its role does not go beyond being a governing class, while the interna-
tional bourgeoisie retains its position as the ruling class. Describing 
the state bureaucracy in Mali, Meillassoux characterized it as a "body 
generated by the colonizers to carry out the tasks which could not (or 
would not) be undertaken by the Europeans" (58). He also stated that: 
"Given the economic dependence of the country, the bureaucra-
cy is itself a dependent group, and its origin as an instru-
ment of Western interests continues to influence its develop-
ment. Instead of striving towards real independence, after 
winning the right to assert themselves as political interme-
diaries with the outside world, the bureaucrats are content 
to return (with a higher international rank) under the rule 
of the old master" (59). 
Moreover, the various measures undertaken by the state bureaucracy 
(nationalization, socialist villages, etc.) are seen as "methods adop-
ted by the governing class to extend its control ••• whatever the anti-
capitalist nature of the ideology, and the well-meaning activities of 
individual socialist intellectuals, this process has only served to 
strengthen the domination of the ruling class - the international 
bourgeoisie" (60). These measures are also seen as steps which the 
bureaucracy had to take "to infiltrate the national economy through the 
creation of a nationalized economic sector .••• under the label of 
'socialism'" (61). Hence such measures, particularly nationalization, 
did not alter the continuing domination of the international bourgeoi-
sie over the national economy since they only affect its 'peripheral' 
interests which can be allowed to be compromised whereas its 'vital 
interests' have remained untouched. In this context Shivji pointed out 
36 
that "the international bourgeoisie, due to its age-old sentiments with 
respect to private property, may make vocal protests against the 
measures initially, but eventually they come to be reconciled and in 
fact objectively may benefit even more" (62). Indeed, it is often the 
case that the interests of the international bourgeoisie are made more 
secure after the nationalization and takeover of the commanding heights 
of the economy by the state, since it is often the case that this 
bourgeoisie "needs activist states on the periphery, states that are 
strong to suppress, by whatever means, growing social contradictions 
and states that can make foreign investment profitable and profit 
secure despite various unfavourable circumstances within the national 
and world economy" (63). 
Turning back to the first view of the state bureaucracy, it is not 
only that the recent historical experience of almost all countries once 
considered either to be •socialist' or to be undergoing 'socialist 
transformation• has proved that it was unrealistic, but that it was 
also based on false theoretical assumptions. It has become clear by now 
that countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Somalia, etc. which 
claimed to be following an independent, non-capitalist, non-Marxist, 
yet socialist path to self-reliant development have lost their original 
orientation (64). In several countries the regimes have became profoun-
dly reactionary or have succumbed to military coups d'etat while 
elswhere immobilization and slow but definite capitalist and dependent 
development have become the dominant features. 
More fundamentally, it is simply wrong to assume that the state 
bureaucracy represents the whole petty bourgeoisie, let alone the 
peasants and the working clas's ~ Even though it may include some indi vi-
-duals whose class affiliation or <>rigin derives--f.Fom---low.er .strata·, tl\:is 
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is not of decisive importance, since their origins and ties do not need 
to be identical with those of the dominant class. The function of the 
state as the cohesive force for the social formation and the engine of 
reproduction of the conditions of production is not entirely determined 
by the class origin or affiliation of the bureaucracy, but is objec-
tively determined by the interests of the dominant class. In the 
context of capitalist society, Poulantzas stated that: 
"Although the members of the state apparatus belong, by their class 
origin, to different classes, they function according to a specific 
internal unity. Their class origin - class situation- recedes into 
the bachground in relation to that which unifies them - their class 
position: that is to say, the fact that they belong precisely to 
the state apparatus and that they have as their objective function 
the actualisation of the role of the state. This in its turn means 
that the bureaucracy, as a specific and relatively 'unified' social 
category, is the 'servant' of the ruling class, not by reason of 
its class origins, which are divergent, or by reason of its perso-
nal relations with the ruling class, but by reasons of the fact 
that its internal unity derives from its actualisation of the 
objective role of the state" (65). 
However, it can be argued that the function of the bureaucracy in 
post-colonial society is different from that in developed capitalist 
countries, and that given the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the bureau-
cracy, the class origin of the individuals who staff it and their 
impact on the functioning of the state cannot be entirely ignored. In 
general, these origins tend to work in favour of the privileged classes 
rather than the working class or the peasantry, or even the lower 
strata of the petty bourgeoisie. Members of the bureaucracy drawn from 
these latter strata, who were always a minority, only owe allegiance to 
their class in terms of their origin rather than of their affiliation, 
since their current position in the bureaucracy implies that they are 
no longer workers or peasants. Secondly, in the absence of a revolu-
tionary ideology and in generally hostile circumstances, they may well 
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be less representative of the classes from which they were recruited 
than in more favourable conditions. In the former circumstances they 
function almost as a labour aristocracy. 
Therefore, if class origins and affiliations cannot be dismissed, 
which is often the case under circumstances where the state has exten-
sive autonomy, it seems that they will favour the privileged classes in 
particular, since immediately after independence the higher echelons of 
the bureaucracy and the military are in fact generally recruited from 
landowning or rich families or the bourgeoisie, because they alone have 
the required level of education. "It is not surprising .... that despite 
commitment, in some cases at the highest levels, to programmes such as 
land reform, these have failed to be implemented effectively, for the 
class that is affected is directly represented within the state appara-
tus by virtue of the class origin of its officials, and is able thereby 
to undermine the implementation of measures directed against itself" 
( 66). 
Secondly, there is no logical progression from anti- colonialism 
and anti-imperialism to anti-capitalism and socialist construction. 
Anti-capitalism is based on completely different material conditions 
and requires different forces. It is clear that at a certain stage the 
national bourgeoisie in a colonial or post-colonial society has 
interests which conflict with those of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. It 
is also the case that petty bourgeois antagonism towards the colonial 
order and international capital often far exceeds that expressed by the 
national bourgeoisie and can often take a more radical form. However, 
even this hostility only operates on the level of opposition to direct 
foreign rule and of foreign policies in support of. other national 
liberation .mov~ments, and it is ;Often the.case t.hat eolonialism,and 
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imperialism are simply identified with the former colonial power. This 
indicates that "There is no consistent appreciation of the collective 
imperialism led by the US, as a global system of capitalism functioning 
in a most sophisticated way through structural links with under-
developed countries reinforced by international institutions" (67). 
Again, the petty bourgeoisie's control over the economy may 
include the nationalization not only of foreign capital but also of the 
property of the indigenous bourgeoisie, which may experience some 
limitations on its activities and suffer expropriation in the produc-
tion, trade, and service sectors. Thus the petty bourgeoisie is often 
engaged in direct political and economic confrontation with the inter-
national bourgeoisie and its local allies in the bourgeois and land-
owning classes. This is normally accompanied by violently nationalist 
and anti- imperialist rhetoric and, in many instances, by attempts to 
mobilize the workers and peasants. 
Such confrontations also reflect the imperative necessity of 
subduing those private interests, both foreign and local, Which have 
failed to introduce sustained and all round development, and also 
indicate that a great deal of this mobilization and rhetoric, however 
extreme, is not mere hypocrisy, but reflects a genuine desire to combat 
the international bourgeoisie and its internal allies. Nevertheless, 
this confrontation does not take place in order to abolish private 
property, but rather because it is essential to transfer some of this 
property to the control of the state, whose primary function is to 
secure the domination of the capitalist mode of production, irrespec-
tive of the extent of nationalization or the expansion of the public 
sector. Moreover, as we will see, these nationalizations are usually 
con£ined to partiCular produCtive sectors of the national economy and 
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do not include all productive activities, of which a significant part 
remains in private hands. Although the extent of nationalization varies 
from country to country, it generally stops when a certain balance of 
the distribution of activities between the state and the private sector 
has been achieved (68). 
Furthermore, the apparent hostility of the petty bourgeois-
controlled bureaucracy towards the international bourgeoisie encompas-
ses a variety of economic and political dimensions which have nothing 
to do with socialism. Most important of all, the transfer of ownership 
to the state is carried out without any drastic reconstruction of the 
social relations of production. State ownership does not transform the 
conditions of exploitation of labour in any fundamental way, but is 
generally restricted to bringing about a shift in the source of exploi-
tation and perhaps a change in the disposal of the surplus, in that a 
greater percentage is now reinvested locally rather than exported to 
the metropolis (69). Furthermore, relations with the international 
bourgeoisie are not terminated by the nationalization measures, as 
economic links are not cut off. Various forms of dependency develop 
between the state and international capital through deals and contracts 
in exports and imports and the supply of technology, and it is general-
ly only a matter of time before a complete reintegration with foreign 
capital takes place. In fact there are growing economic pressures for 
such reintegration, often parallel to increases in the power of the 
bureaucracy. 
This does not mean that pressure from the masses on the bureaucra-
cy is fruitless, but such pressure by itself is only likely to slow 
down the pace of 'new' capitalist development, since this is based more 
__an objective factors_.tnan _on iha willingness or_ wishes. of. the bureauc-
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racy. Hence the 'resumption' of capitalist relations is not the result 
of ignorance and apathy or even mistakes on the part of the political 
leaders of the petty bourgeoisie but has its origins in the very foun-
dation of the social and economic structure of society. 
However, one should be careful not to jump to the conclusion that 
such state bureaucracies are simply a tool in the hands of the interna-
tional bourgeoisie and that all the measures and policies pursued by 
the state bureaucracy are •mere manipulation' ultimately designed to 
conceal its intention to act as a direct servant of the international 
bourgeoisie. Of course there are cases where independence was achieved 
as a result of combinations of factors which include external ones and 
not merely as a result of internal class struggle, involving the 
succession to political power by a state bureaucracy whose relationship 
with the international bourgeoisie was only slightly restructured. but 
there are also cases in which independence was achieved through prolon-
ged mass struggle, spearheaded by the petty bourgeoisie. A radical 
change in the relationship with metropolitan capital then took place 
and a serious confrontation followed, resulting in a true polarization 
of interests between the petty bourgeoisie and international capital 
which cannot be dismissed simply as manipulation. 
Again, it cannot be denied that there is a great deal of hypocri-
sy, fraud, and contradiction inherent in the policies of the bureaucra-
cy at all levels, but it does act according to interests which are 
dictated above all by the material conditions of society. There are 
times, especially in the early period of its accession to political 
power, when its own interests have generally coincided with those of 
the masses, and will thus be antagonistic to those of the international 
bourgeoisie. This is largely because colonial·penetrati<m·has·often· 
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resulted in the emergence of classes and strata whose interests are 
contradictory to colonial rule and even to international capital. Only 
by recognizing this can one really understand the nature of the direct 
military and economic confrontations which have taken place between 
international capital and regimes led by the petty bourgeoisie (70). 
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State Capitalism as a Form of State Intervention 
In the previous discussion we concluded that state apparatus is the 
best organized and most effective institution to determine the course 
and direction of social and economic development in post-colonial 
societies. The state's direct and indirect intervention in almost every 
aspect of social and economic life is not governed by psychological 
considerations emanating simply from the wishes of those who staff the 
state apparatus in such societies to satisfy nationalist feelings as 
some writers try to assert (71), but rather by the objective conditions 
emerging from the concrete circumstances of social and economic under-
development and the need to bring about the profound transformations 
that cannot be achieved without such intervention (72). 
This is revealed not only by the expanding role that the state 
plays in underdeveloped societies, but also by the gradual disapperance 
from conventional development literature of the notion that state 
intervention in the economy restricts development potential and runs 
counter to the interests of private capital. Thus there is a widespread 
realization of the need for state planning and intervention even if 
capitalist development is the declared aim. 
However, state intervention varies in nature and degree from coun-
try to country and from one situation to another in the same country, 
depending on the nature of the state structures and on the strategies 
and aims adopted. In general, state capitalism, is a form of direct and 
indirect state intervention in the economy, aiming at modifiying some 
of the spontaneous effects of economic mechanisms and designed to 
arrive at particular goals according to the nature of the social system 
in which a particular state functions. Although state capitalism means 
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intensive state intervention, it should not be confused with other 
forms of intervention in underdeveloped societies, where the state acts 
as a 'handmaid' to private capital and its activities are confined to 
spheres where private capital is unable or hesitates to invest, either 
because of poor prospects of profit or because profits only come after 
a very long gestation period. 
This kind of state intervention, while varying from one country to 
another, reflects certain solid situations where the impact of colonia-
lism on the indigenous socio-economic structure is combined with the 
impact of changes brought about by an independence movement led by the 
native bourgeoisie, which aims primarily at achieving development along 
capitalist lines. Whether or not this form of capitalist development 
can achieve what the bourgeois class in the advanced capitalist socie-
ties has already achieved is outside the scope of our analysis. The 
main feature of this pattern of development is that private capital, 
local and foreign, continues to hold the largest share in national 
production and depends on the state to provide the means whereby it can 
expand its activities and introduce capitalist relations of production, 
especially in the agricultural sector. Relations with foreign capital 
are modified only slightly to allow local capital to have a larger 
share in production through newly erected protective tariffs on the 
goods that can be produced by this capital, mainly light consumer 
goods. Therefore, the colonial pattern of capital investment has 
basically remained unaltered, and the main change is that complementary 
investment, which used to be undertaken by the private sector, is now 
the responsibility of the public sector. 
In oont.rast, .state -capitalism r-epr.esents=_a completely::dl:Tier-ent ' 
path of .. devalopmenL,.invoLving different- ·social classes leading .the ___ _ 
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process of transformation and implies specific mechanisms. One of the 
important features of regimes following this path of development is the 
dominant role played by the state in the economy, not in support of the 
private sector but as a real competitor and, sometimes, a substitute 
for this sector. Here, the state's own sector is expanding increasing-
ly, especially in industry, foreign trade, banking, and insurance, at 
the expense of the private sector which sees a decline in its own share 
of national production. This is often achieved by the nationalization 
of foreign and national companies and by new state investment in 
various projects. The expansion of the state sector is accompanied by 
the restructuring of property rights and changes in the forms of produ-
ction in agriculture. The latter is usually achieved through land 
reforms which break feudal and semi-feudal estates into small indivi-
dually owned properties and establish forms of cooperation and collec-
tivization. It is also accompanied by an increase in trade and other 
links with the socialist countries. 
These policies, and particularly the extent and scale of the 
nationalizations, encouraged some adherents of the theory of the •non-
capitalist road of development', which we have examined in the previous 
section, to believe that such regimes were actually establishing the 
necessary conditions for the achievement of socialism. Thus advocates 
of this theory carne to refer to states which adopted one form or 
another of such development as 'states with socialist orientation' 
(73). 
The theory of the •non-capitalist road of development' is essen-
tially based on defining the class character of the state in state 
capitalist.soci:e±..ies-as~ neither bourge:ois nor· proletarian-. State power 
has. nCt. de.fiJli.t.a~,clas~Lc.Mrac~erc but is: s-ai-d: to ·be,i.:n-- a state -9f .:1Jr.c1.nsi-
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tion towards socialism; "it is no longer a bourgeois-type state, but 
not yet a socialist-type state" (74). This kind of class character, 
according to the theory, is a reflection of the impact of colonialism 
whose major feature is the absence of a strong national bourgeoisie 
capable of imposing its own rule over society. Furthermore, even if 
such a class existed, it would be anti-imperialist, since foreign 
capital has blocked any opportunities for it to assume a large role in 
the economy and has rendered it hostile to foreign economic and politi-
cal domination. This also implies the absence of a large and well 
organized working class capable of having an effective impact on socie-
ty in general and the state in particular. Therefore the class charac-
ter that the theory gives to these states is described as follows: 
"A specificity of non-capitalist development in the anti-
imperialist nation states in Asia and Africa is to be 
seen in the fact that under conditions in which the 
national bourgeoisie proves to be incapable of releasing 
a general democratic programme on the road of social 
progress, and in which the working class is not yet in a 
position to directly take over the leadership of the 
revolution, representatives of petty bourgeoisie interma-
diary strata, in particular revolutionary-democratic 
forces from within the intelligentsia, take over hegemony 
in the liberation movement and stand in for anti-imperia-
list and anti-capitalist transformations which can lead 
towrds socialism if revolutionary aim is respected and 
deepened" (75). 
Relying heavily in their assessment of the class nature of the 
states of •non-capitalist' regimes on the claims made by those regimes' 
leaders and on their declared constitutions and programmes, advocates 
of this theory consider that development towards socialism can only be 
achieved "by ousting bourgeois and bourgeoisified elements from power 
and consolidating the position of the forces supporting socialism"(76). 
In fact they see such development as involving only a gradual severing 
of relationships between these regimes and the imperialist power, 
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without consideration of the existence of classes in the 'socialist 
oriented societies' and, thus, without recognizing class relations as 
the dynamic factor conditioning socio-economic development. In other 
words the only existing contradiction is that between these societies 
as a whole and foreign capital. In this way the nationalizations under-
taken by the regimes in these societies are seen "as a process whereby 
state enterprises 'are finally returned to the rightful owner-the 
people of the developing countries', ignoring the Marxist precept that 
the state is a class-based phenomenon in all countries" (77). In 
Algeria or Iraq or Ethiopia (countries often considered as primary 
examples of the non-capitalist road), it is evident that there are 
distinct classes, one of which is in control of the state and the other 
of which does the producing, whose needs and interests are not identi-
cal (78). 
Finally, in analysing the conditions and structures of state 
capitalism it will become clear that this form of transformation will 
lead to the creation and reproduction of capitalist relations of produ-
ction; what were regareded as 'anti-imperialist' and 'progressive' 
measures were simply necessary conditions for particular socio-economic 
forces to establish a place for themselves in the capitalist mode of 
production. 
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Conditions for the for~tion of State capitalism 
As a form of transformation characterizing some post-colonial 
societies, state capitalism has its foundations in objective internal 
and external conditions. Weak peripheral economies with weak national 
bourgeoisies and disorganized popular forces outweighed by intermediary 
strata, together with a new set of international determinants have 
facilitated the emergence of these regimes. 
As far as the last factor is concerned, the rise of state capita-
lism occurred in a situation of rapidly changing international rela-
tions, which provided opportunities for anti-imperialist and national 
movements to gain ground. While independence meant that the post-
colonial society left the orbit of domination of a single metropolitan 
country, this took place at a time of increasing inter-imperialist 
rivalry and of a general decline in imperialist domination over the 
underdeveloped countries. 
The emergence of the socialist bloc as an effective challenger to 
the dominance of the capitalist world significantly reduced the possi-
bility that a single imperialist power (especially the USA) could stand 
as a stumbling block in the face of popular Third World governments, 
and expanded the latter's room for manoeuvre in such a way as to make 
the emergence of state capitalist regimes possible and tolerable (79). 
Partly for this reason the anti-imperialist position taken by the state 
capitalist regimes amounted essentially to expressions of opposition to 
the US or the rejection of the domination of the former colonial power 
without implying that any drastic changes would be made in their rela-
tions with the capitali-st -world -as -a----wfl&l~h---· 
State capitaJ.j_sm also_.emer.ged in. response_..t_o the utter failure of 
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externally induced development carried out under the supervision of the 
ex-colonial power or international capitalist financial agencies which 
stressed the leading role to be played by private capital. The lack of 
domestic capital and the fierce competition carried on in international 
and even national markets by foreign capital blocked all possibilities 
of sustained and independent development. The outcome was a tremendous 
aggravation of social inequalities and mass deprivation, the persisten-
ce and exacerbation of sectoral imbalances, increased mass unemployment 
and underemployment, and a tightening of the grip of dependency rela-
tionships with the capitalist world. Foreign investment, which was 
thought of as the panacea for social and economic problems, produced, 
where it took place, generally undesirable consequences aggravating 
already existing miseries by redirecting the exploitation of national 
resources for the benefit of the advanced capitalist countries and 
their local allies by enhancing export-oriented agricultural and raw 
material production without any significant reduction of mass unemploy-
ment (80). 
State capitalism, therefore, was seen partly as a step that had to 
be taken to complete formal independence, which it, was soon discover-
ed, was incomplete if not accompanied by freedom of choice in economic 
decision making. Thus it was not only a response to direct colonial 
rule but also to the problems produced first by colonialism and then by 
the activities of private foreign and local capital during the early 
period of independence. Economic independence came to be viewed as part 
and parcel of sovereignty and as indispensable for the achievement of 
sustained development. 
conditions of. the socio;_economic struct-ure of-c post--colonial societies·, 
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and not in the leaders' desire for economic independence. These condi-
tions are largely determined by the very low level of development of 
productive forces, and thus very low social differentiation, which gave 
the state a larger role in the transformation process (81). This situa-
tion is primarily reflected in the weak position of the •national' 
bourgeoisie, which, in underdeveloped countries, is not the product of 
the natural process of capitalist development. It is structurally 
different from the vigorous European middle class that was able to 
transform itself into a fully-fledged bourgeois class and also to 
galvanize society as a whole into a dynamic organism with developing 
and expanding forces of production. This difference naturally affects 
the future formation and development of the national bourgeoisie and 
the nature of the production relations connected with its rule (82). To 
draw a simple comparison between the European middle class and the 
'national' bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped countries we recall the 
following statement by Paul Baran: 
"While in advanced countries, such as France or G.Britain 
the economically ascending middle class developed at an 
early stage a new rational world outlook, which they 
proudly opposed to the medieval obscurantism of the feu-
dal age, the poor, fledgling bourgeoisie of underdeve-
loped countries sought nothing but accommodation to the 
prevailing order. Living in societies based on privilege, 
they strove for a share in the existing sinecures: they 
made political and economic deals with their domestic 
overlords or with powerful foreign investors, and what 
industry and commerce developed, in backward areas in the 
course of the last hundred years was rapidly molded in 
the strait-jacket of monopoly- the plutocratic partner of 
the aristocratic rulers. What resulted was an economic 
and political amalgam combining the worst features of 
both worlds- feudalism and capitalism- and blocking effe-
ctively all possibilities of economic growth" (83). 
The •national' bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped countries grew 
out of the 1i~-uet:imr"'8lld~ (tiSi:nte-grat..:ton inflicted up.cin the ris±ng 
,.indigenous bQurgeoisi~ -by coloniai-:Jle]1etrati'On (84). J:t ·i-s" in fact· the 
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product of an 'abnormal' capitalist development geared to satisfy the 
needs of the metropolis, a development of restricted and disorganized 
capitalism within the framework of colonial control and dependency. The 
history of the formation of this class is in itself the history of the 
formation of colonial relations, a structural relationship of dependen-
cy between two different social structures, between a capitalist social 
structure which has long completed its development and entered into its 
imperialist phase and a social structure that has not yet completed its 
development (85). 
Colonialism has in fact not released the development of the capi-
talist forces of production. And if it did transform parts of these 
forces for the benefit of capitalism in the metropolis, it has done so 
in a distorted and fragmented manner. One of the main implications of 
this distortion is that the 'national' bourgeoisie of the under-
developed countries is characterized by its structural weakness, which 
emanates from its unequal relationship with the bourgeoisie of the 
metropolitan countries. This weakness is reflected in its inability to 
bring a new social system into being, unlike the bourgeoisie of Europe. 
The latter showed itself able to destroy the old structure and to build 
a completely new one on its ruins, while the former was created and 
superimposed by 'abnormal' capitalist development through colonial 
penetration, primarily to facilitate the domination of the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie over the colonized society. 
Despite having introduced capitalist relations into the colony, 
colonial penetration did not destroy all pre-capitalist forms of produ-
ction; rather, through the particular social transformation which it 
brought about, it preserved some of these forms and thus generallY' 
hindered fully fledg~d ~pitalist qevelopment. Jt ~s for_this r~ason_~ 
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that the native bourgeoisie is often a tiny and marginalized one, 
dependent on the metropolitan bourgeoisie and on the activities created 
by the colonial sector. It consists mainly of large landowners whose 
products are oriented towards the satisfaction of metropolitan needs in 
exchange for consumer goods, large compradors, and industrialists 
producing only light consumer goods (86). 
However, its relationship with the metropolitan bourgeoisie, 
despite its dependency, is not one of identity of interests, and in 
fact, fields of confrontation exist at many levels. The anti-colonial 
position of the industrial bourgeoisie stems essentially from its 
efforts to expand its activities by reconstructing its relations with 
foreign capital. However, it does not follow that it is willing, let 
alone able, to put an end to the relations of dependency with the 
foreign and metropolitan bourgeoisie, for two main reasons. 
First, the industrial bourgeoisie did not develop out of an arti-
san class, but was always tied to the landed classes. Industry first 
emerged as an ancillary sector to agriculture - flour mills, meat 
packing plants etc - and remained an integral part of dependent develo-
pment (87). Thus it is very difficult to draw a demarcation line 
between the 'industrialist' fraction of the bourgeoisie and other 
fractions represented by the large landowners, compradors, and bankers. 
There is considerable interaction between the various fractions of the 
bourgeoisie where an individual can be a landowner, industrialist, and 
a merchant at the same time (88). In fact this is not an expression of 
the outstanding vigour of the national bourgeoisie as much as of its 
structural incapacity. Second, even if such a line can be drawn, and 
-this seems t:a be tile case- after: inil.ependence, -the expansion 'ef-' foreign 
.cap.i.taL to inc~ude_ the remotest societies and the cllanges._.brDuqht._ about 
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by the new international division of labour (including the export of 
capital to underdeveloped societies) has significantly incorporated the 
indigenous bourgeoisie and its industrialist fraction into the world 
capitalist system. 
Thus it continues, especially after independence, to develop in 
close alliance with foreign capital through a wide range of economic 
activities from the supply of technology and know how to trade, loans, 
joint ventures, patents, and licensing agreements (89). Hence, as Frank 
has shown, the national bourgeoisie, after assuming political power in 
a battle with its internal enemies, which in many cases was supported 
directly and indirectly by the metropolis, "voluntarily and enthusias-
tically adopts the free trade policy, which elsewhere the metropolitan 
powers often imposed by force" (90). The national bourgeoisie's 
inability to achieve independent capitalist development meant that it 
was equally incapable of transforming society along capitalist lines. 
Similarily, in periods of crisis during which there was popular 
pressure for a substantial reallocation of resources, the national 
bourgeoisie was likely to be superseded by other elements from outside 
this class. 
The weakness and structural incapacity of the national bourgeoisie 
also makes for a weak working class. The reason for this is the small 
size of industrial establishments and the structure of such industries, 
which are usually capital intensive and only employ a very small seg-
ment of the labour force. Again, since capitalist development in the 
colonial context was not governed by the logic of capitalist expansion 
as in Europe but by capitalist restraint of the forces of production, 
those who have been displaced-~rom ·their previous .pr~~capital~st-". 
-oe,eupctti:Ons: are:-not: absorbe'd· ,by inausttt'y. and.: transf'ornteiL...iJito ·a prole-
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tariat. In addition, the severe repression directed against any form of 
mass organization during the colonial and post-colonial periods effec-
tively denied the labour movement any significant socio-political role, 
which meant that it was severely limited and confined to popular 
outbursts which lacked the kind of leadership needed to provide an 
alternative social and economic system. 
There remain the large masses of the petty bourgeoisie created by 
the incomplete process of capitalist development. Although heterogen-
eous, consisting of socially and economically different groups, these 
strata include the relatively better organized sections of the popula-
tion that can, at a certain stage of development, provide a form of 
political leadership capable of capitalising on the weakness both of 
the national bourgeoisie and the working class to mobilize the masses 
and overthrow the old regime. These factors played the decisive role in 
facilitating the emergence of state capitalism as an alternative system 
of transforming post-colonial society. 
State Capitalism as 'Petty Bourgeois Rule' 
State capitalism is a phase in the transition of pre-capitalist 
societies to a higher stage of development. It is a reflection of the 
incapacity of the indigenous bourgeoisie to transform society along 
capitalist lines, and also of the inability of the working class to 
challenge the bourgeoisie successfully and to impose itself as an 
independent social and economic force able to provide an alternative 
socialist transformation. It is therefore an 'abnormal' phase resulting 
from the structural de.ficiencies which characterize underdeveloped 
societies, and represents a phase of developmentdUrin9'Wh'ich tbe petty 
,bourqeoisie assumes the role --,Of rulHi.<;f-~he society~ Thus state capn.a-
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lism arises mainly from the peculiar nature of the petty bourgeoisie 
and its relations with other classes and with the state. 
We have seen that the petty bourgeoisie can only be defined in 
negative terms, in that it belongs neither to the bourgeoisie nor to 
the proletariat. However, it differs from its counterpart in the 
advanced capitalist countries by being very heterogeneous, having a 
great deal of differentiation within its ranks and by its large size in 
relation to other classes. It includes a wide variety of social and 
economic groups and strata, each with its own political and ideological 
outlook. Like the indigenous bourgeoisie, it is a product of a develop-
ment instigated and shaped by colonial penetration and is one of the 
consequences of the destruction of pre-colonial forms of production and 
of the superimposition of the colonial state. 
While the most important characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie 
in advanced capitalist societies is that it is a transitional class, 
historically fated to disappear, holding fluctuating ideological and 
political attitudes, siding with the bourgeoisie at one time and with 
the proletariat at another, and at no time able to assume the role of 
ruling class, the petty bourgeoisie in underdeveloped societies is 
structurallY and functionally different. It is a product of an 'abnor-
mal' underdeveloped capitalism that blocks its social and economic 
mobility and constantly threatens it with impoverishment and destruc-
tion. However, the relations introduced by the colonial economy consti-
tute the objective basis of the existence of the petty bourgeoisie and 
its continuity. 
In other words, while contradictions exist between the petty 
bourgeoisie and the metropolitan bourgeoisie's direct control over the 
--~ "soe±ety--,,·- the--underdeveloped capitalist relations and the £r.ameworlL of 
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structural dependency on the advanced capitalist system set up by 
colonialism represent the material bases for the petty bourgeoisie. 
cutting off this relationship entirely would run counter to the 
interests of the local petty bourgeoisie, a factor which limits the 
scope and extent of the contradiction and confrontation between itself 
and metropolitan capital. Even in its most extreme form the confronta-
tion will result in a reshaping and redirection of the dependency 
relationships rather than in a total rupture, since the nature of the 
rupture is not governed by the degree of the contradiction and confron-
tation but rather by the class structure, interests, and struggle that 
characterize a particular underdeveloped society. This means that the 
structural rupture with imperialism derives from a comprehensive 
process of radical change in society, which emanates from the mode and 
relations of production. Without such a change dependence on the capi-
talist system remains intact, no matter !low far reaching the degree of 
contradiction or confrontation with a particular imperial power (91). 
Therefore, because of its objectively limited aims in the fight 
against colonialism, "the most it (the petty bourgeoisie) could do was 
to liquidate those specific features which tied the economy and the 
institutions to a particular metropolitan country (mother country) and 
instead multilateralize the imperialist domination thereby becoming 
authentically part of the world capitalist system" (92). 
Unlike the petty bourgeoisie of the advanced capitalist countries, 
the petty bourgeoisie in underdeveloped societies is confronted with 
the task of anti-colonial struggle. While this struggle is not necessa-
rily directed against the existing mode and relations of production but 
:a-gainst- ·the .mode of domination ·exerte(l"by- th~ metropolis*:...-it' is -nften 
·- _..:.the. ease i'-'f.or.".the .rea-sons .men~ioned' at>ov.e,: ;t;bat_~ .t.he_:_p.et.t~~~.eoisie 
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came to spearhead this struggle and hence coordinated its own interests 
with those of the underprivileged masses as far as the struggle to put 
an end to colonial rule was concerned. Thus the petty bourgeoisie in 
these societies has often assumed the historic task of leading society 
and subsequently taken on the role of ruler, a task which its counter-
parts in the advanced capitalist societies could never perform. To 
borrow Amilcar Cabral's words; "in the capitalist countries the petty 
bourgeoisie is only a stratum which serves, it does not determine the 
historical orientation of the country; it merely allies itself with one 
group or another. In underdeveloped countries on the other hand, the 
colonial struggle endows the petty bourgeoisie with a function of 
ruling" ( 93) • 
What are the characteristics of such rule? Is it likely to bring 
about a mode of production different from that introduced by colonia-
lism? To answer these questions we have to tackle two problems; the 
first concerns the specificities attached to the political •representa-
tives• of the petty bourgeoisie who constitute the bulk of the civil 
and military officials controlling the state apparatus, while the 
second relates to the nature of the petty bourgeoisie as a whole and 
the place it occupies in the social production. Regarding the first 
point, one of the major differences between the petty bourgeoisie and 
the bourgeoisie or the proletariat lies in the specificity of its 
•representatives•. Unlike the other two classes,the petty bourgeoisie's 
•representatives' emerge less according to their embodiment of the 
interests of the masses of the petty bourgeoisie than according to 
their economic and social differentiation and alienation from the rest 
Of· itS· strata.· 'Edttcat±on· and--urban "OOCUpat·i-efi.S, ·botl\ created by .colo.,-
.nial..is-Jl4··enabl..e-~ome aumbers-~:f -the .petty. bburqeoisi~ -to lead t.he rest 
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(94). Accession to power enhances the differentiation between the 
political 'representatives' of the petty bourgeoisie and the other 
members of its strata since control over the state apparatus by those 
'representatives' is likely to open up opportunities of social promo-
tion to them, and thus increase their independence from the rest of the 
petty bourgeoisie. This is emphasized by al-'Amil as follows : 
"the class representatives of the governing petty bour-
geoisie, in their class differentiation, within their 
'class' framework, generally form a stratum distinct 
from the petty bourgeoisie, with its own class interests 
which do not necessarily coincide with the class inte-
rests of the petty bourgeois masses, and can even run 
contrary to them" (95). (Emphasis in original) 
For this reason some authors are reluctant to use the term 'petty 
bourgeoisie' to describe the state capitalist oriented strata which 
seize power and impose their own imprint on society, and tend to use te 
terms 'intermediary strata' or 'ruling class' (96). 
Going back to the nature of the petty bourgeoisie as a whole, al-
'Amil distinguished between 'class domination' and 'class control'. He 
goes on to assert that the first is only appropriate for the bourgeoi-
sie and the proletariat as fundamental classes, capable of introducing 
a new social system, while the petty bourgeoisie cannot assume the role 
of a dominant class because of its incapacity to bring a new social 
system into being, but there are cases, especially in underdeveloped 
countries, where the petty bourgeoisie takes on the role of controlling 
society. 
"The attainment of class control by the petty bourgeoisie 
••••• runs counter to the logic of history in the evolu-
tion of the class struggle. It is quite natural that the 
dominant class (whether the capitalist bourgeoisie or the 
proletariat) should arrive at class control, because this 
is part of the logic of its class evolution, and there-
- • fure·t>f~-tlle-'iogi.c of historical development. 4t;c---:Hrc'-abn~- -
rmal' that a non-dominant class should assume the role of 
---==-~,.,,., ;_: ..,~r-0-1~~---arn:l -"1:f-- :ttl:is=takes:-pl~-,- :i~ __repr:.eents ... · 
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an exception in the logic of history" (97). 
From this exception emanate all the features that characterize the 
rule of the petty bourgeoisie, and for this reason its acquisition of 
power is carried out in an exceptional manner, different from the 
social revolution of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. It is usually 
the military coup d'etat which brings the petty bourgeoisie to power, 
and in order to maintain its rule it has to practise constant political 
coercion and repression in support of its regime. 
Theoretically, in Poulantzas's words, occupying the middle ground 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and because of its economic 
closeness and antagonism to both, 
"the petty bourgeoisie believes in the 'neutral' state 
above classes. It expects the state to nurture it and 
arrest its decline. This often leads to 'statolatry': the 
petty bourgeoisie identifies itself with the state, whose 
neutrality it supposes to be akin to its own, since it 
sees itself as a 'neutral' class between the bourgeoisie 
and the working class, and therefore a pillar of the 
state-'its' state. It aspires to be the 'arbitrator' of 
society, because, as Marx says, it would like the whole 
society to become petty-bourgeois" (98). 
Hence, due to the particular place it occupies in the social produc-
tion, the petty bourgeoisie sees the state not as an instrument to 
enhance its rule but as rule itself. This becomes more obvious in the 
case of the petty bourgeoisie in underdeveloped countries, since the 
most effective part of it, namely the civil servants and the military 
men, realize their social and economic well-being through the state as 
the major employer. 
Therefore, the state under the rule of the petty bourgeoisie, 
already central and significant for historical and economic reasons, 
acquires extra powers versus the social structure in general. On the 
political level, the state assumes,- in many""Ca.S~i tne- role of public 
---OrganiZQ-r---ana:__ov~shado.ws• or even r-eplaces :pbli-ti-eal ~es __ and orga-
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nizations, even those of the petty bourgeoisie, mobilizing the masses 
on the one hand and repressing them on the other. This is what Gaul-
bourne described as the "tendency for the political and politics to 
merge or .... the political to become preponderant over politics" (99), 
or using Poulantzas' definitions of these terms, the preponderance of 
the juridico-political superstructure of the state, which can be desig-
nated as 'the political', over the political class practices (political 
class struggle) which can be designated as 'politics' (100). 
This can be explained by the weakness or even the absence of a 
solid social base to provide social and political support for the 
•representatives' of the petty bourgeoisie in control of the state 
apparatus, and hence the necessity to establish a facade of consensus 
based upon the belief that there is only one national interest, uniting 
the whole people under the banner of the national solidarity implied in 
the state. Classes and class struggle are taken to be non-existent 
since the people have a single interest, that of achieving indepen-
dence. If the existence of classes and class struggle were to be 
admitted this would be shown to be unnecessary as well as a threat to 
unity, national independence and security. 
More important, perhaps the single most important source of 
further class formation within the petty bourgeoisie and the focus of 
future class struggle, is the role played by the petty bourgeois state 
in the economy. As noted by Debray; 
"the petit-bourgeoisie does not possess an infrastructure 
of economic power before it wins political power. Hence 
it transforms the state not only into an instrument of 
political domination, but also into a source of economic 
power. The state, the culmination of social rel~tions of 
exploitation in capitalist Europe, becomes in a certain 
sense the. instr~t of their installation in these coun-
tries ( 101). 
-.-- --- -- -- --
o· ~ = · .. -.• -- • .· __.... . .,- . •' 
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The crisis produced by colonial control or by the failure of the 
national bourgeoisie to introduce a sound capitalist transformation and 
to achieve real redistribution of wealth and power, constitutes the 
material base for the petty bourgeoisie to lead the popular struggle 
and to assume political power in order to bring about the better alter-
native aspired to by the masses. The petty bourgeoisie, however, and 
those strata who constitute its 'political representatives' in particu-
lar, are characterized by the lack of an independent socio-economic 
base in any way commensurate with its political power. Hence for those 
'representatives' the state represents not only the means of consolida-
ting their political control but also the means of establishing a 
social base for themselves by various means. The state is also used to 
achieve their economic aspirations, moving towards their transformation 
into a bourgeois class whose nature, interests, and outlook imply a 
role which is qualitatively different from simply acting as the 
•representatives' of the petty bourgeoisie. This mobility is not 
achieved in a smooth and linear fashion by which any ruling petty 
bourgeoisie would be transformed automatically into a bourgeois class. 
Rather it is a complicated process governed by multiple and inter-
related factors, including the nature, political mould, and interests 
of the political 'representatives' of the petty bourgeoisie. Relations 
with the outside world do have an impact on this process through the 
response of international capital to the changes introduced by petty 
bourgeois rule. 
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State Capitalism as a Transitional Phase 
The expansion of the state's economic base is carried out through 
two interrelated processes, both of which involve a rearrangement of 
the relationship between the state and private sectors, and represent a 
drastic shift in weight and size in favour of the state sector. The 
first involves a process of nationalization directed against private 
national and international companies. Such nationalizations, and those 
of foreign companies in particular, provide the state with the 
principal sources of economic surplus and thus with the means to carry 
out or influence development. They also play a political role by giving 
substance to the nationalist claims made by the ruling strata, thus 
providing them with the political legitimacy on which they are able to 
base their endeavours for public mobilization. Hence these nationaliza-
tions are viewed as blows directed against imperialism and a step 
towards socialist transformation. It is here that the contradictions or 
even the confrontation between the ruling petty bourgeoisie and foreign 
capital are likely to be expressed. They vary, however, in extent and 
nature according to the strategic importance of the nationalized 
resources both to foreign capital and to the national government (102). 
The second is carried out through the expansion of state invest-
ment in infrastructural, industrial, and other economic activities. 
Such investments are limited by the size of the state's revenues which 
are derived either from taxes imposed on national and foreign private 
capital or the export of natural resources or both. Since state capita-
lism implies the control of the state over this capital, the contribu-
tion of state investment to the expansion of the state economic sector 
63 
tends to be small compared with the contribution made by the nationali-
zations especially if the state lacks the necessary revenues. 
The result of these two processes is the creation of a relatively 
large state sector with a dominant role in the economy. The size of 
this sector is expanded by the gradual growth of state control over 
external and internal trade and banking in addition to a significant 
part of the service sector. However, state domination over the economy 
is far from complete as various economic roles remain for the private 
sector, which develops increasingly close relations with the state 
sector and participates in its functions. These range from activities 
connected with the control of internal trade to the ownership of small-
to-medium- size industrial enterprises, control over transport, build-
ing, and service activities and almost total control over the agricul-
tural sector. Thus, most agricultural production and even most manufac-
turing and internal trade remains in private hands. As far as internal 
trade is concerned, there are no major visible changes, apart from 
state control over external trade and indirect control through prices 
and subsidies, and the establishment of a limited number of state 
retail stores, so that its essentially private character is maintained. 
Moreover a network of private contractors emerges, tied to the state 
sector in various ways, dependent on executing parts of some state 
projects and expanding with the expansion of the state sector itself. 
Most importantly, the creation and expansion of the state sector 
is not accompanied by a radical change in the social relations of 
production. The only major difference between the state sector and the 
privte sector is the replacement of the role played by the previous 
private. owners of the means of production by state managers, techno-
crats, and bureaucrats, but profit orientation, the hierarchy of 
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authority, and market forces remain essentially unaltered. Thus the 
creation of the state sector does not imply any drastic changes in the 
conditions of exploitation of labour but simply reflects a shift in the 
source of exploitation as the state replaces private capitalists in the 
ownership of the means of production and in the control of the surplus 
value created. Independent workers organizations are usually suppressed 
and replaced by state sponsored unions controlled by the state's 
political party, and play a supportive role in favour of state capita-
lism in mobilizing the workers to endorse and support any measures 
introduced by the state and in suppressing any demands on the part of 
the workers for the introduction of genuine improvements (103). 
The expansion of the state sector also creates the means for the 
state apparatus to dispose of and direct a relatively significant 
amount of accumulated capital and surplus. such an expansion of the 
available surplus is depleted, however, by an equal or even greater 
expansion of unproductive, but labour and resource consuming, govern-
mental and administrative employment (104). Thus the increase in the 
state's surplus is directed towards solving the pressing problem of 
unemployment in such a way that the ruling strata of the petty bour-
geoisie soon has the social base necessary for its rule. The swollen 
size of the military, police, and administrative apparatuses is partly 
a reflection of the desire to solve the problem of unemployment, since 
such employment does not entail additional expenditure other than the 
wages and salaries paid to the new employees. This means little expan-
sion in the productive sectors and therefore an insignificant partici-
pation of these sectors in absorbing existing unemployment because the 
proportion ,_of·_ the surplus allocated after the amount, alJ_ocated to the 
state:• s consumption 'has be-en. subtracted frotn this ·surpl-us and not vice 
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versa. Even when the productive sectors are able to absorb part of the 
unemployed, they do so in a way that exceeds their real needs, causing 
a serious deterioration in productivity (105). 
The extension of the state's role in the economy is accompanied by 
another important measure also motivated by political and economic 
considerations, namely land reform. Varying in its nature and intensi-
ty, this measure, apart from the extension of capitalist relations of 
production, has not led to any radical changes in agricultural rela-
tions in almost all state capitalist countries as far as private owner-
ship of land and other means of production are concerned. Although 
large semi-feudal holdings were broken up, pronounced differentiations 
in the size of land ownership and the means of production either 
remained or soon developed as a result of the failure to introduce 
collective relations of production. The major change brought about by 
the land reform was the increasing role played by the state in agricul-
ture, particularly in the provision of the necessary infrastructures, 
production and marketing facilities. These are the general features of 
state capitalism Which, as we can see, are the conditions for further 
class formation and development and indeed for the qualitative leaps 
which, as the experience of almost all state capitalist counrties has 
shown, heralded the development of a form of capitalism not so differ-
ent in its general features from that introduced by colonialism. 
First, the creation or the wide expansion of the state is 
carried out within a framework of the reproduction of private property 
relations. Hence despite the curbs imposed on the development of the 
private bourgeoisie, especially in the initial phases of state capita-
-lism, ·the· state :sector: ·has. never- eliminated ~the mat-er-ial base f-or the 
conditions of .its reproduction. This . .would .imply.~ .{in- contrast .to the 
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experience of the state sector in the socialist countries which was 
created on the ruins of private property), that no matter how far 
reaching the size of the state sector, it will still coexist with an 
active and prosperous private sector concentrated in agriculture, 
construction and commerce since state control has not obviated the role 
of private ownership. 
A certain balance in size and weight exists between the two sec-
tors. However, neither of them functions in isolation from the other; 
rather, types of interrelations and exchange exist at a multiplicity of 
levels, and the revenues of both sectors depend on the exchanges made 
between them. For example the state sector transfers part of its income 
to the private sector in the form of public investment in infrastructu-
ral activities and agriculture, and the latter does the same in the 
form of taxes. Therefore, given the relationship of interdependence, 
the issue for the private sector has been to find "a configuration 
which maximized one's ability to benefit from the state's economic 
developmental and expansion efforts while maintaining discretionary 
independence from the state" (106). 
In addition, a variety of mixed forms of production relations 
exists which involve degrees of participation and a mixture of resour-
ces from both sectors. al-Khafaji presents a theoretical model (107) 
which clearly demonstrates that the mere existence of the private 
sector with its relations with the state controlled sector, even with-
out taking into consideration the social and economic forces working in 
favour of the former, would objectively mean the flow of resources from 
the state sector to the private sector since the taxation applied in 
the -contextc._of state ·capitalism i& ~capablec'of opreventting this because 
Uac±a:xes_ thernselves.:are an indicatgr~.of .. the si·Ee 'Of private :incomes. 
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Thus in order to increase taxes private capital had to be in a position 
and of a size capable of satisfying the state's need for revenues~ "the 
only way in which tax revenue can increase is by the continuous growth 
of the private sector, a solution which brings the economy of state 
capitalism to a dilemma requiring on the one hand a decline in private 
capital accumulation and on the other the necessity for growth in the 
private sector as the main provider of tax revenues" (108). 
However, the benefit accruing to the private sector from invest-
ment made by the state sector without the latter being able to counter 
these benefits with equivalent taxes on the former is only one side of 
the outflow of resources from the state to the private sector. Another 
aspect is the salaries and wages paid to the employees of the state 
sector which, when they exceed the upper level of consumption, repre-
sent a net transfer of resources to the private sector. The latter also 
benefits from the pricing policy imposed by the state on the products 
of the state sector without having any obligation to follow the same 
policy with regard to its products because of the absence of comprehen-
sive central planning and of complete control over prices. 
The expansion of the state service and administrative sector to 
the point at which it becomes the largest sector in the economy, a 
common phenomenon in state capitalist countries, plays a further role 
in depleting the state's resources and directing them to the private 
sector, since the state sector has the lion's share in financing this 
expansion, and wages and salaries are paid to the employees which 
constitutes a net flow into private accumulation (109). Finally, the 
private sector is involved in activities in which the productivity of 
capital is very .high and where return~_are acquired in a short. space of 
·time, -in aontras·t with the· state .sector which i·s invql ved in .projects 
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where returns are generally slow. 
Therefore, as the private sector exists and remains effective in 
activities like agriculture, industry, construction, and transport and 
is the main supplier of a variety of goods to the state sector, it 
would be right to suggest that any expansion in the state sector will 
be translated into parallel growth and expansion in the private sector-
and not the reverse, unless the state sector undertakes the production 
of the goods and services produced by the private sector. 
These factors will have a crucial impact on the structure of 
society and in particular on the socio-economic character and dynamics 
of the strata constituting the ruling petty bourgeoisie. It is there-
fore natural that since neither the state nor the state sector has any 
specific class nature, an objective and spontaneous development will 
govern the process of transformation initiated by state capitalism. 
These developments would render state capitalism, despite the social 
and economic characteristics which differentiate it from other capita-
list regimes, despite the intensive state intervention in the produc-
tive activity, and despite the raising of political slogans, simply a 
phase in a sequence of capitalist development. Contrary to what one 
might expect initially, the absence of this class nature becomes more 
pronounced if the particular state capitalist country is endowed with 
one or more exportable natural resources which will give the state the 
vital additional means to finance its expansion and its control over 
the economy. In this way the state's role as the chief determinant of 
social and economic power becomes exclusive and independent of the 
productive efforts of the society. On the economic level the state 
functionsas agent for-the expenditure of the revenues derived from the 
:expert: :Of natUFal -resources. Given t·he nature of the- strata- in control 
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of the state apparatus, the existence of such resources will be trans-
lated into vast increases in public consumption which takes the form of 
the expansion of state administration including defence, inordinate 
increases in state salaries and financial rewards which set the 
standard for earnings in the private sector in terms of increased 
consumption of its products and in terms of income tax reductions and 
exemptions which favour the private sector as well. This will mean that 
certain groups and strata close to the state will benefit more from the 
state's pattern of consumption. Rapid increases in demand for luxury 
housing, modern services, durable consumer goods and luxury foods, all 
of which are of particular interest to these groups, will increase 
their opportunity to double their income at the expense of other 
classes and strata located far away from the state apparatus (110). 
On the other hand the availability of these revenues, which are 
generally independent from the rest of the national economy and in 
particular from the productive sectors, threaten the creation and 
expansion of a productive base capable of producing the necessary 
industrial goods by having increasing recourse to imports (111). In 
these circumstances the state possesses a relatively large amount of 
revenues Which make state expenditures beneficial to those private 
interests which are tied to the state on the one hand, and reduce the 
state's need to expand its productive base, rendering the economy 
dependent on imports from the outside world, effectively from the world 
capitalist system, as shortages in the supply of industrial goods can 
be met through imports, since "the liberty of •unlimited' financial 
capital in foreign exchange turns into a general licence for imports" 
( 112). ,l!'he-~limited character·_,o£ __ the market to which natural resources 
are directed and the difficulty facinq any•;attempt.to ·change it accord-
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ing to internal needs plays an additional role in tightening the 
economic links with the outside world and reduces the possibility of 
achieving independent development. 
This brings us to the second point which relates to the relations 
with the outside world and particularly with international capital, and 
the changes in these relations produced by the initial nationalizations 
of foreign assets. It is clear that such nationalizations are markedly 
different from those undertaken elsewhere, not only in their size and 
extent but also in the nature of the assets nationalized, and whether 
or not compensation was paid, as well as the aim of the nationaliza-
tions (113). Although the relations of the state capitalist countries 
with international capital received a major shake up as a result of the 
nationalizations, and vigorous confrontation took place which was not a 
mere manifestation of "age old sentiments" on the part of the interna-
tional bourgeoisie, these relations by no means came to an end. What 
resulted was effectively a shift from direct to indirect control over 
the economy on the part of international capital, usually accompanied 
by a geographical redistribution of control from the bourgeoisie of a 
single metropolitan country to the international bourgeoisie of the 
world capitalist system. This is expressed in the shift from direct 
foreign investment, usually undertaken by capital from the metropolitan 
country, to partnership agreements with the governments of particular 
countries. Apart from an insignificant increase in trade with the 
socialist countries, usually motivated by political factors, foreign 
trade remains largely unaffected as far as the international market is 
concerned, and the capitalist countries and corporations have remained 
:the-- iRos-tc-important ·tradi-ng partners witn--~the -_state- capitalist countries 
{.ll4.). :The::onl-y: signi.fi:Ca:nt:-Change·±s- i.n -the_ direct state monopoly of 
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external trade, with growing and expanding network of private commis-
sioners. 
The overall picture can be described as one of a facade of econo-
mic independence sustained by the apparent control of the state over 
national resources while foreign capital continues, though in a diffe-
rent guise, to play a determining role in development and increasingly 
strengthens its grip over the national economy. In fact some argue 
that, in the long run, the international bourgeoisie are better off 
under the new conditions introduced by state capitalism, since it is 
much more convenient for them, and politically more secure, to deal 
with the state than to be involved directly in the juridicial ownership 
of the means of production. It can make and transfer profits from the 
periphery under other titles than those derived from formal ownership. 
"As long as the social relations of production do not undergo any more 
decisive change, transnational corporations have therefore no inhibi-
tion to participate in joint ventures with the state and negotiate on 
forms of nationalization acceptable to them" (115). 
What are the effects of these economic changes on class formation 
in society in general and on the ruling strata of the petty bourgeoisie 
in particular? It is quite obvious that the expansion in state capita-
lism does not only mean the formation and development of the productive 
base and other related factors such as the expansion of the national 
market, the increase in per capita income etc. but also, and more 
importantly, it means the emergence of a new basis for class formation 
and new class interests and struggle. That the state now controls the 
means of production without any significant or radical change in the 
relations ~-:production :means, in addition: .to thee fac;t that. 'i.ha .state 
is_ no longer .merely.a .part of .the-superstructure-but has become an 
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important part and a major participant in the economic base, that class 
interests are formed following a line of proximity to the state appara-
tus. This means a rapid expansion in the size of the groups and strata 
dependent on the state, each through a distinct mechanism; "absorbing 
the interests of the lower classes in the state, expanding the lower 
middle class through the state and defending the new upper class with 
the state" (116). 
At the bottom the expansion of the industrial labour force is 
limited by the slow process of industrial investment and by the bias of 
such investment towards high technology. However, although the main 
emphasis is on large-scale capital intensive enterprises, varying from 
country to country according to the resources available for investment, 
a gradual if slow increase in the size of the industrial working class 
does take place. This increase is offset by the unproductive character 
of employment policies, reflected in a vast expansion of the lower 
white-collar categories of the bureaucracy including the army and 
police, as a result of the expansion in the state administrative and 
service sector. This reduces the relative weight of the working class 
in the society to a minimum and creates a social base for the ruling 
strata which Will in the long run stand against any pressure which 
might be exerted by the working class. It is also offset by the state's 
clampdown on independent workers' organizations, thus reducing, at 
least politically, the impact of this increase in numbers on political 
development. Both categories are highly dependent on the state whether 
through their incomes or through their access to goods and services. 
At the top there emrges an upper stratum of bureaucrats in command 
of the state who assume t~-role of political~d €conomic leadership 
and deCision making, and a body of technocrats to run the. state's 
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economic enterprises. Although these groups are not the legal owners of 
the means of production, and most of them have no significant economic 
activity outside the bureaucracy, their position in the state apparatus 
and in the social division of labour places them as the stratum in 
effective control of the means of production, thus possessing the power 
of decision making with regard to social production. Since economic 
control or the ability to appropriate surplus value does not neces-
sarily depend upon legal ownership of the means of production (117), 
the control and total right of disposal over the means of production 
provides the bureaucracy with the means of controlling the surplus 
value created, and thus presents them with the means of appropriating a 
larger proportion of the surplus value for themselves. For this reason 
the bureaucracy acts in exactly the same way as the private capitalist 
with regard to state enterprises, where they have total freedom of 
decision making. This freedom allows the bureaucracy to deprive the 
notion of state ownership of the means of production of its social 
content and effectively, although not legally, changes state ownership 
into 'collective• private ownership on the part of the members of the 
state bureaucracy, thus setting the conditions for the bureaucracy to 
acquire characteristics which are increasingly different and distinct 
from those of the rest of the petty bourgeoisie. These characteristics 
becomes clearer with the development of capitalist relations and with 
the growth of the private sector, when the bureaucracy starts to assume 
an identity of its own which is alienated from the rest of society. 
This alienation places the bureaucracy in a position to dominate the 
rest of society, including the national bourgeoisie. In this way it 
emerges as a distinct stratum constituting the bureaucratic bourgeoi-
~ie. 
74 
Although it cannot be described as a class, since this cannot be 
determined merely by participation in the distribution of national 
income (118), the bureaucratic bourgeoisie possesses some characteris-
tics which exhibit a sort of unity and solidarity (119). Its privileges 
are drawn from its administrative position which allows it to approp-
riate the economic surplus. However, this appropriation is not carried 
out in the same way as under private capitalism; instead it assumes the 
form of a deduction from the whole social surplus, including revenues 
from natural resources. This becomes possible because of the control 
over the state by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and its subsequent 
transformation into a means of exploitation. "Only when the state power 
becomes, through nationalizations of means of production, not simply 
the agent of oppression, but also that of exploitation, and a social 
group, because of its control over the state, exercises control over 
the means of production, only then can we identify the emergence of 
bureaucratic-capital and thus of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie" (120). 
Political control of the state apparatus, therefore, represents the 
most important a priori condition for the continuing existence and 
reproduction of the bureaucratic bourheoisie, especially in the initial 
stages when its grip over the economy has not yet been established. 
Moreover, the reproductive conditions of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
and those of the post-colonial capitalist economy are mutually inter-
linked and inseparable. Private accumulation of capital is not under-
mined by state control of the means of production since such control 
has not involved any radical change in the relations of production. 
What is new is that a significant part of such accumulation is carried 
out by the stat-e~_Therefore,-political control. by the bureaucratic 
-bourqeoisie 4nd state control over the means of production together 
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with the continuity of private accumulation are the main conditions for 
the reproduction of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. 
The main criterion determining affiliation to the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie is not size of income or position in the hierarchy of the 
state apparatus, but primarily the extent of influence over social, 
economic, and political decision making in the various spheres of 
production at local and national levels (121). The major contradiction 
that governs the bureaucratic bourgoisie is that between the dominance 
of state ownership of the means of production as the material base for 
its class control and the necessity for the existence of capitalist 
relations of production, together with the need to preserve an active 
private sector as a means of accumulation of bureaucratic capital. Free 
disposal of the means of production and the capacity for the private 
accumulation of a significant part of the surplus (whether through high 
salaries which greatly exceed the average wages and salaries paid to 
other employees of the state, or by legal and illegal means, such as 
commissions and embezzlement, or by shares in profits made by private 
national and international capital participating in the activities of 
the state sector) push the bureaucrats to search for outlets for 
investment. Thus a significant part of the capital accumulated is 
reinvested in the private sector through a network of family members 
and relatives and through participation in the activities of the natio-
nal bourgeoisie. This creates a form of class solidarity between the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the rest of the bourgeoisie functioning 
outside the state sector. In this way an objective possibility exists 
for the bureaucratic bourgeoisie to be united with other elements of 
the traditional-bourg.eoisi.e. to form a united economic, .. soc.i.al, ana 
pelitical front to defend -its class ·interests :in. suppor.t..~of_ a. fr'ee. 
76 
economy and capitalist development, as well as a close alliance with 
foreign capital and international monopolies which is the essence of 
neo-colonialism (122). 
It is here that the need to keep an active private sector tied in 
various ways to the state emerges. Moreover, with further accumulation 
of capital, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie becomes more alienated from 
the petty bourgeoisie and more and more integrated with private capi-
tal. Foreign capital has a vital interest in establishing various 
economic, political, and even personal links with members of the bur-
eaucratic bourgeoisie who play an intermediary role. 
Despite the bureaucratic bourgeoisie's claim that it is a force 
located above classes and the class struggle, which, even if its exis-
tence is admitted, should be ended for the benefit of society as a 
whole, the political implications of these developments will be a 
gradual distancing from the masses and an increasing resort to repres-
sion and coercion. This will give the bureaucratic bourgeoisie even 
more absolute rights of disposal of economic surplus and thus assist it 
to increase its capital. It will also lead to some moderation of the 
anti-imperialist and anti-reactionary rhetoric, under the pretext of 
•maturity• and 'productivity'. 
In socio-economic terms, this leads to greater integration with 
private capital and an increase in the role of the private sector. In 
other words, class solidarity between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and 
other sections of the national bourgeoisie is transformed into a more 
genuine alliance and translated into measures aimed at reviving the 
private sector and encouraging private capital, national and foreign, 
otO, partiCipate: in- the economy:.. :ThUS ,o_ depending_ Ofl~,var iOUS internal and 
e:l{t~rnal political and economic factors~ the, bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
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quickly finds its interests identified with measures of 'liberaliza-
tion' which openly and legally encourage private capital and limit 
state economic activities. This liberalization policy, which aims at 
reversing the trend of state control originally initiated by state 
capitalism, is the common dominator characterizing almost all state 
capitalist regimes (123). It involves a tendency to dissolve whatever 
were viewed as socialist measures in the past, and includes measures to 
reprivatize the basic means of production and the reopening the economy 
to foreign capital. Whatever justification may be given to this policy, 
whether the emphasis is on productivity and efficiency or on the parti-
cularities of this or that country's 'socialism', it is a reflection of 
the crisis of state capitalism and is an expression of the termination 
of this system as a transitional phase towards a capitalist, though 
still dependent, system. 
This crisis takes a multiplicity of forms. For Cooper it is a 
•resource crisis'; "in order to create the necessary social mobility 
and to generate the resources to sustain the absorption of interests in 
the state, the state becomes committed to an aggressive policy that is 
beyond its means. The state's economic enterprise is hard-pressed to 
meet the demands of both populism and developmentalism. The mass subsi-
dization of subsistence coupled with the constant expansion of employ-
ment in the state and an aggressive policy places the regime in an 
extremely precarious resource position" (124). This will definitely 
result in the "beating back the state's role". For al-Khafaji, it is a 
crisis of resource depletion, which stands as a stumbling block in the 
face of the development of the state capitalist system. It is "a mani-
·festation of the -inefficienC!Les...,fi:.Om :which: the state capitalist system 
.. suffer-s as' a -=result:.;af <>its' i:-rrabrlity·'t~ contror·,tne·-spontaneous develo-
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ment generated by its own mechanisms" (125). For al-'Amil, on the other 
hand, liberalization is a way of tackling the class crisis and the 
expression of the transformation of the representatives of the petty 
bourgeoisie into new •national capitalists' whose class interests lie 
in the development of the private sector" (126). 
With the arrival of the latter development the sequence of state 
capitalism is complete. The outcome is the generation of a system that 
is equally dependent and tied to the world capitalist system. The 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie unites with the most oppressive and reactiona-
ry sections of the bourgeoisie to dominate economy and society. Inter-
national capital remains economically dominant and finds its interests 
structurally connected with the national bourgeoisie in its bureaucra-
tic and private sections. 
As with other developments, the time scale of this sequence and 
the form it assumes are governed by interrelated social, economic, and 
political factors. However, as summarized by Petras, the cycle general-
ly ends when the state capitalists start "to accumulate wealth through 
salaries and other perquisites, to open opportunities for investment 
through the state, to finance private investments through private 
savings and public loans and to eventually 're-invite' foreign capital 
for joint ventures" (127). This implies that the bureaucratic bourgeoi-
sie acts as a temporary agent for the national and international bour-
geoisie, and that what appeared as 'progressive achievements• are 
simply the necessary conditions for the ultimate stability of capita-
list development, which can only be dependent on and articulated with 
the world capitalist system. Thus a further incorporation of the bur-
eaucratic bourgeoisie 4.n international capital and its poH:tical submi-
ssion to the imperialist centres is the ultimate co~equence of its 
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rule. The crucial role played by the state in this development makes 
the bureaucratic bourgeoisie not only a local phenomenon but one chara-
cteristic of many underdeveloped countries. 
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State Capitalism and the Agricultural sector 
The importance of analysing the agricultural sector under state 
capitalism stems principally from the large size of this sector and its 
considerable importance and contribution to social and economic develo-
pment in almost all countries where state capitalism has emerged. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon of state capitalism itself came into being 
largely as a response to the incapacity of this sector to support its 
dramatically growing population adequately, let alone to perform an 
active role in the development of society. It is mainly this sector and 
the rural population which experienced the most brutal and vicious 
processes of uprooting and disintegration at the hands of colonialism. 
It is therefore not accidental that state capitalism emerged in 
countries with relatively large agricultural sectors and sizeable rural 
populations. Nor is it a coincidence that agriculture is naturally the 
first of the sectors to experience profound changes under state capita-
lism, whether in the system of land tenure, in its role in the economy 
and society, or in its relations with the state. State capitalism 
involves a wide range and variety of measures which aim directly at 
transforming the backward and dislocated agricultural sector, Which in 
many cases presents a threat to the existing social and political 
order. These measures derive essentially from the realization of the 
effective social and economic contribution that agriculture could make 
to development (128), regardless of the specific aims of such develop-
ment, since "both capitalist and socialist development strategies re-
quire peasants to provide the resources necessary for the developme~t 
of the urban, industri~l economy" (129). 
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As pointed out earlier, agrarian reforms aimed at transforming the 
agricultural sector and at incorporating it into the national economy 
are the cornerstones of the policies not only of state capitalist 
regimes but also of any state aiming to achieve a breakthrough in 
harnessing the forces of agricultural production and to introduce 
capitalist relations of production in the economy as a whole. 
However, agrarian policies in general under state capitalism 
differ significantly in nature and extent from other agricultural 
policies pursued by other regimes in underdeveloped countries. In these 
countries such policies, particularly agrarian reform, are only a 
manifestation of the strength of the ruling strata and in particular 
the bourgeoisie and its ability to risk the sacrifice of the large 
landowners to the cause of bringing about the modernization desired 
together with greater incorporation into the capitalist system. 
Given the class nature of the state capitalist strata, agrarian 
reform is an indispensable step in the direction of rearranging the 
class structure in the countryside and directing a serious blow to pre-
capitalist relations of production based mainly on semi-feudal owner-
ship. These constitute a serious hindrance to the incorporation of the 
agricultural sector into the national economy and are also a glaring 
example of the sharp inequalities in wealth and income. Agrarian reform 
under state capitalism goes farther than just putting an end to the 
rent paid to parasitic landlords, and therefore contributes to the 
incorporation of the agricultural sector into capitalist development. 
It is usually carried out along with other measures that aim to 
introduce effective state control over agriculture whether in the 
sphere of production or in the distribution of inputs and outputs. 
' Agrarian reform under state capitalism is in many cases the I'e?!llt 
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of direct popular and peasant pressure, which itself contributes to the 
emergence of state capitalism as a system Which is likely to improve 
the abysmal living standards and endemic un- and underemployment of the 
rural population. 
Having analysed earlier the nature of state capitalism and its 
sequence as a transitional phase along the path towards capitalist 
development under conditions where capitalist forces are weak, it is 
not surprising that state capitalist agricultural policies are also 
used by the state to gain political control over the rural masses and 
to provide the state with an economic base by methods similar to those 
followed in other sectors of the economy. Therefore, the following 
argument will not concentrate on proving whether state capitalism has 
incorporated the agricultural sector into the framework of capitalism, 
since this is evidently the case, but rather in showing how this incor-
poration has actually taken place. 
Since it is admitted that capitalist penetration in agriculture is 
quite different and more complicated than in industry, it is useful to 
look at the debate on this issue and then to describe how far and along 
what lines state capitalism has incorporated agriculture into capita-
list relations of production. 
capitalist Penetration into Agriculture 
"Agriculture does not develop according to the same process as 
industry; it follows laws of its own" (130). Together with the fact 
that capitalism brings about drastic and revolutionary changes in 
agriculture, this statement constitutes what one might call the common 
_ground on_which the debate on capitalist penetration in agriculture is 
basec:h:·"T-h.iS:·debate ·deriVes _from the _tact that ••peasant farming is far, 
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from dead" (131), as represented by the persistence of family farms and 
peasant household production not only in the agriculture of underdeve-
loped countries, but also because the same system continues "to exhibit 
a remarkable vitality precisely in those countries where capitalisation 
of industry has progressed the furthest" (132). 
Vergopoulos, for instance, cites numerous examples in which he 
demonstrates clearly that family farming dominates agriculture in the 
most developed capitalist countries, and further that it "constitutes a 
relatively recent structure" (133). This is not because capitalism is 
either unable or unwilling to penetrate the agricultural sector, or 
that its development has not (or has not yet) included the agricultural 
sector within its orbit. On the contrary, agriculture represents the 
essential foundation on which capitalism is built, and capitalist 
development cannot take place without the full incorporation of agricu-
lture. Again, this does not indicate that the incorporation of agricul-
ture into capitalist development would not introduce into the former a 
profound transformation whether in forms of ownership or in social and 
economic relations. Rather, the expansion of capitalism has fundamenta-
lly changed the structure and organization of agriculture and of 
peasant reproduction. The destruction of the peasant's domestic indus-
try and with it the insularity characteristic of the countryside was 
the first effect of capitalism. With capitalism came the end of peasant 
self-sufficiency and a new system in which money and market became the 
prime motivators for agricultural activity; "peasants have become link-
ed to the market in several ways, namely through both the sale of part 
of their produce and the purchase of items of productive consumption 
(agricultural inputs) and individual consumption such as food, clothes, 
:and '()tfre.r-11ouSefiS!.d- consumption items" .( 134).. "'Technical. imprwements _ 
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and the use of scientific methods in farming became imperative under 
capitalism since the producer had to increase productivity and to face 
the peasant's consumption and market demands. Specialization of agricu-
ltural production and the revolution in transport enhanced peasant 
dependence on the market. Capitalism also meant a profound restructur-
ing of the socio-economic forces in the countryside. Thus growing 
numbers of peasants experienced constant deprivation and impoverishment 
leading to the loss of their land, while small numbers of landowners 
benefited and saw their wealth and properties expanding rapidly. Large 
scale farms owned by individual owners, based on wage labour provided 
by the landless peasants and on mechanization and specialization in 
specific agricultural products emerged as one of the major features 
brought about by capitalist penetration into agriculture. 
However, "the destruction of the 'peasant economy• does not neces-
sarily imply a weakening of the basis for the reproduction of the 
peasant household" (135). The continuing vitality and functions of the 
peasant household and the family farm in some of the most advanced 
capitalist countries as well as in the developing countries is a 
reflection of this fact. This does not undermine or refute the Marxist 
theory of capitalist development and in particular the theory of the 
transitional nature of petty commodity production: on the contrary it 
is only within the context of this theory that this phenomenon can be 
fully analysed and explained. 
There are two main explanations for the persistence of petty 
commodity production in agriculture reflected by peasant households and 
"distinguished from capitalist commodity production by its logic of 
subsistence_(meeting the needs of simple reproduction) as opposed to 
--,:tm -logre,..o£ the appropriation and realization of surplus value and the 
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accumulation of capital" (136). The first relates to the nature of the 
development of capitalism and to the process of capitalist accumula-
tion, and the second relates to the peculiarities of agriculture and 
the conditions of capitalist development within it as well as to the 
specificities of the peasant household and the family farm within the 
capitalist context. 
Despite the general trends of the development of capitalism which 
produce a completely new mode of production based on specific social 
and economic laws, a mode of production qualitatively different from 
the feudal one and from petty commodity production, it is nevertheless 
often neither able nor willing to dissolve non-capitalist forms of 
production in various areas of society. Rather it articulates such 
forms and directs them to satisfy the requirements of capitalist 
development. "Capitalism neither evolves mechanically from what 
precedes it, nor does it necessarily dissolve it; indeed, far from 
banishing pre-capitalist forms, it not only coexists with them but 
buttresses them, and even on occasions devilishly conjures them up ex 
nihilo" (137). This clearly means that capitalism as a mode of produc-
tion can, even must, contain some forms and relations of production 
which are in essence non-capitalist and might belong to the previous 
mode of production. "Under certain conditions, the intensification of 
commodity relations of production for the domestic and international 
market is consistent with the persistence of (non-capitalist) 'forms' 
operating at an extremely low level of productivity" (138). 
Regarding petty commodity production as a non-capitalist form, the 
process of concentration and centralization of capital in many cases, 
-GoRd par-ticularly .i;n; inctustry does .not~ as -Kautsky stated, i1J1plant 
- --------- --- ~e~f::--:at- ance--ln. all-~-spheres of prodliCtiort; 
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"it conquers them in succession. Where it establishes its 
dominance, the small enterprises disintegrate, which does 
not mean, however, that all the small enterpreneurs be-
come workers in the large enterprise. They go over to 
other professions and encumber those ...... Nor does this 
process express itself in a general decline of small 
enterprises; here and there they may actually increase, 
which could give the impression that they are therefore 
thriving" (139). 
Thus property relations whether in industry or in agriculture are not 
the only indicators of capitalist penetration. 
"When capital is implanted in a non-capitalist environment, 
such as that represented by peasant farming, the effect 
of the penetration of capital is to break up the existing 
system of production, but not necessarily to destroy the 
system of property relations with which production sys-
tems are associated" (140). 
Non-capitalist forms of production, and in particular petty comma-
dity production, are manipulated to serve the needs of the process of 
capitalist accumulation. Here petty commodity production is not a 
hindrance to capitalist development but acts as a support for and an 
integrated part of this development. Similarly peasant household and 
family farms become part of commodity production when they are incorpo-
rated into the capitalist market without necessarily incurring any 
drastic changes in the social forms of peasant production and reprodu-
ction. 
"Peasant forms of production can provide surplus to an 
expanding capitalist economy without being subsumed by 
the logic of capitalist accumulation. This is not to 
argue, of course, that peasant forms of production are 
never subsumed and dissolved in the advance of capita-
lism •••• It is not necessary for the expanded reproduc-
tion of capitalism that peasant forms of production be 
transformed into capitalist forms of production" (141). 
The impact of colonialism on the social and economic structure of 
,,tlJe ,.c.ol.ony. .should be seen from this angle, since it has incorporated 
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production through the appropriation of the economic surplus created by 
those forms of production and directed it towards the metropolis with-
out needing to transform the native forms of production and their 
production relations. In many cases capitalist incorporation not only 
preserved non-capitalist forms of production, but also especially in 
agriculture, enhanced the development of new relations which are also 
non-capitalist such as some forms of family cooperation and tenancy 
relationships and land exchanges, which "emerge as a specific response 
to the penetration of capitalism in the rural economy" (142). It is for 
this reason that Kautsky asserted the necessity of going beyond the 
size of farm in order to arrive at an understanding of the agricultural 
question within capitalism. He stated that; 
"to study the agrarian question according to Marx's met-
hod, we should not confine ourselves to the question of 
the future of small scale farming; on the contrary, we 
should look for all the changes which agriculture expe-
riences under the domination of capitalist production" (143). 
Why has agriculture been the sector where capitalist penetration 
is more likely to fail to introduce parallel capitalist forms and 
relations of production similar to those in industry? Or why is it that 
"capitalist development appears to stop, as it were, at the farm gate"? 
(144). Many writers have cited different reasons, all of which seem 
valid in various ways for the continuation of the peasant household and 
family farms which, though fully incorporated within capitalist develo-
pment, are non-capitalist forms of production. Vergopoulos emphasized 
that the 'perverse' character of land in the capitalist social system 
is the main reason for the persistence of family farms in agriculture. 
This perverse nature is manifested by two characteristics which distin-
--guish land from other factors of production: these are "the rigidity of 
,~ da!ld~.&lWPl¥--'and the decreasing returns of agricuJ,tur.:H pro"fit_s" (145). 
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These two characteristics give rise to land rent Which is to be approp-
riated by those who monopolize its ownership. This rent constitutes a 
net deduction from the economic surplus which capital has to pay to 
those who monopolize the land, whether in the form of feudal landlords 
or of agrarian bourgeoisie who "by tending to take advantage of the 
rigidity of the land supply, constitute an obstacle to the growth of 
industrial capitalism" (146). 
Family farming, on the other hand, constitutes 
"the most successful form of production for putting the 
maximum volume of surplus labour at the disposal of urban 
capitalism. It also constitutes the most efficient way of 
restraining the prices of agricultural products" (147) 
This is so not only because family farming represents a considerable 
gain to urban capital without paying land rent, but also because of the 
"facility and the rapidity with which the family produc-
tive unit adapts itself to the requirements of the urban 
system: it modifies its production, its specialization, 
its investment and its work more easily and rapidly than 
capitalist enterprise, and it certainly knows how to 
restrict its costs much more effectively" (148}. 
Therefore, family farming represents a form of production where capita-
lism, in certain circumstances, can benefit more from agriculture. 
These factors were also observed by Kautsky in stating that "as long as 
the peasant repays the capitalist and the state, his property is sacra-
scant. This poses a serious obstacle to the growth of big landed prope-
rties" ( 149) • 
This, however, does not mean that small family farming is always 
more suitable for capitalism. In fact Kautsky cited many advantages 
which make large scale units, whether in industry or in agriculture, 
superior to small scale ones. But "in agriculture this is true only up 
to a point" since the expansion of an agricultural enterprise, unlike 
~-- ------ ·ffi---4ndustr.yT'c'i'S -usua1ly accompanied by "gre.ater loss of_!!!!!t_erial, a_ . 
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greater deployment of efforts, resources, time, for the transport of 
material and men" (150). These losses stem from the nature of agricul-
tural activity and its dependence on natural conditions and the long 
and frequent interruptions where farm labour, management, and materials 
are out of use, thereby offsetting the advantages of the large scale 
unit of production. 
Mann and Dickinson, on the other hand, emphasized the unfavourable 
nature of agricultural production from the point of view of capitalist 
accumulation. They see that the explanation for the survival of family 
farming and its co-existence alongside a dominant capitalist mode of 
production lies neither in the •subjective approach', focussing on the 
peculiar behaviour of family labour and its ability to produce under 
severe conditions of 'self-exploitation', nor in the 'objective 
approach' linking the persistence of family farming to improvements in 
labour productivity resulting from advances in the forces of production 
and in particular farm technology (151). For them this survival can be 
attributed to the unattractiveness of agriculture for capitalist 
investment because of the wide gap between production time and labour 
time which characterizes it. 
Labour time is the period when labour "is actually applied in 
production", while production time includes, as well as labour time, 
"the period when the •unfinished' commodity is 'abandoned to the sway 
of natural processes' without being at that time in the labour process" 
(152). Since it is only during labour time that the surplus value is 
realized, it is quite natural that capital will strive to penetrate 
those spheres of production where labour time and production time 
coincide; or at,least where the time when the unfinished commodity is 
cl;;e-ft~over ·.-t.or -natoural . .-conditions .i'S .at ·a~i-nimuli\' ·because: such "time 
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does not absorb labour and therefore does not create surplus value. 
Capital will also try to dominate those spheres of economic activity 
where the length of production time is short, because this will mean a 
shorter turnover time and thus a higher surplus. 
As well as having long production time compared to industry, 
agriculture is characterized by the wide gap separating labour from 
production time. "In this case the reduction of production time is 
severely restricted by natural factors and thus cannot easily be socia-
lly modified or manipulated as occurs in industry proper" (153). Other 
related factors limiting capitalist penetration in agriculture are 
ineficiencies in the use of constant capital. "Constant capital lying 
idle during the excess production time finds its value whittled away by 
physical depreciation and social obsolescence rather than being trans-
ferred bit by bit to the value of the commodities produced" (154). 
Again there are severe problems in the sphere of circulation arising 
from the peculiar nature, as far as capital is concerned, of agri-
cultural products with regard to their perishability and durability 
(155), as well as labour recruitment and management problems "arising 
from the seasonal and periodic hiring of wage labour, which is a refle-
ction of the non-identity of production time and labour time" (156). 
Moreover, Mann and Dickinson observe that "the capitalization of 
agriculture progresses most rapidly in the spheres where production 
time can be successfully reduced. These spheres are better represented 
by poultry and egg production and food processing "which have become 
virtually continuous production processes in which labour is almost 
constantly applied and absorbed: it is these spheres which are becoming 
':i.ncreas:i.ngly cproduc-ed -along· capitalist.-Lines" ( 157). Therefore accord-
---·-· ;inCJ to~-tnecautoors,. ·"as long as there are natural objective constraints 
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on the social manipulation of production time, capitalism will regard 
these as high risk and high cost areas of production (and that) when 
conditions of production are sufficiently altered by advances in 
science, technology, etc .•.• there is no reason to believe that 
capitalism will not move in and conquer them as it has done in areas of 
industry proper" (158). 
Although one cannot agree more on the effectiveness and viability 
of these points as factors limiting capitalist penetration in agri-
culture, they nevertheless ignore the fact that even under conditions 
where labour time and production time coincide, family farming presents 
capital with the advantages of very low agricultural prices, since the 
producers here "frequently display a willingness to let their merchand-
ize go to market for less than the price which would be charged by a 
capitalist producer using the same techniques. Thus by relinquishing 
their claim to as much surplus value as would be due to them, they 
offer a subsidy to capital in general" (159). By doing so they also 
exhibit a tendency to "survive the development of capitalism and the 
expansion of commodity relations because of their ability to deliver 
goods to consumers at lower prices than capitalists" (160). 
However, this should not overshadow the fact that under certain 
conditions and with regard to certain crops, developments along 
capitalist lines take place at every level at an accelerated rate, 
resulting in the emergence of privately owned large scale farms depend-
ing primarily on wage labour and submitting to the logic of capital 
accumulation. Colonial penetration has often resulted in the expro-
priation of lands from their original owners and for the production of 
~~tw:al .commodities on farms run by settlers or capitalist compa-
··--··-· -·-~sv-These farms: .were& large units of production Which required a 
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continuous supply of wage labour and produced essentially for the needs 
of the capitalist economy. 
Capitalist incorporation of agriculture meant also the development 
of inequalities among peasants in their access to the whole range of 
resources and income, and thus made the emergence of wealthier peasants 
inevitable. Although not relying on purely capitalist relations of 
production, rich peasants are well equipped to meet the demands of the 
market and to accumulate wealth. They do not only own more land than 
others, but "usually command more farming labour and more and better 
tools with which to cultivate. They are more likely to employ hired 
labour and can do so at lower wage costs than proper farms .•.. They 
are more likely than others to purchase land or rent land •••• and they 
have far greater access than others to credits, extension services, 
sprays and fertilizers" (161). However, capitalism in agriculture does 
not necessarily assume that large capitalist units of production become 
dominant over small peasant households and family farms. 
--.------
- ---------
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State capitalist Agriculture 
One of the major weaknesses of most studies of the agricultural 
sector in state capitalist societies, which has created a great deal of 
confusion in determining the nature of the state's policies towards 
this sector is the lack of a proper consideration of the appropriate 
linkages between policies, and the exact nature of the social forces 
and strata that are directing the state power. In other words, agricul-
tural policies and strategies should be directly related to the 
immediate and long term political and economic interests of the 
•representatives' of the petty bourgeoisies and of the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie in the case of state capitalist countries. 
Given the social and economic nature of this bourgeoisie, the 
peasantry and agriculture have a crucial role to play in maintaining 
the state capitalist system. This is because of the possibilities of 
direct and indirect accumulation that agriculture can provide for the 
ruling strata and equally because peasants can play an active political 
role in support of these strata. In many cases they were themselves the 
main force contributing to undermining colonial control and it was 
because of their claim to represent the rural masses that the petty 
bourgeoisie succeeded in taking over the state apparatus. Capitalist 
incorporation of the agricultural sector within the national economy 
represents the only means through which agriculture can contribute 
significantly to national strategies of development and accumulation 
within the framework of state capitalism and to the reproduction of the 
ruling strata and the accumulation of its wealth. Given the reluctance 
of private capital to invest in the agricultural sector other than in 
activities which do not relate to the production process, state capita-
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list strata have "a more direct interest in the development of commodi-
ty relations within any given country than international companies 
which mobilize capital and switch investment on a global basis" (162). 
The main aim of state capitalist agrarian policies is to change 
the terms of the intersectoral relationship between agriculture and the 
urban sector and particularly to establish terms of exchange between 
town and country which determine the size of the marketed surplus that 
agriculture can contribute to the productive and consumptive activities 
of the urban sector. 
Various methods are employed to achieve this relationship, the 
most important of which is agrarian reform and related policies of 
cooperation and the introduction of some limited forms of collect-
ivization. Despite the fact that agrarian reform an indispensable 
policy followed in almost all underdeveloped countries regardless of 
their political and economic systems one can distinguish the reforms 
undertaken by state capitalist regimes by their emphasis on bringing 
the agricultural sector and the rural population in general under 
direct state control. This is shown by the various measures that 
accompany agrarian reform relating to new forms of agricultural organi-
zation in production, marketing and the supply of credits. 
Agrarian reform generally tends to break up very large landhold-
ings and distribute them to landless peasants. Thus with varying dig-
rees of intensity, it usually results in sustaining a number of small 
agricultural units of production at the expense of large estates. As 
well as resulting in a slight improvement of the lot of the small 
peasants, the process tends to consolidate the position of the medium 
size farmer. Thus inequality in the distribution of land is not elimin-
ated and there is still a relatively wide gap separating the medium 
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size farmers, whose holdings generally remain intact, from the rest of 
the peasantry. As the reform is restricted in scope by the limited 
amount of land to be distributed (since it is confined to large owner-
ship and does not concern medium owners) it is unable to solve endemic 
problems of landlessness and rural to urban migration. Furthermore, the 
reforms do not involve any radical changes in the form of landowner-
ship, which remains in essence private. This is despite the introduc-
tion, usuallY by bureaucratic measures, of new forms of agricultural 
organization such as cooperation and some forms of collectivization 
managed and supervised by the state. Hence, production is still carried 
out primarily on an individual basis, dependent on the work of family 
members with the employment of seasonal wage labour on relatively large 
farms, or primitive peasant forms of cooperation in the peak seasons. 
Agricultural products change from subsistence to cash crops according 
to the intensity of the newly established links with the urban sector. 
Agrarian reform gives the state some desperately needed political 
legitimacy and contributes to the consolidation of the power of the 
bureaucracy, since it represents a direct blow to the semi-feudal lords 
whose mere existence was synonymous with drastic poverty and inequal-
ity. Thus at least in the short term the reform presents the ruling 
strata of the petty bourgeoisie with significant mobilizing power over 
the peasantry, since one of its immediate consequences is the provision 
of some kind of satisfaction and security to part of the peasantry in 
the sense that the reform acts as a catalyst towards a system in which 
the small peasantry are the predominant forces in the countryside. 
The political legitimacy acquired both by the state and the ruling 
strata of the petty bourgeoisie by the promulgation of agrarian reform 
is_soon overshadowed by the emphasis on modernization and by the·ouher 
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policies it introduces to increase productivity. These range from the 
introduction of new forms of agricultural organization represented by 
cooperation and state farms to compulsory programmes of marketing and 
pricing together with supplies of inputs, machines, and credits. The 
essential aim of such policies is to achieve state control over agricu-
ltural production and to mobilize its marketed surplus for the benefit 
of the urban sector. 
Far from eliminating private property, agrarian reform has in fact 
asserted it and apart from trying to abolish pre-capitalist forms of 
production has brought almost no change in production relations as far 
as private property is concerned. On the other hand, cooperation 
enhances state control over farms which remain managed on an individual 
basis. It "merely meant the control of inputs (seed, fertilizer, 
pesticides) and the forced marketing of outputs" (163). Moreover, 
despite its potential for increasing production and for providing the 
peasants with inputs, the impact of cooperation is limited by the 
bureaucratic methods through which it is implemented. In order to 
create a shift in agricultural production towards satisfying the needs 
of the urban sector, the emphasis of cooperation is more towards 
directing the peasants what to produce than towards anything else. 
Cooperation is accompanied by state supply of inputs and state purchase 
of output; it exerts almost total control over agricultural prices and 
thus over the peasants' incomes. These mechanisms together with the 
state supply and the introduction of new services in agriculture, make 
the state able to penetrate more and more comprehensively into peasant 
life. The political incorporation of peasants through the promotion of 
certain individuals as intermediaries linking small peasants to the 
bureaucracy,. will intensify such penetration~ 
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Given the fact that agrarian reform has not radically tackled the 
problem of inequality, since it preserves the holdings of medium size 
farmers which considerably exceed those of small peasants, it is often 
the case that the various policies pursued by the state tend to favour 
wealthier farmers who benefit most from state services, the provision 
of inputs, and agricultural investment, simply because most of these 
services and inputs and much of the advice offered are appropriate only 
for them. They will be the first to apply capital intensive methods of 
cultivation since they are the most able to meet the state's require-
ments for the provision of machines and other inputs. Their incomes and 
their better access to credits and loans enable them to raise the 
initial capital and to increase their productivity and, therefore, to 
increase their capital further. This is true especially if we recall 
the family links that connect the state bureaucracy with the wealthy 
farmers which further emphasise the favourable terms that those farmers 
enjoy under state capitalism. These links enable wealthy farmers to 
control the newly established cooperatives and to manipulate them and 
their facilities for their benefit. It is quite common to see the 
cooperatives headed by rich farmers who by providing the bureaucracy 
with political support, acquire for their own use assets which are 
supposed to be for the equal use of all peasants. 
Moreover, by virtue of their relatively large holdings, wealthy 
farmers are able to evade state control over their outputs by shifting 
production towards those products which are not controlled by the state 
such as fruit and vegetables and animal products. The prices of these 
crops, which are difficult for the state to control, rise rapidly as a 
resul.t -of -the gen~ral· dev~lopment· strateqy: o£ state capitalism which 
places higher emphasis on the urban sector'-and-as a result -of the 
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increasing demand from higher income groups. Wealthy farmers possess 
the technical means to meet the requirements of such production which 
are generally capital intensive. They are able to allocate a signifi-
cant part of their land to fruit and vegetables and use their access to 
state loans and credits to mobilize the inputs required by such 
products. The size of their holdings, their relations with the 
bureaucracy and their incomes allow them to use quite different factors 
of production to those of the rest of the peasantry and to exhibit a 
more capitalist pattern of cultivation such as the use of wage labour 
and capital equipment. 
This trend is opposed by the attempt by the small peasants to meet 
the additional burdens resulting from the state penetration and con-
trol. They tend to multiply their efforts in order to increase the size 
of their land, a process which involves more surplus being extracted by 
the state and more intensive forms of peasant exploitation. What 
further enhances the role played by the wealthy farmers is the failure, 
at least in the early stages of state capitalist agrarian policies, to 
bring about a sustained increase in total agricultural production or 
for this production to match the growth in the population and its 
demands. 
One major reason for this failure is that because of the sectoral 
imbalance characterizing the development strategy which favours the 
urban sector over the rural sector, the agricultural sector becomes 
increasingly discriminated against in terms of employment and wages. 
Increasing demand for agricultural products is met by increasing 
imports. This has very serious implications for the reproduction of the 
bureaucratHvoourgeoisie especially in the absence of- other· resources 
that can.cOOipens;:lte.for. state expenditures~ With more emphasis on 
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production and productivity, which becomes apparent when a serious 
agricultural crisis is in prospect and when the growth of agricultural 
production does not keep pace with population increases, there is a 
sharp rise in the prices of certain foods, normally those produced by 
the wealthy farmers. In such circumstances the latter receive addition-
al facilities from the state, and this leads to more pronounced 
differentiation and inequality. 
The liberalization policy is reflected in the state's position 
towards the wealthy farmers who by trying to expand their resource 
base, start to provide the inputs over which state control is gradually 
lifted (164). Emphasis on production and productivity overshadows, or 
indeed replaces, the concern to abolish or reduce inequality and even 
becomes reflected in the relaxation of ownership ceilings and the 
transfer of usufruct rights from the state to private lessees. State 
policies towards production, marketing, and the supply of inputs and 
material are gradually relaxed (165). The main emphasis is now placed 
on trying to stimulate the private agricultural sector and further 
facilities are introduced to encourage this sector. In the process rich 
farmers find new ways to invest and to expand their activities. 
Thus the sequence of state capitalism which starts with an 
emphasis on social justice and equality ends with policies emphasizing 
efficiency and productivity Which tend to promote the wealthy farmers 
whose fortunes and interests are directly tied to the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie. If state capitalism involves the establishment of state 
farms as pioneer production units, it is the wealthy farmers who will 
benefit from turning such farms into private enterprises as they 
possess, the political and economic,, means' tO"dEr-So--, (·166 h · 
. .we can conclude -from· these generalc tendenci.es that.. whatever.: the 
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intensity and radicalness of the agricultural transformations under 
state capitalism, the task of agriculture during this phase is to carry 
the burden of the development strategy. Beside the evident failure to 
introduce a sustained increase in agricultural production, this policy 
leads to the agricultural sector's integration into the national and 
international capitalist market and thus to new forms of differentia-
tion and inequality. 
----- --
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PART I I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND : ALGERIA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE 
OIAPTER THREE POLITI CAL AND SOCIO- E<XlN<MI C BACKGROUND OF 
COLONIAL ALGERIA, c. 1800-1962 
No social, economic, political, or even cultural issue concerning 
Algeria can be presented or analysed without going back to the history 
of the French colonial period, whether to its begining, its develop-
ment, or its end. The significance of this colonization lies not only 
in the fact that it lasted for more than 130 years but also, and more 
importantly, in the structural changes and transformations that it 
created in Algerian society. 
Pre-colonial Algerian society, which was variously affected and 
conditioned by this colonization, was totally changed and its ways of 
life drastically altered. The existing equilibrium between man and 
resources, production and consumption, imports and exports were effec-
tively disrupted. However, the effects of French colonization are more 
evident in the agricultural sector than in any other sector of the 
economy. A set of new socio-economic relationships was introduced, 
based on private property in land and on the production of exchange 
value and the gradual substitution of a market for a subsistence econo-
my. The foundations of rural society were violently destroyed by priva-
tizing and expropriating its essential means of production, i.e. the 
land, and transferring ownership to a relatively small number of Euro-
pean settlers, who developed their agriculture on a capitalist basis, 
and linked it directly to metropolitan France. 
This chapter tries to trace the development of colonization, the 
stages it passed through, and the changes it introduced into Algerian 
economy and society in general and into the agricultural sector in 
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particular. In order to grasp the scope and extent of the structural 
transformations created by the colonization process, a brief descrip-
tion of the society of pre-colonial Algeria is necessary. 
Algeria: Pre-Colonial Background 
"Algeria (in the first half of the 19th century) was no barbarian 
country inhabited by illiterate people With anarchic or sterile insti-
tuions. Its human and economic values attained a high level, and while 
the concepts and criteria of civilization differed somewhat from those 
of France, they also belonged in many of their aspects to certain 
universal forms".(l) 
Pre-colonial Algerian society was predominantly rural, with 95 per 
cent of the population engaged in cultivating crops (mainly cereals) 
and raising livestock. However,it was not homogeneousJ its ways of life 
varied according to geographical and climatic conditions. It was com-
posed of settled highland cultivators organized into village communi-
ties, semi-nomadic tribes on the steppes, and nomadic tribes in the 
desert who depended entirely upon raising livestock. 
The tribe was the focus of social organization, and an indivi-
dual's ultimate allegiance was to the tribe or to a real or imaginary 
ancestor linking the individual to the rest of society. However, the 
influence of this basic social unit varied from one region to another 
depending on various factors, the most important of which was the type 
of agriculture practised, whether based on settled cultivation of the 
land or on raising livestock in the semi-arid area, and on the proximi-
ty to an urban centre. The tribe was subdivided into several agnatic 
lineages composed of numerous nuclear or extended families. The size of 
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the tribe varied from a small cluster of hamlets dotted about one or 
two mountain slopes to an immense unit occupying a wide region (2). The 
administrative body which settled all communal affairs was the iama'a 
(group) councils on which every family was represented by one vote, 
given to its senior member. Daily matters were discussed and agreed 
upon by the members of the jama•a which functioned as the kernel of 
pre-colonial Algerian political organization (3). 
Agriculture was the main economic activity of rural Algeria, and 
production was directed essentially towards satisfying the needs of the 
producers with only an insignificant proportion of surplus produced for 
exchange with neighbouring tribes and the urban centres. Cultivation 
was generally practised by primitive methods with primitive implements, 
and cereals, olives, and livestock constituted the principal agricultu-
ral products. Devastating calamities due to invasions of locusts and 
agricultural diseases were quite common and regular and forced starving 
peasants to migrate or to resettle in other areas (4). 
As well as the rural population, there existed a few urban centres 
which remained under the direct control of the Ottoman Empire until 
1830. These centres were relatively isolated from the countryside and 
depended mainly on artisanal activities and on commercial exchanges 
with the outside world. The taxes provided by the countryside constitu-
ted one source of income for these centres, which Nouschi has estimated 
at about 2 per cent of all agricultural production (5). 
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Socio-economic structure 
1-Urban Centres 
on the eve of colonization, Algeria was under the control of the 
Ottoman Empire. It was governed by the Dey who represented the Ottoman 
Sultan, and who was assisted by three governors called Beys represent-
ing him at provincial level in Algiers, Constantine, and Oran. Algiers 
was the administrative centre of the Ottoman government. At the state 
level, the power structure was hierarchical, that is, political author-
ity radiated from the centre. 
Ottoman rule, which lasted somewhat intermittently from 1519 to 
1830, had shaped the socio-economic structure of Algerian society but 
it did not destroy it as French colonization did. The reason for this 
was that Ottoman rule did not extend beyond the major coastal cities 
and their surrounding areas. The only contact that the Ottomans had 
with the countryside was the imposition of taxes on agricultural produ-
ction or more often on the agricultural products bartered by the 
tribes. Of an estimated total population of three million Algerians in 
1830, the major cities were inhabited by 160,000 persons distributed as 
follows (6): 
Algiers 
Tlemcen 
Or an 
Medea 
60,000 
20,000 
10,000 (7) 
10,000 
Constantine 
Mascara 
Miliana 
Cherchell 
35,000 
12,000 
10,000 
3,000 
In these cities lived a socially, economically, and ethnically 
heterogeneous population composed of the ruling elements, merchants, 
artisans, and apprentices (8). These cities presented many features of 
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early capitalist development~ important commercial activity, small 
manufacturing workshops, advanced financial institutions, market-orien-
ted agricultural production, and sharecropping arrangements (9). 
Three major important economic activities formed the essential 
sources of income for these urban centres. First, and the most impor-
tant of all, was piracy. Algiers was, for a long time, the main harbour 
for pirates raiding European merchant vessels in the Mediterranean 
(10). Secondly, it is significant that the urban economy was unable to 
realise any considerable surplus except through commerce, which occup-
ied an important position in the list of economic activities. Exports 
of agricultural products produced in the nearby areas and of locally 
manufactured products reached Spain, France, and even Holland. Many 
arrangements and protocols were made in order to facilitate Algeria's 
exports and imports (11). However, the monopoly of trade by the Ottoman 
s~te, which favoured European trading companies, had the effects of 
eliminating Algerian merchants from international trade (12). In fact 
almost all economic activity was controlled personally by the Dey, who 
had absolute power in deciding who should exercise his privileges and 
under what conditions. Thus the main revenues of the state, which were 
hard to distinguish from those of the Dey himself, came from commerce. 
Nevertheless, wealthy indiVidual merchants, who also occupied some 
posts within the state, contributed to a certain extent to trading 
activities. Hence the families of Bushnaq, Bakri, and Sforno played an 
important role in the export and import activities at the same time as 
being state functionaries (13). 
Small manufacturing workshops producing textiles, metals, and 
leather were concentrated in the cities of Algiers, Constantine, Medea, 
and Tlemcen. They were owned either by th-e- state -or· -by indi-viduals 
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employing members of their families, producing both for the internal 
market and for export (14}. 
Finally, there was some commercial agricultural production, mainly 
of wheat, under the Ottoman administration. As we shall see, the state 
owned a considerable amount of land (beylik), worked either by 
sharecroppers (Khammas) and agricultural labourers or by members of 
allied tribes working lands known as ~. 
In addition to all these sources, there was the income which came 
from agricultural taxation which was the Ottomans• sole economic 
contact with the inside hinterland. These taxes were usually collected 
by a number of loyal tribes called makhzan tribes which were rewarded 
for their services and which remained in direct conflict with the 
rebellious tribes which refused to pay these taxes. In this way Ottoman 
rule kept society fragmented by maintaining already existing tribal 
conflicts and protected its rule by preventing any widespread unified 
action against itself. 
2-Rural Areas 
As has been mentioned earlier, 95 per cent of the Algerian popula-
tion lived in the rural areas with agriculture constituting the princi-
pal economic activity, which meant that land was the most important, 
and sometimes the only means of production. Differences in climate and 
ecological conditions led to wide variations in the specialization of 
production. The settled villagers of the North, for example, grew 
mainly cereals and fruit mostly for home consumption but also producing 
some surplus for exchange with urban centres and nomadic tribes. Popu-
lation density in this area was relatively high, perhaps as much as 70 
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to 100 inhabitants per square kilometre. Typical combinations of 
agricultural and pastoral activities were found in areas of average 
density (about 15 inhabitants per sq.km.) as in the villages, plains, 
and foothills of the Tell. In the southern regions, on the other hand, 
the population density dropped markedly and pastoral activities predo-
minated. Variations in agricultural production left their mark on the 
way the land was owned. In the sedentary villages and in areas where 
cultivation needed considerable attention in order to yield a good 
harvest, the privatisation of land had advanced very much faster than 
in agro-pastoral areas where collective ownership of the land by the 
members of the tribes predominated. 
A simple glance at pre-colonial Algerian land ownership would 
suggest that it was of an egalitarian nature. According to the shari'a 
to which Algeria adhered, land belonged to God and man was entitled to 
the usufruct of the land by mixing his labour with it. According to 
pre-colonial Algerian law defining property relations, entitlement to 
property ownership could be achieved by means of any of the following 
procedures: a long and continuous occupation of a plot of land, the 
clearing of uncultivated woodland, by purchase or inheritance, or 
through the medium of mugharisa, a planting contract which granted the 
planter ownership of half the land he had planted with fruit trees 
(15). Such conditions were usually fulfilled by groups rather than 
individuals since the Algerian social formation reflected the predomi-
nance of group over individual rights "where the group with its burden 
of conformism, indifferentiation, and solidarity outweighs individual 
initiative, and collective tenure outweighs private property"(l6). Thus 
the structure of Algerian pre-colonial land ownership was mainly based 
on the collective possession of this essential means of production. The 
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individual's access to the land was part of the group's access, and no 
individual was able to monopolise the land. 
A typical example is that a tribe of at least several thousand 
people held customary rights over an area of thousands or even tens of 
thousands of hectares. The tribe in its turn was subdivided into seg-
ments which each retained a certain degree of autonomy in their pastor-
al life. These segments were in their turn subdivided into duwars or 
villages, each numbering about a hundred or more people. These tribes 
and their areas were called 'arsh. Each member of the duwar had access 
to the land which belonged to it collectively. Cultivation was carried 
out on a collective basis and each family participated in the work and 
gained a share in the harvest. The population of the duwar was supposed 
to consist of the descendants of a common ancester, but it could also 
be composed of fractions from different tribes. As well as the common 
land of the village, each familY possesed a small plot of land for 
personal cultivation. This plot was usually inherited by the members of 
the family but if there were no heirs the land itself reverted to the 
commune to be assigned by the ;ama•a assembly to other families. 
With the passage of time, there was a tendency to shift the social 
importance towards the village rather than the tribe, especially in the 
areas which were near to, or had more contact with, the urban centres. 
Inter-tribal conflict generally became less frequent than conflicts 
between the fractions of a single tribe. This was indeed a clear sign 
that the society was not static, and that the disintegration of some 
tribal ties was under way, although at a very slow rate. 
The second form of ownership besides arsh was private land, ~ 
which belonged to private individual owners who had the right of sell-
ing it ~r bequeathing it to their heirs. This form appeared more in the 
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Northern part of the country or in Kabylia where intensive cultivation 
was practised and land needed considerable labour. Melk property deve-
loped out of communal land, and as early as 1837, the French colonial 
authorities recognized it in the following terms: "private property 
existed and was perpetuated in Algeria on the same basis as among us~ 
it is acquired, transmitted, and held and recognized by long posses-
sion, Muslim testimonials, and regular titles~ the law protects it and 
the court assists it "(17}. A French parliamentary committee which 
studied the question of land tenure in 1873 established that about 4.5 
million hectares of arable lands were held in~ (18). 
In Kabylia, for example, the process of privatization of the 
communal land had gone further than in any other area and "what was 
left of the communal land was limited to assembly places, slaughter-
areas etc."(l9}. However, this private property was not identical to 
its counterpart in the pre-capitalist societies of Europe, since it was 
limited at two levels. On the one hand, land was not costomerily owned 
by an individual but by the family as a whole, including the father, 
mother, sons and their wives, daughters, uncles, and cousins. In con-
tradistinction to many other parts of the Muslim world, the practice of 
shiyu•a was wildely applied in Algeria, under which the land owned by a 
family was nor normally divided after the death of its head. on the 
other hand, the family and the tribe retained a prior right to retain 
possession of any part sold by one of the co-owners by providing a 
prospective seller with the exact sum that he had paid for it original-
ly. This right of pre-emption was known as shaf'a. 
Thus in spite of the existence of private ownership, land tenure 
in general was still dominated by, and under the influence of, the 
tribe and_the family. No individual possessed the full rights of dispo-
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sal over what was supposed to be his private property. The ~ system 
of ownership shows how the individual's right, even when it was held 
sovereign, was set in a communal framework. 
However, the rise of private property did not stop at the family 
unit, due to their social and religious influence, some important 
families were able to obtain larger plots than other families. 
Gallissot, for example, pointed out that "he who, together with his 
close family, dominated the hawsh, enjoyed not only the prestige of 
descent claimed direct from the eponymous ancestor, but also and prima-
rily access to income arising from the labour of other families" (20). 
Similarily, Bennoune has written that "there existed in pre-colonial 
Algeria a big landlord class whose holdings constituted large latifun-
dia. Most of them were absentee estate owners who lived in towns and 
cities; their estates were cultivated by khammassats or sharecrop-
pers" (21). In these ownerships, relations of production were based 
more on social, and sometimes religious, prestige than on serf-feuda-
list ties. 
The third form of land ownership was the habus lands. They were 
those lands constituted as a pious trust by donations in favour of 
religious corporations or institutions, normally mosques or religious 
schools. This form of ownership appeared more in the areas around 
Algiers and oran than in any other part of the country. ~ revenue 
was used for the upkeep of sanctuaries and for charity and above all 
for teaching and propagating the religious life. Statistics about the 
amount of land belonging to this category are lacking but it was esti-
mated to be between 40,000 and 50,000 hectares, although the figure may 
have been as high as 75,000 hectares (22). 
The ~ lands were managed by- families known as marabouts who 
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claimed to be descendants of the Prophet (23). Their control of these 
lands ensured their existence and provided them with a standard of 
living which put them socially and economically above the peasants who 
worked these lands. On the eve of the colonial conquest, the authority 
of the marabout families often equalled that of the tribal shaikhs of 
acknowledged warrior nobility. We can see, therefore, that in spite of 
the supposedly collective nature of this form of ownership- in that it 
belonged to God- it contributed further to social and economic diffe-
rentiation in pre-colonial Algerian society and has paved the way for 
private ownership, which was consolidated by appropriating the surplus 
of labour for private interests. 
The last form of land ownership was the public property of the 
Ottoman state which extended over an area of 146,693 hectares (24). 
This property was divided into two categories: 
1-The beylik lands (known as amiri in other parts of the Empire); 
often the most fertile lands surrounding the cities. Cultivation 
of these lands was carried out either by neighbouring tribes or 
by sharecroppers (khammesa), recruited from landless or impoveri-
shed peasants who were supplied with seeds, draft animals, and 
food, and received one-fifth of the total yield at the end of the 
harvest. These lands were administered by government officials 
appointed by the Bey and should not be confused with the Bey• 
personal property. 
2-The 'azil lands; these were the lands expropriated or purchased by 
the Bey who granted them to: 
-High government officials who employed sharecroppers. 
-Loyal tribes called •azil in return for some of the harvest. The 
.lands cultivated by those tribes were also called~. 
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-Individual tenants in exchange for some kind of taxes. 
Finally, there was mawat (dead) land which was usually unproduc-
tive territory, and any one clearing and cultivating it gained title 
for it. 
From the above description it appears that Algerian society on the 
eve of the French conquest was not socially homogeneous, and that 
collective forms of ownership were existed alongside individual and 
family forms. In fact it is difficult to talk about a uniform social 
structure. On the one hand, exploitation, though it occurred and deve-
loped over time, was not of the flagrantly feudalistic nature which 
ties the cultivators to the land he does not possess; rather, it was 
mystified by the legal/communal form of ownership and hidden under the 
guise of social and religious prestige. Dispossession of cultivators 
and concentration of ownership took place very slowly because of inhe-
ritance and demographic pressure. A more pronounced differentiation was 
developing in the lands in the vicinity of the cities owned by state 
officials, on Which the cultivators were obliged to produce a surplus 
in order to pay taxes. Generally, it can be said pre-colonial Algerian 
rural society just before the French occupation was in a state of 
gradual transition towards a more socially and economically differen-
tiated structure, partly but not wholly set in motion by the extension 
of the tax-collecting activities of the local representatives of the 
Ottoman state. 
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The French Conquest 
The 5th of July 1830 (the day in which Algiers fell to the French 
troops} was the culmination of a new era in Algeria's relations with 
France which had begun long before this date. The colonization of 
Algeria satisfied ,the demands of two influential centres of power in 
the frame of the July Monarchy, both of which saw their interests 
threatened by the loss of colonies to England. The first of these was 
the army which saw its glory fading as a result of defeats inflicted 
upon it by the English army, and the second was the mercantile bour-
geoisie, especially in Marseilles, whose trade had became stagnant 
because of the blockade of the Algerian ports and the effects of the 
Greek war of independence (25}. 
From the begining the French conquest was characterized by a 
degree of violence and brutality almost unparalleled in recent history. 
It involved the destruction and the impoverishment of Algeria's urban 
centres and of its countryside together with its economic, social, and 
political structures. The urban centres were completely ruined; their 
populations were either massacred or fled for ever. In the early years 
of the conquest, for example, 45,000 citizens of Algiers were killed or 
exiled (26}, and oran, which had a population of 40,000 in 1831, was 
reduced to 1,000 in 1838 (27). Furthermore, considerable damage was 
inflicted on those who remained; their houses were demolished, their 
properties confiscated without compansation, and their business ruined. 
Rozet, a French historian, described the demolition of houses in order 
to use the doors and windows frames together with fruit trees as hea-
ting fuel ( 28) • 
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However, the brutalities committed by the French troops in the 
Algerian cities were insignificant in comparison with the violence and 
destruction of the "fine villages"in the countryside (29). Indeed their 
policy of devastation was not simply the result of the stiff resistence 
shown by the Algerian people, but was a conscious plan to destroy the 
basis of Algerian social and economic structures. The means of implemen-
ting this plan were proudly described by the French generals; Marshal 
Bugeaud, the commander of French army in the 1840s wrote: 
"more than fifty fine villages, built of stone and roofed with 
tiles, were destroyed. Our soldiers made very considerable 
pickings there. We did not have time, in the heat of the combat, 
to chop down the trees. The task, in any case, would have been 
beyond our strength. Twenty thousands men armed with axes could 
not in six months cut down the olives and fig trees which cover 
the beautiful landscape which lay at our feet"(30). 
Colonel Forey wrote in 1843 describing the results of one operation: 
"we gained 3,000 head of sheep, fire was set on more than ten villages 
and about 10,000 fig and olive trees were cut or burned". Another army 
officer, Bouteilloux, wrote in 1842 that: "since December our troops 
made organized raids on all the surroundings of Blida. These well 
organized raids have ruined, or started to ruin, the country •••• we 
have inflicted heavy losses on the peasants"(31). 
Stiff resistance to the French was led by the Amir 'Abd al-Qadir, 
who succeeded in uniting the tribes in the west of Algeria, led to the 
temporary establishment of an independent Algerian state in the north-
west of the country. But this was only for a short time since 'Abd al-
Qadir was forced to surrender in 1847. A series of regional insurrec-
tions took place in other parts of the country especially in Kabylia, 
but all were defeated, and were followed by more violence and brutali-
ties and the gradual consolidation of France's grip over Algeria. 
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French Land Tenure and Agricultural Policies 
From the outset the French colonial authorities realized that in 
order to "establish a lasting colony and that as a consequence it 
(France) will bring European civilization to these barbaric coun-
tries"(32), th~ existing Algerian social, economic and political sys-
tems had to be destroyed. Having already weakened the basis of the 
emerging Algerian mercantile bourgeoisie in the cities by expropriating 
its properties and by forcing the civilians to leave the cities, the 
colonial authorities began to implement a well conceived plan to penet-
rate the countryside and to destroy the basis of the peasantry by 
eliminating the existing system of land tenure and by replacing it with 
one more likely to bring settlers to Algeria. 
The French authorities saw that the only means of dominating 
Algeria was by the physical occupation of the land. They also realized 
that in order to establish themselves on Algerian territory, their 
control over the rural areas was a vital precondition. The first mea-
sure was an attempt to transfer the native property directly to members 
of the invading army. This happened very soon after the first landings 
when General Clauzel, who took over the command of the French army 
immediately after the invasion, acquired three plots of land on his own 
account on which he intended to settle colonists, and he encouraged the 
foundation of a joint-stock company to exploit 1,000 hectares of land 
near Maison carree, leased at a nominal annual rate of one franc per 
hectare (33). From now on the appropriation of the land became the main 
feature of French policy. There were, in fact, three main means by 
which this policy was implemented~ public expropriation, delimitation 
(cantonnement), and most devastating of all, the widespread introduc-
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tion of private property. 
1-Expropriation: In the early years of the colonization the bulk of the 
land acquired by European settlers was handed over to them at a nominal 
price by the colonial administration after being expropriated from the 
proprietors. A series of laws and decrees were enacted for this pur-
pose. Considering itself the heir of the Ottoman state, the French 
administration began by expropriating the properties that belonged to 
the Dey and the beys, in accordance with a decree issued on 8 September 
1830. This was followed by another decree of 10 June 1831 which provid-
ed for the expropriation of the properties of those of Ottoman origin 
who had stayed in Algeria and who "are known for their spirit of 
opposition to the authority of France". On 1 March 1833 a commission 
was created to verify title to properties before 1830. This commission 
required proprietors to produce their titles of ownership within three 
days or to see their properties confiscated (34). These decrees were 
followed by continuous, and sometimes ad hoc, actions aimed at enabling 
the French to acquire more lands (35). In 1844 another decree declared 
that all uncultivated lands in specified areas would be classed as 
vacant if nobody could prove rights of ownership. As far as habus 
property was concerned, the colonial administration claimed that 
"perpetual rents have lost their primitive utility and constitute today 
an obstacle to the development of industry; the time has come to dec-
lare it (habus property) resalable at the legal monetary interest 
rate". In other words, ~property was abolished (36). 
one of the major source of confiscation was the war and the resis-
tance put up bY the indigenes to the occupiers. Tribes and individuals 
who had participated in such acts of resistance saw their lands confis-
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cated. An ordinance of 31 October 1845 regulating the rules of seques-
tration, clearly stipulated that "in the future sequestration will be 
established only on the movable and unmovable property of most ~ 
genes who: 
-commit an act of hostility against the French or tribes which have 
submitted to France or who give direct or indirect assistance to the 
-enemy, 
-leave their lands and join the enemy"(37). 
By about 1850, 364,341 hectares had been expropriated by the 
colonial authorities and the most of them were handed over to European 
settlers. In the Mitidja, for example, the French colons established 
sixty farms over an area of 14,500 hectares an average of 240 hectares 
per farm (38). 
The defeat of the revolt of Muhammad Mukrani in 1871 triggered 
off a further wave of expropriation. A war idemnity of 36.5 million 
francs was imposed on the region of Kabylia~ this was estimated to 
constitute 70 per cent of the total capital of the people involved in 
the revolt (39). In addition to that, all the lands of the tribes who 
had taken part in the rebellion were sequestrated by a decree of 31 
March 1871. The total amount of the land which was confiscated as a 
result of this decree amounted to 400,00 hectares (40). 
2-cantonnement: This term refers to the practice of defining and redu-
cing the extent of the tribal lands. The provisions of the previous 
decrees before 1846 had became insufficient in relation to the needs of 
the colons for land. The revolution of 1848 and the coup d'etat of 1850 
triggered off a large wave of immigration from France, and it became 
necessary to device a new form of acquiring land. The definition of the 
tribal lands was a disguised form of land appropriation -from--the -Alger-
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ians for the benfit of the colons. the colonial administration consid-
ered that the tribes possessed more lands than they really needed, and, 
relying more on its judgment than on the claims of the tribes, decided 
to expropriate all lands which were "not used" by the tribes. Since the 
property claims of the tribes were of course not properly documented, 
as the administration was well aware, this practice meant that a great 
loss was inflicted upon the tribes in terms of land, particularly 
forest land, which resulted in a considerable decline in the number of 
their herds. In the Mitidja, for instance, a commission facilitated the 
granting of 16,190 hectares to the state in 1851, leaving the tribes 
with 20,810 ha. for 304 families or 16 ha. per family. The tribe of 
Abid el-Feraila owned 8,941 ha. at Kantera; this was reduced to 3,983 
ha. in 1857. In 1860 the herd of the same tribe was reduced by one 
third (41). 
The policy of "cantonnement" culminated in the promulgation of the 
senatus Consulte in March 1863 which, as described by one contemporary 
author, A. Vassiere, was "the most efficient war machine that one could 
imagine against the native social order, and the most powerful and 
fertile instrument which could have been put in the hands of our sett-
lers"(42). The main aim of this law was, besides the the breaking up of 
the central organizational unit and its replacement by the village 
duwar, to institute private ownership of land. Article 1 and 2 stipul-
ated that: 
-the tribes of Algeria are declared the proprietors of the territory 
they cultivate in a traditional and permanent manner, 
-the following measures will be undertaken administratively and as soon 
as possible: 
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1-the definition and delimitation of the tribal territories, 
2-their distribution among the different duwars of each tribe of 
the Tell (Northern Algeria) and other agricultural areas except 
those lands which should keep their character as communal 
proprietors, 
3-the estabiishment of individual property among the members of the 
duwars wherever this measure is suitable and possible (43). 
In terms of area, and up to 1870, the delimitation concerned a 
total of 372 tribes who possessed 6,833,811 ha. of land. out of this 
total only 1,003,072 ha. were retained by those tribes, or 14.9 per 
cent of the total, an area a little bit larger than the province of 
Algiers (44). 
Generally, the application of this law resulted in the definition 
and reduction of the territories of 709 tribes. Between 1863 and 1930 
the tribes were broken up into 1,196 duwars (667 duwars in 1870). By 
1956 out of a total 801 tribes, only eight had not yet been dismembered 
(45). 
We can see, therefore, that the significance of this law lies not 
only in the fact that the tribes were deprived of their lands and thus 
eventually became impoverished, but also in the setting up of indivi-
dual property as the backbone of the new mode of production, a condi-
tion which created further loss and impoverishment for the local popu-
lation. 
3-Private ownership: This was the most important factor in the destruc-
tion of the foundations of Algerian rural society and in the transfo-
rmation of it structures. Expropriation and cantonnement generally 
reduced the lands available to the Algerian population, and sometimes 
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forced the tribes to move from their villages to less-fertile areas in 
the south as a result of the direct and violent methods of land exprop-
riation. However, these two factors did not entirely changed the owner-
ship system, although it was widely affected and its efficiency was 
reduced. In the pre-colonial period, and in fact until the 1870's, 
agricultural taxation was often extracted either by the state, the 
armed forces, or the social or religious power of the dominant group 
rather than through the mechanism of the market. This had to wait until 
the official constitution of private property in land, a factor which, 
by establishing an exchange value and a market for land, created the 
basis of capitalist development in the countryside and contributed to 
the further impoverishment and destruction of Algerian rural society, 
which now had to compete on unequal terms with the European settlers. 
This official recognition of individual ownership was embodied by 
the Warnier Law of 1873 which was a revision of the Senatus Consulte. 
This law extended the French legal definition of property by recogni-
zing only individuals as landowners whether of communal land or of 
family holdings. Thus all forms of collective property were abolished 
and what was formerly communal land was transformed into the individual 
property of the members of the collectivity. 
Special commissions were established charged with defining owner-
ship and with handing out property certificates to members of the 
collectivity. The mere news that such distribution was imminent was 
sufficient to attract property speculators even from among the Algerian 
population. Lack of information and the general ignorance of the pea-
sants made it easy for speculators to acquire more land, either by 
getting the lands of others recognized as their own, or by using "straw 
Jnen" .t.o whom they could attribute land tradit·ionally c_ultivated by 
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others. One result of these manipulations was the creation of a class 
of large landowners who collaborated with the French until the end of 
colonial rule (46). 
For the colons, this new law created an additional means of acqui-
ring land but this time in a more subtle way than the flagrant violence 
of the state, although it was no less effective. By invoking Article 
827 of the French Civil Code which stipulated that "if real estate 
cannot be conveniently divided a legal sale must ensue" (47), this law 
gave the colons the means of acquiring the melk land of the Algerian 
peasantry at incredibly low prices (48). By means of this law of 1873 
the French office of colonization appropriated 309,891 ha. out of 
2,239,095 ha. surveyed during this period, that is 13 per cent of the 
total (49).The real beneficiaries of the Warnier Law were the settlers, 
who acquired 563,762 ha between 1877 and 1898. ha. (50). 
Taken as a whole, the three policies resulted in two complementary 
and interrelated developments which fundamentally changed Algerian 
rural society and affected its future development. The first was the 
virtually total destruction of the traditional social, economic, and 
political structures of Algerian society, and the second was the deve-
lopment of a new set of economic and social relations based essentially 
on ensuring the economic well-being of European settlers. 
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The Disruption of the Algerian Social Structure 
The first attack directed by the French colonisers against the 
Algerians hit their emerging commercial bourgeoisie. A process of 
impoverishment and migration of this class took place immediately after 
the occupation of the major Algerian cities. This resulted both from 
the violent measures taken to break the resistance of the people and 
the actual mechanism of colonial development. 
A wave of immigration from the cities to the rural areas to escape 
the brutalities inflicted by the colonial army took place shortly after 
the occupation {51). This led the colonial administration to exprop-
riate all the properties belonging to the migrants. In 1831, for exam-
ple, out of 5,000 buildings in the city of Algiers, 3,000 became the 
property of the colonial state {52). 
Another factor played an important role in the destruction of the 
Algerian urban bourgeoisie was the inflation that took place after 1830 
which was aggravated by the introduction of French currency. Augustin 
Berque wrote in 1949 that: "one of the new factors which ruined the 
local bourgeoisie was the rise in prices after 1830 as a result of the 
inflation in the paper note currency. We imported into Algeria a consi-
derable amount of money. It soon chased away the local currency which 
was declared not convertible"(53). As a result prices went up very 
quickly. At Algiers, for example, the price of one hectolitre of wheat 
rose from 5 francs in 1830 to 15 francs in 1837 and to 18 francs in 
1840 {54). 
However, what really eliminated the indigenous urban elite from 
the economic scene was the influx of Europeans in increasing numbers. 
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They could replace the local traders and destroyed the traditional 
manufacturing system because they were directly connected with the 
metropolitan France. It was not surprising that after a few years of 
colonisation the Algerians started to buy burnous manufactured in 
Marseille (55), an indication that the economy was being transformed 
and that the Algerian cities were losing their commercial and artisanal 
strata. In 1900 an official of the colonial administration realised 
that members of many formerly well-off Arab families had become 
impoverished (56). It became clear that members of the indigenous elite 
would either have to be incorporated into the colonial system, which 
was very difficult (although not impossible) because of the discrimina-
tory measures taken by the administration against the Algerian popula-
tion, or to be confined to very marginal economic activities and to act 
as a mediator between the native population and the colons. This was to 
have crucial implications for the role to be played by the elite in the 
national movement, which was relatively marginal, as we shall see in 
the following chapter. 
For rural Algeria the effects of colonisation, in terms of the 
destruction of the existing structures and the impoverishment of the 
indigenous population were little different from those endured in the 
cities. The only major difference was the extent and degree of the 
process of destruction and its dramatic effects upon rural society. 
The penetration of French colonisation into Algerian rural society 
took place in two distinct but complementary phases, each being a 
byproduct of the development of capitalism in the metropolis itself. As 
the latter was weak in the early stages of colonisation, we can see 
little development in the rules governing the organization of property 
and; in turn,- in t1re sociaT structure of the ruataLareas. What took 
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place was a transfer of ownership of vast areas of land from the 
Algerians to Frenchmen and other Europeans. The generals personally 
took the lion's share of these transfers. Until 1851 the Algerians lost 
about 1,583,000 ha. to French colonisation, of which 504,000 ha repre-
sented the most fertile in Northern Algeria and was given to French 
settlers. The remaining 868,000 ha consisted of forest and grazing 
lands (57). In the years between 1863 and 1870, and as a result of the 
application of the Senatus Consulte, Algerian rural communities taken 
as a whole lost an average of 14 per cent or over one million hectares 
of the best arable land and forest to the colonial public domain which 
controlled the transfers of land from the indigenous peasantry to the 
French settlers (58). 
one of the consequences of these spoliations was that the indige-
nous rural population was forced to cultivate the less fertile areas in 
the south of the country and to become essentiallY dependent on exten-
sive cultivation of land to produce even the most minimal means of 
subsistence. The loss of land also meant a decline in animal production 
due to the decrease in the area of the grazing lands, which severely 
disrupted the existing agro-pastoral equilibrium. A process of real 
impoverishment of the population immediately followed the process of 
colonisation, mainly as a result of the expropriation of property and 
of the heavy taxes which were imposed on the population. From now on 
famines and diseases became the constant lot of the Algerian rural 
population, resulting in a sharp decline in the population. From three 
million in 1830, Algeria's population declined to 2,656,100 in 1856 and 
to 2,462,900 in 1876, and it was not until 1880 that it returned to its 
original level in 1830, that is 3 million. 
However, despite all thi~ the structure of landownership and the 
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organization of rural society remained largely intact until 1870, when 
European migration to Algeria underwent a dramatic increase. The tribe 
remained the central organization of society, and the tribal aristo-
cracy in its pre-colonial form continued to be the spearhead of fierce 
and widespread resistance to the French. Communal and family land-
holding was still dominant in many areas. At this stage it was not yet 
necessary for the progress of capital accumulation in the metropolis or 
for the settlers in the colony to introduce drastic structural changes 
throughout the country as long as it was possible to extract a surplus 
through the existing framework of pre-capitalist social relations. It 
was not until 1870-1880 that more direct pressure from the metropolis 
to create outlets for the investment of its capital and its products in 
the colony became more insistent. In order to achieve this, the 
indigenous social structure had to be drastically weakened. 
In this respect, apart from the physical liquidation of some parts 
of rural society by arbitrary expropriation and constant impoverish-
ment, the most efficient method was the formal and legal imposition of 
individual ownership of land, particularly in the fertile North of the 
country. This accounts for almost all the structural transformations 
that engulfed Algerian society during the 19th and the 20th centuries, 
leading to the loss of what had been largely inalienable property. 
Sales of land became more and more frequent. Gradually those who had 
formerly owned their land, whether individually or communally, became 
khamroas or sharecroppers on the same land. As they were very often 
unable to meet the fiscal demands of the colonial administration and 
could usually only do so by selling all or part of their crops (59), 
taxation worked to undermine subsistence production and forced 
cultivators to become more and more involved in the market. The fact 
139 
that they were forced to participate in the market under the most 
painful and unfavourable conditions meant that many cultivators found 
themselves in a vicious circle, which as Germaine Tillon put it: 
"starts when the peasant is forced to sell his produce immediately 
after the harvest in order to pay off his debt - to sell, that is to 
say, at the bottom price. It continues when five or six months later he 
is compelled to buy the same produce back at the top price, which means 
at least double the figure he was given for it" (60). 
The need to borrow money led to impoverishment and dispossession 
as money lenders and speculators used unscrupulous methods to obtain 
land from their creditors. Almost all the literature, whether sympathe-
tic or hostile to colonisation, has denounced the effects of usury. 
Rates were as high as 120 per cent and repayments were often scheduled 
on a weekly basis (61). To the phenomenon of usury was attributed the 
destruction and dispossession of the Algerian rural community. In a 
note written by General Martinprey in 1860 he admitted that the increa-
se in the occurence of usury which resulted from the French colonisa-
tion had drastically changed the former conditions of existence of the 
indigenous people (62). 
More borrowing meant more dispossession and more pauperisation of 
the cultivators. By 1917 the Algerian peasants had lost about 2,317,466 
ha of their best lands to the colons through direct and indirect 
expropriation, as is shown in the following table. 
Colonial Land in 1917 (Hectares)(63) 
Region Forest CUltivates Land Total 
Algiers 24,672 365,832 390,504 
Or an 23,962 937,786 961,712 
constantine 145,561 819,669 965,230 
-Total -- -- - ... --194·; 159 . 2;123,787 2,317,446 
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To give one example of the land loss, in a village in Eastern 
Algeria called el-Akbia, the amount of land per capita fell from 2.78 
ha in 1867 to a mere 0.84 ha in 1907 (62). 
This considerable loss of land and especially of grazing land, 
which coincided with a drastic demographic increase at the end of the 
19th century, meant a real impoverishment of the rural population and a 
real decline in their standard of living. After the First World War the 
per capita production of grain in the areas cultivated in the traditio-
nal manner by the Algerian population fell to about half of what it had 
been before the War. The decline in the number of sheep was even more 
spectacular; a herd estimated generallY at 7.5 to 8.5 million head 
before the First World War fell to 5 to 6 million afterwards (64). 
The negative effects of colonisation upon indigenous agriculture 
are suggested in the following table. 
Impact of Colonisation on Agriculture (65) 
1863 1911 1938 1954 
Population (million) 2.2 5.6 7.2 8.8 
Cereals (m.ha) 2.2 3.47 
cereals Production(mq) 20-22 18.7 17.7 18.3 
Yield in q. per ha. 9-10 5.4 
Kilos of Cereals 
per Head 1000 337 231 202 
cattle (million) 10.0 8.5 5.9 6.0 
For the impoverished rural population, the only salvation from 
famines, epidemic, and collective despair lay in wage labour or share-
cropping on the newly constituted colonial farms. The introduction of 
the vine in the 1860s accelerated the process of proletarization of 
those who were previously owners of land. Thus a "free" labour force 
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started to apppear before the end of the 19th century in such great 
numbers that some colons were induced to warn the authorities of the 
potential dangers of this labour force ( 66). At the end of the 1880s 
there were between 16,000 and 20,000 Algerian wage labourers. Their 
average wage was between 1.25 and 1.50 francs per day, or the equiva-
lent of 8 to 10 kilos of wheat (67). This number reached 428,032 by 
1930. The number of sharecroppers (khammasl increased by 81 per cent 
between 1901 and 1930 as the following table shows. 
Algerian Agricultural Labour Force (1901-1930) (68) 
Year 
1901 
1910 
1914 
1930 
Landowners 
620,899 
350,211 
565,218 
617,544 
Khammes 
350,715 
426,851 
407,050 
634,600 
Agricultural 
Workers 
151,108 
207,707 
210,205 
428,032 
Agricultural 
Active Pop. 
1,135,166 
1,164,769 
1,163,532 
1,730,947 
Agricultural 
Population 
3,320,647 
3,525,768 
3,605,449 
4,419,943 
More proletarization and dispossession meant not only the creation 
of a large wage labour force but also the concentration of lands in the 
hands of the European settlers and some wealthy Algerian landowners. By 
the early years of the 20th century there large land holdings began to 
appear owned by individual owners and worked by large numbers of agri-
cultural workers producing essentially for export. The table below, 
although it does not distinguish between holdings owned by colons and 
those owned by Algerians, serves to illustrate this point. 
Structure of Agricultural Property in 1920 (69) 
Size Number 
" 
Area 
" 
Average 
Less than 10 .ha 443,000 68.7 1,781,000 17.9 4.2 ha 
10 to 50 ha 147,000 22.8 2,852,000 28.8 19.06 
50 to 100 ha 42,000 6.4 1,960,000 19.5 46.07 
.More than 100 ha . •1,3,000· 2.1 .. 3,316,000 . 33.-5 255.47 
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The destruction of the landownership system of pre-colonial Alge-
ria led to the dislocation of the tribal structure and the disappearan-
ce of other social institutions which used to assist needy individuals 
in bad years, The process of dislocation was completed by official 
measures aimed at replacing tribal and kinship ties with identification 
with a particular locality. Indeed fractions from different tribes were 
either combined to form a single ~, or fractions of the same tribe 
were divided up into a number of duwars (70). 
For the aristocracy, the results of colonisation meant its relega-
tion to insignifican~e and the destitution of that part of it that was 
based on tribal and religious prestige, especially those who resisted 
the French. conversely, the process of colonisation resulted in the 
promotion of that fraction which based its social power on owning more 
land and on acting as agents of the colonial administration. 
After the failure of the colonial authorities to establish a 
system of authority which relied heavily upon the indigenous notables 
(71), a new group of non-aristocratic origin was promoted to fill the 
role of ~ and to act as tax collectors and informers for the admini-
stration. Through the facilities offered to it by the administration, 
this group acquired more lands, especially in the areas that the colon-
ists had not yet penetrated, and came later to constitute the Algerian 
rural bourgeoisie. 
Finally, there were two principal reasons why the penetration of 
capitalism in Algeria had such particularly disruptive effects. First, 
neither the existing class structure nor the framework under which 
social conflict took place were congenial to the rapidity with which 
capitalist structur~s were being_introduced. Secondly, capitalist 
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'development' was being imported from outside and primarily served the 
process of capital accumulation in the metropolis and the enrichment of 
the European settler minority. The existence of this minority served to 
channel the surplus created in Algeria to the metropolis by connecting 
the colonial economy and way of life with the metropolitan economy. 
The Developnent of the Colonial Sector 
The process of destruction explained above was paralleled by a 
process of building a new society based on settling European migrants 
in Algeria and on serving capital accumulation in France. 
From the begining of 1840 the Chamber of Deputies in France 
decided unanimously that "Algeria is a land which will never be 
abandoned by French domination". And in order to fight Amir 'Abd al-
Qadir, Bugeaud was appointed governor general. Considerable human and 
material means were put at his disposal. From now on there was a 
consistent development of the colonial sector in Algeria. However, this 
development, as mentioned earlier, was affected directly by the develo-
pment of capitalism in France. And as the latter was only begining in 
the early stages of the colonisation process, the colonial policies 
were concentrated mainly on finding solutions to the social and politi-
cal struggles in France and in creating jobs for the unemployed in 
French cities. The example of 1848 shows that Algeria, in the early 
stages of colonisation, was not considered so much a place of capital 
investment but as a "penal colony" for the surplus population of France 
and "troublesome" working class elements. In that year, after the 
revolution of 1848, the French Government decided to rid France of 
20,500 workers who had dared to erect barricades. From the end of 1848 
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to 1850 those proletarians were forcibly transformed into "reluctant 
pioneers". Upon their arrival in Algeria they were assigned to 56 
Centres de Colonisation that had been established to receive them. The 
colonial army provided them with houses, arable land, instruments of 
cultivation, livestock, food, and pocket money (72). on 21 June 1871 
the French Government granted 100,000 hectares of land in Algeria to 
8,000 refugees from Alsace-Lorraine. Moreover, the phylloxera disease 
which ruined the French vineyards during 1875 induced a considerable 
wave of migration of French vine growers to Algeria. 
The following table shows that it was only after 1906 that the 
natural growth in the settler population exceeded its influx into 
Algeria. However, a considerable number of those migrants were not of 
French origin (73). one half of those who migrated in 1848 were Span-
ish, Italian, and Maltese~ in 1876, out of a total European population 
of 344,000, some 153,000 were not French (74). 
Colonial Immigration (1833-1954) (75) 
Year Colonial Pop. Growth 
Natural By Migration 
1833 7,812 
1841 37,3?4 1,711 + 24,524 
1851 131,283 - 10,790 + 46,752 
1861 192,746 + 3,461 + 30,038 
1872 245,117 3,923 + 31,050 
1881 412,435 + 9,274 + 58,412 
1891 530,924 + 14,902 + 51,202 
1901 633,850 + 26,922 + 28,448 
1906 680,263 + 27,418 + 18,955 
1911 752,043 + 38,082 + 33,698 
1921 791,370 - 11,725 + 23,442 
1931 881,584 + 34,865 + 13,360 
1948 922,272 + 80,359 - 76,277 
1954 984,031 + 63,940 2,181 
In its early stages, colonial agricultural policy aimed at the 
cr_eat.ion _of small agricultural holdings owned by the new settlers. 
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Between 1842 to 1845, 45 villages were created and some 105,000 ha were 
freely distributed. From 1846 to 1848, 27 new villages were established 
in the Sahel of Mitidja. Wheat was the main crop in the colonial 
agricultural sector. In 1860, 9 per cent of the total area allocated to 
wheat production was occupied by the Europeans. Some new crops started 
to appear but only on a very small scale. The first vineyard was 
founded at. Staouelie in 1843, and in 1854, for example, 2,306 ha were 
planted With vines producing 11,000 hectolitres of wine. Tobacco began 
to be cultivated as well, and up to 1872 the area allocated to this 
crop reached 1,496 ha (76). The area allocated to cotton production 
increased during the five years between 1860 and 1865 from 1,200 ha to 
4,024 ha and production increased from 159,000 kg. to 656,000 kg. (77). 
Under the Second Empire (1852-70), the colonial agricultural 
policy underwent substantial changes, favouring agrarian and banking 
joint-stock companies which received very large concessions (78). This 
coincided with the large-scale introduction of vine cultivation into 
Algeria after the destruction of the French vineyards by phylloxera. 
From now on the process of land acquisition and of the creation of 
colonial Villages proceeded very fast through the mechanisms explained 
earlier. The table below shows the increase in the area of the colonial 
agricultural sector until 1933. 
The Development of the Colonial Sector (79) 
Period 
1841-1850 
1851-1860 
1861-1870 
1871-1880 
1881-1890 
1891-1900 
1901-1920 
1921-1933 
Total 
Colonial Centres 
126 
85 
21 
264 
107 
103 
199 
67 
.. .. :972. 
146 
Area (ha) 
115,000 
250,000 
116,000 
401,099 
176,000 
120,097 
200,000 
270,481 
-1:;648:;481 . 
However, the figures shown in this table, which were produced by 
the colonial administration, seem to underestimate the extent of the 
process of land confiscation and to minimize considerably the amount of 
land under colon control. More accurate figures were produced by 
Bahloul {80), with which other authors seem to agree (81). 
Year 
1850 
1880 
1900 
1920 
1940 
1954 
Area of the Colonial sector 
115,000 
1,245,000 
1,912,000 
2,581,000 
3,045,000 
3,028,000 
Located in the most fertile and most productive lands of Northern 
Algeria, the colonial agrarian sector soon had to develop new methods. 
New socio-economic structures were set up based on large private estat-
es and private capital, on the employment of a free labour force, and 
on the production of a marketable surplus. Three factors created the 
preconditions for this development and accelerated the process under 
which the capitalist development of the colonial sector was consoli-
dated. 
First, the opening of the external market to Algerian agricultural 
products enhanced the development of capital accumulation. Phylloxera 
reduced the area of the French vineyards to about half of what it had 
been previously {82), and this pushed the French authorities to encou-
rage Algeria to provide the necessary amount of wine. Thus the protec-
tive tariff on French wine which was relatively high was reduced from 5 
francs per hectolitre in 1871 to 4.5 in 1881 for Algerian wine and to 2 
francs .only for Spanish and Italian wine in the same year (83). Vine-
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yard plantation in Algeria became very profitable (84), and the colons 
were encouraged to expand the area allocated to it. Wine exports to 
France increased rapidly from 17,000 hectolitres in 1880 to 2,338,000 
hectolitres in 1905. As a percentage of Algeria's total exports wine 
increased from 9.9 per cent in 1881 to 49.3 per cent in 1892 (85). 
secondly, the availability of capital to the large landowners 
provided by large financial institutions in France accelerated the 
process of capital accumulation in the colonial agricultural sector. 
In addition to the Bank of Algeria which established special financial 
institutions for agricultural business, other financial groups also 
supplied loans to large landowners, especially wine growers (86). 
Thirdly, and most important, there was the cheap labour force made 
up from those who wrer driven out of their lands either through the 
internal mechanism of colonial expansion or through drastic demographic 
increase. This large labour force was necesary because of the introduc-
tion of the new capitalist farms based on labour intensive techniques. 
Wine growing in particular needed large amounts of labour with differ-
ent qualifications; unskilled labour for land reclamation, ploughing, 
and grape picking; specialists in grafting and pruning; and technicians 
for wine-making and for the maintainence of the implements. These 
functions were performed in the early stages by the European settlers 
themselves but the Algerian labour force soon came to replace the 
Europeans because of their competitiveness in terms of wages. 
These three factors contributed to the emergence of specialised 
and mechanized agricultural holdings, with wine being the dominant 
product, both in the area allocated to its production and in its propo-
rtion of total Algerian exports which reached 60 per cent in 1933. The 
-table below shows the development of wine production in terms of area 
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Year 
1880 
1885 
1890 
1900 
1910 
1921 
1924 
1927 
1930 
1934 
The Development of Wine Production (87) 
Area (ha) 
23,724 
70,886 
110,048 
154,430 
, 152,129 
168,742 
180,757 
207,367 
234,916 
373,292 
Production (hl) 
7,034,267 
10,141,589 
8,402,618 
12,821,141 
16,613,032 
~~-~~-3~f:~,~; 
' - :· -~~,.-~!: ~ 
' ~~~~;~~ :\:. 
Export (hl) 
4,236,120 
7,394,048 
7,121,531 
10,939,434 
11,652,304 
The differentiation in income which accompanied this development 
existed not only between the colons and the indigenous population but 
also between the colons themselves. Concentration of property in the 
colonial sector proceeded very fast and soon the wine growers emerged 
as the new agrarian aristocracy (88). Many small cultivators among the 
European settlers were gradually forced to hand over their property to 
large landowners and to move to the towns and urban centres. 
Together with wine production, the colons introduced other produc-
ts, such as citrus fruit, cotton, and tobacco, for which the major 
demand also lay in metropolitan France. With these new products and the 
methods under Which they were produced, Algeria's agriculture was 
drastically transformed. It became part of the social division of 
labour in the metropolis, and its products were exclusively for export. 
The Algerian rural population was uprooted and dramatic changes 
took place in its social and economic structures. Traditional modes of 
property holdings and tribal social relations were disrupted and rep-
laced by capitalist ownership and wage labour. In the course of this 
transformation, ,a --major· part of theis population -was alienated from its 
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in the colonial sector, While the rest was pushed to search for living 
on meagre resources. The colonial sector which gradually came to 
dominate the Algerian economy was much more geared to meet the demands 
of the metropolis than of the Algerian population. It was the source of 
the prosperity of the European settler minority at the expense of the 
impoverishment and destitution of the majority of the Algerian popula-
tion. 
The nature of the colonial sector came to determine the features 
that characterized Algerian society and economy and established the 
pre-conditions for its dependence and dislocation. This meant that 
Algerian society became sharply divided into a very small minority 
which monopolised the means of wealth and a very large majority which 
witnessed continuous deprivation in a variety of ways. Being oriented 
almost totally to the outside, the development of the Algerian economy was 
determined, shaped, and affected by the conditions and the needs of the 
outside world, mainly of France. This had further grave consequences on 
the situation of the indigenous population which experienced aggravated 
social and economic problems. This was in fact the general trend of 
development in Algeria until the 1950s, when the problems which these 
developments created were reflected in a voilent reaction on the part 
of the oppressed people. The following section tries to trace the main 
characteristics of Algerian society and economy prior to independence, 
which formed the material background to the Algerian war of independ-
ence. 
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On the Eve of Independence 
Before independence Algeria, was a typically underdeveloped 
country with one exception, familiar to most colonial settler socie-
ties, namely that its social and economic divisions were founded on a 
community split between a minority of European settlers and a majority 
of the indigenous population. This meant that the class structure and 
class conflict in Algeria as a whole reflected the domination of the 
European and French colons over the Algerian population. In this sense 
Algeria presented a situation which was different from the majority of 
other colonised countries where the colonial administration, whether 
British or French, relied on a local aristocracy connected economically 
and politically with the metropolitan country which served to facili-
tate the colonial authorities' domination. In Morocco and Tunisia, for 
example, the colonial power supported either the landowning feudal 
aristocracy or the embryo mercantile bourgeoisie. Nothing comparable 
happened in Algeria where the process of colonisation actually confined 
the development and role of the local agricultural bourgeoisie to a 
minimum (89). 
However, it should not be concluded that the only differentiation 
which existed was between the European and the native population. In 
fact the sharp contrast which existed between the two communities 
should not conceal the social and economic inequalities within each 
community. If the process of colonisation transformed Algerian society 
into a more differentiated one by impoverishing the native population 
and relegating it to the status of landless and workers, this process 
was futher aggravated by the promotion of limited number of Algerians 
151 
who constituted no economic or political threat to the continuing 
existence of colonial domination. 
All the phenomena of the colonisation process, namely the division 
of the society into two communities, the subdivisions and the differen-
tiation within each community and especially within the native communi-
ty, the nature of colon society, their social, economic, and political 
origin, their way of life, their attachment to France, and the nature 
and needs of French metropolitan capitalist accumulation, all contribu-
ted to a various degree not only to shaping the framework and the 
essence of Algerian society before independence but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, to the subsequent development of independent Algeria, 
its social classes and groups, its political and national movement, and 
its strategies of development after independence. 
Before going on to explain the situation of Algerian agriculture 
on the eve of independence, it is useful to examine the state of the 
Algerian population and in particular its rural component, its growth, 
its labour force, and its standard of living. 
Population 
The main characteristics of Algerian society shortly before indep-
endence were its rapid growth and its sharp division into wealthy 
European colons and impoverished Muslims. While the population of 
metropolitan France increased by 8 per cent between 1911 and 1954 (from 
39,605,000 to 42,777,000), Algeria's population increased by 73 per 
cent in the same period as the table below shows. Taking only Northern 
Algeria, the population density was 41 inhabitants per km., or less 
than half of that of France (90). Undoubtedly, given the meagre resour-
ces available, this huge increase resulted in the impoverishment of the 
Algerian population and further aggravated its economic and social 
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problems. The rural component of this population was as much as 76 per 
cent. 
The Growth of the Algerian Population (1856-1954) (91) 
Year Total Estimated Rural Estimated Urban 
1856 2,487,373 
1866 2,921,246 
1876 2,867,626 
1886 3,817,306 3,061,091 226,126 
1896 4,429,421 
1906 5,231,850 3,704,453 341,691 
1911 5,563,828 
1921 5,804,275 
1931 6,553,451 4,419,943 606,440 
1936 7,234,648 4,847,814 722,293 
1948 8,681,785 5,747,930 1,129,482 
1954 9,529,726 7,051,796 1,397,536 
However, the figures presented in the table above conceal the 
profoundly dichotomous structure of the Algerian population. There 
existed two socially and economically and even sometimes geographically 
different communities. The European settler minority numbering about 
one million, or 11 per cent of the total population (92), had acquired 
over a quarter of the most fertile and productive land of Northern 
Algeria which was developed to produce cash crops, namely wine and 
citrus fruits for export. While the urban population of Algeria in 1954 
was estimated at 26 per cent of the total, 82 per cent of the European 
population lived in towns and cities, where they were mostly adminis-
trators, bankers, technicians, traders, and skilled workers. Their 
concentration was greatest in the big cities with Algiers, the capital 
and major port, which contained over one-third of all Europeans (93). 
With a relatively low rate of fertility and mortality (19 and 9 per 
thousand respectively), the rate of population growth within the Euro-
pean minority was relatively low (1 per cent per annum), and life 
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expectancy was between 63 and 65 years. The number of children (under 
15 years) was a bit higher than in France, 27 per cent against 24.8 per 
cent, and they benefited from primary education. In 1954 only 6.3 per 
cent were illiterate compared with 90 per cent of the Algerian Muslim 
population (94). 
On contrast,increasing at an annual rate of 3 per cent or three 
times the annual rate of the European population growth, the Muslim 
population nearly doubled between 1911 and 1954, from 4.7 million to 
8.4. Such a fast increase, with a life expectancy of 46 years, meant 
that the Muslim population represented one of the youngest populations 
in the world, in which 52.6 per cent were under 20 years of age. Very 
few Algerians received any education or technical training and very few 
Algerian workers participated in industry or other non-agricultural 
economic activities. 
The native Algerians constituted nearly 84 per cent of the rural 
population. However, the high rate of population growth among them and 
the gradual depletion of agricultural resources led to a massive rural 
to urban migration during the last years of colonisation. Since the 
advent of the 19th century larger numbers of destitute and landless 
peasants were driven to the urban centres mainly because of the lack of 
resources in the rural areas. Part of the migrants were recruited as 
cheap labour in metropolitan France and other Western countries (95). 
With the persistence of the process of impoverishment, the extent of 
the migration problem became quite apparent during the years before 
independence. Hence between 1959 and 1962, the urban Muslim population 
increased by 56 per cent, from 2.3 million to 3.7 million. 
The total number of the economically active population of Algeria 
was 3,512,000 persons or 37 per cent of the total population; the 
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agricultural sector alone mobilized about 80.8 per cent of this number 
(2,810,000), 2,573,000 of which were Muslims. The landowners represen-
ted 19.5 per cent of the total active labour force, the rest were 
essentially wage workers (22 per cent) and aides-familiaux (55 per 
cent). 
Unemployment and underemployment was very high within the Muslim 
population, particularly in the countryside. In 1954, it reached a 
total of 850,000 males or 46 per cent of the total active Muslim 
agricultural population. 
Wealth and natural and economic resources were very unequally 
distributed.The European settlers controlled almost all the riches of 
the country especially the most fertile lands of Northern Algeria 
leaving the Muslims the less fertile and sometimes unproductive lands 
of the steppes. This was reflected in the distribution of income, which 
showed a sharp contrast between the two communities in favour of the 
European minority. According to the a report published by the colonial 
administration (96), which divided Algeria's population into five in-
come groups, the average per capita income for the year 1953 was 54,000 
francs ($154.28 at the official exchange rate of 350 f. to the dollar). 
However, this figure is highly misleading since it conceals wide 
discrepancies among different groups in the society. 
At the bottom was 73 per cent of the rural Muslim population, 
roughly 65 per cent of the total, with a per capita income of $55 per 
year. 78 per cent of this income was devoted to food, and 6.1 per cent 
was derived from relief. Next to this was an urban group, also entirely 
Muslim, with a per capita income of $164 per year, 57.4 per cent of it 
was devoted to food and 3.6 per cent was derived from relief. The two 
groups combined to form 93 per cent of the Muslim population and had a 
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per capita income of $78.49 a year. In the centre there was a group of 
wage earners, artisans, and small shopkeepers with a per capita income 
of $372.50. Its Muslim component was 53.6 per cent (6.4 per cent of the 
Muslim population). Next to the top was a small "middle class", only 
8.6 per cent of which was Muslim with a per capita income of $673. It 
contained less than l per cent of the Muslim population. The leisured 
or well-to-do group at the top, which included no Muslims, had a per 
capita income of $4,657. Some rich proprietors had over a million 
dollars a year. Assuming that Muslim and European incomes in the two 
mixed classes were equal, which is incorrect, the per capita income for 
all Muslims would be $98.03 per year, while that of all non-Muslim 
would be $587,44. The ratio indicated of 1 to 5.88 should be 1 to 6 if 
not worse (97). 
Economy 
The agrarian nature of capitalism established in the course of 
French colonialism meant that the economy of Algeria was to be deter-
mined by the nature of its agricultural sector which was to occupy a 
dominant position in both a social and economic sense. The agricultural 
sector's immediate importance lay in the fact that in 1954 it supported 
in one way or another about 75 per cent of the Algerian population, 
accounted for one-third of the Gross Domestic Produc, earned 67 per 
cent of export value, and employed 81 per cent of the total work force. 
Algeria, therefore, was a typical rurally dominated society in 
which agriculture not only represented an economic activity but a way 
of life for the overwhelming majority of the population. Outside agri-
culture, apart from the extraction of mineral and hydrocarbons which 
started at the end of 1950s (98), and the very small and fragmented 
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industrial enterprises which were mainly connected with processing 
agricultural products for export, there was no industry to speak of. 
This was because the colons "had never been truly enterpreneurial (we 
build this country up from nothing), the real risks had been incurred 
by the state"(99). Thus there was no class capable of creating a true 
industrial infrastructure. The colons, who constituted the elite, were 
sometimes described as having a peasant mentality because of their 
rooted hostility to any further transformations either of the rural 
scene or of the economy as a whole. Large wine-growers sometimes prefe-
rred to invest their capital in politics as senators, deputies, and 
counsellors in the French and Algerian assemblies, or to defend their 
interests and to act as a colonial lobby. They did not invest their 
huge profits in industrialization but they invested them in politics 
"not out of any deep political conviction but for the purpose of conso-
lidating and increasing their position and maintaining the status 
quo"(lOO). 
Lack of capital was an important factor restricting the growth of 
industry. Profits made from capitalist agriculture were either invested 
in local property and services, exported to the metropolis and invested 
there, or consumed in the hedonistic life-style of the colons. The 
French or other foreign companies exploiting minerals and hydrocarbons 
also exported their profits. 
The closeness of France was another factor limiting the expansion 
of any sector other than the agricultural export oriented sector. It 
meant that any industry would have been in competition both in France 
and Algeria with established French industry. Moreover, the poverty of 
the indigenous Algerian population restricted the size of the potential 
market. 
157 
Thus in spite of the favourable conditions created during the 
Second World War, when imports of manufactured goods from France were 
severely restricted, industrialization in Algeria remained limited and 
confined to some mining and extractive activities over which the metro-
politan state exercised complete control. The annual rate of growth of 
the whole of industrial and crafts production was very low. After being 
1.2 per cent until 1930, it increased to 4.7 per cent between then and 
1955. In that year large-scale industry, which was mainly based on food 
processing and other light leather and textile industries, still only 
provided 10 per cent of gross domestic product (101). 
The extent of the area cultivated by the colons remained more or 
less the same in the last decades before independence, as is shown by 
the following figures (102): 
1930 
1941 
2,345,000 ha 
2,720,000 ha 
1951 
1962 
2,726,000 ha 
2,393,000 ha 
Productivity in this sector also failed to increase significantly 
during this period. Apart from the relatively new fruit and vegetable 
sector, which achieved a satisfactory growth rate of 3 per cent between 
1945 and 1955, production of almost all major crops was either stag-
nating or declining. This was mainly due to the exhaustion of the soil 
and the colons' disinvestment in agriculture. Cereal production, which 
increased at a fairly uniform rate of 1.7 per cent a year between 1850 
and 1919, rising from 5.2 to 18.8 million quintals, remained stagnant 
at around 20 to 21 million quintals between then and 1955 (103). Wine , 
Algeria's main product and principal export, had a long-term growth 
rate of 3 per cent till 1940, but after 1948 this growth declined to 
almost nothing. In terms of area, vine cultivation declined from 
364,000 ha in 1931-45 to 350,000 ha in 1956-60. Similarily, production 
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decreased from 18,351,000 hectolitres to 15,299,000 hl. during the same 
period. This was accompanied by a decline in yield per hectare from 
61.37 hl. in 1928 to 53.91 hl. in 1938, to 35.86 hl. in 1940, and to 
only 25.36 hl. in 1947. Only the production of citrus fruits and vege-
tables achieved a notable increase. From 7,500 ha in 1938, the area 
allocated to these crops increased to 34,445 ha in 1961. 
Algerian agriculture was mainly oriented to satisfy the needs of 
the outside world and particularly that of metropolitan France. This 
appears from the relationship between the total value of the production 
of the main products and the total value of exports a? revealed by the 
following table (104). 
The Distribution of the Algerian Agricultural Exports in 1960 
(Milliard Old Francs) 
Products Total Pro. Total Exp. European Share European Share 
in Pro. in Exp. 
Wine 971 1,038* 89% 925 
Vegetables 369 135 52% 70 
Fruits 236 162 65% 105 
Cereals 723 82 41% 34 
Tobacco 59 49 50% 25 
Others 835 83 60% 33 
* as stated in the original table 
Dichotomy of Agriculture 
1-Production and Methods of Cultivation 
Algeria extends over an area of 2,381,741 sq.km., including the 
Sahara, and of that area only Northern Algeria, or 210,000 sq.km. 
represents the agricultural sector, as the rest of the country is 
almost completely unproductive desert. According to a note of the 
government of Algeria in 1960, Northern Algeria was divided as 
follows:(l05) 
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Agricultural Lands 
Forestry Lands 
Unproductive Lands 
10,000,000 ha 
3,000,000 ha 
8,000,000 ha 
Behind the general features of the Algerian agricultural sector, 
there was a sharp contrast between the two agricultural sector which 
differed in almost every aspect of production, orientation, ownership, 
etc. By 1950, due to more than a century of a consistent policy on the 
part of the colonial administration to settle European migrants on the 
best lands, which were either seized compulsorily, purchased, or colle-
ctively expropriated, a clear and defined demarcation line can be drawn 
between two agrarian sectors, regionally compartmentalised and contras-
ted in their social and economic organisations. 
The first was the modern sector, extending over the most fertile 
land and was based on very large-scale private farm units and on the 
utilization of relatively advanced means of intensive cultivation and 
mechanization, worked by agricultural labourers. This sector extended 
over the area where the European settlers had managed (by means which 
have been explained earlier) to expel the original owners to less 
fertile land in the interior of the country. The products of this 
sector were totallY oriented towards the metropolitan market, and in 
1953 it produced 65 per cent of gross agricultural output (including 
100 per cent of all alfa, cork, and sugar beet, 93 per cent of citrus 
fruits, 90 per cent of wine). 
The second sector was the traditional or Muslim sector. It extend-
ed mainly over the less fertile land and was essentially destined to 
satisfy the needs of the growing population who had been pushed into 
these areas by the policies of the colonial regime. It consited largely 
of private and collectively owned land (although the latter had 
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sharply declined in importance), cultivated by a vast number of small 
farmers employing primitive methods of cultivation, with a consistent 
deterioration both in productivity and in the amount produced. 
The contrast between the two sectors was reflected by many indica-
tors, the most important of which was the yield of the land unit; it 
was estimated that land cultivated by Europeans yielded on average 
three times per hectare more than the land cultivated by the Muslims in 
the traditional sector (106). Thus the traditional sector, though 
occupying an area three times as large as that of the modern sector, 
produced only one-third of total agricultural output, and only 10 per 
cent and 7 per cent respectively of the lucrative wine and citrus 
fruits. Moreover, the modern sector possessed about three times more 
tractors than the traditional sector. A further contrast between the 
two sectors was in the average size of agricultural holding, 11.6 ha in 
the traditional sector, and 124 ha in the modern sector. Finally the 
amount of credits received by each sector throws more light on the 
nature of the two sectors. While the traditional sector received 40 
milliard old francs during the period between 1953 and 1962, the modern 
sector, on the other hand, received 34 milliard francs in 1960 alone. 
The modern sector was rich since it possessed in 1954 a capital totall-
ing 600 milliards of francs and had an annual income of 93 milliard 
francs. "This was the golden age of the European proprietors since the 
annual per capita income of these proprietors was 780,000 francs com-
pared with 237,000 francs for the owners in France itself"(l07) 
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2-Structures of ownership 
According to the census of 1950-51, the distribution of the land 
among the two sectors was as follows (lOB): 
Traditional Sector 
Modern Sector 
Total: 
State property 
(mostly grazing and 
uncultivated land) 
7,133,000 ha 
2,703,000 ha 
9,836,000 ha 
11,000,000 ha 
The traditional sector was exclusively occupied by the Muslim 
population who in 1954 accounted for 89 per cent of the total 
population and 98 per cent of the rural population. This sector 
was composed of 543,310 agricultural holdings in Northern Algeria 
extending over an area of 7,131,000 ha, with 75 per of these holdings 
had an average size of less than 10 ha. 
The Structure of Land Ownership in the Traditional Sector (950-51)(109) 
Size Holdings No. % Area (ha) % 
Less than l ha 105,954 16.8 37,200 0.5 
l to 10 ha 332,529 52.7 1,341,200 18.5 
10 to 50 ha 167,170 26.5 3,185,800 43.3 
50 to 100 ha 16,580 2.6 1,096,100 14.9 
More than 100 ha 8,499 1.3 1,688,800 23.0 
Total 630,732 100.00 7,349,100 100.00 
It appears from this table that the area of this sector was 
unequally distributed and that intense inequality seems to have 
developed. A wealthy class of cereal cultivators owning more than 50 ha 
and representing only 3.9 per cent of the total, had enriched itself by 
taking advantage of the conditions created by colonial land policies. 
This class was differentiated from the mass of peasants not only in its 
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income but also in its mode of cultivation depending mainly on agricul-
tural workers and sharecroppers (khammasat). 
On the other hand, 70 per cent of the landowners owned less than 
19 per cent of the area in this sector. This category of agricultural 
holdings varied substantially in size of holding, soil fertility, 
methods of cultivation, and standard of living. Beneath this category 
of owners, there was the mass of aides familiaux (1,436,000 persons), 
the khammassat (57,600), daily workers (357,500), and seasonal workers 
(77,100). There were also the agricultural proletarians who worked in 
the modern sector and who had an average per capita annual income of 
11,000 francs compared to 20,000 francs for the small landowners (110). 
The modern sector was controlled by the European settlers. It 
covered an area of 2,720,000 ha of the most fertile land and was 
divided into 22,037 agricultural holdings whose average size was 124 
ha, and 29 per cent of these holdings occupied about 87 per cent of the 
land in this sector. It depended in its operations mainly on the agri-
cultural workers recruited from the traditional sector. The number of 
these workers was estimated in 1954 at 112,000 permanent workers plus 
80,000 seasonal workers. 
Given the circumstances explained above, Algeria, as a colonised 
country, presented a situation which was unique, in the sense that any 
meaningful political independence, let alone economic idependence, 
would require the elimination of the power of the local elite whether 
of European of Algerian origin. The impoverishment and oppression which 
engulfed nearly all sectors of society meant that the forces likely to 
unite to achieve independence would include a wide spectrum of society, 
and that a serious struggle within these forces would follow the achie-
vement of independence. 
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As far as the agricultural sector was concerned, any serious 
development plan aiming to achieve a sectoral balance and to reinteg-
rate this sector into the national economy would require major structu-
ral changes either in the social relations governing the production 
process, and thus in the balance of forces among existing social class-
es, or in the nature of production itself towards the satisfaction of 
the actual needs of the Algerian economy. The effectiveness and effi-
ciency of these changes would be conditioned and substantially affected 
by the nature and interests of the forces which would carry out these 
changes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR THE ALGERIAN NATIONAL M>VFMENT AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR INDEPENDENCE 
The 5th of July, the day on which Algeria fell to the French 
troops in 1830, is also the day on which Algeria achieved its indepen-
dence and became a sovereign state in 1962. Between the two dates there 
were 130 years of consistent and systematic French colonization. The 
preconditions for the development of policies at all levels after 
independence derive not only from the eight years of the liberation war 
but extend further back to include the whole period of French coloniza-
tion, during which the whole society had seen varying degrees of social 
and economic transformation. Therefore, in order to grasp the realities 
of todays Algeria, it is necessary to look at the history of coloniza-
tion. 
The most recent past of this history covers the emergence of the 
Algerian National Movement which led to Algeria's independence. And 
since our study is particularly concerned the nature of the Algerian 
state and its role in agriculture, it becomes equally necessary to 
analyse the conditions under which the independent Algerian state was 
created, together with the social and political forces which played an 
active part in this movement. 
We have seen in the previous chapter that French colonization had 
forcibly introduced capitalist relations into part of the Algerian 
society at the expense of isolating and impoverishing the other. It 
destroyed the existing social and economic balance for the benefit of a 
small minority of European settlers. Those settlers, known as the 
pieds- noirs, controlled the country's major resources and regarded 
Algeria as an indivisible part of France. They imposed almost total 
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economic, social, and cultural dominance over the native population and 
met any sort of resentment or opposition by the latter with fierce 
repression, following policies which would give Algeria a European 
rather than an Algerian destiny. 
Algerian nationalism was, in many ways, both a contradiction and a 
response to this assumption. French domination over Algerian society 
meant that any sort of economic, social, cultural, or even religious 
activities on the part of the natives would be considered as resistance 
to the colonial regime. Thus, conditions were favourable for the 
emergence of a resistance movement in which tradition and religion were 
to play a major role. 
Effective resistance to colonization, therefore, started almost 
from the day when French troops landed in Algeria. The most striking of 
the early acts of resistance was the revolt by Amir 'Abd al-Qadir which 
lasted until 1848, in which an Algerian sovereign territory was recog-
nized by the French. Sporadic uprisings took place between then and 
1870-71, the year Shaikh Muqrani's Kabyla revolt which was put down 
with severe brutality and destruction by the French occupiers. 
However, these and other smaller uprisings were local movements 
that reflected resistance to French colonial penetration and opposition 
to the (colonial) plunder of lands, and represented geographically and 
regionally isolated uprisings rather than any sense of Algerian nation-
al identity or a struggle for independence and no sense of national 
movement had yet developed. This did not happen until the end of the 
First World War which acted as a major watershed. In its earliest 
stages, the national movement had two main origins. First, the educated 
sons of privileged native families, probably through their education 
and their close contact with the Europeans, began to resent their 
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position as subjects or second class citizens of France, and demanded 
equal civil and political rights. Some sought assimilation into French 
society and acted politically to achieve this goal. At the same time 
other groups, especially from the lower strata of the Muslim population 
either in Algerian cities or among the migrant workers in France, 
adopted a more radical attitude and believed that only the total 
independence of Algeria from France would satisfy the Algerian people's 
aspirations for social equality. These two trends dominated Algerian 
national politics throughout the years up to 1954 and were countered by 
the pieds-noirs' opposition to any sort of concession to the demands 
made by either group. 
In 1954, the newly founded FLN, which at that stage consisted of 
small guerilla force, realized the futility of carrying out the strug-
gle within the institutional framework of the colonial regime, and 
succeeded in mobilizing the great majority of the native population 
around armed struggle as the only means of achieving national objec-
tives. After nearly eight years of costly and bitter fighting, the FLN 
demonstrated its strength by forcing France to grant Algeria total 
independence in 1962. 
This chapter is an attempt to trace the development of the 
Algerian national movement since the 1920s. It tries to identify the 
social classes and the dominant political forces involved in the natio-
nal struggle. The creation and development of the FLN as a party and 
mass movement around which almost all Algeria's social classes and 
political forces were gathered will be analysed. Finally, the nature 
and the causes of the infightings and internal conflicts which dogged 
the FLN since its birth and persisted up to and beyond independence 
will be discussed. The discussion, however, will not deal with the 
174 
creation and the political struggle on the part of the pieds-noirs or 
the politics of France with regard to the Algerian national movement 
(1). It will, nevertheless, deal with the policies of successive French 
governments towards Algeria as far as these affected the development of 
the FLN. 
Two Trends within Algerian Nationalism 
Until the end of the First World War, the participation of the 
Algerian native population in the political life of the colonial system 
was almost non-existent. This was the result of the colons' total 
refusal to recognize Muslim political rights through the Code de 
l'Indigenat of 1881 which denied the native population basic civil 
rights and excluded them from participation in the administration. 
However, it was in theory possible for those Muslims who wished to 
rer1ounce their status as Muslims to be given French citizenship. But 
this was always hedged about with complicated restrictions, and in 
addition the renunciation of personal status meant that the Muslims had 
to abandon their cultural heritage and, more importantly, their prac-
tices in matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and religion. Such 
apostasy would be met with stiff resistance by the Muslim population 
and anyone who accepted those terms would be resented and referred to 
as "Beni Oui Oui" or the tribe of yes-men. 
After the First World War, France eased the requirements for 
Muslims to qualify for citizenship as a concession based primarily on 
their service in the French army or in industry (2). Coinciding with 
the growth of national feeling that followed the war, which was accele-
rated by the October revolution in Russia (3), the younger generation 
of educated Muslims or those who were in close contact with the French 
175 
culture both inside Algeria and in France were encouraged to demand the 
equality of their people with the Europeans. They realized, on the one 
hand, the great misery which their people was suffering as a direct 
result of colonial exploitation and, on the other hand, that Muslim 
population, if given the opportunity to develop their potentialities, 
they will not lay behind the Europeans (4). 
Within this generation some viewed Algeria's aspiration largely in 
terms of obtaining more concession from France with regard to the 
status of the Muslim population. They demanded the total assimilation 
of Algeria into French society and considered that the abolition of 
discrimination between natives and colons could be achieved simply by 
regarding all Agerians as French citizens. Political and religious 
organizations were set up to achieve these aims. Others, on the other 
hand, adopted more radical positions and believed that equality would 
not be achieved without t!1e total independence of Algeria and the 
complete withdrawal of French troops. 
Before going on to analyse the two trends in Algerian nationalism, 
it is useful to recall the political and the socio-economic impact of 
the colonial situation on the population of Algeria as a whole. 
Foundations of Native Opposition 
Above all, although French colonization in Algeria was a direct 
one, its relationship with the colonized masses was kept at a minimum 
through the existence of weak native intermediaries as we have seen. 
This was largely because of the presence of about a million European 
settlers who controlled every aspect of Algerian life. They dominated 
Algeria's economic activities including agriculture, industry, trade, 
banks, etc. creating the virtual pauperization of native Algerian 
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society, which became identified With the dominated and exploited 
classes. The settlers also had complete control of the cultural life of 
the native population. They did not see Algeria as a colony or as a 
''country being steered, by however slow a process, towards independence 
(as) .... for countless generations all French school children have 
learned as part of their curriculum that !'Algerie, c'est la France" 
(5). They regarded themselves without equivocation as the masters of 
the Muslims and called for the bloody repression of any independent 
Muslim political movement. They had total control over Algeria's poli-
tical and administrative life, and except for the tribal affairs where 
hand-picked caids held sway, the whole administrative apparatus, inclu-
ding the local police, the bureaucracy of the Governor General, and the 
Algerian branches of French ministries, were in settlers' hands (6). 
The settlers unanimously and violently rejected all calls for equality 
between tJJemselves and the native population. With regard to the rise 
of the Algerian national movement, except for a handful of individuals 
and organizations not dependent upon French control of Algeria who were 
working beneath the surface to maintain rapport between the Muslim and 
European communities (7), the settlers acted collectively as a single 
"party'', despite the structural and social differences between them, to 
suppress this movement and to deny it any concessions from French 
liberals. 
As regards native Algerian society, the impact of colonization, in 
as much as it transformed its foundations and disrupted its existing 
balance, was incoherent and contradictory. On the one hand, the destru-
ction of the traditional economy released am enormous work force and 
thus created the conditions for the spread of capitalist relations, 
and, on the other, this development remained mostly limited to enclaves 
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directed towards the metropole. In consequence colonization did not 
replace the disintegrating values and tradition of the native society 
with a new and universal set of social and political relations. It was 
geographically confined to enclaves and settlements based on relatively 
advanced technology and methods of production but isolated from the 
vast majority of uprooted former cultivators who had been driven into 
the cities and towns after having seen their properties expropriated 
and transferred to the settlers. These masses constituted the newly 
emerging proletariat and lumpenproletariat who were cut off from their 
past without being able to forget it, since the colonial regime did not 
provide them with a solid alternative. Some of them also constituted a 
petty bourgeoisie of professional and commercial intermediaries whose 
occupations depended on the activities of the colonial economy. 
Colonization, therefore, injected into Algeria a form of capita-
list development which could not embrace the whole population, despite 
the damage and the destruction it inflicted upon traditional society. 
The new urban classes created by this process of capitalist development 
were too weak either to manipulate the countryside or to play a role 
independent of the colonial structure. 
The native urban elite which was integrated into the marginal 
sectors created by the colonial economy, was limited in its actions by 
the extent of the process of proletarianization, and by the colons• 
monopoly over the most important sectors of the economy. It represented 
some social strata which descended from heterogeneous origins, includ-
ing local caids and administrative intermediaries, large landowners who 
took advantage of the colonial property laws, merchants and owners of 
small industrial workshops, and intellectuals incorporated into the 
colonial institutions. 
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The working class, on the other hand, was small in relative and 
absolute terms, and also was burdened by the existence within it of a 
large number of Europeans. Mostly concentrated in the colonial agricul-
tural farms, it was a juxtaposition of different groups often organized 
on a regional basis (8). The agricultural workers consisted either of 
owners of small holdings or landless cultivators who were fortunate 
enough to find stable work in comparison with the other landless who 
had to migrate to the towns. They never developed any form of elementa-
ry trade union action and their influence over the trade unions exis-
ting in the cities was effectively nil (9). Thus, the Algerian working 
class was on the defensive against the deruralized and unemployed 
masses. It was reduced to a daily struggle for bare subsistence (10). 
In these conditions the competition for employment among the members of 
this class reinforced tendencies towards economism and syndicalism, as 
the concerns and the attitudes of the workers were not independent of 
the conditions that governed their subsistence. In these circumstances, 
the working class found it difficult to develop any revolutionary class 
consciousness. The absence of a conscious working class party which 
could unite the class struggle and the national struggle explains the 
limited participation of the Algerian proletariat in the national 
struggle. The Algerian Communist Party, which was closely linked to its 
French counterpart, failed to see the real social and economic dichoto-
my between the Algerian and the European communities and generally 
dismissed the national question as an irrelevance. 
There remained the rural masses who were the most hard hit by 
French colonization. The process of economic and social degradation and 
pauperization initiated by the colonial conquest never ceased; rather, 
it was intensified by many new factors. The confiscation of lands was 
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carried out in a vicious manner as a result of the introduction of the 
French property laws which made this process a continuous one. The 
drastic demographic increase carne to add to the misery and pushed 
increasing numbers of the peasantry to migrate to the cities and towns, 
crowded into bidonville settlements. However, the rural population was 
the only part of the society whose relations with the past were never 
completely cut off. They still remembered the lands that used to be 
their own. The memory of insurrection against the occupiers and its 
heros still lived in their minds (11). Describing the feeling of the 
rural population during the war of independence F. Fanon wrote: 
"The memory of the anti-colonial period is very alive in 
the villages, were women still croon in their children's 
ears songs to which the warriors marched when they went 
out to fight the comquerors. At twelve or thirteen years 
the village children know the names of the old men who 
were in the last rising, and the dreams they dream in the 
duwars or in the village are not those of money or of 
getting through their exams like the children of the 
town, but dreams of identification with some rebel or 
another, the story of whose heroic death still today 
moves them to tears" (12) 
In the eyes of the rural population there was no indication whatsoever 
that the colonial system would improve their deteriorating situation, 
because they considered that same system as the sole cause of their 
misery. They therefore retained a genuine potential of hostiliy 
against colonialism and against the settlers who had stripped them off 
their basic resources. However, this hostility never developed into a 
solid national feeling; it expressed itself in a sequence of sponta-
neous rural protests and insurrections lacking any clear political 
programme and deprived of urban support, which were treated simply as 
problems of law and order (13). There was no means whereby the rural 
population could unite so as to constitute a real threat to the colonial 
system, as feelings of solidarity never rose above the boundaries set 
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by tribal relationships. Above all the rural population were totally 
isolated from the political struggle going on in the cities and towns, 
not only because they resented city dwellers who were always 
identified with the settlers, but also because the national political 
parties in the urban centres could only conceive of a struggle taking 
place within the limits permitted by the colonial legal institutions 
and they did not develop any links which might turn this potential 
hostility into forms of conscious action that could threaten the 
existence of the colonial regime. This did not come into being until 
1954, the year in which the pioneers of Algerian nationalism rallied a 
revolution which was largely based in the rural areas. 
Forms of Political Action 
French colonization and its impact upon the native social classes 
created within its cour-se, definitely had its effects in moulding the 
Algerian national movement. As the colonial system, or at least colo-
nial political domination, did not represent the interests or aspira-
tions of any class or strata within the native society apart from a 
very small elite, there was common hostility towards the common enemy 
who had either reduced the participation of one class in the system to 
a minimum (the small indigenous bourgeoisie) or, in the case of the 
rural population, abolished it altogether. However, the cause and the 
form of this hostility differed greatly between one class and another. 
This important point should be taken into consideration in any attempt 
to studying the Algerian anti-colonial revolution. 
One of the most interesting studies of the Algerian revolution was 
made by William Quandt, who made an effort to present historical events 
in connection with specific types of leadership, which were in their 
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turn the products of specific conditions and varying social and cultu-
ral backgrounds. He divided the leaders of the various political move-
ments in Algeria into three categories~ Liberal "assimilationists'', 
Radical ''Messalists and Centralists", and Revolutionaries "OS-FLN". In 
explaining the differences between these three categories, Quandt 
accorded due importance to what he called the ''historical accidents" 
which had produced men whose views and politics differed significantly 
(14). By ''historical accidents" Quandt means the social background, the 
political socialization, and the date at which they entered the move-
ment. From these conditions, factors such as family, school, age, and 
political environment in which the men involved in the political move-
ment grew up and were educated, emerge as the main or even the only 
determinants in tracing the difference between the three categories 
which dominated Algerian politics between 1930 and 1962. According to 
Quandt the Liberals "were perhaps more products of French school than 
of their societies, and not surprisingly their first political demands 
were for equal rights with Frenchmen, including French citizenship, 
rather than independence" (15). For the Radicals, the school was "the 
most important element in shaping their political socialization", there 
they not only "learned that colonization was bad, but also they learned 
about the National Movement" (16). The Revolutionaries, on the other 
hand, differed from the previous two in their socio-economic status and 
in their educational level. 
In fact, although these factors are useful and important for an 
understanding of Algerian political history, their utility is largely 
confined to providing possible explanation for the political behavour 
of an individual or a group of individuals. They remain insufficient as 
explanations of the differences in programmes and strategies that 
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emerged in the course of the national struggle. 
one cannot dismiss social interests and origins as important 
factors in shaping the main objectives of the political parties and 
movements in Algeria. For the fragmented Algerian elite created by and 
dependent upon the colonial structure, which dominated the political 
scene between the two wars, the goal was integration with France which 
would bring about equality of civil and political rights. If met this 
demand would mean the further enhancement of the role that the elite 
could play in society in that it would have more opportunity to parti-
cipate in the non-marginal sectors of the economy. 
As it was isolated from the rest of Algerian society, because it 
was basically urban in a predominantly rural society, and not having 
been fully integrated into the colonial structure, the Algerian elite 
could only turn to the metropole. Assimilation would abolish the 
barriers which prevented its expansion, because equality in civil and 
political rights would mean giving it equal terms to compete with the 
settlers, the main group that stood in its way. 
The political movement which represented the Algerian elite was 
the Federation des Elus Musulmans d'Alqerie (Federation of elected 
Muslims of Algeria) (FEMA), founded in 1927. This movement saw assimi-
lation with France as the ideal solution to the problem. Being drawn 
almost entirely from french-educated intellectuals and former officers 
of the French army, who acted on behalf of the surviving pockets of the 
traditional middle and upper classes and for the higher strata of the 
petty bourgeoisie (clerks, teachers, traders, professionals, etc.} 
"assimilation was, in fact, a real possibility only for this group 
because it was in some sense already assimilated" (17). It saw the 
Algerian problem purely in terms of its own dependence on the few 
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opportunities provided by the colonial system and its inability to 
benefit fully from that system. 
Led by its most prominant figure, Farhat Abbas, a pharmacist from 
Setif, the FEMA adopted a strategy of non-violence during the 1930s and 
appealed to French liberals and governments to grant their requests. 
They demanded: 
-the parliamentry representation of indigenous people in 
proportion to their numbers; 
-equal conditions in civil and military employment and promotion; 
-the uncompromising application of legislation to initiate public 
education; 
-equal political and judicial rights. 
However, since the FEMA represented only a fragment of Algerian 
society, it could only claim political representation on behalf of a 
part of the national movement. Its limited appeal was demonstrated by 
the creation of another grouping, the Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), in 
France by Hadj Qadir, a member of the Central Committee of the French 
Communist Party, which recruited its first members from the large 
number of Algerians working in France. In 1927 the Etoile came under 
the leadership of Messali Hadj, a member of the French Communist Party 
and a worker in Paris who later resigned from the Party because he 
refused to accept that nationalism was a reality only in industrial 
Europe and had no relevance to a non-industrial country like Algeria 
( 18). 
The Etoile under Messali put forward an uncompromising 
nationalist programme which demanded: 
-complete independence for Algeria; 
-the complete withdrawal of the occupation forces; 
-the creation of a national army and a national revolutionary 
government and the creation of a constituent assembly elected by 
universal suffrage; 
-the confiscation of large properties controlled both by the 
feudalists who are allied with the conquerors and by the colons 
and the financial companies and the redistribution of land among 
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landles peasants; 
-free and compulsory education at all levels in the Arabic 
language. 
The Etoile gained its support essentially from migrant industrial 
workers in France and to some extent from working people in the cities 
and towns of Algeria itself. When it was forcibly dissolved by the 
government for the first time in 1929, it claimed 4,000 members (19). 
It was revived again in 1933 and gained considerable popularity, large-
ly because it was the first real national movement to express the 
aspirations of the majority of Algerians for independence, and in a 
matter of few years the Etoile became a real threat to the domination 
of the bourgeoisie over Algerian politics. However, like the bourgeois 
movement, the Etoile remained isolated from the countryside, a limita-
tion which greatly hampered its activities. This was evident from the 
fact that the continuous and systematic repression exerted by the 
French authorities succeeded in putting a brake on the expansion of the 
movement until it was dissolved altogether in 1937. 
As well as these two movements, there was the Association of Ulema, 
founded in 1932 to purify Islam from decadent mystical trends. The 
Ulema came to lead a large educational, religious, and political move-
ment emphasizing Algeria's Islamic specificity and its separateness 
from Western culture. Their motto was: Islam is my religion; Arabic is 
my language; Algeria is my fatherland. Their influence spread to the 
cities and towns in Algeria and to some extent to the countryside where 
they were able to undermine the authority of the French-sponsored 
Maradouts (20). The Ulerna represented the tradition of the pre-colonial 
Algeria and gained the support of those Muslim intellectuals who defen-
ded the interests of Algeria's traditional classes of absentee land-
lords and city merchants "who saw in Arabic-Islamic values an instru-
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ment of ideological struggle against colonialism" (21). This can be 
deduced from the fact that despite the common programme that they 
shared with the Etoile regarding demands for independence, they allied 
themselves in the political action with the FEMA in 1936. In fact they 
adopted a gradualist strategy so as not to disrupt the existing hierar-
chy and also to limit popular participation in politics (22). 
The only other organization to play a positive role before 1954 as 
far as national aspirations were concerned was the Algerian Communist 
Party. This had been created as a branch of the French Communist Party 
and was dominated by radical European intellectuals whose efforts were 
limited to seeking social and economic reforms within the colonial 
framework. Despite this the PCA had a certain importance in the develo-
pment of the national movement in Algeria, as it was the only European 
political group in Algeria to be involved in a dialogue with Muslim 
nationalists on a basis of mutual respect. 
Confronted by the two major trends in the Algerian national move-
ment, self-determination versus assimilation, the colons stood firmly 
against the demands of both groups and forced the French governments to 
apply total repression. On several occasions their lobby was able to 
block the introduction of liberal reforms demanded by the assimilatio-
nists, the most important of Which was the defeat of the Blum-Viollette 
project. Leon Blum's Popular Front came to power in France in 1936 
promising to alter the relationship between Europeans and Muslims. The 
Blum-Viollette project proposed to grant rights of citizenship to 
between 20,000 and 25,000 Muslims. Had it succeeded, the project would 
have boosted the hopes of the assimilationist, in particular the elus 
and would have reinforced their position within the national movement. 
However, the colons displayed stiff resistance to the project viewing 
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it merely as a preliminary to their general absorption by the native 
society. Their objections were symbolized by the collective decision of 
the European mayors to submit their resignations unil the project was 
defeated. The colons then intensified their pressure on Paris to 
suppress any sign of nationalist feeling and in particular to ban all 
the nationalist parties. Their demands were, in fact, met when the 
Etoile was dissolved in March 1937. 
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Intensification of National Struggle 
Shortly after its dissolution, Messali succeeded in transforming 
the Etoile into the Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA). The PPA programme, 
though less radical than the Etoile's, still advocated national indepe-
ndence, but put more emphasis on pan-Arabism and Islam and showed less 
signs of Marxist influence in its economic programme. 
The PPA gained considerable support inside Algeria, and Messali 
Hadj soon emerged as the leading figure in the nationalist movement. 
His speech delivered at a mass meeting in Algiers in 1936, in which he 
declared his firm rejection of the Blum-Viollette project, announcing 
that "this land is ours and is not for sale" (23), captured the minds 
of the Algerian people. The PPA organizations spread quickly in the 
cities and smaller towns and to some extent to the surrounding rural 
areas (24). Both workers and intellectuals began to gravitate towards 
the Party, which pressed more than ever before for uncompromising 
nationalist demands. Messali's paper al-Umma stated in July 1939 that 
"no sentiment links North Africa to France except the hatred that a 
hundred years of colonialism have bred in our hearts" (25). 
However, before the PPA could acquire a significant hold on the 
Algerian people, the French authorities banned it two years after its 
establishment and arrested its leaders, forcing it to go underground 
and to keep its 10,000 members under secondary leaders (26). Messali 
was the first of the PPA leaders to be arrested. In 1941, a military 
court sentenced him to 16 years hard labour for sedition. He was 
pardoned in 1943. 
The assimilationists were dealt a major blow by the defeat of the 
Blum-Viollette project, and became disillusioned and even embittered by 
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the colons' persistent refusal to meet their most elementary demands. 
This disillusion was aggravated after the fall of France by the Vichy 
government, which then controlled Algeria, since this government was 
known to be particularly hostile to aspirations for independence. It 
paid more attention to the wishes and demands of the European settlers 
who, encouraged by the defeat of Blum's project, moved towards an 
openly pro-fascist position. The Vichy government received the support 
of the colons, suppressing all the nationalist parties and arresting 
their leaders. 
Quite unintentionally, such policies resulted in a radicalization 
of the demands of the assimilationists, who realized that their posi-
tion had become untenable. After making several unsuccessful appeals to 
the colonial administration, Farhat Abbas, who remained at liberty, 
adopted a more radical line and shifted from the position of trying to 
persuade the French to give all Algerian Muslims French citizenship on 
equal terms with the Europeans to a commitment to the notion of Alge-
rian autonomy. This shift can easily be traced from the following 
statement he made in 1941: 
"It is enough to examine the process of colonization in 
Algeria to realize how the policy of "assimilation" auto-
matically applied to some and denied to others, has 
reduced Muslim society to utter servitude •••.• The sa-
lient and continuing characteristic of French coloniza-
tion is the subjection of the entire country, its humani-
ty, its wealth •... , and its administration, to the Euro-
pean and French elements. It is here that the policy of 
linking Algeria to metropolitan France, the so-called 
"policy of assimilation'', finds its source, its justifi-
cation, and its truest expression. 
Politically and morally, this colonization can have 
one concept, that of two mutually alien societies. Its 
systematic or disguised refusal to allow the Muslim 
Algerians into the French community has discouraged all 
those who have favoured a policy of assimilation extended 
to the aborigines. this policy appears today, in the eyes 
of all, as an inaccessible dream, as a dangerous device 
in the hands of colonization" (27). 
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Thus Abbas abandoned FEMA and organized the Union Populaire 
Algerien (UPA), a movement similar to its predecessor but more explicit 
in its demands for progressive Muslim enfernchizement. In 1942 the 
Anglo-American forces landed in Algeria and defeated the Vichy govern-
ment. On 3 June 1943 General de Gaulle came to power in France and in 
the following month,in an attempt to create a new political balance 
against the mainly pro-Vichy colons, he issued a decree which embodied 
the Blum-Viollette proposals. This gave 60,000 Muslims (holders of 
university degrees, former army officers etc.) access to French citize-
nship. For the assimilationists, these measures were too little and too 
late. They did little to decrease the colons• overwhelming control over 
the country's political and administrative institutions. Even before 
this, Abbas, influenced by various factors such as the American 
attitude towards the emancipation of the colonial territories, the 
defeat of France, the loss of French prestige in Muslim eyes, and the 
inflexible attitude of the Europeans (28), had gone too far to retreat. 
In February 1943, he produced a famous document signed by 55 Muslim 
elus and politicians, Which became known as the "Manifesto" in which he 
sharply criticized French colonization, demanding a federal solution 
for Algeria and its right to home rule within French political frame-
work. It contained other specific and familiar demands such as freedom 
and equality for Algerians; freedom of worship, the separation of 
church and state, the freedom of speech, the press and of association, 
free and compulsory education, the institution of Arabic as a national 
language alongside French, the elimination of the colons' land monopo-
ly, and the acceptance of Muslims in the Algerian government (29). 
Although far from being revolutionary, as it did not demand full 
self-determination, the Manifesto represented a crucial development not 
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only in Abbas's position but also in that the national movement as a 
whole. With Messali Hadj released from prison in April 1943, although 
remaining under house arrest in Shellala, Abbas now emerged with 
considerable freedom to manoeuvre and to consolidate his position as a 
nationalist leader. In response to de Gaulle's initiative of giving 
citizenship to some Muslims and after the rejection of his manifesto by 
the Algerian government, Abbas launched a new organization on 17 March 
1944, in his home town of Setif, the Amis du Manifeste de la Liberte 
(Friends of the manifesto of Liberty) (AML). 
This new organization, which received the approval of both the PPA 
and the Ulema, established the first unified front in the national 
movement and symbolized a minimum broad agreement on their goals. 
Political differences and rivalries were subsequently expressed within 
a common orgnization whose main aim was to create an Algerian republic 
federated with France. With the lifting of political restrictions by 
the French authorities, the AML recruited 500,000 members. The banned 
PPA could now work within this front, but it never abandoned its mili-
tancy or its uncompromising demand for independence, and in fact it now 
had a chance to extend its political influence among the workers and 
the rural population. The strength of the PPA and its leaders' rejec-
tion of moderate nationalist demands were revealed in the AML's con-
gress held in Algiers from 2 to 4 March 1945. Messali was still under 
house arrest, but his followers dominated the congress. They defeated a 
motion by Abbas calling for an autonomous Algerian republic federated 
with France, and pushed two other motions through the congress, calling 
for the release of Messali "the undeniable leader of Algerian people", 
and another for the formation of an Algerian parliament and government 
without any commitment on its future ties With France (30). 
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The 194S Uprising and the Rise of Revolutionary Action 
Despite the existence of the AML front, the national movement 
remained sharply divided into two major factions, the former assimila-
tionists who had moved a step forwards in the direction of demanding 
Algerian self-rule, and the PPA which demanded complete independence. 
However, both movements were unable to mobilize the support they 
required in sufficient quantity, whether from the French authorities, 
for the assimilationists, or from the Algerian population, for the PPA. 
The years that followed the foundation of the AML and the revival 
of the PPA witnessed increasing Muslim agitation. Uncoordinated and 
isolated attacks on French property and the appearance of leaflets in 
the streets denouncing colonialism became regular occurences. An 
attempt to free Messali from house arrest was discovered by the French 
authorities and resulted in his being put under closer surveillance. 
Abbas and his supporters tried to distance themselves from the PPA and 
its activities, and Abbas released a statement in April 1945 declaring 
that "the AML is not responsible for any incident caused by suspicious 
elements" (31). Despite this the widespread hostility towards colonia-
lism was accompanied by a growing understanding of the need for more 
vigorous pressure for independence, and the tensions were further 
aggravated by the acute economic crisis. 
In May 1945 Algeria was shaken by an uprising unparalleled since 
1871 both in its extent and in the violence with which it was encoun-
tered. On the first of May the traditional parades were permitted, and 
the Muslim processions in the cities of Algiers, Bone, oran, and sever-
al other towns were turned into PPA demonstrations in which the 
Algerian green and red flags were waved and calls made for Algerian 
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independence and for the release of Messali. In the town of Setif, the 
French police provoked a bloody clash between the Muslim and European 
demonstrators as a result of their attempt to seize the flags, and by 
the end of the day, 21 Europeans had been killed. The police moved 
swiftly, punishing the Muslim participants indiscriminately and firing 
savagely into the crowd. Both sides reported significant casualties but 
the estimates of Muslim deaths vary between the official (under) 
estimate of 1,500 and the nationalist figure of 45,000 (32). 
Whatever the figure may be, it is clear that the repression was 
extremely brutal, and that no effort was made to distinguish between 
the guilty and innocent. The colonial administration seemed to have 
been determined to use this occasion to wipe out the Algerian national 
movement, which developed significantly at all levels from then on. The 
AML, which was thought to be primarily responsible for the demonstra-
tion, was banned immediately. 
The events of May 1945 proved to the Algerian nationalists that 
independence must be their objective and also that it would not be 
achieved except by force. However, this final step was not taken for 
another nine years, during which the national movement underwent a 
series of bitter internal struggles. Although the scale of the repres-
sion and the brutalities committed by the colonial authorities in 1945 
confirmed the PPA's position regarding the futility of relying on 
French "good will" for a solution, the movement as a whole and the PPA 
in particular was not able to formulate an adequate alternative strate-
gy to replace agitation within the framework of the legal and political 
institutions of the colonial system. Part of the reason was that the 
PPA was unable to exploit the potential hostility of the countryside 
towards the colonial regime; as we have already indicated, the rural 
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population remained almost completely isolated from the struggle waged 
in the cities. 
The moderate middle class leaders who took no responsibility for 
the events of 1945 tried to disassociate themselves from responsibility 
of similar incidents occuring in the future. Once again Abbas warned 
against any further actions which might evoke such a response; further-
more, when he realized that the PPA had been implicated in the Setif 
events, he abandoned the AML coalition and founded another organiza-
tion, the Union Democratigue du Manifeste Algerien (UDMA). Like his 
previous organizations, the UDMA recruited mostly among Muslim intelle-
ctuals, and gained little mass support. Abbas claimed that the program-
me of the new organization was the same of that of the AML. On 7 May 
1946, he published in Le Courier Algerien an appeal to Algerian youth, 
both French and Muslim in which he described his political aspirations 
as being neither assimilationist nor separatist. He appealed to French 
youth to overcome its "colonial complex" and to Muslim youth to rise 
above "anarchic Muslim nationalism" (33). The UDMA adopted a programme 
which demanded an autonomous Algeria federated to France, so that the 
oganizational split in the national movement appeared once again. 
In June 1946, Messali Hadj was released from detention, and orga-
nized the Mouvement Pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratigues (MTLD), 
to act as a front for the PPA, which had been forced underground. The 
new movement was virtually the revived PPA, and its members were also 
drawn from workers, students, and intellectuals. Many were convinced of 
the need for direct and violent action to achieve Algerian independen-
ce. The MTLD stood for much more than autonomy for Algeria; its progra-
mme included universal suffrage, the removal of French control over 
religion and schools, and the evacuation of French troops from the 
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country. Its resolutions were in favour of complete independence and 
were opposed to any federal status. Between 1946 and 1954 the MTLD 
became a mass party, penetrating a large part of the middle-class and 
exercising almost exclusive influence among the sub-proletriat who were 
organized in committees of the unemployed, and who were generally first 
or second generation of landless rural migrants. This led to the estab-
lishment of the first links between the national struggle in the cities 
and the countryside. 
Despite the French government's failure to give any real conside-
ration to the demands put forward by the UDMA for autonomy and fedra-
tion to France, limited political representation for the Muslims was 
introduced. The Statute of 1947 created Algerian assemblies and munici-
pal councils with two electoral colleges, the upper one for the French 
and the Muslim beneficiaries of the 1944 ordinance and the lower for 
the other Muslims. 
The strength of the national movement at this time was increasing 
considerably, as was clear during the municipal elections in October 
1947, and the Assembly elections in April 1948. Having boycotted the 
previous elections, the UDMA and the MTLD decided to participate, 
although not without much debate and effort to persuade their members 
of the uility of these elections. Between them they took a high percen-
tage of the lower college seats in the municipal elections and were 
only prevented from doing the same in the Assembly elections by wides-
pread ballot-rigging. 
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The Emergence of the Armed Struggle 
By 1950, the national movement was going through a period of 
tortuous and futile struggle over whether or not it should continue to 
function within the existing colonial system, which satisfied neither 
the colons nor the nationalists. While the latter were aware of the 
almost total control exercized by the colons over the political, 
administrative, and economic machinery, and the ineffectual nature of 
any ''reforms" which might be introduced by Paris to alleviate, if not 
to eliminate, the inequalities that existed at all levels, they had not 
forgotten the violent retaliation by the French authorities in Setif 
which made them hesitate to resort to violent open conflict with the 
colonial system. 
The elite and its moderate leaders took the events of 1945 as a 
pretext to stick to its demands and aspirations towards gradual develo-
pment or ''legal revolution" and their hope that French liberals would 
put forward suitable solutions to the problem. This policy was reflec-
ted in the UDMA, whose popularity gradually declined year after year, 
emphasizing the incapacity of the middle and upper classes even to 
bring about a settlement appropriate to its own status. Their position 
within the colonial structure had relegated the Algerian elite to a 
marginal position. Thus it was struggling to achieve the impossible as 
it was faced with a dilemma that could only be solved in a revolutiona-
ry manner, that is, a solution which would necessarily nullify its 
role. The collapse of Algerian bourgeois politics was revealed in the 
decline of the UDMA and the growing strength of the FLN in 1954, and 
its realization that its role would be overshadowed by other social 
strata for many years to come. 
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Among the poorer strata and the petty bourgeoisie represented by 
the PPA-MTLD, much of the struggle centred around the issue of whether 
armed action was the only means of achieving independence or whether it 
was useless. In spite of its uncompromising programme calling for 
unconditional independence, the PPA's social structure had undergone 
considerable changes since it began to expand, and it now included a 
number of intellectuals and professionals, who occupied high ranks 
within the Party. In the absence of the clear ideological education and 
the disappearance of the collective party mechanism that had characte-
rized the work of the Etoile, power-seeking individuals who could 
attract a larger block of supporters behind them emerged as the most 
effective disciplinary force within the Party. At many levels, adhesion 
to this or that tendency was often determined less by political choice 
than by personal relations. This tendency was favoured by the absence 
of any reference, in the course of the struggle, to the social ques-
tions which would emerge after the achievement of independence. The 
level of political education and the absence of democratic practices 
and procedures, which colonial repression played a significant part in 
its development, were important features in creating this situation 
(34). 
As the MTLD became increasingly dependent on the continued existe-
nce of the politico-legal framework of the colonial system, and the 
latter's tolerance of its activities and programme, a number of rival 
factions began to spread throughout its organizations. Even Messali 
Hadj, who had acquired a certain charismatic appeal, also experienced a 
number of challenges from other leaders of the MTLD. Much of this 
confusion was caused by the indecisiveness and the ambiguity that 
accompanied the creation of the MTLD, whether it was simply intended to 
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be a parliamentary cloak for the PPA (which remained working under-
ground and presided over by Messali) or whether it was intended to 
replace it. This incoherence reflected the movement's fundamental 
indecision about legal politics, since the MTLD continued to partici-
pate in the sterile parliamentarianism denounced by the clandestine PPA 
(35). A great degree of dissatisfaction and confusion within the ranks 
of the PPA was caused by MTLD's decision after fierce argument during 
the congress of March 1947, not to form a para-military force, but to 
press for reforms in a non-violent manner. 
In 1949 a group of more rdical members of the MTLD established a 
clandestine operational body, Organisation Speciale (OS), which was the 
first organization dedicated to the use of violence in order to attain 
independence. The leaders of this organization were all young men in 
their twenties, and came from humble backgrounds in which notions of 
moderation and legality made no sense (36). Except for Ait Ahmed and 
Boudiaf, none of them was college-educated or considered as intellec-
tual. After seeing how easily the colons could manipulate the electoral 
process, they became convinced that only direct armed action could 
destroy the colonial regime. They had also become disenchanted with 
Messali's charismatic leadership and critical of his dependence on the 
legal framework of the colonial system, and, unlike him, did not 
believe in spontaneous mass agitation. The first leader of the OS was 
Hocine Ait Ahmed, followed by Mohammed Ben Bella in 1949, but in 
general a form of collective leadership of the former MTLD members 
prevailed. 
The OS set itself the task of galvanising the population by direct 
attacks on colonial targets. They concentrated both on raids and on 
obtaining supplies of money and arms. The first successful operation 
198 
undertaken by the OS was Ben Bella's attack on the central Post Office 
in Oran in 1949, which netted about thirty million francs (37). By 1950 
the OS claimed 1,800 members but in March the same year the French 
secret service discovered its existence and arrested about a hundred of 
them, including Ben Bella, who remained in prison until his escape in 
March 1952. The existence of the OS produced heated discussions and 
arguments within the MTLD. After some indecision the MTLD dissolved the 
OS and denounced the use of force as a means of obtaining its objec-
tives. 
The Emergence of the F.L.N. 
After the disbanding of the OS, the national movement underwent a 
further split, but on different terms from the earlier one, the issue 
now being the way in which Algeria could achieve complete independence. 
The division over whether armed struggle was a vital precondition for 
the achievement of independence became finally crystallized in an 
organizational split four years later, which proved that despite the 
success it claimed earlier, the old national leadership could not 
overcome its social origins. The relative weakness of the social strata 
which this leadership had represented meant that the struggle became 
limited in a way which was inappropriate to conditions in Algeria, 
where a revolution would require a degree of mass mobilization that 
would include the rural population and capitalize on their genuine 
hostility to the colonial system. The early 1950's marked the end of 
the political careers of those leaders who had set out their objectives 
without formulationg the necessary means of achieving them. 
A third generation of politicians now emerged, which differed from 
the two previous generations in being able both to set its objectives 
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and formulate the means of attaining them. As well as the accumulated 
political experience which the movement had been able to acquire before 
1950, this group differed from its predecessors not only in that they 
had grown up in a different political environment but, more importan-
tly, in that they came from social strata which had nothing to do with 
the colonial regime. They represented, or at least acted for, the most 
disinherited groups in the population in the sense that they were not 
prepared to function within the colonial legal framework. 
Thus the MTLD eventually fell victim to an internal struggle which 
exhausted it and rendered it ineffective (38). As non-violence became a 
central tenet of its policy, discontent grew larger and larger. Opposi-
tion to Messali came first from the Central Committee of the MTLD, led 
by Hocine Lahoual, which held a congress in April 1953 to debate the 
issue of reconstructuring the OS, voting down Messali's request for 
greater power. In his turn Messali dissolved the Central Committee at a 
congress held in Belgium in mid-July 1954 in which he was elected life 
President of the MTLD. The emergence of the conflict between Messali 
and the members of the Central Committee, who later became known as 
Centralistes was usually expressed in terms of personality conflicts, 
but it has also been suggested that even before the split, the Centra 
listes were moving towards more legalistic means of action and away 
from a revolutionary progrmme (29). 
In his appeal of ll March 1953, following the creation of Comite 
du Salut Public (Public Salvation Committee), Messali exposed his 
differences with the central Committee by stating that 
"the national Movement is going through a crisis that is 
not without gravity ...• For three years, during which I 
was struggling inside the Party in silence and in an 
orderly manner, to protect the national movement from 
sliding towards adventurism and from abandoning the revo-
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lutionary struggle .... a policy of superficiality and 
compromise has developed since that period .••. and a real 
bureaucracy with functionaries, telephones, Pashas, and 
Chaouchs .•.. was instituted in the Party" (40) 
On the initiative of Mohammed Boudiaf (41), a member of the OS, 
which continued to function clandestinely since its foundation, and 
together with other members of the organization, who tried to put an 
end to the exhausting and costly war of attrition among the leaders of 
the MTLD, a third force, called the Comite Revolutionaire pour l'Unite 
et l'Action (CRUA), was formed in March 1954. Its aims were to end the 
deepening internal struggles within the MTLD (which occasionally erup-
ted in violent clashes (42), to reunite the national movement, and to 
inaugurate the armed struggle against the colonial system. The CRUA 
initiallY included two members of the OS and two Centralistes. It held 
a meeting in 22 July 1954 in Algiers attendd by 22 members, who dele-
gated five members (Boudiaf, Ben Boulaid, Didouche Mourad, R. Bitat, 
Ben M'Hidi L'arbi) to organize a series of coordinated activities which 
would take place at the same time, to draw attention to the eistence of 
a national armed movement. This group decided that these activities 
were to begin on l November 1954. The external delegation of the MTLD 
which was based in Cairo and included Ait Ahmed, Ben Bella, and Moham-
med Khidher, affiliated to the CRUA in July 1954. A Central Committee 
of the CRUA consisting of nine members (43), who came to be known as 
the chefs historigues was established. During August and September 1954 
the CRUA made an attempt to reconcile the two factions of the MTLD so 
that the revolution could be launched with united support, but it was 
not successful (44). In its second meeting in an Algiers suburb in 
October, the date of the revolution was agreed upon and the name Front 
de la Liberation nationale (FLN) was adopted with the stipulation that 
the Front must be open to all political groups. 
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Before going on to describe the new situation brought about by the 
creation of the FLN, it is useful to recall that the rise of militancy 
within the national movement was directly connected with the severely 
worsening economic and social conditions within Algeria. Aggravated by 
the sharp demographic increase, social and economic inequalities 
continued to grow rapidly. We saw in the previous chapter that 93 per 
cent of the Muslim population lived on a per capita income of $78.49 
compared to an average income of $578.44 for the Europeans. Unemploy-
ment was very high and was estimated at 2 million within the Algerian 
population; more and more cultivators became forced to leave their 
villages and migrate to the cities and towns to search for jobs. This 
situation increased the discontent among the Algerians in general and 
their bitterness against the French colonial system. It was against 
this background, which implied a greater degree of discrimination and 
repression, that the revolutio11ary tendency within the national move-
ment was gaining momentum. 
202 
The Socio-Political Origins of the FLN 
The FLN was the central force behind the Algerian revolution. It 
enabled the nationalists to wage one of the longest, most violent and 
most successful wars against colonialism in the 20th century. It 
emerged out of a situation in which both the colonial regime and the 
Algerian national movement had reached an impasse. The creation of the 
FLN represented a decisive turning point not only in the history of 
Algerian anti-colonial revolution but also in the modern history of 
Algeria. A significant part of the social, economic, and political 
development that Algeria has experienced since that date derives from 
the nature of this new movement and the conditions under which it was 
created. by launching armed resistance, the FLN succeeded in mobilizing 
almost all sectors of Algerian society, particularly the rural masses, 
who had remained almost entirely isolated from the national struggle 
until 1954. 
The founders of the FLN were all young men who had came into 
politics through the PPA and the MTLD during and after the Second World 
War. They had a common dedication to the national cause and they shared 
a common belief not only that complete independence was the only answer 
to Algeria's problems, but also that this independence could not be 
achieved without armed struggle. Many of them had been effectively 
involved in this struggle even before the creation of the FLN, through 
the os. They also believed that a revolutionary situation had existed 
in Algeria since 1947 and that either because of fears of a Setif-style 
retaliation by the colonial authorities or because of reformist tenden-
cies within the movement, the PPA/MTLD would not exploit this situation 
effectively. Hence they opposed Messali who wanted to settle the 
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political fragmentation that had enfulfed the MTLD before becoming 
involved in armed struggle, and also opposed the Centralistes who 
considered this to be premature and were inclined to organize the Party 
around a form of politics that would be permitted within the limits of 
the colonial framework. 
Socially, the men who established the FLN came from a variety of 
backgrounds. They included the sons of aristocratic families, whose 
power and properties had been weakened or even abolished by colonia-
lism, sons of merchants, proletarians and professionals. None of them 
had any full-time employment (except in the French army),and they felt 
the contempt of clandestine militants towards a class whose aims until 
the revolution, according to Harbi, had been identical to those of the 
French petty bourgeoisie (45). They did not maintain any strong links 
with their social origins and instead tried to establish ties with the 
urban and rural population from whom they would draw support. 
Ideologically, they lacked any sort of defined programme or theory 
that would have given them a profound understanding of their society 
(46). Partly because of the mechanisms by which the PPA-MTLD was run, 
their only common ideological background was their absolute contempt 
for colonialism and their dedication to putting it to an end. They 
regarded colonialism as being primarily responsible for all Algeria's 
social problems and they also tended to identify it with capitalism and 
feudalism. They considered that the misery and poverty of the Algerian 
masses was simply a direct result of the colonial system. Their demands 
for land reform and social justice were made largely because of their 
conviction that the colonial regime had introduced social inequality 
and divisions. Their total commitment and dedication to rid Algeria of 
French colonization through armed struggle inevitably led them to 
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oppose, and indeed to fight, any political group whose aims were not 
identical to their own. They used all possible means and arguments to 
justify their position and to mobilize the masses around themselves. 
Religious and traditional arguments were put forwards to convince the 
rural population that it was their duty to fight colonialism. For them 
Islam was a vital mobilizing force, which could expose the misery to 
which the masses were condemned and encourage them to fight to put an 
end to colonial exploitation. 
Finally, they looked at Algerian society as a single entity; if 
they saw any divisions within this society, it was only between the 
exploiting colons and the exploited Algerian people, and they consi-
dered that to have any faith in gradual development or improvement 
by means of the colonial structures was simply to misjudge the nature of 
colonialism; any one who maintained such beliefs was urged to abandon 
them and to rally to the armed struggle. Above all they were nationa-
lists and populists who believed that an Algerian national identity had 
existed before French colonization, and that this identity could only 
be regained through popular participation. Their common broad beliefs 
in independence and in direct confrontation in order to achieveit 
largely masked the potential divisions between them. As in many other 
national movements, the absence of clear ideological aspirations on the 
part of the Algerian leadership served to unite groups of varying 
social backgrounds and political beliefs, since the goal of 
independence acted as a unifying force. After the achievement of 
independence, however, when concrete decisions on policy had to be 
taken, the underlying differences inevitably came to the surface. 
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FLN: Supre~cy in the National MIDvement 
The Algerian anti-colonial revolution broke out on 1 November 1954 
with seventy small but coordinated attacks, organized by the preparato-
ry committee, against French military and police garrisons (47). The 
attacks were concentrated mainly in the Aures area and Greater Kabylia, 
the homeland of the Berber population, which became a major theatre of 
war. Th initiation of the revolution was accompanied by the issue of 
the FLN's first public statement which declared explicitly that: 
"After decades of struggle, the National Movement reached 
its final phase of fulfilment •.•. a group of responsible 
young people and dedicated militants, gathering about it 
the majority of wholesome and resolute elements, has 
judged that the moment has come to take the National 
Movement out of the impasse into which it has been forced 
by the conflicts of persons and influence, and to launch 
it into the true revolutionary struggle 11 (48). 
With few human and material resources (49), the fighters of the 
FLN succeeded in drawing public attention towards a new political force 
and in obtaining support from most of the Algerian people. However, 
during the early months of the revolution and until mid-1955 the mili-
tary activities of the FLN lacked adequate organization and prepara-
tion, and amounted to little than sporadic acts of terrorism and 
banditry. This was because the founders of the FLN rushed into armed 
struggle "in order to take advantage of the confusion created by the 
crisis (of the MTLD) and of the smoke screen of conflicts to escape 
possible repressionn (50). 
In fact the declaration of the revolution on l November was not 
only a declaration of war against colonialism but also against the 
leadership of the MTLD, and was an attempt to draw the support of the 
Algerians away from Messali and the Centralistes. Referring to 1 Novem-
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ber, Ben bella later commented (51): 
"We anticipated two results from the action of the lst 
November. The first and most important was the long-term 
result of rallying the entire Algerian people by means of 
this action launched by a vigorous minority. The second 
hoped-for result depended on the enemy making a mistake: 
the mistake was duly made, as we had anticipated, and we 
benefited enormously from it. We knew that, if the 
situation became really serious, the French government 
would not fail to dissolve the MTLD and imprison its 
leaders. To our unspeakable relief, this was exactly what 
happened. The government thereby relieved us of the 
presence of a lot of political meddlers who were assumed 
to be our accomplices but who, in fact, were a terrible 
hindrance to our movement because of the confusion which 
they created in the mind of the public. On the lst 
November, the Organisation Speciale had founded the Front 
de Liberation nationale (the FLN); now thanks to the 
enemy, it became the only political force in Algeria". 
The destruction of the colonial order was the supreme objective of 
the FLN, together with the aim of achieving "national independence 
through: 
1-restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and 
social within the framework of Islam; 
2-preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without distinction 
of race or religion" 
The FLN appealed to "Algerian patriots of every social position and of 
all parties" to join the national struggle. After emphasizing the 
objective of national independence and explaining the means of achie-
ving it declared that "French culture and economic interests will be 
respected, as well as persons and families" (52). 
Thus through the proclamation the FLN presented a broad and 
general programme which had a great political and psychological appeal 
to the Algerian people, reflecting the concern of the founders of the 
FLN to obtain maximum political support from the masses and replace the 
old political parties. 
A military wing of the FLN was established by the internal leader-
ship early in 1955, called the Armee de la Liberation Nationale (ALN). 
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Two principles were followed in organizing this apparatus; decentrali-
zation, and the priority of the interior (those within Algeria) over 
the exterior (those outside Algeria). Because of the nature and the 
vast size of the country it would be impossible for the struggle to be 
led by highly centralized organizations; thus Algeria was divided into 
six zones (later called Wilayas), each with its own command and army, 
and accorded freedom of action on this principle. The priority of the 
interior over the exterior meant that nothing was to be done without 
the agreement of those who were fighting inside Algeria. The armed 
struggle was organized in order to create an atmosphere of political 
instability and thus to establish liberated zones in the interior of 
the country which would be used as bases for military action. 
The external delegation of the FLN, consisting mainly of Ait 
Ahmed, Ben Bella, and Khidher, had the task of establishing, with 
Egyptian aid, a network to supply the interior with arms and of organi-
zing a diplomatic and propaganda campaign to rally international sup-
port for the revolution. 
Within a year of the begining of the revolution, the FLN fighters 
were able to expand the sphere of their operations not only against 
French military and police targets but also against native collabora-
tors with the French. For example, in the rural town of Tazmalt, the 
FLN militants organized twenty-one different assassinations of local 
Muslim bureaucrats in the French administration, which had the effect 
of totallY eliminated Muslim officials in the towns (53). Until the end 
of 1956, the FLN was able to draw on immense support and to orgnize an 
accelerating process of recruitment among the militant of the MTLD and 
then among the rural population. By the summer of the same year the 
armed struggle had expanded to extend over the whole country for the 
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first time. 
The FLN became the central political and military force of the 
national movement, which thus entered into a new phase of direct con-
frontation with the colonial system. The other political forces saw the 
FLN assuming the initiative by armed action, and realized that from now 
on they had to accomodate themselves to its programme and leadership. 
But it did not take long for them to see that they had lost the battle 
to the FLN and that if they still wished to be involved in the national 
struggle, it had to be through the FLN, which now appealed to all other 
Algerian political forces to dissolve thmselves and join its ranks. The 
Centralistes were forced to consider this new development and realized 
that they had to take action before it become too late. Eventually they 
rallied to the FLN under their leader, Benkhadda, in 1955 after seeing 
that many of their members had already jioned the FLN. 
The moderate UDMA was headed by Farhat Abbas, who had been a 
staunch supporter first of assimilation and then of federation. He had 
once maintained that violence was merely "desperation, disorder, and 
adventure", but he was now driven by a combination of his political 
failure, the blockage of his freedom of manoeuvre by the colons, and by 
several threats on his life from the FLN (54), to announce that the 
UDMA would support the FLN. Later, it affiliated to the FLN in April 
1956, together with Tawfik al-Madani of the Ulema. 
By now the FLN had become a major national front, uniting the 
different political factions whose common aim was the achievement of 
independence. Thus for the time being the internal struggles Within the 
national movement had been abandoned and almost all sections of 
Algerian society began to find to find common ground through a single 
political body. 
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However, the FLN did not arrive at this position without difficul-
ty and confusion or even, in many instances, without clashes with other 
forces in the national movement. Messali now found himself in a curious 
position, after losing the initiative to his opponents while he was 
busy trying to check the disintegration of the MTLD before engaging in 
armed action. He immediately formed the Mouvement Nationale Alqerienne 
(MNA), which initially gained considerable power, spreading mainly in 
Algiers and in France, eventually becoming a major rival to the FLN. He 
made several attempts to join the FLN but on his own terms, negotiating 
through his representatives in Cairo with Ben Bella for the entry of 
the MNA en bloc into the FLN. Ben Bella did not agree, insisting that 
the MNA must first be disbanded so that its members could join the FLN 
individually after rejecting their old allegiance. Messale refused the 
FLN's terms, and he later began to condemn the FLN openly. Large scale 
armed clashes took place between the two factions between 1956 and 
1958, both inside and outside Algeria, claiming hundreds of victims on 
both sides, to the great benefit of the French troop and police which 
manipulated the conflict in order to destroy both sides. The MNA actua-
lly ended up fighting the one force which could pose a major threat to 
the colonial regime, the FLN. This is the origin of the accusation on 
the part of the FLN that the MNA and Messali personally were traitors 
and allied with the enemy, an accusation which would have been the 
other way around if the balance of forces was in the MNA's favour. The 
gradual collapse of Messali's movement cleared the way for the FLN's 
overwhelming pre-eminence in the fight against the French. It showed 
how serious and ruthless the FLN was in totally eliminating any challe-
nge to its domination over the national movement. 
The only other force which remained outside the FLN was the Alge-
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rian Communist Party, which also found itself in an unenviable position 
after denouncing armed struggle. The PCA later participated effectively 
in the armed struggle but insisted that its activities should be kept 
separate from those of the FLN. The latter intentionally directed large 
numbers of Communist fighters to take part in risky operations where 
the chances of survival were slim. Thus they were ruthlessly and 
callously eliminated, as were many other Communists with the ALN (55). 
However, the Communists were able to prove their fighting merits to the 
FLN leaders, and their willingness to die for the cause of Algerian 
independence (56). 
The year 1956 saw the birth of the Union Generale de Travailleurs 
Algerians (UGTA) as a separate legal trade union, an a rival to the one 
controlled by Messali, Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algeriens 
(USTA). The FLN sponsored the UGTA, which had more success inside 
Algeria and was able to recruit 110,000 workers (57). From its early 
days UGTA members and leaders submitted to the orders and instructions 
of the FLN, which exercized a complete monopoly over its activities. 
However, the success of the workers' leaders within the organization 
gradually became much more dependent on their relations with the FLN 
than on their links with the workers and the defence of their inte-
rests. 
The FLN and the VVar of Indepndence 
By 1956, after almost all the national parties had rallied to the 
FLN, the movement gained considerable momentum both inside and outside 
Algeria. Through political and armed action against both the French 
army and the rival national forces, the FLN managed to score substan-
tial successes. Based in Cairo, the external delegation of the FLN, 
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which had to handle finance and arms suplies as well as diplomatic 
relations, was able to rally considerable Arab and world wide support 
to the Algerian cause. One of its achievements was managing to persuade 
a number of Arab and other sympathetic countries to urge the UN General 
Assembly to consider the Algerian problem in September 1955 (58). 
After witnessing with surprise the mounting success achieved by 
the FLN, France finally began to realize the seriousness of the situa-
tion. After the failure of the integration project introduced in 1955 
by the Governor General, Jacques Soustelle, which attempted to isolate 
the rural population from the revolution by trying to make contacts 
between the Muslims and the European community and by gradually exten-
ding political rights to Muslims, the French government, which was now 
under constant pressure from the settlers, realized that only a setious 
and effective military response would contain the FLN, especially after 
it had received a major boost by the grant of independece to Tunisia 
and Morocco. By this time no part of Algerian territory was spared from 
armed ALN attacks against the French police and army and the lives and 
property of the settlers. In fact some parts of the country, especially 
some sections of the Aures and Kabylia and the Constantine area were 
effectively under the control of the ALN. Part of the frontier region 
near the Tunisian border was also completely under ALN domination, as 
was a section of terrain along the Moroccan border in the west, where 
Tlemcen was partially besieged. 
In response, the French government raised the number of troops in 
Algeria to 40,000 in 1956, equipped with better and more efficient 
arms, and in April and May of the same year it mounted a counter-
offensive which was undeniably successful. The ALn had to give ground 
and fall back to avoid incurring heavy casualties. With good intellige-
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nee and air support, the ground troops were able to search out and 
harry the ALN, which was poorly equipped and in no sense trained to 
match such a violent and ruthless offensive. However, the violence and 
the atrocities committed by the French army in its attempt to combat 
the revolution contributed indirectly to achieving what the FLN had 
initially hoped for, since these acts alienated more and more of the 
rural population from the French, and galvanized their hostility to the 
colonial regime and their passive sympathy for the FLN into active 
participation in the national struggle. 
The FLN First Conference of the Sowmmam Valley 
Besides the initial successes achieved by the FLN, the expansion 
of its activities over almost all Algerian territory, and the growing 
intensity of the fighting as a result of France's evident determination 
to put an end to the revolution, the FLN also exhibited its organiza-
tional efficiency by preparing, in extremely difficult circumstances, a 
conference of its leaders inside Algeria, which took place in the 
soummam Valley, in Kabylia, on 20 August 1956. Preparation for this 
conference began in March, and its main purpose was to solve the conti-
nuing problem of establishing the unified military and political 
leadership which had so far been lacking. It was hoped to put an end to 
the political and organizational confusion that had accompanied the 
functioning of the FLN since its formation, and also to draw up a 
policy and programme which would regulate and guide its activities. 
The conference discussed a wide range of issues including the 
division of political and military responsibilities, the division of 
authority between the internal and the external leadership and the 
relations between them, the human and material resources of the FLN, 
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the regional division of authority, and elaborated a political program-
me setting up the objectives of the revolution and the military tactics 
to be used against the enemy (59). 
The conference marked the emergence of an important but hitherto 
latent conflict between the leaders of the FLN. This took the form of 
disagreements over the respective authority of the internal and exter-
nal leadership, each of which tried to exert its own control over the 
movement. In fact, the conference was only saved from actual conflict 
by the inability of the external delegation to attend, allegedly 
because poor communications and the absence of security meant that the 
safty of the external delegation could not be assured. But given the 
conflict, it is reasonable to assume that the external delegation was 
deliberately excluded from the conference in order to prevent it being 
dominated by Ben Bela. The external delegation waited in Italy for 
about three weeks for the signal to slip secretly into Algeria, but 
this signal never came (60), and they only learned about the decisions 
of the conference after they had already been taken. 
The most important of these decisions was the creation of Conseil 
National de la Revolution Alerienne (CNRA) as a sovereign parliament, 
authorized to consider and approve the decisions of the FLN with an 
executive, the Comite de Coordination et Execution (CCE). regarding the 
balance between military and political objectives, the conference gave 
a higher priority to political than to military maters. It decided that 
political prerogatives would prevail, emphasizing that this provision 
affirmed "the essentially political aim of our struggle: national 
independence". 
The conference also decided that the guerrillas of the interior 
were to have political and military precedence over the political and 
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military leaders stationed in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, and that in 
any conflict between internal and external activities or needs, the 
internal should take prioprity. The conference laid down details for 
the standardization of the ALN; ranks were introduced, and each Wilaya 
commander became a Colonel. 
The decisions taken at this conference underlined the conflict 
within the FLN leadership and represented a clear victory of the inter-
nals (dominated by three personalities, Ramadan Abbane, Belkacim Krim, 
and Omar Oumrane) over the externals, headed by Ben Bella, who was 
implicitly condemned by the delegates several times during the confere-
nee when they referred to the need to avoid any cult of personality and 
to maintain the independence of the influence of any foreign power. The 
delegates also condemned the efforts of Ben Bella to attempt to nego-
tiate a settlement without having consulted the internal leaders. In 
his turn, Ben Bella showed his dissatisfaction with the results of the 
conference on many occasions, stating that: 
"The congress undeniably gave to the Revolution the stru-
cture, the hierarchy, and the organization wich it lac-
ked. But at the same time it also introduced bureaucracy 
and red tape, which succeeded in gradually detaching the 
movement from the realities of the struggle. The main 
error of the Congress was in appointing to executive 
posts politicians who had always opposed the transition 
to armed rebellion, and who had not hesitated to publicly 
denounce our action after the lst November .••.. The lea-
dership of the FLN now became full of confusion and 
contradiction, and was noticeably lacking in stong prin-
ciples and well thought-out revolutionary strategy. Our 
capture a few months later (61) left the field clear for 
the politicians, both left-wing and conservative, who had 
none of the training required for the organizing of a 
revolution" (62). 
Ben Bella's objection to the decisions of the conference also 
appeared in a letter to the CCE in which he criticized the "the non-
representative (character) of the conference. The Aures, the external 
delegation, Oran, and the Eastern zones have not attended" (63). 
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For the internal leaders, especially the military leaders, the 
soummam conference was a landmark in the FLN's development as front 
with a clear programme and objectives, headed by an authoritative and 
established leadership. In the words of Mohammed Sa'id, one of the 
military leaders inside Algeria, the Soummam conference "represented a 
second 1st November; until then, I was scared to death, because in view 
of the past, the organization could fail. After 1956, I no longer had 
any fears because solid structures were established" (64). 
In fact the antagonism between the internal and the external 
leaders, although exaggerated by the French as a struggle between 
Berbers and Arabs for control of the FLN, did have a certain ethnic 
dimension. Given the large Berber representation in the FLN and its 
leadership (65), it would be incorrect to dismiss altogether, as many 
authors have done (66), the ethnic differences as simply one element 
among others in the conflict between the internal and the external 
leaders (67). Here Harbi has noted that "the 'Arab/Berber' thesis, used 
to serve the purpose of the colonial is not entirely without foun-
dation, since regionalism is a donee reelle of Algerian political, 
social, and cultural life" (68). In fact Arab-Berber differences had 
become apparent within the MTLD since 1948, centering around the issue 
of the definition of the cultural identity of the Algerian nation. 
Messali's slogan "l'Algerie arabo-musulmane" was contested and opposed 
by the slogan "l'Algerie Algerienne" raised by the Kabyle leader of the 
Federation de France du MTLD, Rashid Ali Yahya, who stressed that it 
was necessary to recognise that a substantial minority of Algerian 
Muslims were not Arab either in language or culture (69). Thus it is by 
no means implausible to suggest that the internals were sensitive to 
what they saw as an Egyptian attempt to control the FLN. However, it 
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would be incorrect to consider the ethnic element as the only factor in 
this antagonism, since political differences also played an important 
part and should not be overlooked; it would otherwise be difficult to 
explain the conflicts which developed between the internals which 
resulted in the assassination of Ramadan Abbane by his comrades Belka-
cim Krim, Bou Souf, and Ben Toubal, all Berbers who took an active part 
in the Soummam conference (70). 
The antagonism was only temporarily cast aside by the capture of 
the four leaders of the external delegation by the French authorities 
on 22 October 1956, and their imprisonment for the rest of the war. 
This incident was to have a crucial impact on the structure of the 
leadership, since it kept the four, who had been in the centre of the 
political conflict, away from these rivalries for the next four and 
half years. They also benefited, especially Ben Bella, from the public 
attention given to their capture and imprisonment, a factor which 
enabled them to have a substantial influence on the course of events, 
and also to play an influential political role when they were released 
at independence. 
The Soummam conference drew up the first political programme for 
the FLN in which vague and broad socialist and populist ideas were 
presented. The programme emphasized the objective of complete indepen-
dence through the unity of the people without any reference to distin-
ctions between classes. It divided the Algerian people into strata 
rather than classes and emphasized the role of the stratum with the 
larger and less privileged numbers. According to the programme, the 
leadership of society should not be accorded to a specific class but to 
a collective leadership composed of the most honest, uncorrupt, and 
courageous elements. No mention was made in the programme either of 
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social questions or social differentiation within society. 
The conference covered other important issues concerning the 
revolution: relations with the PCA and the Jewish minority, the role of 
women and youth, peasants and trade unions, and the social reforms to 
be enacted after independence. But its most remarkable feature was the 
terms it laid down for peace with France. There was to be no cease-fire 
before the recognition of independence, and negotiations only would 
take place on the basis of existing Algerian borders (i.e. including 
the Sahara) and of the refusal of double citizenship for the pieds-
noirs (71). 
Most important of all was the creation of bodies representing the 
process of formalizing the structure and institutions of the FLN. The 
CNRA was composed of 17 members, with a further 17 substitutes named in 
case there were casualties, making a total of 34 members (72). The 
selection of the members reflected the balance of forces among the 
contesting groups of the FLN. In all, the interior was represented by 
16 members and the exterior by 13 (73). 
The domination of the interior was reflected more in the composi-
tion of the CCE, whose role was to make decisions between meetings of 
the CNRA and to ensure smooth liaison between the Wilayas, and to 
ensure that all followed the master plans which had been decided upon 
centrally. The CCE was composed of five members of the CNRA, Abbane, 
Belkacim, Saad Dahleb, Ben Khadda, and Larbi Ben M'Hidi, all from the 
interior. 
In the course of the revolution the CCE or more precisely the 
policy adopted by the conference, was directly responsible for the 
policies which were to have a long-term effect on the coduct of the 
war. The most important of these was the adoption of urban guerrilla 
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warfare as a supplement to the struggle in the countryside, a new move 
apparently taken in the belief that urban violence would draw much more 
attention to the FLN inside and outside Algeria, especially in France 
where public opinion would be against a prolongation of the war. This 
led to the "Battle of Algiers" in which sporadic bombings took place in 
the hitherto colon-dominated capital in the summer of 1957 (74). This 
battle led to savage and violent French reprisals resulting in the 
quasi-annihilation of the urban political cells of the FLN, and eventu-
ally forced the CCE to flee to Tunisia and Morocco. 
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Military Retreat 
Militarily, the year 1957 was disastrous for the FLN. Having 
realized its potential strength, the French authorities started to act 
more effectively and efficiently, trying to crush it by force. As 
mentioned earlier, the armed forces were increased and were supplied 
with more effective means of combatting the rebellion, the Air Force 
was brought to Algeria for the first time, and this, together with the 
use of napalm, made the movement of ALN guerrillas inside the country 
very difficult. In addition, the construction of mined and electrified 
fences (Morice Line) along the borders with Tunisia and Morocco effec-
tively prevented the bulk of the better trained and armed elements of 
the ALN from entering the country and supporting the guerrillas inside 
with men and weapons. The successful and efficient surveillance by the 
French of the ports and international waters resulted in the seizure 
and appropriation of a large amount of arms destined for the ALN, 
depriving it more and more of major sources of arms and ammunition. The 
most devastating of the policies pursued by the French which had a long 
term effect not only as regards the FLN, but also as regards the future 
social and economic development of Algeria, was that of regrouppement, 
inaugurated in 1957, which involved moving some 2 million people away 
from areas considered favourable to the guerrillas and resettling them 
in camps under military guard. 
These policies largely succeeded in limiting the operations of the 
ALN to a minimum and caused a temporary defeat for the insurrection. 
Heavy casualties were inflicted upon the ALN, and it was reported that 
in the first months after the construction of the electic barrier the 
ALN lost 6,000 men and 4,300 weapons (75). The defeat was reflected in 
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the sinking morale of many Algerians. In fact about 30,000 Algerians 
were employed by the French army at the end of 1957 as auxiliary 
fighters and informers (Harkis), drawn primarily from ex-FLN fighters 
and starving peasants who had lost hope in the revolution. In the 
cities, and especially in Algiers, which was a major focus of FLN 
attacks against Europeans, the French police and army were able to hit 
out hard at the underground cells of the FLN and dismantle its organi-
zation. By the end of 1957 the French government and the settlers felt 
confident that they would succeed in breaking the FLN, as they had come 
to believe that the rebellion was over. The French government even set 
about initiating some political reforms which introduced more represen-
tation for the Muslim population in the administrative and political 
structures. 
The Establisrunent if the G.P.R.A. 
The military defeat inflicted upon the forces of the ALN inside 
Algeria had a direct impact upon the structure of the leadership and on 
the tactics subsequently followed by the FLN. The ALN adopted entirely 
new fighting methods, so that from now on the remaining forces inside 
Algeria had to change their tactics by abandoning any direct engagement 
with the French Army and reverting to the guerrilla tactics of the 
first year of the war. This meant that it tried to base its hopes for 
an eventual political victory on the threat of an indefinite continua-
tion of the fighting. 
The bulk of the FLN armed forces was forced to stay outside Alge-
ria. An army of 40,000 men was stationed on the Tunisian and Moroccan 
borders, cut off from the battle theatre by formidable French defence 
lines. They were regarded with disdain as outsiders by the military 
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leaders inside the country who (thereby) acquired more autonomy in 
decision-making in military and political matters, which added to the 
existing divisions among the military and politicians outside Algeria. 
The military defeat of the internal forces, and the inability of 
the bulk of the ALN to enter Algeria meant that the leaders of the CCE 
and the CNRA who were based in Cairo and Tunisia had to concentrate 
their efforts in the diplomatic field to gather support for the 
Algerian cause. On 9 September 1958, the CCE proclaimed the establis-
hment of the Gouvernment Provisoire de la Republigue Algerienne (GPRA) 
in Tunis to represent the Algerian government abroad. This move came 
mainly because of the stalemate which resulted from French military 
reprisals and partly in response to President de Gaulle's speech of 4 
July 1958, in which he promised equality of political rights to 
Algerian Muslims. The establishment of the GPRA was intended to show 
that only the FLN could represent the Algerian people, and that it 
would not accept any solution short of total independence. 
The members of the GPRA, the last of the political institutions to 
grow out of the wartime FLN was a combination of former assimilation-
ists and Centralistes, together with the four hijacked leaders, now in 
jail in France, as honorary members (76). At the head of the GPRA stood 
Farhat Abbas as prime minister, symbolizing the principle that the 
leadership should include all factions, although his appointment to 
this position gave the moderates and the right wing the opportunity to 
influence the course of the revolution. However, as well as being only 
loosely in touch with the internal leaders, and generally unable to 
control or influence them, the GPRA was at odds with the forces of the 
ALN outside Algeria. Thus in the years after the creation of the GPRA 
there was a profound internal struggle between the three distinct 
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centres of power within the FLN; the GPRA, the ALN, and the internal 
Wilaya commanders, which was further escalated by personal rivalries. 
The result was a great deal of confusion and incoherence within the 
leadership and constant reshuffles within the GPRA. The most notorious 
incident in this struggle was an abortive coup attempt against the GPRA 
in 1959, involving a group of seven officers of the ALN General Staff 
in Tunis led by Houari Boumedienne (77). In addition, after the crea-
tion of the GPRA the army emerged as a major new contender for power. 
As the most disciplined force within the FLN it became the decisive 
force in determining the chances of victory by any faction over the 
others. 
The Evian Agreements 
From its base in Tunis, the GPRA waged an intensive campaign to 
win diplomatic recognition and to gain support for the cause of 
Algerian independence. Much credit has been asigned to the GPRA's 
endeavours in this respect; as M. and D. Ottaway had put it, "it was 
largely because of this diplomatic offensive that Algeria obtained 
independence after the French had won the war militarily" (78). Howe-
ver, one should not forget that political stability continued to be 
greatly disrupted and that there was a constant threat of violence. 
This together with the development of new French interests in Algeria 
brought about by the discovery of oil, made the French government more 
inclined to play down the demands of the colons in favour of those of 
the nationalists in order to bring about a more stable situation in 
Algeria. Hence considering negotiations with the FLN became increasin-
gly popular in France. 
After gaining recognition from many Arab countries and other 
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members of the United Nations for the Algerian cause (79), the FLN 
campaign culminated in de Gaulle's proclamation in June 1960 that he 
was ready to negotiate a peacful settlement. The GPRA offered to nego-
tiate immediately. After a series of meetings between the French and 
the GPRA representatives, cease-fire negotiation began in May 1961, but 
soon broke down when the two parties failed to agree on an agenda. 
Nevertheless the meeting represented a major breakthrough in the rela-
tions between the FLN and the French government and an unpresedented 
success for the FLN in that it had finally gained recognition from the 
French as the representative of the Algerian people. 
However, even this success could not conceal the fact that after 7 
years of war the FLN still suffered from a lack of a comprehensive 
political and military coherence, as was evident from the mounting 
antagonisms between the FLN leaders over how the GPRA ought to handle 
the cease-fire negotiations. The ALN General Staff, led by Boumedienne, 
opposed all concessions to France, whose main concern was to secure 
guarantees for the civil and property rights of French citizens and to 
maintain France's economic interests in Algeria. The GPRA, on the other 
hand, favoured a more flexible approach and was prepared to make 
further compromises in order to be certain to obtain independence. 
In March 1962, the CNRA authorized the GPRA to renew negotiations 
with France, and a delegation headed by Ben Khadda and Krim Belkacim 
succeeded in reaching a cease-fire agreement with the Gaullist gover-
nment at Evian (Switzerland) in 18 March 1962. The agreement ranged 
over a wide variety of issues including future relations between Alge-
ria and France on a number of levels (80). According to the agreements, 
a Provisional Executive, or a temporary government, composed of three 
Europeans and nine Muslims was constituted to govern the country during 
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the transition period between the cease-fire and the referendum which 
would decide the future of the country. The French settlers' property 
rights and citizenship were preserved and France was granted the right 
to maintain military and economic control over part of the Sahara 
region for a five year period and to occupy the French naval base at 
Mers El-Kabir (81). 
The agreements inaugurated a new and historic phase in Algeria's 
relations with France; for the first time in modern history the 
Algerians were able to decide on their own political future. Yet 
the agreements took the conflict within the different elements of the 
FLN leadership a stage further, since the ALN and its General Staff 
refused to endorse them. After the Evian agreements, the four recently 
released leaders were also divided on this issue; Ben Bella condemned the 
agreements as a sellout to France, while Boudiaf and Ait Ahmed endorsed 
them. Indeed, the agreements added to the widening rift within the 
leadership. 
The Tripoli Congress of the C.N.R.A. 
Eventually Ben Bella, who was now in direct confrontation with the 
GPRA which was itself weary of the opposition of the army, succeeded in 
inducing the CNRA to hold a meeting in Tripoli (Libya) between 25 May 
and 7 June 1962 in order to draft a new FLN programme to be implemented 
after independence, following the conclusion of the Evian agreements. 
This meeting was also intended to prepare for the transfer of power 
from the GPRA to a constitutional republic by establishing a Political 
Bureau, Which would form the core of the new government. The GPRA tried 
unsuccessfully to block this meeting, seeing it as a trial of its 
legitimacy (82). Thus the congress was the scene of open confrontation 
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between all factions of the FLN since it was attended by all the 
members for the first time (83). 
The meeting started by debating the Projet de Programme pour la 
Realisation de la revolution democratigue et Populaire which became 
known as the Tripoli Programme. This programme was drafted under the 
direction of Ben Bella by Mohammed Harbi, a Marxist, Mohammed Yazid, a 
former Centraliste, and Mustafa Lashraf, a professor at the Sorbonne 
(84). 
The programme presented a brief analysis of Algeria's socio-
economic conditions since the begining of French colonization, and 
outlined the political programme of the FLN. It opened up with an 
analysis of the conduct of the war, heavily criticizing the leadership 
of the FLN (meaning the GPRA) for its ideological ambiguity and its 
authoritrian attitudes towards the masses: 
"The ideological idleness of the FLN, its feudal mentali-
ty and petty bourgeois attitudes which these produce 
indirectly, risk turning the future Algerian state into a 
mediocre and non-democratic bureaucracy in reality if not 
in its ideology" (85). 
The programme then gave a brief description of Algerian society, in 
which four classes were outlined; the poor peasants, the proletariat, 
the petty bourgeoisie, and the feudalists. According to the programme 
the National Liberation Movement was supported by: 
"the poor peasants, the chief victims of colonialist 
seizures of land, segregation and exploitation, •••• the 
urban proletariat, a relatively small group and teeming 
sub-proletariat .••• another intermediate social category 
.••• which is composed of artisans, menial and middle-
rank workers, functionaries, small shopkeepers and 
certain members of the liberal professions, all of whom 
together make up what might be called the lower middle 
class. This group has frequently taken part in the fight 
for liberation and contributed political staff •••• a 
relatively unimportant middle-class, composed of 
businessmen, wealthy merchants, managerial personnel and 
a few industrialists. These last two social categories 
have participated sporadically in the movement, perhaps 
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from patriotic conviction or perhaps from opportunism. 
Exception must be made for flagrant administrative 
feudalists and certain traitors who have sold themselves 
body and soul to colonialism" (86). 
The programme moved on to consider that the content of the Algerian 
revolution "is the deliberate construction of the nation within the 
framework of socialist principles and of power in the hands of the 
people". (Emphasis in the original). According to the Programme this 
implies "the elimination of the social and economic structures of 
feudalism and its survival and the establishment of new structures and 
institutions capable of fostering and guaranteeing man's emancipation 
and his full and entire enjoyment of his liberties ...... Algeria's 
development ..•. should necessarily be planned in a socialist perspec-
tive". It goes on to stress on the necessity of the people's unity in 
achieving the goals of the revolution: 
"The tasks of the democratic revolution in Algeria are 
tremendous. They cannot be accomplished by a social 
class, however enlightened; only the people are prepared 
to carry them out- that is, the peasantry, the workers in 
general, the youth, and the revolutionary intellectuals". 
(Emphasis in original) 
It then went on to elaborate the orientation of the FLN and drew 
guidelines for the leadership. The most important elements were: 
-the war of weapons is to be succeeded by ideological combat 
(through) the construction of the nation within the framework of 
socialist principles; 
-the work of national reconstruction will embrace all Algerians, 
class interests will be suppressed. Algerian culture is to be 
revolutionary, national, and scientific; 
-the leadership will foster an agrarian revolution in which land 
will belong to those who work it. This will include the 
modernization of agriculture; 
-ultimately, the FLN will sponsor the nationalization of credit, 
foreign trade, mineral resources, and energy resources; 
-to realize the social aspirations of the masses, the FLN 
dedicates itself to the progressive improvement in living 
standards, the elimination of illiteracy, the acceleration of 
efforts to improve health conditions and the emancipation of 
women; 
-in foreign affairs, the FLN is to be in the forefront of 
movements assisting the liberation of colonial dependencies, 
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fighting imperialism and striving for Arab unity. (87). 
The programme also described the role of the Party and its rela-
tions with the state, emphasising its leading role in guiding society, 
and stipulating that the head of the government and the majority of 
ministers should be members of the FLN. The programme also warned at 
the same time against the possibility of bureaucratic relationships 
developing between the Party and the mass organizations. 
While the programme emphasized the necessity of avoiding socio-
economic development along capitalist lines, this was to be achieved by 
preventing the national bourgeoisie from playing a significant politi-
cal role either in the state or the Party. On the other hand, there was 
no mention of the total economic elimination of this bourgeoisie which 
was believed capable of playing a subordinate but useful role in econo-
mic development. Socialism on the other hand, was considered only in 
terms of erecting the machinery to inaugurate the nationalization of 
major means of production, which would be followed by the rational 
planning of the economy. 
Although all conflicting factions of the FLN in the congress were 
able to adopt this ideological programme easily without a single modi-
fication, they were to face enormous difficulties in resolving the 
question of political power. This does not mean that the internal 
struggles and infighting within the FLN had no ideological basis, still 
less that the factions were ideologically homogeneous. At this stage 
the most important issue was not to ensure specific ideological orien-
tation but to decide who would assume political power, since that 
person or group would then be able to impose his own ideology, because 
at that stage ideology would follow power and not vice versa. This can 
be illustrated by the attitude of Farhat Abbas, a moderate right wing 
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leader, who while describing the programme as "Communisme mal digere" 
(ill-digested communism), and having undoubtedly nothing in common with 
communism, had nevertheless voted to accept it. 
Although a minority in the GPRA, Ben Bella and his supporters (88) 
appeared to constitute a majority in the CNRA strong enough (in any 
case) to convene the Tripoli congress inspite of GPRA objections (89). 
In an attempt to undermine the position of the GPRA, he proposed the 
names of seven men to staff the new organ, the Political Bureau (90). 
Another list, including many more names and opposing Ben Bella's list 
was presented by Krim Belkacim. When it came to the vote on the member-
ship of the Political Bureau there was great confusion and many members 
withdrew, which resulted in the adjournment of the congress in disarry 
without any decision taken on this matter (91). 
The Political Crisis and the Triwmph of Ben Bella in July 1962 
Thus at the end of the Tripoli Congress the FLN appeared to be 
torn apart more than at any previous time, and the divisions and splits 
threatened to break out into imminent civil war. By July 1962 there 
were at least four major groups competing for power. The first was that 
of the supporters of Ben Bella, who was evidently the most popular 
figure, but who lacked the means to impose himself and assume power. 
The second was the GPRA headed by Ben Khadda, who replaced Farhat Abbas 
in September 1961, and claimed to have been instrumental in achieving 
independence after the negotiation with France. The third was the ALN 
and its General Staff headed by Boumedienne, and the fourth, the wilaya 
commanders who were themselves divided between supporters of the ALN 
and of the GPRA. The latter were aware of the risks of being deprived 
of the power which they had obtained during the years of the war. Three 
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Wilaya commanders from wilaya 2 (North Constantine), 3 (Kabylia), and 4 
(Algiers) blamed Boumedienne for not supplying them adequately with 
arms (92). 
The conflict turned into a serious political crisis when the GPRA 
published its decision to dismiss Boumedienne and two other ALN comman-
ders from their posts before entering Algeria. The decision enabled Ben 
Bella to exploit the situation and to develop his relationship with the 
ALN into an alliance with Boumedienne, and both Ben Bella and the ALN 
refused to accept the decision. 
To add to the confusion that developed after the Tripoli Congress, 
two members of Ben Bella's Political Bureau, Ait Ahmed and Boudiaf, 
refused their seats in the body (93). Nevertheless, when Ben Bella 
succeeded in forging an alliance with the ALN, he had secured the 
support of the most organized and disciplined force in Algeria. Thus 
when Ben Khadda and the GPRA arrived in Algeria to set up their gover-
nment on 3 July 1962 after a massive vote for independence by the 
Algerian people, Ben Bella arrived shortly afterwards in Tlemcen with 
an ALN force from Morocco and announced the formation of the Political 
Bureau as the supreme government on 22 July. For his part, Boumedienne 
marched on Algiers after defeating the forces of wilayas 3 and 4 who 
had rallied to the GPRA and convincing those of wilayas 1 and 2 to join 
him. The clashes between the ALN and the wilaya fighters in which 
thousands were killed, were on the verge of developing into a devasta-
ting civil war, had the local population not intervened and taken over 
the streets of the cities and towns, demanding the immediate halt of 
the agony of nearly eight years of war with France. 
Thus by September Ben Bella, backed by the ALN was able to extend 
his control over the whole country. Algeria then entered into a new 
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phase of its history, in that not only did the eight agonising years of 
war come to an end but also 130 years of systematic and consistent 
French colonization. What followed later was of course rooted in this 
history but more particularly in the conditions under which the coloni-
al era came to an end. 
Finally it is necessary to try to shed some light on the origins 
of the political infighting which had accompanied the Algerian national 
movement between its emergence and the achievement of independence. 
Going back to what I have already said, it would be misleading to 
suggest that the differences and conflicts within the various political 
organizations can be attributed only to differences in political socia-
lization or to the "historical accidents" that moulded the people who 
joined these organizations. In fact the consideration of social origins 
cannot be ignored in any analysis of the participants in the Algerian 
national struggle and is important even in the context of the conflicts 
within the FLN factions before and after independence. 
We have seen that the Algerian middle classes originally fought 
unsuccessfully for political rights which were to be achieved either by 
complete assimilation with France or by the revival and modernization 
of the Islamic nation. Their failure was largely due to the accelera-
tion of the process of colonization, which put severe limitations on 
their economic development potential and rendered their demands 
impossible to achieve. Similarly, this process also resulted in the 
emergence of a deprived petty bourgeois social stratum, which, since it 
was closer to the mass of the population in the sense that its social 
upward mobility was constantly checked by the existence of the European 
colons, saw that the liberation of Algerian society could only be 
attained through the destruction of the colonial system. By capitali-
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zing on the failure of the former political movement, it had been able 
to dominate Algerian national politics since 1930. In this context the 
birth of the FLN represented a shift in the political approach of the 
petty bourgeois stratum to that of achieving national liberation by 
means of armed struggle. 
The nature of the colonial regime and the inherent inability of a 
movement led by petty bourgeois elements to develop a unified ideology 
of its own induced it to carry out its struggle on the basis of very 
broad and largely undefined objectives. It claimed to represent the 
whole of Algerian society, and in this way appealed to all socio-
political forces to join the struggle for independence. This permitted 
two major developments to emerge in the course of the liberation War. 
First, by exploiting the mechanisms under which the FLN had been 
created and was run, the more bourgeois elements of the national 
liberation movement were able to play an important role in the revolu-
tion, encouraged indirectly by French liberals and the French govern-
ment, as well as by the international reputation they acquired during 
the diplomatic campaign. Secondly, the conditions under which the 
revolution developed contributed to the emergence of an independent and 
disciplined force, the ALN, most of whose members came from a petty 
bourgeois background. This force was less willing to compromise and 
less tolerant of the educated and well-off politicians who had been 
yesterday's assimilationists. 
Hence the divisions within the FLN must be considered in terms of 
social conflict. The GPRA felt able to assume power, and saw a golden 
opportunity to achieve this with the aid of the assistance promised in 
the Evian agreements. However the role of the ALN after its alliance 
with Ben Bella ensured the victory of the more petty bourgeois 
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elements within the movement. This was the underlying reason for the 
struggle which ensued, but the role played by personal rivalries and 
divisions within the factions cannot be ignored. Severe repression and 
the almost total absence of democratic institutions and procedures 
within the national movement had of course greatly aggravated this 
situation. 
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PART III 
ECON<MY AND SOCIETY IN INDEPENDENT ALGERIA 
CHAPTER FIVE THE RISE OF THE ALGERIAN PETTY BOURGEOISIE AND 
ITS ACCESSION TO POWER 
Over the last two decades the social and economic development of 
Algeria has been so rapid and has assumed such a drastic form that the 
impression initially given was that the country was following a quali-
tatively different form of social transformation from that of many 
post-colonial societies. Moreover, the benefits of this development 
have been fairly widely distributed in comparison with other oil-rich 
states in the Third World (1). Popular mobilization was frequently 
involved in this development, and some forms of democratic institutions 
were created in its course. State involvement in the economy and socie-
ty far exceeded the standard set by similar experiences in other newly 
independent countries. However, if Algeria has greater claims to be 
considered as a 'socialist' country, this should be traced to its 
inherited characteristics and the consequences of 130 years of French 
colonization and particularly of the eight years of violent confronta-
tion with the colonial power. 
First, the protracted war followed by the sudden exodus of the 
European colons who had formed the core of the country's elite made it 
impossible for any single social class to assume the responsibility of 
transforming society. This has meant effectively that the indigenous 
upper middle classes, structurally weak and ill-equipped in terms of 
capital and skills, had to be content with a very marginal economic and 
political role for a considerable time, and its actual survival depend-
ed on conditions largely outside its own determination and control. 
Hence the state was the most suitable vehicle to mobilise the resources 
required for the transformation of the economy. 
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Secondly, the war of independence played a very significant role 
in mobilizing the Algerian people and in transforming their political 
attitude and awareness, since it effectively combined aspirations for 
social justice with those of independence. Discussing the radicaliza-
tion process which the Algerians experienced during the war, Bourdieu 
stated that: 
"everywhere the same consciousness of their rights is 
now in evidence: the right to work, the right to 
decent housing, the right to the different social 
benefits (social security, family allowances, etc.). 
For the attitude of the beggar who comes humbly to 
solicit a charitable gift there has been substituted a 
demanding and revolutionary state of mind which is 
inducing the Algerians to insist on their rights to 
social benefits and service" (2). 
Thus the war not only brought a large section of the population 
into direct confrontation with the colonial power, but also greatly 
radicalised the attitude of most Algerians. As a result the state has 
found itself under continuous pressure to satisfy demands which were 
not attainable during the colonial period (3). This meant that to be 
effective, development policies had to give serious consideration to 
the interests of all sections of the population, and above all that 
they were not supposed to benefit particular groups at the expense 
of the majority. 
Given the central role which the state plays in such a society, 
these developments brought about increased pressure for the widest 
possible representation of all social forces, and also made individuals 
within the state apparatus seek to win the support of as much of the 
population as possible. Any attempt on the part of a particular group 
to dominate the state is constantly ckecked by the interests of other 
groups and classes. In other words, the specificities of historical and 
social development under French colonization have made it difficult for 
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a minority to disregard the interests of the majority for its own 
benefit. Translated into the political action of the leading strata 
after independence, this meant that revolutionary action and rhetoric 
was the only means by which the leadership could achieve legitimacy, 
since "there is no legitimacy outside the revolutionary symbol, groups 
and policies" (4). The purpose of this chapter is to try to explore the 
social origins of the strata who led the anti-colonial struggle and 
subsequently imposed their authority on the independent state. 
The Emergence of the Algerian Petty Bourgeoisie and its 
'Representatives' 
French colonization destroyed most of the foundations of native 
Algerian society. Through various mechanisms, it managed to transform 
this society into a series of disorganized and uprooted entities. This 
was achieved mainly by the imposition of French property laws and the 
drastic changes in the social and institutional structures of society 
which followed. However, despite the fact that the colonial regime kept 
in minimal contact with the indigenous population and worked essential-
ly through the European settlers, and despite the virtual liquidation 
of the traditional aristocracy, the colonial regime also introduced a 
considerable degree of social stratification within Algerian society. 
This was done either through the promotion of certain elements to act 
as intermediaries between the colonists and the colonized society and 
to help in imposing law and order (5), or through the encouragement of 
a social category which had direct contacts With the colonial sector 
(landowners in rural areas and businessmen, exporters, traders, and 
intellectuals in the cities) and which came to form the Algerian rural 
and urban bourgeoisie. While structurally weak and small in size, 
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playing only a marginal economic role in the colonial sector, this 
group was nevertheless relatively privileged and enjoyed a higher 
standard of living than the rest of the native population. However, 
despite the important role played by the educated sons of this group in 
the early stages of Algerian nationalism, their own particular aspira-
tions could neither be satisfied by the colonial administration nor 
they were shared by the rest of the Algerian population. 
The first coherent demands for independence came from the migrant 
Algerian workers in France in the 1920's, and also from those petty 
bourgeois groups who became increasingly exposed to French education 
and involved in the colonial economy and institutions. French coloniza-
tion had also created various middle strata who, though dependent on 
the colonial economic and administrative sector, were less privileged 
and less wealthy than the former group. They consisted of different 
social and economic groups including the new middle and small traders 
and owners of small workshops, army officers, intellectuals, and civil 
servants. It is very difficult to determine the exact numbers in these 
heterogeneous groups not only because of the lack of accurate statis-
tics but also becuse of the wide differences in their income and social 
position. 
The origins of these strata are diverse; some of the small traders 
belonged to the traditional urban society especially those involved in 
buying and selling of tobacco, others, such as greengrocers, traders in 
agricultural products, and retailers of other goods emerged as a result 
of colonial development, the commercialization of agriculture and the 
increase of money in circulation. There were also a large number of 
small traders with very little capital who were in fact a "refuge pour 
des sous-proletaires" . The larger merchants were involved in the trade 
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of grain and olive oil, and in imports and exports. After eliminating 
these two extremes, Ageron estimated the number of Algerians involved 
in trade at 79,000 in 1954 (6). He also estimated that there were about 
1,500 owners of small and medium sized workshops engaged in tobacco and 
cigarette manufacture, and in the production and distillation of 
alcohol. 
Apart from the development of the colonial economy, and the 
increase in the amount of money in circulation, a major factor contri-
buting to the emergence of these new social strata was labour migra-
tion, which "has not only permitted numerous Algerian families to 
survive, but also has favoured a certain degree of social mobility" 
(7). Remittances from migrant workers to their families were a major 
source for the latter's economic activities, especially if one consi-
ders that the migrants transferred about 37 and 38 milliard francs each 
year between 1950 and 1954, which represented l/4 of the salaries paid 
in Algeria by commerce and industry, and equivalent to almost all 
agricultural wages (8). 
Any attempt to analyse the society of colonial Algeria in this 
period must also take account of the French army Which helped to 
elevate certain members of the indigenous population to relatively 
important social positions. In 1942 8,000 Muslims were retired pensio-
ners with a grade of officer or under-officer (9). At the same time, 
the development of primary, secondary and higher education was one of 
the most important factors in creating a new and widespread social 
stratum which began to shape a growing political and national consciou-
sness and played an important role in undermining the colonial system. 
The educational system in Algeria "had always been the fulcrum of 
political struggle between the colonial bourgeoisie and the state 
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authorities on the one hand, and between the colonial bourgeoisie and 
the Algerian people on the other" (10). The colons were profoundly 
opposed to any expansion of education among the native population (ll). 
Apart from the possibility that education would fuel patriotism and 
nationalist sentiment within the native population, it would also be 
very costly. "They repeated ceaselessly in the colonial newspapers that 
the financial burdens have hampered the natural development of coloni-
zation. They crudely but clearly stated it: 'Let us keep our money 
where it would be better employed: in agriculture, an area in which 
colonisation is vitally interested.' " (12). The colonial authorities 
considered the extension of education to the native population not only 
as a means of bringing about social peace by creating a stratum of 
native intellectuals and bureaucrats attached to and dependent on the 
existence of the colonial regime, but also as a technical necessity for 
the reproduction of colonial relations. It therefore sought to make 
school attendance compulsory and to provide a minimum basic welfare 
programme for the majority of the urban population. It also aimed, as 
far as the Muslims were concerned, to compete against the Muslim 
schools where teaching was in Arabic, and to combat nationalist feeling 
(13). A decree was passed on 6 June 1917 requiring, for the first time 
in colonial history, compulsory attendance for all children residing 
within three kilometres of a school building (14). 
However, both the number of school places and the quality of 
education available for the Muslim population were low, as the table 
below indicates. The main beneficiaries of the expanded educational 
opportunities at that period were the sons of the urban notables who 
were already to some extent assimilated within the colonial economy 
and society. 
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Primary and Secondary Education in Algeria Between 1919-1921 (15) 
Year 
1919-1920 
1920-1921 
1919-1920 
1920-1921 
Year 
1919-1920 
1920-1921 
Mus. 
477 
434 
Primary Education 
Muslims 
41,144 
42,904 
Normal Schools 
Europeans 
115,308 
112,223 
55 367 
51 347 
Secondary Education 
Public Schools Private School 
Eur. 
8,639 
9,000 
Mus. 
23 
24 
Eur. 
10,272 
9,929 
Nevertheless, education expanded rapidly during the 1940's. While 
only 7,605 certificates of primary education were delivered to native 
Algerians in the thirty years between 1883 and 1913, this number 
increased to 12,000 in 1944 (16). In 1943, out of an estimated popula-
tion of 7.5 million Muslim Algerians (of whom 1.25 million were chil-
dren aged between 6 and 14), 110,200 children (boys and girls) were 
receiving primary education (17). In November 1944 a plan for education 
approved by the Governor-General of Algeria was drawn up to cover the 
period between 1945 and 1965. This plan aimed at the creation of 20,000 
classes for one million Algerian primary pupils. Between 5 December 
1944 and 5 December 1945, 449 new classes were opened for 24,301 
pupils, increasing the classes available from 2,073 to 2,522 and the 
number of pupils from 110,636 to 134,987 (18). The following table 
shows the sharp increase in the number of Algerian students in primary, 
secondary, and university education after 1945. 
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Number of Primary, Secondary, and University Student in Algeria 
1945-1960 (19) 
Year Muslims Europeans Total 
Males Females M. F. M. F. 
1901 24,975 1,779 115,576 57,404 140,551 59,183 
1911 40,778 3,527 136,979 67,140 177,757 70,967 
1921 42,904 4,131 112,223 55,687 115,127 59,618 
1931 67,738 8,410 124,015 63,357 191,735 71,467 
1945 108,663 19,804 132,543 65,397 241,206 85,201 
1954 306,215 80,370 134,848 66,532 441,063 147,002 
1956 272,417 83,818 131,782 64,133 404,199 148,351 
1957 345,533 109,287 131,224 64,871 476,757 174,158 
1959 609,545 227,428 136,136 67,314 745,681 294,742 
1960 714,774 268,844 125,305 59,127 840,079 327,971 
Despite this increase, the number of registered native students 
remained very small in relation to the size of the Muslim population. 
The percentage of those receiving education only increased from 3.8 per 
cent in 1908 to 4.5 per ecnt in 1920 and 6 per cent in 1930 (20). The 
bulk of those receiving education carne from the relatively privileged 
urban population who started to realize the immense benefits that 
education could provide, since it was only through education that they 
could gain access to public employment or the liberal professions. Thus 
the number of Algerian civil servants increased from 4,000 in 1930 to 
9,600 in 1944 and to 33,147 in 1954 (21). These figures show the prime 
importance of education in creating a semi-privileged social force 
primarily composed of school and university graduates who could find 
permanent employment in the administration and secure relatively high 
incomes for themselves. However, this was not the only function of 
education, since it also carne to play a major role in the spread of 
nationalist feeling and in agitating the Algerian revolution as we will 
see later. 
249 
By 1955, according to figures presented by Samir Amin (22), 
135,000 persons could be classified as middle class, including those 
working in small-scale industry and business, in liberal professions 
and as junior executives in the administration. Together with white-
collar workers in the big and small businesses and in government 
service (numbering 90,000), they formed 50 per cent of the urban work-
ing population (460,000). They had an average annual income of 270,000 
francs, and were thus relatively better off than the workers whose 
annual incomes were about 150,000 francs and the unemployed, who 
numbered between 150,800 and 230,000. 
Although primarily intended to benefit the colons, French land 
policy also contributed to the emergence of numerous large and middle-
size proprietors in the rural areas. Their land holdings varied from 
one region to another according to the quality of the land, its ferti-
lity and the kinds of crops grown. The rise in the prices of cereals 
and animal products after 1919, and the difficulties facing the smaller 
peasant landowners had enabled some owners with marketable surpluses to 
acquire more land despite the considerable rise in land values. 
Similarly, during the period between 1930-1945, the depression of the 
1930's had brought further impoverishment to the small peasants and led 
to increases in the size of the property of those wealthy neighbouring 
landowners who were able to buy more land. Moreover, between the two 
world wars and for the first time, the European colons sold more lands 
to the Algerians than they bought. Thus Muslim Algerians regained 
25,000 hectares between 1918 and 1920 and 43,000 hectares between 1941 
and 1946 (23). 
These groups then were the main components of the Algerian petty 
bourgeois strata before independence. Their importance lay not only in 
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their relatively large numbers in relation to the rest of society, but 
was also underlined because of the structural weakness of the bourgeoi-
sie and the proletariat, neither of which was able to impose its 
hegemony over society. As has already been pointed out, the Algerian 
elite or middle classes never developed into a fully fledged bourgeoi-
sie, and the lower classes did not develop into a homogenous working 
class, despite the very rapid process of proletarianisation which 
resulted from French colonisation policies. 
It was thus the more numerous petty bourgeois stratum which was 
to play the intermediate role and to become the principal social milieu 
out of which the various groups developed which dominated the political 
struggle for independence. In addition, many other factors, such as the 
persistence of aristocratic values and aspirations (despite the virtual 
annihiliation of the material base of the Algerian aristocracy (24)), 
the heterogeneous nature of the petty bourgeois strata and their 
extremely diverse socio-economic composition, made the adoption of a 
unified and coherent political position impossible. The struggle of the 
emerging classes was taking place within these strata since their 
diversity was wide enough to include the aspirations of conflicting 
interests and world views. 
However, a number of factors made the position of the Algerian 
petty bourgeois groups towards colonialism more or less unified, 
principally the simple fact that colonial policy towards the native 
society was based on its almost complete subjugation and on the promo-
tion of the European minority. This played an important role in shaping 
the outlook and awareness and later in determining the actions of the 
petty bourgeois groups. In the final analysis Algerian independence 
became the aim around which almost all Algerians could unite, and to 
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postpone at least for the time being the various conflicts of interests 
and views on the future shape of Algerian society to which these diffe-
rent groups aspired. The aspirations of many of those involved in the 
national movement were greatly influenced by their education. In order 
to grasp its importance one should discuss briefly the role played by 
the colonial educational system in shaping the political outlook and 
awareness of those Algerians who were the first to acquire such a 
privilege and to translate it, given the colonial specificities, into a 
force that would contribute to undermine the colonial system. 
The Development of the Political Action of the Petty Bourgeoisie 
The Role of Education 
Although French educational policies were primarily intended to 
create a social base for French rule among some sections of the indige-
nous population, the expansion of education also resulted in the expo-
sure of pupils and students to the ideas and values of French society, 
often for the first time. "The history of French schools in Algeria 
since 1885 was one of identification with that of the French schools in 
the metropolis at the level of programmes of the taught techniques and 
ideologies" (25). Naturally, this had a crucial effect on the awareness 
and consciousness of the Muslim students who now became acquainted with 
such values, especially such notions as 'the public interest', 
'equality of opportunity', and other ideals of the French Revolution. 
These values were in striking contrast with the actual circumstances of 
existence of the Muslim population, which were dictated by the colons, 
which were based on repression, the almost total exclusion of Algerians 
from political life and the institutionalization of economic and social 
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inequality. The impact of education became even more significant when 
the 'modern' sector of the economy began to require the development of 
new technical and administrative skills. As a result the social compo-
sition of those receiving education began to go beyond the sons of the 
native bourgeoisie and notables, to include a wider range of Muslims 
from lower social strata (26). 
Thus it is not surprising that together with other factors discus-
sed below, particularly the continuous resistance of the colons to any 
native participation in wealth and position, school and university 
education made Algerian students increasingly aware of their own situa-
tion, and contributed to their resistance to colonial exploitation and 
the repression of the native people as well as encouraging the growth 
of elementary nationalist feelings and the sense of a separate national 
identity (27). It was also at school that Algerians discovered that 
they were not only considered inferior to and thus exploited by Euro-
peans, but that they were entitled to equal rights with Europeans, 
since they were "intellectually and morally as good as Frenchmen" (28). 
Thus education not only created a new category of intellectuals and 
professionals but also imbued them with profound nationalist senti-
ments. In this context it is necessary to consider colonial economic 
policy towards the indigenous petty bourgeois strata, and the political 
impasse which had arisen as a result of the total rejection of the 
early nationalists' demands for equality. 
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Economic Limitations 
Despite the fact that colonial policies, especially after the 
Second World War, had led to the growth in the middle stratum of 
Algerians, total numbers in this group remained very small, barely 
exceeding the size of the European middle class. However even this 
limited growth was fiercely resisted by the colons who did not want to 
have an Algerian middle class competing with them for jobs and social 
position. Thus despite the relatively privileged status which it 
enjoyed, this middle stratum remained inferior to the colons, who 
continued to occupy the key positions in the economic and administra-
tive structure of the country. In terms of income, the Algerian equiva-
lent of the urban middle class working in small-scale industry and 
businesses, the liberal professions, and as junior executives, received 
an average of only a quarter of that of their European counterparts, or 
270,000 francs against 1,150,000 francs for the Europeans (29). More-
over, Algerians were constantly excluded from the putlic administration 
despite their qualifications, which should have enabled them to enjoy 
opportunities equal to those of the colons. Thus they had to be content 
with the lowest echelons of the bureaucratic apparatus, as is shown in 
the following table. 
Structure of Job Occupation of Algerians in the State (30) 
1955 
Category % of Algerians 
A. Governors, Secretary Generals, Cabinet Directors 2.8 
14.4 
25.2 
25.2 
B. Office Supervisors, Skilled Personnel 
c. Clerical Personnel 
D. Messengers 
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The lack of Algerian private capital was a further limitation in 
absorbing the increasing numbers of the educated native cadres, 
although it was also the case that Algerians were refused access to the 
technical schools and colleges. Thus in 1953, the National School of 
Agriculture had 120 students, none of them Algerians, and the three 
national higher schools (Technical, Commerce, and Industrial) had 355 
students in 1953, of whom only nine were Algerians (31). 
The colons' control of most aspects of political and economic life 
restricted the activities of small-scale owners and traders who were 
often squeezed out of business by increasing competition from modern 
industry as well as by economic stagnation. Rapid population growth 
during the 1940's and 1950's worsened the lives of the urban population 
and made their situation intolerable. 
In these circumstances, their nationalism and their recognition 
that they had an identity separate from that of the colons represented 
the only means by which politically conscious Algerians could achieve 
the status they sought. Thus the petty bourgeois strata were able to 
channel and mobilize public discontent by transforming the vague 
aspirations of the national movement into a genuine anti-colonial 
colonial independence struggle. 
Political Crisis 
As we have already seen the Algerian nationalist movement had 
originally been dominated by two main factions, broadly speaking the 
assimilationists on the one hand, and the populist/nationalists on the 
other, who stood for complete independence from France, Which it was 
thought initially could be achieved by means of the colonial legal 
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system. Although the latter's adherents came form fairly disparate 
social groups, it is probably correct to say that the majority of the 
poorer sections of Algerian native society supported them. 
By the 1940's attempts to achieve assimilation had failed conclu-
sively, partly because the colons had totally rejected the accommoda-
tion of even the simplest demands of the assimilationists, but also 
because the day to day experience of life under French rule for the 
vast majority of the native population made the ideas of assimilation 
appear unreal and utopian. After the events of Setif in 1945 the main 
concern of the Algerian nationalist movement was to find an effective 
method of achieving political independence, since all legal avenues had 
been exhausted without achieving any significant improvement in the 
conditions of the vast majority. Hence violence and armed struggle came 
increasingly to present themselves as the only alternatives. However, 
the adoption of armed struggle meant that the national movement had to 
be fundamentally broadened to incorporate as many of the native popula-
tion as possible. Although the leadership of the national movement 
generally came from a lower middle class or petty bourgeois background, 
it expressed the immediate aspirations for national independence of the 
Algerian people as a whole. 
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The F.L.N.: the Obfuscation of Social and Factional Struggle 
The choice of armed struggle did not develop out of the particular 
interests of certain classes or strata, but was the direct response to 
the political and economic repression imposed by the colonial system. 
Thus although the decision was initially taken by a minority of leaders 
who had become disillusioned with more conventional means of agitation, 
the revolution led by the FLN soon managed to attract almost all 
factions of the Algerian nationalist movement with the exception of the 
MNA led by Messali Hadj (32). 
The FLN appealed to "all Algerian patriots from all social levels 
and from all truly Algerian parties and movements to join in the strug-
gle for liberation" (33), and made it clear that the achievement of 
national independence "will not be the work of one party, but that of 
all Algerians" (34). The fact that most Algerian nationalist factions 
came to support the FLN meant that it had to transform itself from a 
conspiratorial group into a more broadly based political movement (35). 
Although it managed to obtain an unprecendented measure of support from 
the native population, disputes among the various leaders continued 
unabated and in fact became more intense as the years passed, largely 
because the FLN had come into existence as a liberation front rather 
than as a political party (36). These conflicts reflected the divergent 
interests and expectations of the varying social strata represented 
within it, whose leaders had temporarily united around the immediate 
objective of national independence. 
However, the disputes within the FLN were not simply a rigid 
reflection of the different interests and aspirations which it 
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contained. The political conditions under which it was established and 
forced to operate, and the lack of a clear and defined ideology also 
played a significant part. A further complication was caused by the 
fact that bureaucratic apparatuses developed within the FLN, particula-
rly the GPRA which "provided the bourgeois elements with the means to 
play a part in the revolution while at the same time enlarging their 
base by recruiting younger members with no political affiliation" (37). 
Thus the wartime FLN was a conglomeration of individuals who 
represented varying political forces and different social strata but 
were united around the single objective of national independence. There 
was little interest in working out a coherent political or ideological 
doctrine, a point which has been noted by almost all writers on the 
Algerian revolution. This is usually explained by the FLN's need to 
unite all forces behind it, but although this was certainly important, 
the fact that many of its leaders represented very disparate interests 
within the petty bourgeoisie is probably also have been significant. Of 
course, this is not to imply that social and ideological conflict did 
not exist, but rather that the structure of the FLN and its accommoda-
tion of different socio-political groups had made such conflict more or 
less inevitable. The differences were shelved during the war, mainly 
because the presentation of a united front (in the form of the FLN) was 
the only way to win support and to gain independence. 
However, independence quickly revealed the internal struggles 
within the FLN, and marked the end of the period of artificial unity. 
The divisions that resulted exposed Algeria to a virtual civil war, 
involving personal rivalries, individual aspirations, historical animo-
sities and ad hoc alliances and counter alliances (38). 
As we have already seen, the main division was between the GPRA, 
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dominated by the former assimilationists, and the Political Bureau led 
by Ahmed Ben Bella. This represented a fundamental ideological divide 
within the leadership on the nature of the future of the Algerian 
state. Most of former elite sided against Ben Bella in the more 
'moderate' faction working in the GPRA . Each side felt entitled to 
assume political power, but neither faction was able to mobilize enough 
popular support to secure overall political control. With the rise of 
the army as "the best organized and only truly national (that is, 
drawing from the entire population) group in the country (and) the 
strongest political institution to grow out of the Revolution" (39), it 
became clear that the victory would go to whichiever faction managed to 
win its support. Given the structure of the army, and the animosity of 
its General Staff to the GPRA, it was natural that it would strike up 
an alliance with Ben Bella. 
Independence: the Petty Bourgeoisie in Power 
Although there were major divisions within the FLN this did not 
mean that each faction was sufficiently organized or homogeneous to 
form a coherent and disciplined political force, especially as factions 
"were not primarily ideological in character. With the exception of the 
Marxist led by Mohamed Harbi and the liberal Right led by Farhat 
Abbas, •..• alliances were based on personal loyalties rather than 
doctrinal agreements" (40). In these circumstances, Ben Bella's group 
emerged as an alliance of the various factions whose support was essen-
tial to counterbalance opposing factions which remained excluded from 
power (41). As has already been mentioned, the army, led by Boumedienne 
and the 'Oujda clan' (42), was the most effective and organized force 
within the alliance. Ultimately this alliance did not provide the 
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regime with sufficient stability because of the pressing need both to 
preserve a facade of national unity and to keep the opposition in 
check. Ben Bella's political actions indicated that in order to 
minimize the threat to his leadership and to consolidate his personal 
power, he attempted to eliminate the factions within the regime and 
weaken or neutralise those excluded from power (43). It was against 
this background, together with the radicalisation of the Algerian 
population which has already been mentioned, and the vacuum created by 
the departure of the colons, that the process of building the state 
institutions, the Party, and the implementation of a number of crucial 
economic measures took place during the first three years after indepe-
ndence. Pragmatism, inconsistency, and incoherence, therefore, were the 
dominant features of Ben Bella's policies towards a number of political 
and economic issues. 
The Changing Role of the F.L.N. 
After independence, the FLN underwent drastic structural changes, 
resulting partly from its disintegration into a number of political 
factions and partly the attempt to transform it from a national front 
into a political party to provide the leadership with legitimacy and 
support (44). The Tripoli Programme specified five points on which the 
wartime FLN had committed grave mistakes, among which were; its under-
estimation of the real potentialities of the people of the countryside, 
its lack of ideological firmness, its growing feudal and petty 
bourgeois spirit, and the gap which it had created between the leader-
ship and the base (45). The Programme stated that " the conversion (of 
the FLN) into a political party has become an imperative necessity for 
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our forward progress ..... (this Party), founded on the ideological, 
political, and organic unity of the revolutionary forces that it 
embraces, ..... should unify all social classes of the nation round 
itself in order to achieve the objectives of the revolution" (46). 
This conversion of the FLN into a political party coincided both 
with the need to build a new Algerian state in circumstances where it 
was "the sole direct body capable of 'doing something valid for the 
country'" (47), and with the fierce competition and intrigue among the 
factions within Ben Bella's regime. The social, economic, and political 
disorder that followed independence required a degree of rapid reorga-
nization in order to cope with the problems created by this disorder 
and to set up an effective economy. This implied that the Party would 
play an auxiliary role in this process, drawing its legitimacy from the 
role it had played, as a front, during the war. The vacuum created by 
the colons' sudden departure, especially from the administration, led 
to the 'defection' of large number of party militants to positions in 
the civil bureaucracy, local administration, and various ancillary 
services. Thus "while many retained membership within the FLN, their 
basic loyalties shifted to the new elites which crystallized within the 
vacuum created by the departure of the Europeans" (48). 
The role which the Party was to play in Algerian society was a 
matter of dispute, largely because of the conflicting ideals and 
interests of the various factions, and it carne to be used as an instru-
ment in their struggle to gain political power. Hence, despite the 
tasks assigned to the Party as the body that "draws the guidelines of 
policy for the nation and inspires the acts of the state" (49), it was 
rendered unable to play any significant role. While Ben Bella advocated 
the idea of a vanguard party 'a party of militants' and not a 
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'political gang, a political oligarchy', Mohamed Khider, the Secretary 
General of the Political Bureau, and Rabah Bitat, a party cadre, 
favoured a mass party (50). This dispute resulted in the resignation of 
Khider from the Party and the further consolidation of Ben Bella's 
power as he took over the post of Secretary General. But even before 
this dispute, both Ben Bella and Khider had used the Party to limit the 
responsibilities of the National Assembly, created after independence, 
which was headed by Farhat Abbas and included many deputies opposed to 
Ben Bella (51). 
The Party was also used directly by the regime to suppress the 
activities of the mass organizations, in particular the UGTA, which had 
shown a considerable degree of independence and clearly resented the 
Party's interference in its affairs. This became evident during the 
UGTA Congress in January 1963 where Khider and 'several hundred goons' 
invaded the Congress and forced the Union leaders to hand over their 
posts to pro-Party individuals. The result was that the UGTA lost its 
autonomy and was forced to accept a leadership appointed by, and subse-
rvient to, the Party. 
However, this merely indicates that the Party was used as an 
instrument to consolidate Ben Bella's power rather than for the 
purposes suggested by the Tripoli Pragramme, since "Ben Bella was not 
in fact willing to accept the practical implication of the theory, 
namely that he himself, the prime minister was subordinate to Khider, 
the Party's Secretary-General" (52). Despite the rapid expansion in the 
rank and file of the Party (53), mainly as a result of the recruitment 
of people who sought to reap the numerous advantages of affiliation to 
it, it remained a force "that competes with rather than organizes the 
masses" (54). It lost whatever capacity it may have had to mobilize the 
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people on a social revolutionary basis or to elaborate the socialist 
principles of the Tripoli Programme. At the same time, although now 
bureaucratized and the "refuge of the former nationalists without 
political training, it could not compete with the bureaucratic strata 
within the state apparatus" (55). The Party was only effective as a 
"symbol of national unity and of continuity with the revolutionary 
period ...• and serving as standing pretext, by its mere existence, for 
the ban of all rival political formations" (56). Its inadequacies were 
noted by many of the leaders; thus while Ben Bella accused the Party 
under Khider of being composed of scum, Boumedienne after the coup of 
June 1965 questioned the entire existence of the Party other than on 
paper and with its banners; "Party members, Boumedienne stated, were 
informed of decisions only after they had been taken and executed" 
(57). 
The Party was to remain insignificant in Algerian politics and 
society for many years despite the efforts made to revive it and to 
give it a proper role. The leadership's main interest in the Party was 
as an instrument to control the masses and suppress any autonomous 
action and provide it with the socio-political base it so desperately 
needed. Thus it is not surprising that the population in general became 
greatly disenchanted with the Party, and was profoundly critical of the 
relationship between the leadership and the base, since the latter's 
role in decision making was always minimal (58). 
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Army and Bureaucracy: the Consolidation of Power 
The army's strength was evident long before independence and 
increased with the growing incompetence of the FLN. It is difficult to 
determine whether Ben Bella or the army had used the other to steal a 
march on the GPRA and to seize power (59). In fact it was clear from 
the begining that as the most organized and disciplined force that 
remained intact during the war of independence, the army's role would 
not be confined to assuring Ben Bella's success, but would extend to 
pressing for its own participation in determining the nature of the 
future Algerian state and its structures. 
This was clear from the relatively high representation of the army 
in the political institutions created after independence (60), and also 
by the increasingly influential role which it played in the development 
of society in general. The first National Assembly, elected in 20 
September 1962, whose candidates were nominated by the Political Bureau 
of the FLN, came from a list chosen by Ben Bella and Boumedienne (61); 
18 per cent of the 194 deputies belonged to the ANP (Armee nationale 
Populaire) (62), as the regular army was renamed after independence, 
and together with the supporters of Ben Bella they formed the dominant 
alliance. Similarly, army representation in the new 17 member Political 
Bureau of the FLN, created in the Congress of April 1964, was very 
high, as nine of them were serving or former military officers. The 
same was true of Ben Bella's ministers, who although selected because 
of their technical competence, demonstrated the decisive importance of 
the army in Algerian politics (63). With the power it now exerted in 
the principal political institutions it became evident that no major 
changes could take place against the army's will or without it being 
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closely involved (64). 
This consolidation of power was matched by a parallel process of 
creating a coherent, centralized, and well equipped and trained ANP, 
carried out independently from the FLN under the direct supervision of 
Boumedienne who "had always refused to accept any interference from the 
Party and had set up an independent political commissariat" (65). This 
process required the conversion of ex-guerrilla fighters and wilaya 
leaders into disciplined members of the ANP; it also involved the 
formation of new military regions, and the promotion of competent 
professionals who had been trained in the French army (66), without 
regard to their previous political affiliations and uniting those with 
the guerrilla commanders and officers of the armee de l'exterieur. By 
having the second largest share of the national budget after education 
(67), Boumedienne was also successful in equipping his army with 
advanced weapons and in introducing various training schools that 
helped to make the Algerian army one of the best equipped and trained 
in the region. One indication of the army's special status was its 
being assigned a degree of control over various economic enterprises, 
notably the farms abandoned by the colons. The army played a decisive 
role in defeating the principal manifestations of opposition, especial-
ly the revolt of the ex-wilaya leaders and the insurrection in Kabylia, 
thus rendering Ben Bella more and more dependent on it for the consoli-
dation of his own power. 
The ANP saw itself as the guardian of the revolution and as a 
national organization above regional and factional conflicts. Its 
leaders asserted its unity on the principles of the revolution and 
proclaimed its concern for efficiency and strong state structures (68). 
Hence, when the leadership realised that Ben Bella was using it as one 
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more faction to be played off against other factions, it acted 
unanimously in overthrowing him on 19 June 1965 (69). In this way it 
proved its supremacy in Algerian society and initiated a new era in the 
country's development, based on the emphasis of principles of efficien-
cy and on the creation of a strong state apparatus capable of introdu-
cing far-reaching economic transformations. 
If the army's power derived from its control over the means of 
coercion and from its role in the war of independence, as well as from 
the absence of any serious opposition, the civilians in the state 
bureaucracy realised that their own power emanated from the dominant 
role played by the state in society in general and from the damaging 
administrative vacuum which had resulted from the colons' mass depar-
ture from Algeria in the summer of 1962. The colonial bureaucratic 
apparatus had been staffed almost exclusively by Europeans, with native 
Algerians only at the lowest levels. Efforts were made by the colonial 
authorities during the war, mainly through the Constantine Plan, to 
initiate a programme to "train Algerians for mid-level administrative 
positions within the colonial bureaucratic structure in order to sever 
the FLN from its social base and belatedly to redress the job inequali-
ties of the past. The Algerians who were selected for this program came 
from a bourgeois and petty bourgeois background" (70). 
The outcome of these efforts was largely insignificant, and it was 
the sudden departure of the colons that provided "an immense puff of 
oxygen for all the intermediary strata (small traders and small func-
tionaries), brutally thrown up in front of the scene and rendered 
indispensible by the vacuum" (71). The destruction inflicted by the war 
and by the activities of the OAS (72) made it vital to recruit some of 
those who had served in the colonial administration as well as those 
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who participated in the liberation, "who attempted to occupy all possi-
ble positions of power, both as their reward for their efforts {jihad) 
and as a base from which to enact programs to continue these rewards" 
(73). A major reshuffle of personnel took place, involving the promo-
tion of personnel in B positions to A positions, while C and D catego-
ries were reserved for war veterans. Hence, particularly in the upper 
echelons, the administration not only had to rely heavily on members of 
the former colonial administration, but also had to promote them in 
large numbers, as is clear from the following table. 
Members of Algerian Administration early in 1963 (74) 
category Percentage of Members in Colonial Administration 
A 
B 
c 
D 
43 
77 
12 
3 
Since A and B positions were occupied by those with decision-
making powers and managerial responsibilities, the nature of the 
colonial administration was hardly affected (75). Not only had a number 
of those office holders collaborated with the colonial regime, but also 
and more importantly their ethos and training was quite alien to their 
new task, which was to enforce a system qualitatively different from 
the one to which they were accustomed. 
Moreover, the administration expanded rapidly after independence. 
Hence the 'old' administration was swollen by another type of bureauc-
racy, including the administrators that had been formed abroad, prima-
rily in Tunisia, Morocco and France, and also those trained within the 
framework of the Evian Agreements. For instance, 1,200 people from the 
central administration and 1,700 financial experts were trained in 
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special centres in France (76). The administration had 70,000 employees 
on its payroll on April 1963, but this number soon reached 100,000. In 
1959, the number had been 63,000 (77). This involved frequent over-
staffing, especially at the lower levels, mainly to provide jobs for 
the unemployed. 
The importance of the consolidation of the bureaucratic apparatus 
for Algeria's social and economic development derives mainly from two 
factors. First, the whole administrative structure which was built and 
staffed to satisfy colonial-capitalist needs was preserved, and second-
ly, this structure was asked to perform functions which were supposed 
to serve socialist objectives. The social composition of the Algerian 
bureaucracy was to govern its actions in a way that would ultimately 
benefit the social groups from which it originated. Thus the first 
years of independence saw a major struggle between the bureaucracy and 
other forces, particularly over the issue of workers' self-management. 
The bureaucracy tried to expand its sphere of activity and to entrench 
itself in the system to further its interests and that of the social 
strata and classes from which it descended, while the 'socialist 
forces' struggled for more freedom of action and less interference in 
their initiatives on the part of the administration. As we have already 
indicated, this struggle took place in circumstances where the state 
was the only mechanism capable of undertaking sound social and economic 
transformation. In addition to attempting to identify the socio-
political conditions that governed state action in the economy and 
agriculture, the following chapters will explore some aspects of this 
struggle. 
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CHAPTER SIX TIIE CONSTRUCfiNG OF STATE CAPITALISM AFTER INDEPENDENCJ 
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELO~. 1962-67 
The Unfolding of Class Struggle 
The previous chapter described the course of events before and 
immediately after independence. These events constituted the political 
background of a more complex and multi-dimensional struggle, which 
developed in the post-independence period. This was largely caused by 
an event which was both unexpected and unplanned, the sudden mass 
departure of the European colons. Indeed a great deal of Algeria's 
subsequent social, economic, and political development can be attri-
buted to this event, not only because it involved the sudden disappea-
ranee of almost all the capitalists, administrators, and technicians 
(1), but also because it opened various alternatives and courses of 
development for Algerian society. Almost uniquely in the post-colonial 
world, Algeria had the opportunity to erase much of the legacy of the 
past and to reconstruct its economy on entirely new lines. That this 
opportunity was not taken is a matter of historical record, but the 
conditions for it certainly existed in the autumn and winter of 1962-
1963. 
Each social force found its opportunity in the social and economic 
vacuum created by the colons' departure to seize power and to impose 
its dominance. As the colons abandoned their properties and positions, 
the social and class struggle that followed their departure centred 
around these properties and positions. This struggle was intensified by 
the disintegration of the FLN, the fact that the ranks of the polit~cal 
•representatives• who came namely from a petty bourgeois background. 
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were divided and had no thoroughly worked out analysis or programme for 
the future. 
The most spectacular o this exodus was the the self-management 
(autogestion) movement. Its importance lies not only in its immediate 
impact on the economic system particularly in agriculture, but in the 
new and lengthy struggle which it triggered off among the newly emerg-
ing social forces. This movement came almost as a result of spontaneous 
action on the part of those members of the Algerian working class 
employed formerly on the colon farms and factories. Faced with a 
chaotic situation after the owners had left their properties having 
inflicted a great deal of damage on them, and faced the danger of 
unemployment and even starvation, the workers themselves took the 
inititiave and began to run the enterprises. They established a Comite 
de Gestion (management committee) in each abandoned enterprise, in 
order to restart production and to provide employment and incomes for 
themselves. This took place when there was no other alternative and at 
the same time no authority to stop them. (2). 
Despite its lack of conscious political leadership during its 
initial phases and despite being a defensive move "directed more 
against the local proprietors, who tried to take the colons' position, 
than against the colons themselves" (3), the self-management movement 
was soom extended to almost all the properties vacated by the colons. 
It began to acquire a national dimension and to provide a social and 
economic organization that represented the interests of the working 
class, transforming its action from a merely self-interested one to a 
class conscious action in defending the new system against the attacks 
and intrusion of its enemies. It also acted as a polarizing factor for 
var~ous politieal and secial tre~ds and·currents by contributing to the 
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radicalization of the supporters and enemies of self-management outside 
the working class (4). The supporters of this system, represented by 
the left wing of the FLN and the student movement together with the 
working class themselves, saw it not only as a positive achievement of 
the revolution which should be defended, but also as a system for 
economic and social development that should be extended to include 
every aspect of society and the economy. As noted by Michel Rapitis, 
self-management was envisaged by the militants "not as a simple econo-
mic relationship characterizing the management of the economic units of 
the base, but as a more general relationship that should mark the whole 
country's socio-political system (5). However the self-management move-
ment raised a great deal of resentment and dissatisfaction on the part 
of those who viewed it as a source of disorder and chaos. The Union 
Generale des Commercants Algeriens (UGCA) published a pamphlet in which 
it openly attacked 'class struggle' as a "hideous ideological specula-
tion which generates chaos, arbitrariness, injustice, misery, and 
adventurism" (6). Self-management also played a part in the resignation 
of certain liberal politicians, including Farhat Abbas and Ahmed 
Franses from their posts, even after it was accepted and legalized by 
the government. Very rapidly self-management went beyond the limited 
functions of being a way of organizing and running vacant properties 
after independence. It became a major social and political issue that 
provided Algeria with a socialist ideology and a progressive image for 
many years, and shaped and reorganized the country's socio-political 
forces. 
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The Birth of Self-Management 
As mentioned earlier, the birth of the self-management movement 
came amidst, and was a result of, a period of almost complete disorder 
and chaos. All sorts of properties, ranging from cars to villas, furni-
ture and lands were sold by both panic-striken colons and the Algerians 
who acquired them by various means,at very low prices. Although it is 
difficult to prove, it is known that many Algerians made fortunes out 
of these bargains, which became the basis for the development of new 
forces and enlarged the material base of the new petty bourgeoisie (7). 
Wealthy Algerians rushed to Europe to search for the departed settlers 
in order to strike bargains with them for their properties. Thus: 
"an astonishing spectacle, of business speculators and 
petty capitalists, rushing to France, Switzerland, to 
look for repatriates willing to sell them their farms, 
their businesses, their factories. By this stalking for 
the property titles, the Algerian bourgeoisie set about 
inheriting French colonization" (8) 
Leading members of the state apparatus, the army, and the Party did not 
hesitate to seize any opportunity to take over the abandoned proper-
ties. This phenomenon was described as follows: 
"Some Algerians, often those who had suffered the least 
from the war, rushed in pursuit of biens vacants. The 
harvest had been done and the crops sold or placed in 
clandestine silos since the summer of 1962. In the gene-
ral confusion that prevailed, the abandoned grape harvest 
have permitted some people to procure substantial gains. 
The vacant properties became the object of frantic specu-
lation whose beneficiaries had often been precisely those 
who remained secure from want, such as responsible mili-
tants of the Party, of the Administration, of the Army 
and also proprietors and big businessmen. (9) (Emphasis added). 
However, these bargains together with private appropriations of 
colon properties were limited by various factors, the most important 
being the lack of capital to purchase properties which were often 
278 
concentrated and large-scale such as farms and factories (10). It was 
also difficult for private individuals to take over firms and factories 
because the workers in these enterprises knew very well who the owners 
were and were not ready to accept orders from just anyone, (11), and 
finally, the state of uncertainty about the future development of 
Algeria and its way out of its crisis made private purchases extremely 
risky (12). 
It was in these abandoned enterprises that self-management was 
spontaneously established and spread. However, this process was assist-
ed and accelerated in the rural areas in particular by the role played 
by the more politically conscious members of the UGTA who seized the 
opportunity to take the initiative to resume production and to organize 
the workers to take over the management of the abandoned enterprises. 
In this regard Juliet Minces noted that; 
"young trade unionists, just released from prison, began 
to go out to the countryside persuading the peasants to 
resume their work without further delay; 'The boss is 
away, for the time being we'll do without him. Later on, 
we'll see'" (13). 
The UGTA set up a 'commission d'autogestion' to advise on the formation 
of comites de Gestion. It also organized work teams to help in provi-
ding financial, technical, and organizational support for the workers 
in the abandoned enterprises. Thus in the Algiers area, railway workers 
volunteered to repair equipment on the farms. 
While there is a semi-consensus on the part of the analysts of the 
Algerian self-management movement on the spontaneity of its birth (14), 
mainly because its theoretical outline had not appeared in the program-
mes of the FLN or of other political forces before the FLN, there is 
disagreement on the motivation of the movement. Ian Clegg, for' exampd.e,_ 
considered that it can be traced to the immediate economic interests of-
279 
the workers and did not emanate from their ideology, which was general-
ly conservative. On the other hand, the involvement of the UGTA in its 
organization, and the support that it received from the left wing 
political forces, had led others, particularly Tlemcani, to see it as " 
authentically revolutionary" and a conscious reaction directed, within 
the process of decolonization, towards establishing political power for 
the workers in order to match that of the bourgeoisie and to prevent 
the privatization of the means of production. In fact given the condi-
tions that favoured the emergence of the movement together with those 
which hindered it, which will be listed below, it is difficult to draw 
any very definite conclusions. Immediate economic interests, for 
example, could also have led to the division of the property among the 
workers in an enterprise or at least their involvement in selling the 
land to private owners especially as the situation was highly 
uncertain. on the other hand, the revolutionary nature of the action 
would suggest that any attempt to attack it would be vigorously resist-
ed. In practice neither of these alternatives occurred in any noticea-
ble way. The movement certainly marked a rare moment in which the 
immediate economic interests of the working class corresponded with its 
aspiration to be recognized in the balance of social forces. Hence 
spontaneity was quickly manipulated into a strategy that would accommo-
date working class interests in the collective appropriation of the 
means of production. In this lies the causes both of the movement's 
immediate success and of its long term failure, since, unlike a strike 
movement that might endenger the immediate interests of the partici-
pants or confront them with violence, it emerged under relatively 
favourable conditions, and was immediately espoused by the most 
dedicated .. elements wi:thin the UGTA. However, this factor. also· meant, 
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that the movement lacked the capacity to resist the manipulations of 
the bureaucracy. in undermining their full control over the properties 
as will be demonstrated later. 
In its initial phases, self-management encountered various 
immediate obstacles. First, not all the workers in the abandoned 
enterprises were willing to move towards collective appropriation and 
management. Raptis, one of the active participants, noted that; 
"Because there was a near-total vacuum in effective poli-
tical power and a vast agricultural, industrial, commer-
cial and rented sector, there was a great temptation to 
make individual expropriation of •empty property', albeit 
via a collective •management committee'" (15). 
Duprat cites some examples where the workers in agricultural enterpri-
ses in some regions demanded the division and distribution of the 
abandoned farms into lots of 40 to 50 hectares (16). Second, the Provi-
sional Executive whose functions, due to its nature and to the condi-
tions under which it was created, were essentially to set the basis for 
future cooperation with the Algerian middle classes, were not at all 
enthusiastic that instituting self-management or giving official 
recpgnition to the management committes. Thus "far from encouraging the 
bleeding of men and properties, in which case risking the birth, by the 
movement of workers management, of an Algeria very different from the 
planned model, on the contrary (the Provisional Executive) sought the 
return (of the colons) and worked for the paralysis of the workers' 
initiatives" (17). After the number of abandoned colon properties had 
greatly increased, a decree published on 24 August 1962 put them under 
the protection of the administration of the 'biens vacants' which 
guaranteed the rights of the owners of these properties and appealed to 
them to CGI!le back_and resume--~heir,management .. , If the owners fai:l-ed-tu 
return within- thirty days after the publication· of -the dectee,-the: 
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prefects were authorized to appoint managers to run the enterprises, 
chosen for their "technical and professional competence". Thus self-
management was not authorized by the highly unstable political authori-
ties which, by their very nature were pledged to Franco-Algerian coope-
ration and looked to the French to save Algeria from chaos (18). 
Moreover, for a variety of reasons, the army, which did not have a 
unified view towrds self-management, took over large parts of the 
abandoned farms, placing them either under its direct control, in the 
case of larger estates, or distributing them among ex-combatants. In 
doing this the army in many cases dissolved the spontaneously formed 
management committees by force and expelled the original permanent 
workers (19). There were also cases where local notables and some 
commanders of the interior took hold of vacant farms on their own 
initiatives and for their own benefit (20). Thus approximately 400,000 
hectares of European land disappeared during the period of confusion, 
either sold by the departing colons or taken over by the army and later 
turned into special cooperatives for war veterans (Cooperatives 
Agricoles de Production des Anciens Moudjahidine) (CAPAM). 
These setbacks, however, can be seen as spontaneous and ad hoc 
reactions from different elements to self-management which, like the 
workers themselves, tried to benefit from the state of confusion and 
chaos created by the colons' departure. They were in many cases a 
reflection of the factionalism that developed out of the war situation 
and did not yet represent the development of a coherent and unified 
body of opposition to self-management as a system of workers' control 
over the means of production. This did not in fact come into being 
until self-management was constituted and legalized by the government. 
By then the movement ha9 acquired po~itical implications_as_a.national 
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system which would crystallize the interests of workers, and ceased 
merely to represent a form of more immediate benefit for workers rather 
than for the local bourgeoisie. It was developed to provide the workers 
with an economic and political base from which they could defend their 
interests. In developing in this direction the self-management movement 
was bound to antagonize some social forces whose interests lay in 
replacing the colons both economically and politically. Thus the elite 
and those employed in the administration and the Party saw self-manage-
ment not only as a limitation on their own economic and social advance-
ment, but also as a threat to their position. However, as self-manage-
ment gradually became an accomplished fact and was increasingly suppor-
ted in various quarters, the issue for these social forces became one 
of containing and undermining the new movement rather than abolishing 
it altogether, which they could not do. 
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The Constitution of Self-Management 
The recognition of self-management as an economic strategy of 
management was a practical, politicl and ideological necessity (21), 
given the economic disorder and the urgent need to deal effectively 
with the 'biens vacants' in a way that would guarantee the resumption 
of production. This was apparent in a speech delivered by Ben Bella 
introducing the March Decrees which inauguratd the self-management 
system: 
"Two solutions were presented: should (the 'biens vcants') 
be entrusted to the management of the state? should 
they be managed by the workers? In fact it was impossible 
to hesitate. The principle of self-management of the 
enterprises by their workers was already written in the 
realities of the Algerian revolution by the spontaneous 
and conscious action of the Algerian working masses. The 
strong movement of the Comite de Gestion which had spread 
all over the country awaited simply its legislation in 
all its revolutionary entirety" (22). 
This legislation came in two stages; the first was driven by the 
utmost necessity to defuse the situation and also to bring an end to the chaos 
in the abandoned enterprises. It was 
represented by two decrees No. 62-3 and 62-3 issued on October 22 and 
23, 1962. These aimed to put an end to speculation and to forbid further 
transactions involving abandoned properties in order to prevent 
their appropriation by large landlords and private owners, and to give 
legal standing to those management committees which 
had already been established. The property rights of the French owners 
would be preserved if they returned, but the 
decree also stated that the committees should continue to participate in the 
management of the farms. Between this stage and the second there was a 
period of semi-official silence over the issue of self-management, in 
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which only a few comments on the decrees and on the inaugura-
tion of the management committees were made in the press and the National Assem-
bly (23). The enterprises controlled by the management committees 
lacked a definite and clear form of organization and "there were as 
many forms of self-management as the number of enterprises" (24). 
All indications seemed to point at to a belief, at least on the part 
of the government, that the colons would soon return after order was 
restored but when this did not happen the government had to act 
to put an end to the situation of uncertainty. Three important 
decrees were issued on 18, 22, and 28 March 1963 marking the begining 
of a new era in which Algeria became known for its system of 
self-management and 'socialism•. These decrees, which were largely inspi-
red by the Yugoslav model of workers' self-management (25), were the 
work of a few left wing intellectuals led by Mohammed Harbi and Michel 
Raptis, and represented a profound transformation of the government's 
attitude towards the self-management movement (26). 
These decrees came to affect 1,200,000 hectares of land, 1000 
industrial and commercial enterprises (27), and 200,000 apartments 
and houses. Not all the concerns affected were put under self-manage-
ment, since the decree of 22 March provided that those enterprises 
considered to be of 'national importance' would be placed under state 
control and managed directly by the state. Thus self-management was 
limited to enterprises of local importance, which restricted its 
application in the industrial sector in particular. This exception was 
used later by the government as a legal means of converting self-
managed enterprises into state-controlled ones; a decree issued in 9 
May -l.963 allowed property and-' enterprises to be put under state protec-
_t:.ion if there-were 'public.:.disturbances' in their methods.oLmanagement 
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and production (28). 
Self-Management as a source of Political Power 
"The March decrees legalized what was already fact, making the 
quasi-spontaneous establishment by the workers of the management commi-
ttees in estates abandoned by the French settlers appear to be the 
fruit of a socialist initiative on the part of the Government" (29). At 
the same time they ended a relatively long period of uncertainty and 
speculation concerning not only the fate of the 'biens vacants' but 
also the organization of the economy and society as a whole. Many 
alternative policies to deal with the new situation existed, the gover-
nment could have adopted the workers' action as its own and legalized a 
de facto situation, or have intervened directly to transform the 
abandoned properties into state-owned enterprises, or have allowed 
private owners to purchase and appropriate them, or have distributed 
the lands to landless peasants as promised in the Tripoli Programme. 
The actual course of events showed that Ben Bella's government went all 
the way in recognizing and supporting the workers' action in seizing 
the vacated enterprises. This became apparent not only in the March 
Decrees but also in the later decrees of July and October 1963. These 
completed the nationalization, of all the colonial concerns especially 
the landed strata, including those not covered by the March Decrees. 
It is difficult to determine the real intentions of Ben Bella's 
regime in instituting self-management without considering contemporary 
political and economic conditions, and the impact of the system upon 
the social and political structure and upon the regime's efforts to 
consolidate itself. In other words, to state that the institution of 
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self-management was a mere manoeuvre on the part of the newly establis-
hed government, or that it represented a genuine attempt to build 
socialism, without incorporating this into the wider context of the 
system and the nature of the regime, would amount to drawing general 
conclusions from an uncertain and confused situation in which a multip-
licity of motivations and aims existed. 
None of the documents of the wartime FLN contained a well defined 
policy and programme for dealing with the organization of economy and 
society after independence. Allusions to agrarian reform were simply 
"an instrument of propaganda destined to mobilize wider participation 
in the armed struggle" (30). Even the Tripoli Programme which drew up 
the basic principles of economic policy saw "economic planning and the 
control of the economy by the state" with the participation of the 
workers in management as a 'vital component' in building up an indepen-
dent and prosperous economy. It also envisaged an agrarian reform that 
would follow the principles of the: 
"restriction of holdings according to crops and produc-
tion, expropriation of holdings in excess of the maximum 
to be decided, free grants of expropriated lands to 
landless peasants or to those with insufficient land, the 
democratic organization of the peasants into production 
cooperatives, and the creation of state-owned farms on 
parts of the expropriated land managed by the state with 
the participation of the workers of these farms in their 
management and profits" (31). 
This reveals very clearly that self-management was neither 
anticipated nor considered by the leaders of the revolution to be the 
system upon which Algeria's economic and in particular agricultural 
organization was to be based. However, as self-management became a 
'fait accompli' especially in the socially and economically most 
important sector -agriculture- it became an issue too large to be 
i.gnored by~the-poil..itica'l' leaders at a time of factional division and 
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infighting, with each faction claiming to have its authentic roots 
among the people and in particular among the peasants who had carried 
the armed struggle on their shoulders. 
One of the major priorities for the new state was to stop the 
nascent middle classes from taking possession of the properties vacated 
by the colons. Ben Bella repeatedly attacked the 'bourgeoisie'; "there 
is no place in the country for the bourgeoisie, for those 4 to 5 per 
cent who have found the means of massing fortunes" (32). Thus in order 
to legitimize its claim to represent the interests of 95 per cent of 
the Algerian people it was imperative for the government to try to find 
a way to wrest economic power from these groups. Self-management served 
at the time the most effective means of accomplishing this task. Howe-
ver, significant part of the rural population, whose entire struggle 
had been essentially for the land, were deeply committed to acquiring 
jobs in the vacated farms of the colons. The high rate of illiteracy 
within this population and the limited size of the other economic 
sectors made the agricultural sector the most secure source of employ-
ment. Thus although self-management did not concern more than a frac-
tion of the rural population, mainly the agricultural workers on the 
colonial lands which were themselves geographically distant from the 
war, for the winning faction of the FLN it represented the fulfilment 
of a promise to the rural population, expressed in the slogan 'the land 
belongs to those who till it'. 
Moreover, self-management provided Ben Bella's regime with a pre-
cious and urgently needed political and ideological legitimacy, giving 
it the image of being revolutionary and 'building socialism'. This was 
important for areg.ime engaged in bitter fighting with internal oppo-
nents antt pb'l'it;ica:i' factions~· all claiming to represent the Algerian 
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people, and forming a fragile alliance among relatively heterogeneous 
groups and forces. Without trying to discredit his zeal and commitment 
to self-management, it was natural for Ben Bella to be concerned with 
the introduction of this system, since self-management as a revolutio-
nary measure could be a useful method of discrediting the regime's 
adversaries and of developing a rural constituency by mobilizing the 
support of the peasants (33). Furthermore, "Ben Bella's popularity was 
greatly enhanced by the establishment of the self-management system 
which strengthened his hand against his ally-turned-enemy Khider" (34). 
Thus the political advantages gained by instituting self-management 
helped to transform this system from a purely pragmatic form of action 
into a political choice affirmed in October 1963. At that stage the 
government decided to liquidate the remaining French-owned landhold-
ings, and to nationalize a number of industries which it subsequently 
converted into workers' self-managed enterprises . 
. ; -" ' .L '- ' ~ ~ ' i ' ;_ ... l. 
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The Deficiencies and Contradictions of the March Decrees 
The concern with the politics of the self-management scheme was 
reflected not only in the fact that the government paid far more atten-
tion to its •socialist' ideological dimension than to the self-managed 
enterprises themselves (35), but also in the inherent structural and 
functional contradictions and discrepancies in the March Decrees. The 
hasty formulation of these rules reveals that "the state had allied 
itself with the power base and not with the issue as such" (36). In the 
first place the decrees did not take adequate account of the general 
illiteracy,lack of knowledge and experience of the workers. If the 
latter knew of the existence of the decrees, they did not have an 
adequate understanding of their contents (37), and no officials, either 
from the state or the Party, made any serious efforts to explain these 
decrees to them (38). In fact any sense of the need to create simple 
institutions which could effectively permit the masses of illiterate 
and uninformed people to excercise direct and real management, seemed 
to have been alien to the authors of the texts (39). This opened up 
possibilities for the intervention of the state bureaucracy in matters 
which were supposed to be the workers' concern. Thus worker parti-
cipation in the establishment and elections of the self-management 
organs was reduced to a minimum. Juliet Minces, writing in 1967 about 
the application of the sytem to agriculture , stated that "the members 
of the management committees, instead of being elected, are frequently 
appointed by the 'trustee authorities' i.e. the National Office of 
Agrarian Reform (ONRA), the prefecture, the local section of the Party, 
or other administrative authorities" (40). Similarily Duprat reported 
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that only 40 management committees out of the 250 existing in the 
Mitidja in June 1964 had 'really' democratic elections (41). 
Complaints about the duplication and overlapping of functions 
within the organs of self-management and the ambiguous nature and role 
of each were commonplace in descriptions of the March Decrees and their 
rules. The task of the General Assembly, for example, and that of the 
Workers' council was almost identical, so that there was little point 
in having both. Both organs had little power compared to the management 
committee or the director. The role of the latter was so contradictory 
and ambiguous in that he was, on the one hand, the executive agent of 
the decisions taken by the management committee and by the Workers' 
Council under the authority of the president, and on the other hand, 
the representative of the state within the enterprise and could thus 
oppose all decisions that did not conform to the national plan. The 
ambiguity of his role was compounded by the fact that the president, 
who was normally an ordinary worker, found it difficult to find the 
necessary time to check all the matters proposed for his signature 
(42). This gave the director, who was often the only literate member of 
the concern and was thus usually called upon to explain the decrees 
(43), the opportunity to assume for himself alone the responsibilities 
of the decisions concerning the daily running of the enterprise. More-
over the decrees had already given the director very wide powers and 
had in fact situated him outside the self-management framework, since 
he could veto any decision on technical grounds without having his 
power challenged. 
The explict division between permanent and seasonal workers (which 
effectively denied the latter all the rights enjoyed by the former) 
under the pretext that "the seasonal wor.kers would not have the long-
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term interest of the enterprise at heart and would, consequently, act 
in an openly instrumental fashion" (44), led to a straightforward 
eploitation of the seasonal workers, who were hired to do the hardest 
tasks at derisory wages (45), and to the effective division of the 
workers into two groups, thus weakening their power vis-a-vis the state 
and the bureaucracy (46). 
The Function of Self-Management 
Theoretically, self-management is a socio-economic system which 
supposes that the human resources of a society are mobilized to the 
fullest extent by activating everyone's participation. In practical 
terms it involves the direct ownership, control, and management of the 
means of production and of the surplus produced by those who operate 
them. It is an expression of the existence of 'social property', to be 
achieved essentially through economic decentralization and, in particu-
lar, workers' self-management. In the context of the self-management 
system economic enterprises are seen as the property of society as a 
whole, while the employees of each enterprise are to manage them on 
society's behalf. Decision-making power is rooted in the base and is 
vested in workers' councils which are elected freely by the workers. 
These councils take decisions about the short and long term operation 
of their enterprise at all levels including production, marketing, and 
the distribution of revenues. The councils are headed by a general 
manager or a director, who is also elected by the workers and is 
supposed to run the enterprise's business, execute the decisions of the 
workers' council and other bodies of management as well as representing 
the workers. The role of the state is mainly to coordinate the activi-
ties. o£ the various enterprises and to insure the avoidance of competi-
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tion among them on the basis of efficiency. These are the main princip-
les of the functioning of the self-management system, which is meant to 
involve management by the workers of their means of production (47). 
Examining Algerian self-management against this theoretical background 
requires a brief look at the general socio-political environment that 
surrounded the creation of this system and the difficulties it encoun-
tered in its relationships with the state institutions created to cater 
for its needs. 
General Environment 
The contradictions that were contained in the March Decrees were 
to prove very vital in the next, and most important stage, in which 
self-management came into existence and attempted to prove itself to be 
the optimal system in economic and social terms. The importance of 
these contradictions lies in the fact that they represented the sphere 
of conflict between the self-management system and its opponents. This 
is not to say that if these contradictions had been removed or over-
come, self-management would have prospered and expanded, since the 
forces opposed to it not only existed but managed to occupy the posi-
tions from which to launch an assault. In fact instituting any kind of 
self-management would have been a revolutionary step, but only a step 
in a long process of social struggle which could not be settled without 
long and enduring efforts to release the creative initiatives of the 
workers and to undermine the power of the forces whose interests it 
threatened. 
A study of Algerian self-management institutions would show that 
"it was a·case of theory improvised upon the spur of the moment to 
correspond with practice" (48). This practice or the real.ity.:ln which 
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self-management existed was anything but supportive of a system based 
on workers owning and managing the means of production. Although the 
system had been initiated by the workers themselves, they were also 
driven by fears of unemployment and the prospect of starvation. Self-
management did not represent an offensive against the power of the 
colonial bourgeoisie as much as a defensive move against the intrusion 
of the nascent Algerian middle classes. No matter how successful the 
workers were in taking these defensive measures, they remained quanti-
tatively and qualitatively weak and lacked an effective theory and 
leadership. However, the nascent middle classes, the large landowners, 
industrialists, merchants, and high functionaries in the state appara-
tus, were not in a much better position, as "many of these people were 
able to keep their wealth at the cost of lying low and using their 
economic power base politically for defensive purpose only" (49). Under 
constant attack from various quarters and on many occasions identified 
with those who benefited from colonialism, the upper and middle classes 
had to rely on indirect action carried out by forces which were not 
completely identical to them but to which they had various connections, 
either by origin or by shared values and ideological affiliation, such 
as the newly established bureaucracy in the administration, the Party 
and the army. In this sense, given the degree of independence it posse-
ssed due to the weakness of other social groups, the bureaucracy could 
cater for the interests of those social groups, from which its members 
mainly came. Although its action was not fully representative of the 
rising middle classes no matter how strong the ties connecting the two, 
there was no doubt, given its composition and the way its members were 
able to -tak~---up--ctheir -positions, that it would adopt oan· antagonis.tic 
-atti-t-ude--towards--worker--s' attempt- -t-o -aS5UIIIe-tJie-ownersh:ip -and- management of the 
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means of production. In fact it is in this context that we must inves-
tigate the difficulties facing the system of self-management, which 
crystallized the struggle within Algerian society over the nature 
of the whole future course of socio-economic development. 
The Structure of Self-management 
As we asserted earlier, the ambiguities in the March Decrees 
enabled the bureaucracy to assign the tasks of effective management and 
the daily running of the enterprises to the representatives of the 
government on the management committees. However, the appointment of 
the director as the state's representative, with power to veto any 
decision which did not conform to the 'national plan' was, as Benhouria 
correctly noted, not of itself the actual instrument that rendered the 
autonomous function of self-management difficult; it was the formation 
of the supervisory bodies from the successors of the colonial adminis-
tration that was primarily responsible. In fact self-management does 
not in principle rule out the establishment of some form of incorpora-
tion of individual enterprises within the national economy through the 
creation of economic activities which are centrally planned and contro-
lled by national bodies. What matters is the way in which this incorpo-
ration is carried out and the nature of the superstructure required. In 
Algeria, as summed up by Ian Clegg; 
"In the absence of any theory on what the relations 
between the (self-managed) enterprise and the centre 
should be, the superstructure was pieced together in an 
ad hoc fashion. Each successive stage in this process 
placed the comites more firmly under central control 
until the administration came to control every essential 
aspect of the economic activity of the comites, rendering 
the concept of autogestion derisory" (50). 
The process of creating the superstructure of self-management 
involved the~stabl-i:shment of a ser.tes-of'--insti~Ut:ions whose declared 
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aim was to coordinate the activities of the self-managed enterprises 
and to integrate them with the entire economy as well as providing them 
with technical and financial assistance. Alongside the legislation of 
the March Decrees the Office Nationale de la Reforme Agraire (ONRA) was 
created as an independent institution of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Another institution to supervise self-management had already been 
created for abandoned hotels, resturants, and cafes, the Office 
Nationale de Tourisme (ONAT). In April 1964, the Bureau National 
d'Animation du Secteur Socialiste (BNASS) was set up with the task of 
"education, stimulation, coordination and supervision of the socialist 
sector" (51). Since it duplicated the functions of ONRA, BNASS became 
confined to industrial self-management, and when self-management was 
restricted to agriculture after the incorporation of the industrial 
enterprises into the state economic sector, BNAAS was left without any 
real function and was eventually dissolved. 
These institutions were not in fact created from nothing but grew 
out of institutions which had been set up before independence and kept 
the essentials of their structure and personnel unchanged. ONRA, for 
example, was developed out of the SAP- the Societes Agricoles de 
Prevoyance, craeted in 1952 to providea credit and technical advice for 
small farmers but which "behaved like a conservative banker rather than 
an imaginative innovators" (52). In 1965 ONRA had nineteen engineers, 
only eight of whom were Algerians (53). Through the tasks assigned to 
them and by exploiting the prevailing situation of need and inexperien-
ce on the part of the self-managed enterprises, these institutions were 
gradually able to deprive them of their autonomy in production, invest-
ment, marketing, financing etc. ONRA, headed.by Ali Mehsas, who 
- - - ~ -
believed in state control and not in self-management (54), was soon to 
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possess wide powers vis-a-vis the self-managed enterprises in agricul-
ture through the different specialized local bodies (55). Thus as well 
as interfering in the inner workings of the management committees as 
far as elections were concerned, ONRA controlled the granting of 
credits, the purchase of equipment and the sale of produce on the self-
managed farms. 
The criteria used by these institutions in dealing With self-
managed enterprises were purely profit and market oriented. The provi-
sion of credit, for example, followed strict rules and required levels 
of productivity and profitability which were often very difficult for 
the newly established enterprises to meet. Thus self-managed enter-
prises were often forced to borrow from private sources at inflated 
interest rates. Difficulties and obstacles were met by these enter-
prises every time they turned to the appropriate government institution 
which was supposed to be providing assistance to them. And since these 
institutions controlled almost the whole range of activities of of the 
self-managed enterprises, including wages, inputs and outputs, one can 
imagine the disorder that characterized the functions of these enter-
prises and hindered their development (56). 
The effects of these difficulties upon the self-management system 
in general and in agriculture in particular were tremendous; they 
"created the conditions that made workers' self-management appear as a 
non-viable alternative to socio-economic development " (57). With per-
sonnel trained under the colonial administration who had a deep animo-
sity towards the system of self-management and others who had only 
minimum of experience or competence, •self-management' was soon to have 
·no 'more t-han a ficti-ona-l .existence.· ~husc~~that appeared .in . .the early 
stages of the development of self-management p.s incompet.ence and 
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disorganization on the part of the administration, resulting in many 
scandals that were reported in the national press (58), became a means 
to enable the bureaucracy to indulge in a social and economic struggle 
against the workers' movement. The bureaucracy began to assert values 
and practices that would institutionalize a form of development in 
which it could consolidate its own socio-economic position and benefit 
the forces from which it had emerged or which it sought to join. In 
order to combine this task with the fact that it was asked to implement 
a programme with •socialist' goals, the bureaucracy's struggle had to 
be carried out behind a facade of revolutionary and left-wing rhetoric, 
claiming to represent the interests of the workers while in effect 
undermining the independence of their movement and benefiting the 
private sector. 
The manifestation of this struggle and the awareness of its 
implications on the part of the workers took numerous forms, notably 
protests and complaints expressed by workers on many occasions, parti-
cularly at the various congresses held at that time. These protests 
were quite revealing of bureaucratic infringements and manipulations 
aimed to deprive the workers of their autonomy and attempts to turn the 
self-management system into a mere propaganda achievement for the 
bureaucracy. Words such as 'dictators', •newbosses•, and •caids', were 
very commonly used by the workers to describe the directors and the 
officials of the state administration, who were accused of exceeding 
their rights and in acting as bosses towards the management committees 
(59). In a congress in March 1964, the workers in the self-managed 
industrial sector voiced their concern and criticisms of the bureaucra-
-cy which was trying to create every possible obstacle in the_ way_ o£ 
healt-hy :function df thefr enterprises. 'l'he cspoke -about the "messieurs, 
- --·---- ----
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the civil servants who on the one hand approve President Ben Bella and 
on the other do nothing but create problems for us" (60). As well as 
discussing their technical problems and pointing the finger towards the 
state officials, the delegates demanded, after comparing their status 
with that of the private sector, more organization for themselves in 
order to resist the manoeuvres of this sector and those of the bureau-
cracy and its attempts to "suffocate the experience of self-manage-
ment". They attacked the "juridical and administrative structure of the 
state (which) does not correspond to the socialist option" and pointed 
out that "the actual state apparatus does not help self-management, 
rather it has sabotaged it". One delegate stated that "we did not fight 
for the flag, we did not fight against France but against oppression" 
and declared that "another revolution is to start which concerns poli-
tics and the economy- socialist revolution starts only today" (61). A 
clear description of the nature of the forces which were in real 
control of self-management and implied a recognition of the class 
nature of the struggle with the bureaucracy, was made by an agricultu-
ral worker in a self-managed farm in Ain-Temouchent in the course of 
the Congress of the Federation National de Travailleurs de la Terre in 
December 1964, who after comparing the life style of the workers with 
that of the officials declared that "we should liquidate the bourgeoi-
sie which is leading us .•.•. Give us democracy and we will show you 
how we will defeat them" (62). Another worker declared that "the March 
Decrees gave the workers the right to manage their farms, but certain 
functionaries prevent them from doing so". Voices of discontent and 
attacks on the state officials were very frequent, criticising them not 
only for encroaching on the autonomy of the workers' management. and for 
the---persistence- of- poverty and the lack of .i.mpr:ov.eme.nt ~n.. tne_ .warker.s.' 
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standard of living, but also on their extravagant life style and their 
ambivalent attitudes towards the workers. As one delegate declared in 
the same Congress "the functionaries of ONRA come to us in their 404* 
and tell us that there is no money to employ the unemployed workers" 
(63). Despite the fact that 300 out of 700 delegates were ONRA offi-
cials, the final resolution of the Congress expressed the workers' 
demands and their understanding of who their real enemies were (64). 
It also happened that workers in certain enterprises translated 
their protests into collective petitions and written complaints to the 
ministry concerned, or to the highest levels in the state, condemning 
the bureaucratic practices of the state officials and their infringe-
ments of their autonomy, or exposing the malpractice of particular 
persons in the administration and demanding their punishment (65). 
Although not part of a nationally organized campaign, strikes on the 
self-management farms took place in 1964, protesting against the diffi-
culties encountered with the administration and the long delays in the 
payment of salaries, highlighting the fact that the workers were becom-
ing increasingly disillusioned and alienated from the means of produc-
tion they were supposed to own and manage by themselves and the fact 
that they felt, or believed becoming simply wage labourers in enter-
prises controlled by the state. 
* The Peugeot 404 was the status car of the Algerian Bureacracy at that 
time.. 
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The Impact of Bureaucratic Control on Self-Management 
This perception on the part of the workers enabled a clear line to 
be drawn between them and the bureaucracy in the running of self-
managed enterprises. The workers were no longer confronted directly 
with the owner of the means of production but with the bureaucracy, 
which was just as antagonistic to their interests and autonomy. How did 
the bureaucracy act vis-a-vis self-management, and what was the outcome 
of its actions? 
Although the importance of the role played by the bureaucracy in a 
society like Algeria can hardly be stresed sufficiently, it was diffi-
cult in the 1960's to try and define its members other than as a 
faction of the petty bourgeoisie. To define it as a class, as Clegg 
does, encounters serious objections relating to the basic criteria for 
the determination of class and to the fact that members of the bureauc-
racy also belong to a variety of other social groups. Although the 
bureaucracy enjoyed considerable material and social privileges, which 
distinguished it from the rest of the working population (66), this 
factor is not a sufficient condition to enable it to be considered as a 
class, since class nature is not determined by wealth and privileges 
but by relations to the means of production and the social reproduction 
of these relations. Hence the importance of the bureaucracy's attitude 
towards the issue of a self-management lay not in the fact that this 
somehow contributed to its definition as a class but in the impact this 
action was to have on subsequent socio-economic development. 
By various manipulations and manoeuvres, the bureaucracy was able 
to put serious obstacles in the way of self-management, which not only 
~ucceeded in -limiting ita expansion and its extension to the-rest of 
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the economy, but also reduced its effective size eventually restricting 
it to part of the agricultural sector after having undermined its 
operations in the industrial sector. Certain members of the bureaucracy 
were able, by various means, to obtain significant material rewards and 
privileges which facilitated the emergence of new interests and aspira-
tions within its ranks. This action had the effect of safeguarding the 
interests of the Algerian middle classes and new links developed 
between them in the process of preserving the rights of private owner-
ship and in efforts to incorporate the interests of the private sector 
with those of the public sector. An equally important link between the 
bureaucracy and the middle classes was that they took a common stand 
vis-a-vis the workers. Thus if self-management was tolerated for 
reasons beyond the control of both the bureaucracy and the middle 
classes, it had to be limited and as far as possible deprived of its 
social content as a system of workers' control and management. 
Looking at self-management from a wider perspective shows that 
although the petty bourgeoisie was divided and factionalized at the 
political level, its leaders realized that they could only establish a 
socio-economic base for their rule by tolerating and endorsing the 
workers' initiatives, in a bid to associate themselves with their own 
claim to represent the interests of the people against those of colon-
ialism. In practical terms, the leadership tried to remove the autono-
mous social content of these initiatives by placing its own bureaucra-
tic faction at the head of the self-management movement and by using 
various manipulations, both to regulate its action and to limit the 
workers' initiatives. However this group, which was under pressure from 
various sources. did not have ,the same priorities as 'Other factions of 
the . .pe.t..t.y bourgeoisie .111hi.ch .. supported the .establishment o£ .a strong 
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state apparatus and saw workers' management as an impediment to enhan-
ced and sustained development. The former had to reconcile, neutralize, 
and eliminate different centres of power and social forces. It also 
sought to establish a popular base among the workers and peasants in 
the face of the urgent need to build up the economy. This may account 
for the lack of consistency and for the improvisation on the part of 
the political leadership with regard to vital matters of social and 
economic organization and to the precise role of the state in society. 
The outcome was a constant divergence between the declared aims 
and the actual methods of constructing society and the economy, with 
the bureaucracy constituting the most important instrument in this 
process and a factor which helped to produce new social groups and 
interests. In other words, there were inconsistencies between the 
nature of the forces in control of the state apparatus and the adminis-
tration on the one hand and the tasks assigned to them on the other, 
between the declared policies and the methods of implementing them, 
resulting in a great deal of incoherence in the policies themselves and 
major inefficiencies in their application. 
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Developments Leading to Political Change 
These, then, were the objective conditions that rendered Ben 
Bella's regime permanently vulnerable. Bureaucratic control over the 
economic machinery was exerted on a larger scale than the political 
leaders intended. This often resulted in inconsistencies and improvisa-
tion in policy-making and also in a general failure to arrive at a 
defined programme of development. 
The regime proclaimed its intention to build socialism in many 
documents and speeches issued and delivered by its leaders. The most 
important of these was drawn up during the FLN Congress of April 1964, 
known as the Algiers Charter (Charte d'Alger). This charter, drawn up 
by left wing supporters of Ben Bella, spelled out the aims and ideology 
of the revolution. Apart from its first section which emphasized the 
importance of Islam and denounced the impregnation of Arab culture with 
Western values, the Charter exhibited an overtly Marxist analysis that 
emphasized the idea of class struggle and the necessity of an alliance 
between workers and peasants and the struggle against exploitative 
private property both in the countryside and the city. It openly stated 
that~ 
"the role of the urban workers, together with the agricu-
ltural workers of the self-managed sector, will become 
more and more decisive because the social bases of revo-
lutionary power can only be the working masses allied to 
the poor peasants of the traditional sector and the 
revolutionary intellectual elements" (67). 
The Charter stressed that the self-management system was the principal 
economic organization guiding the transition to 'socialism' and stated 
that it had "brought about the need to extend agrarian reform and 
nationalization in agriculture and industry" (68). It also emphasized , 
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the "necessity to build a state of a new kind, which will express the 
interests of the peasants and workers and become more and more an 
instrument of production and not of coercion" (69). It went on to warn 
of the dangers of; 
"new and rapidly developing social strata (which) threa-
ten to appear in the form of the instinctive anti-socia-
lism of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie (and) which is form-
ing in the machinery of the administration, the state and 
the economy" (70). 
It was stated that the solution was to assign key positions to mili-
tants who possessed sufficient political training and revolutionary 
consciousness to guard the revolution from 'bourgeois and petty bour-
geois deviation'. In order to achieve the aims of the revolution, the 
charter emphasized the necessity of creating an avant-garde party 
separate from the state and based neither on the masses nor on an elite 
of intellectuals and professionals. Finally, the Charter promoted the 
ideology of anti-imperialist struggle as the cornerstone of the advan-
cement of the revolution. This can only be translated into an 
"uncompromising policy of national independence", by rigorous control 
of the economy based on planning and the gradual nationalization of 
private capital, and into continuous "denunciation of imperialism" and 
alignment with the Arab, African, and Asian peoples fighting against 
imperialism and with all democratic forces of the world for liberation, 
democracy, and peace. 
In its essence the Charter affirmed the socialist choice of Alge-
ria and appeared sufficiently revolutionary for Henri Alleg, a leading 
Algerian communist and a cO-editor of the communist daily Alger 
Republicain, to believe that "from now on nothing can make (Algeria) 
retrace her steps. She will :advance l.rresis_tibly al.bnq the way marked 
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can be traced to the regime's attempt to inject an ideology into its 
socialism (72), which permitted Harbi's Marxist group to push for a 
radical and socialist programme, capitalizing on the inability on the 
part of the army, now the main faction opposing Ben Bella, to find a 
body of intellectuals capable of drawing up an alternative document. 
However, Harbi's group had no social base of its own to push its line 
through, and in the absence of the revolutionary avant-qarde party they 
wished to create, could only fulfil their own ideas through the very 
state and party bureaucracy which they were attacking (73). Ben Bella 
tried to make use of the second Congress of the FLN in a bid to gather 
support for himself by giving Algeria an ideological platform and by 
mobilizing the Party against his opponents. 
However this Congress marked the beginning of a profound new split 
between Ben Bella and the army, controlled by Boumedienne, which was 
only temporarily patched up in return for several compromises by each 
side. These included the distribution of the higher posts of the Party 
in such a way as to guarantee the army a sizable presence in the 
Political Bureau, the incorporation of the army's modifications of the 
original text of the Charter emphasizing Algeria's Arabo-Islamic 
culture and heritage, the exclusion from the Political Bureau of the 
leftist elements and Mohammed Harbi and Abdelaziz Zardani, the authors 
of the Charter, together with mounting pressure against the Communist 
Party and its influence. These compromises enabled Ben Bella to 
legitimize his position and to strengthen his hand against the opposi-
tion (74). 
However, Ben Bella's tactic of "reducing the number of factions in 
play :111ti.t:h.i!i h-isr-reg.ime,, instead. of: containing Ulem. ana submitting their 
interplay t.~.: binding arbitration" ( 75), did not come to an -eno with th~ 
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FLN Congress. In fact it became evident that his strategy was being 
extended to include the army, on which the regime had depended heavily 
to eliminate and quell other opposing factions. In other words, Ben 
Bella became determined to eliminate Boumedienne and the Oujda clan 
from his alliance. This was implied in a number of measures which he 
took either to counterbalance the power of the army by creating the 
•people's militia' linked to him and by promoting ex-wilaya leaders, 
known for their animosity to the regular army, to higher posts in the 
army, or by overtly dismissing Boumedienne's supporters from the gover-
nment, such as Ahmed Medeghri and Kaid Ahmed. Moreover, Ben Bella 
started to move closer to the mass organizations of workers and 
students which shared his desire to reduce the power of the army, 
trying to re-establish the confidence of these organizations in him. 
Thus after a period of control imposed by the FLN and government offi-
cials on the activities of the UGTA and other organizations outside the 
FLN, considerable freedom was given to them and many of their demands 
for autonomy and independence were accepted. Ben Bella's addresses to 
the workers showed a remarkable shift in tone, away from pleading for 
hard work, moderation and a low profile to the affirmation of workers' 
rights to manage their enterprises. At the agricultural workers' 
congress in December 1964 mentioned above, Ben Bella accused the offi-
cials of the Ministry of Agriculture of exceeding their powers, 
promised support to the workers' union against the intervention of 
ONRA, and supported the affiliation of the agricultural workers to the 
UGTA (76). Ben Bella's shift in attitude towards the workers was 
illustrated further during the UGTA Congress in March 1965, in which, 
after having been f'or-eed- to accept an FLN · aPJ.D()int~d J..Qader-Ship at their 
:first· ·Congr.es.s, ct_.n_, 'l~fi-3,,, -the-e delegates: were- allowed--to: .elect..a.new ... _ _ 
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leadership whose members were known to be very critical of the more 
docile previous one and stuborn opponents of any infringements of the 
Union's autonomy. This attitude, which was also echoed in the Students' 
Union, can only be explained by Ben Bella's wish to appear as a 
champion of the people and his desire to acquire more popular support 
in order to silence his opponents. The outcome was a period of revolu-
tionary fervour as the leftist forces inside and outside the FLN seized 
the opportunity to push for the application of the March Decrees and 
the Algiers Charter in a move which was only halted by the army coup. 
Ben Bella's Lack of Social Power 
The most striking feature of the 1965 coup d'etat was the compara-
tive ease with which the army succeeded in ousting Ben Bella in spite 
of his apparent popularity. However, popularity is one thing and having 
a solid social power base another. Ben Bella did not create or at least 
did not sufficiently strengthen any independent institution which could 
serve his rule in the long term. Under Ben Bella the National Assembly 
and the Party lost much of their influence; the latter in particular 
became an instrument of coercion to prevent the growth of any indepen-
dence on the part of the mass organizations and its popularity general-
ly declined. Ben Bella's measures in favour of the workers and peasants 
were motivated more by his need to consolidate his power than out of 
concern for their well being or an expression of ideological commitment 
and were in fact a response to challenges from forces directly hostile 
to the proclaimed 'socialist option•. D. and M. Ottaway wrote: 
"To every challenge (Ben Bella) responded with a conces-
sion to his opponents or with anouncement of a popular 
· ~~ODo;=Khi-der -.t,r-ietL.·t.o impose hims~s ·hl'le- ~·tronq. 
man of the regime, and Ben Bella reacted by publ±shing 
U1e ltlarch Decrees. Ait Ahmed openly defied Ben Bella in 
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the fall of 1963, and Ben Bella answered by nationalizing 
all remaining French lands. The army became a threatening 
ally, and Ben Bella turned to the UGTA, giving it the 
autonomy it demanded and even proposing to nationalize 
all private enterprise" (77). 
Ben Bella's alliances were formed on an ad hoc basis and directed 
to serve his prime aim, the consolidation of his personal power, which 
had the effect of rendering the structure and composition of his regime 
incoherent (78). Thus his alliance with the revolutionary forces was 
based not on his identification with their aims and strategies, but on 
gaining more power and popularity for himself. At the same time he 
remained as mistrustful and afraid of these forces as ever, depriving 
them of an effective voice in the running of the country and also 
depriving himself of the chance of gaining any long term support which 
might emanate from popular initiatives. This situation reflected the 
true position of a leader claiming to be the sole representative of the 
people without translating this claim into more than rhetorical 
phrases. 
Gradually the population became disillusioned and could no longer 
control the bureaucracy or prevent the opponents of the revolution from 
eroding its achievements. This was recognized, if somewhat belatedly, 
by Ben Bella himself in an interview in 1985, in which he admitted that 
those who surrounded him and shared his power "were essentially 
motivated by their own interests in extending their authority and in 
expropriating the initiatives of the people, in a situation that 
required revolutionary changes and purges" (79). Ben Bella also 
admitted that the people lacked the means to carry out the tasks 
assigned to them: "My historical mistake was that I did not act fast 
and give ·the power to those who had achieved in a sbort. time of self-
·-----·---~~-=_!:~...__!!. .!,__··~·- -~---~-- ~:.· 
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time (sic), had I armed them, a second revolution would have taken 
place" ( 80). 
The Coup d'Etat of 19 June 1965 
As his regime remained under constant threat and as he continued 
his 'juggling policy', Ben Bella became too weak to confront the army, 
without whose support he would never be able to stay in power. In fact 
when it became clear to Boumedienne that Ben Bella was not only deter-
mined to weaken the army's role in the state and society, but also to 
eliminate Boumedienne himself, the latter needed only to make contact 
with about thirty opponents of Ben Bella who occupied sensitive posts 
inside and outside the army (81) to assure his arrest and removal from 
power. The army coup d'etat, which took place in the early morning of 
19 June 1965, suddenly exposed the fragility of Ben Bella's power and 
influence. It proved what the army officers had been expressing in 
private for some time, that "Ben Bella is nothing •••• he has no force 
to back his power .•.. we could take care of him in a few hours and no 
one in the country would raise a voice in his defence" (82). In fact 
some voices were raised in the main cities of Algeria but they were too 
weak to affect the course of events. 
In the first proclamation addressed to the people of Algeria and 
signed by Houari Boumedienne on behalf of the new Council of the 
Revolution, the coup leaders described their act as having been neces-
sary to put an end to a 'dramatic situation' to which the revolution 
had reached. Accusations of "sordid calculation, political narcissism, 
and morbid love of power" (83), were directed against Ben Bella whose 
rule aceording to the proclamation had resulted in: 
-_c "personal power, (where) all nationa-l and regional -insti-
- t_utiQns __ of_ the party_ and state are at the mercy of one 
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man who delegates power to suit himself, whose actions 
are dictated by unsound and improvised tactics and who 
imposes policies and men according to the mood of the 
moment, whim and caprice". 
The proclamation went on to affirm that the continuity of the revolu-
tion should be based on 'efficiency' and that " realistic socialism 
based on the country's needs must replace day-to-day publicity-seeking 
socialism". It put strong emphasis on the necessity of "serious 
construction of a state which will survive governments and men". 
What the Coup Really Represented 
In order to evaluate the effect of the coup upon Algeria's social 
and economic development, it is not enough to look only at the imme-
diate causes that drove Boumedienne and his allies to act in this way, 
but also to assess the nature of the army, and how it regarded itself 
and its role in Algeria. In the first place, as a force which was 
created in specific conditions and drew its strength mainly from the 
peasantry, the army exhibited conservative ideological convictions 
generally very different from those of Ben Bella. This explains why its 
opposition to Ben Bella's regime was expressed in terms of the argument 
that Islamic and traditional values should be integrated with socialist 
and egalitarian values. Thus the army leaders were quick to announce in 
their first proclamation that "the radical transformation of our socie-
ty cannot take place without taking into account our faith, our convic-
tions, the secular traditions of our people and our moral values". They 
objected to the Marxist orientation of the Algiers Charter and to the 
existence of a group of foreigners among Ben Bella's advisors who 
inspired the adoption of Marxist doctrines as the ideological platform 
of his ~egime. Tpese objections were_openly expres$ed by Boumedienne 
<-; !_ ~ o:11 ~ '. ,- '' .. - . i 'J • i ••• ~ 
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after the coup in an interview with al-Ahram where he stated that 
"Algerians did not launch the revolution of lst November and sacrifice 
a million and a half martyrs in order to make it possible for an 
opportunist group of Trotskyites under the leadership of their apstole 
'Raptis' or 'Pablo' as he calls himself, to rule Algeria and to become 
custodians of the revolutionaries in the name of socialism" (84). In 
his criticism of the previous regime and its "divorce from the tradi-
tions of Algerian society for which the revolution took place" 
(emphasis added), Boumedienne stated that: 
"when we wanted to talk about the past, they said let us 
talk about the future, the past has gone and let us leave 
it to the history. When we wanted to talk about our 
personality and about our Arabic and Islamic heritage, 
they said these are reactionary thoughts and that reli-
gion is the opium of people" (85). 
Despite the fact that Boumedienne was not opposed to socialism in 
principle, he favoured orderly state control rather than •anarchic' 
self-management (86). He saw socialism as "part of our historical 
heritage (and) a choice objectively imposed by the Algerian reality as 
a way of life and development" (87), but rejected Ben Bella's •verbal 
socialism as a mere 'falsification' based on "the improvisation of the 
means and the use of emotions". He asked on one occasion "does socia-
lism mean the nationalization of some cafes and small shops, and is it 
the enactment of a host of contradictory measures concerning the expro-
priation of properties and the nationalization of certain enterprises 
which have no economic importance for the state?" (88), and on another 
"where is the national plan? Where is the land reform about which we 
heard so much?" (89). For him "socialism is not this collection of 
incoherent and improvied measures of personal impulses. It is a lengthy 
and difficult process requiring a rational plan established in politi-
cal, economic, and social terms" (90). It is natural, therefore, t~ 
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find Boumedienne justifying his action by referring to the inconsisten-
cies, improvisation, and lack of efficiency that characterized Ben 
Bella's rule. 
Secondly, and most important, is the fact that at no time did the 
army, which was establishing itself as an increasingly coherent force, 
view its position and role as one of a regular and classic army whose 
functions were confined to the defence of the country's borders. 
Instead it saw itself as the "worthy heir of the glorious Army of 
National Liberation". On many occasions Boumedienne asserted the claim 
that the ANP is not an army in the classic sense of the word; "our 
military men are not military men in the true sense" (sic) (91). On 
another occasion Boumedienne stated that; 
"The ALN was created from those who took up arms without 
any previous training or conventional military experience 
to fight the colonialists, and from among them also the 
ANP was established after independence. Who are they? 
They are the people, and they are the revoltuion" (92). 
In this general atmosphere it is hard to imagine that the army or 
its leaders could be apolitical or accept a role in the shadow of Ben 
Bella's cult of personality, let alone that it should be prepared to be 
weakened or undermined. on the contrary, it saw itself as a bearer of a 
historical message, and considered its action in overthrowing Ben Bella 
to be the embodiment of the aspirations of the people from which the 
army "sprang and from which it draws both its strength and raison 
d'etre" (93). Thus it never regarded its action as a military coup; 
rather it was a 'historical commitment' or "the style of revolutionary 
legitimacy practised by the militants in order to save their revolution 
from the deviation, inaction, and the sickness of the cult of persona-
lity wfiich charac-ter-ized the rule ofc-Ben-Be·n_a .. =(9'4),; "- , ____ , ''··--"'--·' _,_ __ 
Thirdly,_given the importance and the weight of the army in the 
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politics of Algeria and the fact that it had become the most powerful 
and organized force in the country, it was quite natural that such a 
force should react sharply to any attempt to weaken or undermine it. 
Thus, in the light of Ben Bella's attitude to the army and his manoeuv-
res to divide it and prevent it from constituting a power base which 
might compete with his own personal power, the coup d'etat represented 
a 'legitimate' reaction, a defensive act on the part of the Oujda clan 
which saw its existence threatened by Ben Bella's policy and intentions 
(95). This threat was expressed by the various attempts on Ben Bella's 
part which have been mentioned briefly above (96) to divide the army 
and eliminate its leaders. It was intensified after the reconciliation 
between Ben Bella and Ait Ahmed, whose violent revolt against Ben Bella 
was put down by the army. This not only involved negotiating the 
release of Ait Ahmed, who had been sentenced to death, and a general 
pardon for his supporters, but also his incorporation into the gover-
nment as Foreign Minister in place of Abdelaziz Boutaflika, member of 
the Oujda clan and a close supporter of Boumedienne (97). The fact that 
the Second Afro-Asian Conference was due to open in Algiers in June 
1965 might have pushed Boumedienne to act more quickly in order not to 
let Ben Bella gain more international popularity and prestige. 
What political changes resulted from the coup? From the subsequent 
course of events and from eyewitness accounts, it seems that the coup 
was masterminded and executed by a small group of army leaders led by 
Boumedienne. The group then attempted to incorporate as many political 
groups as possible into the Council of the Revolution in order to 
"avoid giving the impression that the army, which was not popular in 
th-e~c6untry, acted_ a1on~ and thar Alger~a-wd.s .1'lela~w--a-m1.~~tctr~Y~ cucta-
torshi.p~'-- .( 98} ·~Thus t:~ compos. it i-On- of t:he Gounciil -of- Ule.- Rey-alu.tion 
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was not revealed until July 5; it consisted of 26 members and was 
assigned the task of functioning as the "supreme instance of the 
Revolution" until a new constitution was drawn up which would redefine 
the structures of authority (99). Its composition indicated that 
Boumedienne and his group had been fairly successful in wining over a 
significant number of politicians and army leaders from Ben Bella's 
regime; ten out of the seventeen original members of the defunct Poli-
tical Bureau became members of the Council of the Revolution and only 
two members of this Bureau, Ben Alla and Neccashe, in addition to Ben 
Bella himself, were arrested. This seemed to confirm Boumedienne•s 
claim that his action "did not aim at changing the regime but only 
replacing the president" (100). In the face of the role played by the 
army and the Boumedienne group before the coup, this claim might have 
had substance, as no major political change would be likely if Ben 
Bella was simply removed and the already inactive institutions he had 
created such as the Political Bureau and the National Assembly were to 
be formally abolished. However, given Ben Bella's role and his impact 
on political development as a result of the concentration of power in 
his hands, his removal was bound to have a profound effect on the 
course of socio-economic development. However, these changes did not 
have the same impact at all social, economic, and political levels 
because of the character and priorities of the Ben Bella regime and 
also because of the composition of the new alliance. 
The new regime represented a new and broad alliance in Which 
Boumedienne, unlike Ben Bella, managed to act effectively as the 
arbiter of the interplay between the factions (101). Boumedienne was 
able to incorporate the ex-wilaya leaders wi.thi:n_Jiis_.- alLiance,, :togethll!r 
With·tne two·mos't prblninent fig'utes ftolli the Ben Bella regime, Mehsa.s 
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and Bouma'za, and others known for their technical competence and 
expertise rather than their political affiliation or beliefs. None of 
the leaders outside the Oujda clan who were expelled during the Ben 
Bella regime were brought into the Boumedienne alliance, which suggests 
continuity in the exclusion of those leaders who supported liberal and 
capitalist development. Nevertheless, the alliance was a broad one as 
Boumedienne tried to incorporate a large number of factions into his 
government. This had the advantage of ensuring relative stability for 
some time and the disadvantage of virtually paralyzing any decision-
making (102). Thus it was not until the end of 1967 that "the internal 
profile of the regime had been effectively rationalized, the factions 
reduced to a manageable number. With the ensuing stability, it was 
possible for coherent policy-making at last to be undertaken (103). 
On the level of policies, the new regime was quick to emphasize 
the continuity of the revolution and its socialist orientation set out 
in the March Decrees and the Algiers Charter, and to warn against any 
deviation from their principles. As one member of the Council of the 
Revolution declared; 
"I warn all those who doubt, all those who have unjusti-
fied hope in seeing us change our present policies and 
jeopardize the gains of the revolution, I tell them with 
force and frankness that anybody who sets himself against 
our present policies, .••. against the decision of the 
(Party) congress contained in the Algiers Charter, will 
be crushed by the revolution" (104). 
The new regime stressed that the course of the Algerian revolution 
would not be changed. Ben Bella was blamed for every deviation from the 
principles of the revolution which resulted in the growth of his perso-
nal power, the impotence of the political institutions, the alienation 
of real militants, and improvisation in policies. Furthermore, as the 
coup took place against a background of persistent deterioration in the ~ 
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social and economic situation with high unemployment and declining 
revenue, investment, production and productivity, all these defects 
were attributed by the new regime to Ben Bella's incoherent and 
improvised policies that had resulted in the inefficient running of 
economic enterprises and in the wastage of human and economic resour-
ces. 
With its general aims and orientations apparently unchanged, and in fact 
firmly emphasized, the new regime placed great emphasis on the need for 
order, discipline, skills, stability, efficiency, planning, hard work, 
and economic development. The intervention of the state was regarded as 
essential to achieve these aims and to produce coherent policies 
which could be applied efficiently. Thus the most urgent priority was 
given to building up a strong state structure and institutions, which 
was reflected by Boumedienne•s constant references to the impossibility 
of consolidating the revolution without such a structure: 
"It is important to build a state based on morality and 
real social commitment, representing our Arab and Islamic 
values. We have to moralize our institutions, to build an 
effective state machinery capable of insuring revolutio-
nary order and discipline and of protecting the agents of 
the state and administration from any form of pressure or 
solicitation" (105). 
Emphasis was also placed on the need to follow criteria of technical 
competence in the recruitment of state economic caders and administra-
tors ( 106). 
What impact did the coup have on the socio-political forces of 
Algeria? The coup took place partly because, for various reasons, Ben 
Bella had made undeclared alliances with the revolutionary forces and 
with the UGTA in particular at a time when popular enthusiasm had not 
yet evaporated, despite the manoeuvres o£ the bureaucracy, ~~-~lso· a~--
a -t·ime when- Al..geria• sti.ll had-an .international. image as the 0 ' At:ri.Ca.IL~. 
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Cuba'. Despite their claims, the action of those who overthrew Ben 
Bella was bound to result in a great deal of demoralization and disap-
pointment on the part of the revolutionary forces and to bring their 
expectations to an abrupt end. On the other had, it aroused great 
optimism and satisfaction on the part of the reactionary forces, since 
the previous regime had managed to antagonize significant sections of 
the population either by the 'socialist' content of its ideological 
programme or by the continuous threat of land reform accompanied by 
random nationalizations of small private concerns and agricultural 
properties. The religious leaders and conservative groups expressed 
their support for the Council of the Revolution in a flurry of teleg-
rams and messages in the days following the coup (107). certain Western 
countries also expressed satisfaction, presumably in the hope that the 
coup would lead to basic changes in domestic and foreign policies which 
would enable the Western world to establish closer relations with 
Algeria. 
However, the outcome was to prove more complex than had been 
initially anticipated and hoped, since, despite being part and parcel 
of the class struggle and despite its class implications and impact, 
the coup did not take place as a direct response to a paricular antago-
nistic situation on the part of class interests outside the petty 
bourgeoisie. It was very much a part of the factional struggles within 
the ruling stratum. It was more a response on the part of a political 
group which felt itself to be threatened but which also had access to 
the means to enable it to assume a leading political role. Thus, while 
under the previous regime there was a considerable gap between actual 
social· develo:r:>ment and the~·ciaims and commitments of thec-poH.,ti£al.. 
leadership, (because the latter was unable to achieve economic· ·t".l~velop-
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ment on a scale which would correspond with its political and ideologi-
cal commitments, thereby causing great incoherence and serious social 
and economic bottlenecks) the new regime came in to redress the situa-
tion in favour of the social environment and order which had already 
been established, in the form of tight bureaucratic controls. Ian Clegg 
sums up the coup with regard to its impact on social development by 
stating that: 
"The 19 June coup was not a counter-revolution in the 
classic sense. It marked a point of rationalization and 
acceleration of a counter-revolution that had been under 
way since soon after independence. Under Ben Bella the 
new middle class had aleady become firmly entrenched in 
the state and party apparatus. The achievements of the 
workers in 1962 had already been eroded significantly. 
The coup was part of a class struggle that was aleady 
under way. In this struggle Ben Bella represented a 
populist mystification; his removal clarified and shar-
pened its lines" (108). 
The Army in Power 
One of the major tasks facing the new regime was to give itself 
legitimacy in a highly volatile situation. First, the Algerian people 
were still very demanding and had a high expectation of the state's 
capacity to provide them with what had been denied them under the 
colonial system. Secondly, the popularity of the ALN in the war of 
independence was insufficient to provide the ANP with legitimacy espe-
cially when the latter had just ousted a popular leader. The new lead-
ers knew that their tasks were formidable, and realized that the mere 
exposure of the previous regime's 'deviations' would not be enough to 
legitimize their own power. 
With this in mind, and with its declared intention to adhere to 
the principles and orientations set out in the earlier documents, the 
.. ,...--·~....:. ~- . ·-
319 
new regime gave a new interpretation of the aims of the revolution. 
'Socialism' and 'socialist objectives' now were directly linked to 
economic development based on planning and industrialization and the 
mobilization of all available resources, including private capital, 
under the leadership of the state. In the face of constant criticisms 
of the previous regime, socialism became devoid of its populist content 
as a mere slogan imposed in order to gain popularity and to enhance Ben 
Bella's personal power. State control over the economy, with the 
emphasis on criteria of efficiency and profitability, was stressed as 
the way forward to enhanced and accelerated development and the only 
alternative to economic anarchy and disorder. 
During the early years of the new regime, new interpretations of 
the objectives of the revolution were reflected in minor and sometimes 
contradictory changes in general policies, which revealed the immobili-
zation of the new leadership and its incapacity to produce a major 
breakthrough in economic and political development. In the early months 
after the coup, following criticisms of the Ben Bella regime for promo-
ting "a haphazard and propagandist socialism", expressed in popularity-
seeking nationalizations of firms of no vital importance, the new 
regime expressed its objection to his policy in a series of dena-
tionalizations of a number of small workshops, hotels, cafes, and 
shops. In the confusion created by the coup and partly as a reflection 
of the accomodation of the interests of the 'enemies of socialism' 
within Boumedienne's alliance, this series of random denationalizations 
included the return of peasant-run lands to their former feudal owners 
in the provinces of Constantine and Oran, lands Which had been seized 
under the previous government because their owners had collaborated 
with the French. 
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In the region of Al-Asnam (formerly Orleansville), for 
example, the Bouthiba, big landowners, regained posses-
sion of their lands. The worker-run sections of industry 
were also affected by this'liberalization' and various 
enterprises were given back to the former owners, such as 
the 'Norcolor" paint and building materials factory (109). 
In 1966, twenty important economic enterprises which were expropriated 
because they belonged to collaborators with colonialism were returned 
to their previous owners (110). 
The new regime's outlook and its commitment to economic develop-
ment and the notion that the state must play a major role in this 
development, had ambivalent and contradictory repercussions on atti-
tudes towards the self-management system, which eventually resulted in 
its total erosion and its gradual transformation into state-management 
(111). Thus while this system was rhetorically praised and presented as 
a reflection of the "political maturity of the peasants and workers 
(and of) their initiatives and awareness" of their role in independent 
Algeria (112), great emphasis was placed on the necessity of producing 
'positive results' in production and productivity, where responsibility 
was to be shared equally between managers, workers, and state organs. 
Thus.while stating that "despite certain people attacking self-manage-
ment~ one should clearly affirm that it remains a fundamental option, 
prticularly in agriculture" (113), it was clear that the regime regar-
ded economic criteria as the most efficient way for self-management to 
survive and produce desirable results. This position was reflected in 
its clearest form in an interview with Boumedienne in Le Monde in April 
1968: 
"We are for sel-management, but a viable self-management 
that yields profits, that results in an efficient organi-
zation of work and an increase of production. To liberate 
the work·er is a revolutionary principle, but to 
produce is also a necessity" (114). 
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Moreover, while accepting the existence of the enemies of self-
management and their efforts to undermine this system by various means, 
and while condemnations were frequently made of state bureaucracy's 
expropriation of workers' rights, the regime also showed its disappro-
val of the workers' attitudes and blamed them for their low productivi-
ty and negligence: 
"The era of paternalistic autoqestion is over .••• No more 
favouritism ••• the workers in autogestion must pay their 
enterprise taxes: they will get no more loans; they must 
pay for the amortization of their capital goods, in a 
word, they must, in future, run their sector rationally. 
Only after an experience of this sort can we make a 
definitive and rational judgement on autogestion" (115). 
In a speech addressed to representatives of the sociaJist agricultural 
sector in April 1970, Boumedienne accused the workers of not "having 
understood the meaning of self-management" and exhorted them to work 
harder and produce more, reminding them that "you are lucky because the 
revolution enabled you to gain control of this sector which includes 
the richest lands of Algeria (thus) you are responsible for any negli-
gence or slackness" (116). 
It became clear that instead of being encouraged and expanded, 
self-management was only allowed to exist within a framework of 
increasing state control over the economy, and was asked to function 
correspondingly as a part of a state capitalist system, but only 
because there might be serious political repercussions if it was to be 
abolished. As mentioned earlier, the new regime was not totally respon-
sible for the erosion of self-management; it only completed a process 
that was already under way because of the limitations of the system 
itself and the process of its incorporation into a system of state 
capitalism, while initiating a conscious process of creating and expan-
ding t)le state economic sector as-- we will see later .. 
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The criticisms of the previous regime in general and of self-
management in particular did not strictly speaking reflect a new 
perception and outlook towards Algeria's economic development. The 
preconditions for this were the state's growing control over the 
economy and the incorporation of the self-management sector into the 
state sector, together with the tolerance of the existence of an active 
private sector, all of had occurred under Ben Bella. The purpose of the 
criticisms was generally to provide legitimacy for the new regime and 
they were not translated into coherent action until 1967, following the 
abortive coup d'etat by Tahir Zbiri. It was at this point that the 
regime managed to move out of its immobilization, which was largely the 
result of the broadness of the alliance that brought Boumedienne to 
power and the heterogeneity of the factions within it. Even cohesion 
within the individual factions was not based on social homogeneity but 
on the role of the members during the war of independence. However, 
such heterogeneity did not mean that they had nothing in common. Their 
experience under Ben Bella, and the fact that they owed their positions 
to the roles which they had played in the armed struggle either inside 
or outside Algeria made them more committed to the notion of the supre-
macy of the army and the state as the prime means of introducing 
transformations in the economy and society. Thus, after the coup the 
army was consistently presented as the army of the people that would 
play a major role in the 'national and socialist' construction of the 
country. It experienced a continuous process of modernization and 
expansion. In 1968 it was composed of 70,000 men. Its tasks were not 
limited to military matters but extended to include various civil 
functionsin the administration and the economy. In a word, its rol.e as 
the. most organized force in society was greatly ·enhanced. Hence despite 
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the emphasis of FLN documents on the necessity of the control of the 
Party over the army, reality suggested that the latter and especially 
the Political Commissariat of the ANP remained totally independent of 
the Party. 
However, with the setting up of various state structures the 
decisive role of the army receded into the background and became less 
apparent, although it remained the source of authority and power. With 
these general orientations in the background, Boumedienne undertook the 
delicate task of harmonizing his alliance This involved the elimination 
of "certain factions definitively, especially those linked to ex-
guerrilla commanders, usually by coaxing their leading members into 
substantial responsibilities outside the government •••• or into purely 
token positions within it .... in which they were badly placed to 
maintain an organised following of political significance" (117). It 
also resulted in the alienation of the civil ministers in charge of 
agriculture and information and their subsequent elimination, and 
culminated in the rupture of the alliance after the Chief of Staff of 
the ANP Tahir Zbiri failed in his attempt to assume power. The outcome 
was the consolidation of the authority and power of the Oujda clan and 
thus a breakthrough in the state's attempts to present a more coherent 
programme of development. Hence in the following years there was a more 
consistent consolidation of the state apparatus at national as well as 
regional levels, together with the initiation of ambitious economic 
programmes. This was accompanied by the comprehensive nationalization 
of foreign capital operating in Algeria and the extension of central 
economic planning, which rapidly expanding the size and importance of 
the state economic sector. The following chapter will analyse· the 
pa.Fticularities of the Algerian economy and the impact ~f eolon.iali.sm 
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and the way it came to an end, in order to examine the state's poli-
cies towards the economy in general and the agricultural sector in 
particular in relation to the nature of the strata in control of the 
state apparatus. 
-
-- - -~· 
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CAPTER SEVEN TilE ECON<MY UNDER BEN BELLA AND BOlMED I ENNE 
We saw earlier how colonialism had profoundly transformed the 
social and economic conditions of Algeria and how Algerian independence 
was achieved in an exteremly chaotic and disorderly social and economic 
circumstances. In order both to measure the extent of the problems with 
which the new independent state was faced and to estimate the importan-
ce of the agricultural sector in the economy it is necessary to look at 
the general state of the Algerian economy at independence and the 
effects of the war upon it. 
Two prominent and interrelated features characterized the economy 
of Algeria; the predominance of the agriculture, and its exter nal 
orientation towards satisfying the demands of metropolitan France. As 
in a typical colonial economy agriculture played the most important 
role in the social and economic life of the Algerian population, for a 
variety of reasons. First of all agriculture provided the major source 
of income for the vast majority. Between 1955 and 1964 almost three-
quarters of the population lived in the rural areas and 60 per cent of 
the total population derived their livelihood directly from 
agriculture. The agricultural sector mobilized 80.8 per cent of the 
total active population, estimated in 1954 at 3 512 000, and 87.8 of 
the economically active male population (1). The majority of the labour 
force was composed either of small farmers who used no paid labour or 
of labourers on the colonial farms who together constituted 75 per cent 
of the total rural population (2). Second the agricultural sector's 
share in the structure of Gross National Product on the eve of 
independence did not reflect the imp~r~ance of this sector in th~~ 
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society, mainly because of the dualism inherent in the colonial economy 
as will be discussed below. However,with the sectoral imbalance that 
characterized the Algerian economy, the agricultural sector accounted 
for a relatively large share in the composition of the GDP as revealed 
in the following table (3): 
Primary Sector 
Secondary Sector 
Tertiary Sector 
Structure of GDP between 1950 andl962 
(in percentage) 
1950 
37% 
27% 
36% 
1954 
33.5% 
27% 
39.5% 
1958 
26% 
27% 
47% 
1962 
24% 
36% 
40% 
This only needs to be compared with the percentage of the agricul-
tural sector's share in 1974, which was 7.4 per cent to show the real 
importance of this sector on the eve of independence. Furthermore, as 
an economy dominated by agrarian capitalism, agricultural exports, and 
especially those products produced on the colonial farms, formed the 
principal source of growth in Algeria. They played the same role in the 
development of the Algerian economy as that of cotton in Egypt or 
coffee and sugar in Brazil (4). A very large proportion of the most 
important agricultural products was exported; 90 per cent of wine,70 
per cent of fruit and vegetables,and 40 per cent of cereal production 
(5). At independence, agricultural production accounted for 80 per cent 
of all Algerian exports and just before the advent of oil and gas, wine 
formed 53 per cent of the annual trade receipts of the economy. 
The predominance of agriculture in the economy and the heavy 
reliance on agricultural exports implied the relative underdevelopment 
of industry and the weakness of the industrial sector, and the predomi-
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and extractive industries owned by French capital also saw noticeable 
growth during the last years of colonialism. Oil production, for exam-
ple, increased from 3.2 million barrels in 1958 to 159.5 million in 
1962 (6). Also, as a result of rapid urbanization, there was rapid 
growth in the construction industry and basic public works whose share 
in GNP rose to 8 percent.This was in fact the main reason for the 
sudden growth of the secondary sector between 1950 and 1962 as shown in 
the table above. The service sector was over-inflated as a result of 
the concentration of capital in commerce and finance. Sectoral 
imbalance was one of the most striking features of the Algerian 
economy, and there was also very weak integration between the various 
sectors. In l954,for example, the industrial sector absorbed only 25 
per cent of local agricultural production and in turn a mere 8 per cent 
of the value of industrial production was directed towards the 
agricultural sector (7). This was basically due to the externally-
directed nature of the economy towards mainly metropolitan France. In 
1960, 80 per cent of Algeria's exports and 75 per cent of its imports 
were to and from France. The main Algerian exports were primary 
products, agricultural and other raw materials, and its main imports 
were manufactured goods. 
Slow growth and stagnation was another feature of the Algerian 
economy which was entirely dependent on the colonial state for new 
investment. The absence both of a large internal market and of an 
enterpreneurial bourgeoisie together with the domination of French 
industry over the Algerian market, made substantial industrial develop-
ment impossible. Thus profits made by local capital in agriculture and 
in mining industries were either exported to France or invested in 
•local property and s-ervices, or- spent on luxury consumer goods .• Two 
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important indicators demonstrated the stagnation of the economy; the 
rate of population growth exceeded that of material production, and a 
trade deficit, estimated at AD 4,351 million, existed in 1960. 
However, a more serious and important weakness, mentioned earlier, 
lay behind these general characteristics. This was the dual nature of 
the economy and the sharp division of the population into a minority of 
wealthy European settlers and a majority of impoverished Muslims. 
We saw earlier how colonialism had produced two agricultural 
sectors; one modern, large scale and capitalist, in which production 
was destined for export, and the another traditional, dominated by the 
indigenous population and destined for subsistence. We also saw that 
the colons monopolized the key economic and political positions while 
Muslim population remained impoverished. The vast majority of the 
latter occupyed the rural areas; half of them were landless and anot-
her third were living at bare subsistence level. They saw a continuous 
process of impoverishment and degradation of their lives with the 
underdevelopment of the economy and the very few opportunities open for 
their survival.The high rate of Muslim population growth (estimated at 
more than 3 per cent per annum) further aggravated the situation. It 
resulted in an increasing wave of rural to urban migration and in 
congestion in the urban centres with marginalized people surviving on 
very small incomes derived from casual jobs in the service sector. Thus 
more than one third of the non-agricultural labour force was unemployed 
or semi-employed in 1954. As a result, many Algerians were forced to 
migrate to France in search of employment. Hence the number of Algerian 
migrant workers increased rapidly during the last years before 
i~dependence reaching as we saw earlier more than half million. Thus 
generally-,- while- the- annua·l per capit.a -income of the colon-s in 1954 -
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ranged between $502 for the lowest groups and $3181 for the highest, 
that of an average Algerian was $45 per year. The European population 
of about one million took 47 per cent of national income, while the 
indigenous rural population took only 18 per cent. 
Against this background the war of independence broke out, inflic-
ting additional strains upon the economy. Private French capital, which 
was already incapable of changing the bleak situation, was rapidly 
transferred to the metropolis, 430 milliard AF in 1959, 528 in 1960, 
616 in 1961, and 712 in 1962. In an attempt to restore the political 
stability threatened by the war and to guarantee capital accumulation 
in the oil sector which had been increasing rapidly since 1956, and in 
order to lay the foundations for a neo-colonial relationship between 
France and Algeria, the government of General de Gaulle introduced an 
ambitious Five Year economic development plan known as the Constantine 
Plan. The importance of this plan lies more in the fact that it set the 
basis for the industrial development of independent Algeria than that 
it introduced any real structural transformation of the economy, sine 
only a minor part of the plan was ever realized. 
As well as making massive investments in socio-economic infrastructure 
(8), the plan sought a policy of "growth poles" through which heavy 
industrial investment for the transformation of natural resources was 
to be initiated in a few coastal locations. A steel complex at Annaba, 
an oil refinery at Algiers, a petrochemical complex at Arzew near Oran, 
and a gas line from Hassi Ramel to Arzew, in addition to several import 
substitution industries which were suggested in the plan, had a pro-
found impact on the Algerian economy and influenced the direction and 
character of its development (9), since those projects subsequently-
formed th~ basis of the indu,strial_ policy of independent Algeria. 
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The Effects of the Liberation War on the Economy 
If the long history of colonialism had profoundly transformed the 
Algerian economy and introduced structural disequilibrium and imbalance 
within it, the way in which it carne to an end and the subsequent flight 
of the colons precipitated a social and economic disaster. As a result 
of the war severe disruptions took place in the structure of the 
population and its geographical distribution. The war had inflicted 
heavy human losses on the Algerian population, estimated at around one 
million, and about 400 000 children were left orphans. Another half 
million people were forced in the course of the war to live outside 
Algeria in Tunisia an Morocco. More importantly, the policy of 
"regroupernent", initiated by General Challe in order to pacify the 
rural population involved the uprooting of over two million inhabitants 
from their villages and their resettlement in camps under military 
guard called "regroupernent centres". Together with the use of napalm in 
combating the FLN fighters in the rural areas, this policy had an 
extremely damaging effect upon traditional agricultural activities. In 
the traditional sector, for example, wholesale theft and destruction of 
live- stock took place. Half the goats, 70 per cent of cattle, and 40 
per cent of sheep were slaughtered (10). 
However, the real impact of these phenomena was apparent irnmedia-
tely after the end of the war. A very large number of those who had 
been "regrouped" left their camps after independence and flooded into 
the urban centres to join those who already had fled from the 
countryside during the war (11). With the limited capacity of the 
various economic sectors to absorb sufficient amounts of labour, this 
had drastic consequences on levels of un- and underemployment. Thus 
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unemployment in the new republic was estimated at 70 per cent of the 
total labour force, or two million in the industrial and service 
sectors. Population growth, together with the existence of 400,000 
orphans, resulted in an extremely youthful population with 47 per cent 
under 15 years of age. 
The departure of the colons resulted in complete economic devasta-
tion and paralysis. By 1964 over one million Europeans had left Algeria 
for France. In six months alone about four-fifths of all Europeans, or 
800,000 persons, emigrated, and some 328,000 Europeans departed during 
the single month of June 1962. The major consequence of this sudden 
departure was that Algeria was left almost entirely devoid of profes-
sional and technical personnel since the Europeans constituted, as we 
saw, the bulk of administrators, teachers, technicians etc. Some 
300,000 of the Europeans had been engaged in active work: 15,000 had 
belonged to the higher administrative levels or liberal professions, 
33,000 were from managerial levels, 35,000 were skilled workers, and 
some 200,000 occupied posts requiring a higher than average technical 
or general level of education (12). Given a rate of illiteracy within 
the Algerian population of more than 80 per cent one can imagine the 
paralysis which engulfed the economy and administration after the 
departure of the colons. This departure also meant the closing down of 
shops and factories and the abandoning of farms owned by the Europeans, 
aggravating already chronic problems of employment and production. In 
addition the departing Europeans committed acts of destruction and 
sabotage to buildings, railways, machinery, documents, and e£fectively 
everything they could put their hands on which might be of use to the 
new republic. 
-~his·chaotic situation was bound to have a drastic impact upon the 
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economy in general and upon the level of production in particular. 
National income declined by about 23.5 per cent from AD 11,000 million 
in 1959 to AD 8,400 in 1963 (13). By 1963 the real value of production 
had dropped by 35 per cent below that of 1960. The most immediately 
affected sectors of the economy were the industrial and the service 
sectors. Apart from the oil sector, which, because of its geographical 
distance from the area of conflict, and because it was owned by the 
French state and international companies, was not affected by the 
flight of the colons, almost all industrial production and investment 
sharply declined. The production of manufacturing industry expressed in 
current prices fell from an index of 100 in 1959 to less than 80 in 
1963 (14). Electricity and water supply in terms of volume reached the 
index of 88 in 1963 from a base of 100 in 1959. One source lists the 
following levels of utilization of production capacity in the months 
after the ceasefire(l5): 
per cent 
Textiles 50 
Olive Oil 71 
Fish-canning 14 
Fruit-canning 40 
Sugar-refining 0 
Chemicals 40 
Metallurgy 25 
Activities in the construction and public works sector were 
closely connected with the level of investment and this level fell 
sharply after independence from 366,000 million Francs in 1959, includ-
ing 142,000 million in the oil industry, to 83,000 million in 1963 of 
which 15,000 million went into oil (16). Thus in the sector of constru-
ction and public works, formerly the largest s.inglec. employer'. in the 
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non-agricultural sector, production dropped 55 per cent in 1963 in 
comparison with 1962, and the number plummeted from 200,000 to 30,000 
(17). The eight years of war had affected a number of agricultural 
activities especially industrial crops, forest, and animal production 
which constituted 30 per cent of the value of the agricultural 
production tion and which were mainly in the hands of the Muslim 
population, whereas most production in the colonial sector was not 
affected at all (18). 
However, the effects of independence on the agricultural sector 
were felt more in commercial and distribution circles than on the level 
of production. This was mainly due to the fact that agricultural produ-
ction depended more than anything else on climatic conditions, and 
since the latter were favorable during 1962 and 1963, agricultural 
production was extremely good. As crops had already been planted 
before independence and because of the energetic actions of the manage-
ment committees which ensured that most crops were saved and harvested, 
levels of production were generally maintained. Wine was the only product 
which recorded a drop, of about one-third from 18.4 to 12.6 million 
hectoliters in 1963 due to the sudden departure of skilled European 
labour. The condition of the agricultural machinery in the colonial sector 
deteriorated either as a result of sabotage by the departing 
colons or because of the lack of local skill. Within a year of independence 
their potential was reduced by 60 per cent (19). 
The commercial market for agricultural products was the most hard 
hit, as the colons owned and operated the apparatus of agricultural 
distribution and exports and their flight meant the sudden disruption 
and paralysis .of normal trade channels. The export of fruit dropped by 
·212' per~ een't; ·in ·1962-63 and by a. further 27- per, cent ill ~963~64. Vegeta-
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ble exports dropped by 39 per cent in 1962-63 and by a further 45 per 
cent in 1963-64 (20). However, the flight of the colons and the disrup-
tion of external trade channels were also reflected in the decline of 
the level of imports, as the market for imported goods became noticeab-
ly limited. Thus the value of imports declined from AD 6,298 million in 
1960 to 374 million in 1964 and remained fluctuating around this amount 
until 1968. With the gradual growth of oil exports the trade deficit 
was reduced from AD 4,351 million in 1960 to 30 million in 1964. 
However, this seemingly positive aspect was only made possible at 
the expense of the destruction of the economy and a major reduction in 
employment. Moreover despite this and despite the fact that the value 
of oil exports constantly increased and in fact exceeded the value of 
agricultural exports for the first time in 1963 (as can be seen from 
the tables below) the state budgetary situation worsened. This was due 
to a number of factors; the deficit was no longer covered by the 
metropolitan budget, and tax revenues declined sharply by 30 per cent, 
because of the flight of the colons who used to provide 46.3 per cent 
of these revenues, leaving the state budget with a monthly deficit of 
between 100 and 150 million Francs (21). More importantly, oil did not 
produce a dramatic change in the economy and its benefits to Algeria 
remained almost nil. The increase in the value of oil and gas exports 
after independence did not involve the same increase in state revenues, 
since this sector was still largely controlled by French companies. 
Thus while the value of exported oil and gas exceeded that of agricul-
tural exports in 1963, it was only after 1967 that treasury receipts 
from oil and gas exceeded the value of agricultural exports. 
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Oil Production, 1960-1966 (in thousands of tons) (22) 
Year Production Year Production 
1960 8,631,6 1964 26,488,9 
1961 15,689,4 1965 26,481,3 
1962 20,690,7 1966 33,868,1 
1963 23,887,1 
The Value of the Agricultural Exports and the State's Income from 
Oil (1963-1969 in million AD) (23) 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1967 1969 
Agriculture 1,150 1,394 1,137 930 579 623 929 
Oil and gas 257 259 376 631 BOO l ,133 1,320 
This deficit meant a heavy reliance on external sources to cover 
expenditure. Thus in 1963 out of total investment receipts of 2,245 
million AD, Algeria provided only 154 million itself. In that year 
foreign sources provided 50 per cent of total government revenues (24). 
The prime supplier of these sources was France, which was committed 
under the Evian agreements to provide Algeria with financial aid to 
cover the compensation paid to the Europeans if their properties were 
national-ized together with the costs of the projects initiated before 
independence. During the years 1963, 1964, and 1965 French aid to 
Algeria amounted to AD 1,050 million, 950 million, and 716 million 
respectively, excluding technical and educational aid which reached AD 
50,150, and 154.5 million in these three years (25). 
Therefore, the independent Algerian state inherited an underdeve-
loped, undercapitalized, and externally oriented economy which besides 
being unbalanced and incapable of providing employment for the rapidly 
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increasing population, saw a sudden and violent disruption to its 
structure after independence. Yet one can not go to the next section 
without mentioning what was called by Chaliand and Minces the "positive 
heritage of French colonialism". 
At independence Algeria inherited an economic infrastructure that 
was more developed than that of almost all the ex-colonial countries. 
Although it lacked the means to man them and the people to serve (26), 
Algeria owned at the time of independence 10 important ports, three of 
which were international ports, 10,000 KM of roads, 3000 KM railways, 
20 civil airports, together with a relatively developed network of 
electricity and water supply (27). Most important was the agricultural 
and industrial infrastructure which offered considerable potential for 
future economic development. 
The Ideology of Algerian Development 
Although underdevelopment and economic misery was an underlying 
course of the Algerian revolution, no systematic economic programme was 
formulated by the leaders of the FLN during the war of independence. 
However, some ideas about the economic development of independent 
Algeria were presented in FLN documents during the war generally stres-
sing the needs to build "national, authentic, and integrated economic 
development (through) destructive and constructive processes" (28). The 
destructive action consistd of eliminating the ties of dependence upon 
the outside world and particularly with the metropolis, 'eradicating 
exploitation', and removing all mechanisms blocking economic develop-
ment. Constructive action, on the other hand, involved the optimal 
utilization of national resources and organizing the economy towards 
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satisfying internal needs (29). These ideas remained, however, part of 
the FLN propaganda for legitimacy and popular recruitment, and only 
when Algeria's independence became inevitable and in sight were they 
formulated, as we saw, in the Tripoli Programme. This acknowledged that 
political independence would remain meaningless without sustained and 
independent economic development capable of severing the neo-colonial 
relationship and enforcing rather than compromising the democratic and 
socialist ideals of the revolution. According to the Programme, this 
was to be achieved by the total rejection of "foreign domination and 
economic liberalism" which would "increase economic dependence on 
imperialism", and the adoption of the "control of the economy by the 
state with the participation of the workers" through economic plann-
ing. The latter would "permit the accumulation of the capital required 
for profitable industrialization in a relatively short period, for the 
centralization of the most important decisions concerning investment, 
and for the elimination of waste and false costs arising out of compe-
tition among enterprises"(30). 
The basic means of achieving such economic development were to be: 
an agrarian revolution involving the modernization of agriculture and 
the conservation of land resources at a national level, the profound 
restructuring of property rights through a radical land reform which 
would guarantee the distribution of lands to landless peasants and 
their democratic organization into production cooperatives. This would 
create the necessary conditions for the development of industry, which 
was to be oriented towards satisfying local needs and be based on the 
full exploitation of national human and natural resources. Another 
means was to be nationalization, which would include all the major 
sector-S· of. t-he economy- particularly ·hank~ing_:,::..i.n:surance, :foreig.n:..:.txaete, 
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and mineral resources and sources of energy. The ultimate aim of this 
development was to be the achievement of 'socialism' raising the stand-
ard of living of the masses and by extending basic services to the 
Algerian people. The Programme defines socialism as state control over 
the key sectors of the economy, rejecting any approach which would 
leave the "the solution of basic Algerian problems to the discretion of 
an embryonic middle class tied to the economy of imperialism by the 
nature of its activities ...• The state, here, should represent the 
totality of the Algerian people since the tasks of the revolution 
cannot be accomplished by a single social class whatever its involve-
ment may be ". This broad and general definition of socialism would, as 
Temmar has noted, serve to justify a number of contradictory socio-
political choices; the justification of the self-management system as 
the most democratic organization (1963-1965), the shift to an institu-
tional model of centralized statist organization (1965-67), and 
adopting the institutions of socialist forms of management within state 
enterprises (1977) (31). 
Along the same lines but with additional components incorporating 
the self-management system as a major feature of Algeria's 'socialism', 
the Algiers Charter became the official programme of the FLN after its 
adoption during the FLN's first congress in April 1964. In fact the 
Charter went further in rejecting the capitalist way of development and 
adopting socialism which it defined as "not only the nationaliza-
tion of the means of production, (but) also and especially ••• self-
management" The national tasks laid down in the Tripoli Programme were 
asserted again in the Charter, as it regarded the current stage of 
Algerian.development as a stage of transition from capitalism to socia-
lism. 
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Both texts were, in fact, motivated to a great degree by the 
political priorities of the groups struggling for power. The remarkable 
shift towards emphasis on the self-management system represented one 
facet of this, since approval of the system was only given after it had 
become an accomplished fact. Also the emphasis on state ownership and 
the centralization of decision making after the coup of 1965 while 
continuing to retain the ideology of •socialism' exhibits the broadness 
of this ideology, whose content and the methods of implementation were 
subject to considerable change. Like the formulation of the ideology 
itself these changes were determined by the interests of the ruling 
groups and directed to mobilize wide popular support for their rule. 
Thus ideology increasingly became an abstraction and "acquired a life 
of its own independent of the reality of which it is expected to 
provide an interpretation" (32). 
Ben Bella's Economic Policies:Pre-conditions of State Capitalism 
In the early years of independence, economic decisions were infl-
uenced partly by the political struggle within the FLN factions but 
principally by the government's bid for survival. The major step of 
legalising the workers' de facto occupation of the abandoned colon 
properties together with the nationalization of French-owned lands at 
the end of 1963, was dictated by the same pressure, to gain popular 
support and to weaken the regime's the opposition by isolating it. 
However, these moves did not provide an immediate solution to 
Algeria's major economic problems, of underdevelopment and unemploy-
ment. Beside involving a·great deal of improvisation and incoherence 
especially with regard _.to ihe nationalization of a number of small 
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enterprises whose economic importance was very limited, the effective-
ness of these moves in changing the structure of the economy was limit-
ed by two main factors: first, despite the promising new social system 
that they introduced, they were imposed by the urgent necessity of 
keeping running what properties were left intact simply to provide a 
livelihood for those working on them. The recognition of self-manage-
ment by the state was also undertaken out of political expediency and 
thus represented a compromise rather than a preconceived ideology of 
the nature of the socio-economic system. Second, the outcome of these 
moves, whose effects varied from one sector to another, was not the 
complete substitution of one socio-economic system for another. Outside 
the agricultural sector, where the colonial farms were placed under the 
system of self-management, the application of this system was very 
limited. In the industrial sector only 450 enterprises, mostly of 
artisanal activities, were placed under self-management at the end of 
1963, accounting for no more than 12 per cent of the industrial labour 
force. Only 5 per cent of the self-managed enterprises had an important 
industrial character, employing more than 100 labourers each (33). The 
commercial sector, on the other hand, remained largely unaffected. With 
the exception of the creation of state commercial enterprises to mono-
polize the import and export of certain products of vital importance 
and to limit speculation in basic commodities, the vast majority of 
commercial activities remained in private hands. Even in agriculture, 
about three quarters of the cultivated area remained unaffected, 
although the part covered by the self-management system included the 
most fertile lands of the country and produced the bulk of Algeria's 
agricultural exports. Thus the new system of self-management was too 
limited to provide an immediate or drastic solution to Algeria's 
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economic problems. 
The state's attempt to put the economy in order was dictated by 
various factors: first of all by the desperate need to establish coor-
dination and organization within the economic sectors and enterprises 
on the one hand, and between them and the state after a period of 
confusion and disorganization on the other. Secondly, in the light of 
the scarcity of the state's resources it was vital to provide some 
assu ranee and guarantees to private capital to operate in Algeria. 
Finally, the state did not desire not to break off relations with 
France since Algeria was heavily dependent on French economic assist-
ance. 
While the self-management system was publicly hailed as the core 
of Algeria's socialism and was regarded as an economic panacea for 
Algeria's problems, a steady process of temporization was in fact under 
way. Thus if 1963 was the year of socialization, 1964 was the year of 
organization (34). The latter process involved the consolidation of 
state control over the self-management sector together with the estab-
lishment of state enterprises in the key economic sectors. The same 
process also meant the scaling down of the application of the land 
reform outlined in the Tripoli Programme, confining to almost one third 
of the agricultural sector. This meant that 8,500 agricultural holdings 
each covering more than 100 hectares and 15,000 holdings of more than 
50 hectares remained untouched. This policy set the basis for the 
creation of an economic system dominated by state capitalism, based 
primarily on direct state control of important economic sectors, notab-
ly the system of agricultural self-management, together with the survi-
val of private foreign and local capital' in t·he economy and its comple-
mentary li~ks with the state sector. In practical .terms this was 
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translated into the creation of various state enterprises, notably 
ONACO (Office Nationale de Commercialisation) which was charged with 
the organization of the external trade, SNTA (Societe Nationale des 
Tabacs et Allumettes), SNS (Societe Nationale de Siderurgie), SONATRACH 
(Societe Nationale de Transports at de Commercialisation des Hydrocar-
bures), and EGA (L'Electricite et du Gaz d'Algerie). Many of these 
enterprises carried out the projects which were envisaged by the 
Constantine Plan which, surprisingly enough, was also based on the idea 
of establishing state-owned enterprises in the strategic sectors of the 
economy. The state acquired the participation with the French state in 
a number of companies operating in Algeria: 56 per cent of the oil 
company S.N. Repal and the oil refinery of Algiers, 20 per cent of 
CAMEL (Compagnie Algerienne de Methane Liquide d'Arzew), 40 per cent of 
Caral-Renault, 30 per cent of Sabab-Berliet, and 20 per cent of the 
Union Industrielle Africaine (35). At the same time self-management 
sector was gradually eroded and transformed into state management. In 
the industrial sector self-management committees were placed under the 
control of the Ministry of Economics and self-management units were 
integrated slowly but effectively into the growing state sector by 
their conversion into state-owned and state-run enterprises (36). In 
the agricultural sector, a less explicit process of integration and 
absorption was carried out by subordinating the self-managed farms to 
state institutions in a number of ways and transforming the workers in 
these units from owners of the means of production into state employ-
ees, while at the same time using the issue as a means of gaining 
political support for the new rulers. Thus profit mechanisms and wage 
hierarchies were soon to govern the internal function of the self-
man'age-tl unit-s -witn -state· financial· and· C,0111me-rcial ·i.nstitu:tions iilssuming 
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the decisive role. 
Given the small size and the limited area of activity of private 
capital outside modern agriculture and the oil sector, the creation of 
state enterprises was not designed to limit the activities of the 
private economic sector. In fact during the early years of independ-
ence, the Algerian leaders seemed to have realised industrialization of 
their country would be achieved by private, almost exclusively foreign, 
capital (37). Thus Ben Bella lost no time in assuring the bourgeoisie 
on 20 Nov. 1962 that "there is a vital sector in our country, i.e. the 
public sector, but there will be also a semi-public sector and a pri-
vate sector. Even in socialist countries, there sometimes exists an 
important private sector. Nationalizational (of the private sector) and 
draconian measures are rumoured: there is no question of that"(38). 
Guarantees and assurances to foreign capital were legally spelled out 
in the first Code of Investment of 26 July 1963 (39). Among the general 
assurances and benefits to private capital were: freedom of investment 
and its equality before the law, that expropriation would only be 
introduced within a legal framework and "when the net benefits equal 
the amount of the invested capital", that "all those expropriated are 
to be given the right of just compensation", and tax exemption on 
industrial and commercial profits relating which were re-invested in 
Algeria. Hence the existence of the private economic sector was by no 
means prohibited, but was encouraged and institutionalized, paving the 
way for the gradual development of complementary links with Algerian 
socialism, an important factor which was to play a crucial role in 
shaping the socio-economic development of the country. Therefore, while 
private properties in the Muslim aqricultural sector were not affected 
by independence and large landlords remained in control of sizable 
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agricultural areas, a survey of industry in 1966 revealed that the 
private sector with 599 enterprises (48 per cent of all industrial 
concerns) employed 40,570 workers or 40 per cent of all employees in 
the industrial sector; if artisanal firms were excluded the private 
sector still employed about 25 per cent of the industrial labour force 
at that time. This sector constituted a major competitor to the indus-
trial self-managed sector, as it could exhibit far greater flexibility 
and greater capacity to accomodate itself to market needs. 
Within this context the government's economic policies in the 
first three years of independence were characterized by their ad hoc 
nature, trying to repair the damage to the economy and to fill the gaps 
left by the termination of colonialism. Restricted by the lack of 
financial resources, state investment swung between first one sector 
and then another. Thus while agriculture received the highest propor-
tion of government spending (36 per cent) in 1963 mainly to cover the 
maintenance and purchase of equipment, as a part of a declared policy 
of favouring agriculture over industry (40), education and training 
received the lion's share of 42.4 per cent of total government spending 
in 1964, and 30.8 per cent was spent on economic infrastructure (41). 
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The Bownedienne era: State Capitalism as Official Policy 
The main components of Algerian state capitalism, the expansion of 
the state economic sector, the incorporation of self-managed enter-
prises into this sector, and the preservation of the private sector, 
were substantially renforced and systematized under Boumedienne. 
Immediately after the coup, assurances were made to private capital, 
which was hesitant and in a state of constant fear of random nationali-
zation. On 1 November 1965, Boumedienne clearly pronounced the division 
of tasks between the state and the private sector by stating that "if 
the major means of production must be kept under the control of public 
domain, it is ..... in the national interest not to exclude, and 
particularly not to discourage, private investment". He also appealed 
to the private sector to understand the new situation which did not 
rule out its active participation, but rather sought its cooperation 
with the state sector: "all that we are asking it (the private sector) 
is that it should be .... in harmony with the policy of the country and 
that it should not hamper the implementation of state projects"(42). 
These assurances were accompanied by a series of de-nationaliza-
tions of the properties of Algerian nationals that had fallen under the 
control either of the self-management system or the state sector during 
the regime of Ben Bella. They were later formulated in a new Code of 
Investment of 1967, as we will see shortly. 
More important, the creation of the state capitalist system was 
presented as the "genuine basis" of the political independence achieved 
in 1962, which would remain insufficient without independent economic 
development based on the efficient utilization of available human and 
economic resources. "Exploitative foreign capital", in Boumedienne's 
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words, constituted an obstacle to this development, that is capital 
which does not submit to the rules and regulations imposed by the 
national state and does not function within the limits and directions 
of planned development. Thus state monopolies of transport, banking, 
insurance, textile production, steel, chemical, and most export-import 
trade started gradually to emerge in 1966 through the nationalization 
of foreign owned companies, and moved slowly into the oil and gas 
complexes in 1968 and 1969, culminating in 1970 with the take-over of 
the remaining French oil interests. State control was exercised through 
the establishment of National Corporations (Societes Nationales) which 
were not put under the system of self-management, a clear indication of 
the disenchantment of the regime with this system, which was considered 
a source of disorganization and anarchy: 
"As for Algeria, we have decided, in spite of all the criti-
cisms, to create national corporations because our task is to 
put an end to anarchy, squandering, and chaos in this sector 
(i.e. the socialist sector)"(43). 
Despite being financed and having their managers appointed by the 
state, these National Corporations, which officially replaced the sys-
tern of self-management outside agriculture, possessed a great degree of 
autonomy in investment, production, and marketing. Each corporation 
operated one sector of the economy and functiond semi-independently. 
The internal logic of their functions was arranged along lines little 
different from that of capitalist companies. In Henri Alleg's words, 
"their constitutions, far from bearing the hallmark of a revolutionary 
determination to make them the weapons of socialist choice, instead 
have the characteristics and outlook of foreign bourgeois economists 
"specialist in the Third World" and ideological agents for new colon-
ialism"(44). They seemed to function somewhat like the Federal Trade 
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Commission and Interstate Commerce Commissions in the United States 
(45). The directors of these corporations acted in exactly the same 
manner as private capitalists, motivated by purely economic criteria of 
productivity and profitability (46). Their attitude to the workers was 
like that of a capitalist employer with regard to hiring and wages. The 
workers were denied the right to participate in the running of these 
corporations, and if there was some sort of representation of the 
workers in the management of the enterprises, it was purely symbolic. 
Their role became purely consultative through the workers' committees 
set up in every production unit or through a central workers• council 
which meets once a year to provide the director-general of a particular 
corporation with some feedback (47). 
These corporations were soon to cover all the vital sectors of the 
economy (48), exercising independent control over most industrial and 
commercial activities. The predominance of these corporations "was not 
the result of technical decisions, but rather of a particular policy: 
those who run the country today have only a limited confidence in the 
possibilities of worker-management, just as they are suspicious of .•.. 
the participation of of the workers in the political and economic 
running of the country"(49). 
However, this organizational framework did not rule out the parti-
cipation of foreign and domestic private capital in the development of 
the country. Such participation was in fact further encouraged and 
investment was invited according to the regulations set out in a new 
Code of Investment published in 1967. This Code established the princi-
ples of coexistence and complementarity between the private and the 
stpte sectors and, unlike the previous Code of 1963, it tackled the 
status of both foreign and national private capitalists. It provided 
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guarantees and benefits for investment capital, including a "ten years 
total or partial exemption from real estate tax", a reduction on duties 
paid on imported capital goods, "a total,partial, or progressive exemp-
tion from tax on industrial and commercial profits". If an investment 
is higher than AD 500,000, an ''exclusive" produc- tion right may be 
granted in specific geographical areas (50). 
This indicates that opportunities for private capital and inte-
rests continued to be available, giving it the means to function in and 
exert influence upon the economy. The only difference was that private 
capital could now only function if it established economic links with 
the expanding state sector. 
Within this form of economic organization, primary emphasis was 
placed on the development of heavy industry by the state economic 
sector (based primarily on petrochemicals and steel) by encouraging the 
transformation of national resources into products for domestic consum-
ption. This strategy and its accompanying organizational forms has come 
to shape and articulate the interests of the newly emerging social 
strata. While it preserved, and indeed encouraged, the right of private 
capital to invest and function within the space left by, and connected 
with, the state sector, which is by no means insignificant (51), giving 
the Algerian and the international bourgeoisie a means of extending 
their activities and influence, this form of development has also been 
"responsible for the emergence of a comparatively wealthy, powerful and 
ideologically •untrustworthy' upper bureaucratic elite which is an 
important barrier to the construction of a more egalitarian society" 
(52). This elite was to become a distinct social force with interests 
and values of its own and was to leave its imprint on Algeria's social 
and economic development not only through its vital influence on 
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policies, but also through its relationships and links with other 
social classes. Hence agricultural policies cannot be isolated from the 
nature and interests of the dominant social forces and from the impera-
tives imposed by the adopted strategy of development and its organiza-
tion. 
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PART IV 
AGRICULTURE AND THE POST-COLONIAL STATE 
CHAPTER E I GIIT AGRICULTURE BE1WEEN OOLONIALISM AND STATE CAPITALISM 
Algeria's colonial legacy was most apparent in agriculture, not so 
much because of the creation of the modern sector, but because of the 
agrarian nature of capitalism created in the course of colonialism and 
its impact on the whole social structure involving the traditional 
indigenous agricultural sector. Mainly for this reason, together with 
the overall importance of agriculture, an examination of sector became 
crucial for an analysis of the relationship between the state's poli-
cies and the the strata in control of the state apparatus, and the 
impact that these policies would have on the development and character 
of new social structures. 
The Colonial Heritage on Agriculture 
As emphasized earlier, colonialism had presented Algeria with, two 
technically and socially distinct agricultural sectors. They differed 
significantly in their structure of ownership and production as well as 
in many other levels relating to the utilization of technology, 
productivity, and incomes. 
The difference between the two sectors represented a drastic 
inequality favouring the modern colonial sector. Thus while the latter 
occupied 2.7 million hectares of the most fertile lands of North Alge-
ria shared among 22,000 European proprietors, the less fertile 4.5 
million hectares of land located in the arid or semi-arid zones of 
Algeria, which constituted the major part of the traditional sector, 
were shared among 618,000 Algerians. There was also a large difference 
in the structure of ownership within each sector. In the modern sector 
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the land was concentrated in a very few hands; 6,000 proprietors, or 
only 30 per cent, owned 2,381,900 hectares or 87 per cent of the total 
colonial land. In the traditional sector, on the other hand, the major-
ity of owners (70 per cent) possessed less than 10 hectares each and 
shared less than 20 per cent of the total area of the traditional 
sector (1). 
The two sectors differed in the nature of their production. While 
the modern sector mainly produced crops destined for the market, and 
primarily for the market of the metropolis such as wine and citrus 
fruits, production in the traditional sector was destined for subsist-
ence and only a small part was directed to the market. The difference 
. in the use of technology was striking, with the modern sector employing 
advanced scientific methods of cultivation and technology. It was even 
more mechanized than French metropolitan agriculture and depended main-
ly on permanent and seasonal salaried workers. The traditional sector 
used primary and backward means of production, which was reflected in 
the striking differences in levels of incomes between the owners within 
the two sectors, which showed that an owner in the colonial sector 
received some 48 times more than for his counterpart in the traditional 
sector. 
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Independence: The Embodiment of the Agricultural Division 
Despite the declared objective of land reform pronounced in the 
FLN's Tripoli Programme, the achievement of independence and the 
state's new policies for agriculture in fact intensified the division 
among the two sectors. Thus while the modern colonial sector was 
converted to "self- management" after the workers occupied the colonial 
farms, the traditional sector was left to its own devices and remained 
largely unaffected by the events that accompanied independence. Hence 
the state's agricultural policies would have different implications for 
the two sectors, since the striking differences between them in the 
structure of ownership, production, and productivity remained unchang-
ed. This would meant that the mechanism of development and its impact 
on each sector would not be the same. The following is a brief descrip-
tion of the structure and the situation of both sectors following 
independence. 
The Self-Management Sector 
The actual size of the self-management sector varied considerably 
from time to time. This was partly because not all colonial land was 
converted into self-management, and partly because of the constant 
nationalization and denationalization of various properties that took 
place during the early years of independence (2). A significant part 
of the colonial land, estimated at 400,000 ha, was donated to 10,000 
ex-combatants of the war of independence, and 4,000 C.A.A.M. (Coopera-
tives Agricoles d'Anciens Moudjahidine) were set up (3). These cooper-
atives had a different status from that of self-management farms and 
the status of agricultural workers on them remained unchanged. Thus the 
theoretical figure of 2.7 million ha was in fact never achieved and the 
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size of the self-management sector is usually estimated at 2.3 million 
ha, or 35.3 per cent of the total cultivated area. 
The 22,000 colonial farms were drastically reduced following the 
state's decision to regroup the self-managed agricultural units to 
3,000 and then to 2,000 units each of an average size of 1,066 ha. The 
following table shows the distribution of self-managed agricultural 
units according to area in 1964. 
Distribution of the Self-Managed Units According to Their Size (4) 
Size of Units Number % Area h. % 
Less than 50 h. 27 1.23 625 0.03 
50 to 100 40 1.82 3,105 0.13 
100 to 200 130 5.96 19,460 0.84 
200 to 500 553 25.27 193,670 8.30 
500 to 1000 620 28.33 447,715 19.19 
1000 to 1500 327 14.94 396,705 17.01 
1500 to 2000 183 8.38 314,450 13.48 
2000 to 2500 131 5.99 292,480 12.54 
2500 to 3000 63 2.88 172,515 7.39 
3000 to 3500 41 1.88 134,285 5.76 
3500 to 4000 18 0.82 67,720 2.90 
4000 to 4500 33 1.50 145,755 6.24 
More than 5000 22 1.00 144,375 6.19 
TOTAL 2,188 100.00 2,332,860 100.00 
An inquiry carried out in 1969-70 indicated that the number of 
self-managed agricultural units had been further reduced to 1,999, 
bringing the average size of each unit to 1,231 hectares (5). 
The economic weight of the self-management sector arose largely 
because the Algerian economy had generally bee constructed to satisfy 
the needs of the metropolis rather than those of Algeria. Since this 
sector represented an embodiment of the orientation towards the metro-
polis and was owned by the colons , its economic itnportance was signi-· 
f·i-cant, -:i:t contribut.ed 30 per cent to National Income and produced 60 . 
367 
per cent of total agricultural production (6). The major components of 
production in this sector were crops demanded by the French market. The 
most obvious example was wine, which was not consumed at all by most of 
the Muslim population. Despite the fall in wine production in 1964-65 
to 10 million hectoliters from 15 million in 1957-58 it still consti-
tuted 60 per cent of agricultural exports and was equivalent to one-
third of petroleum exports at that time. The self-management sector 
produced about 90 per cent of the citrus fruits and more than half the 
market crops which also constituted a vital part of agricultural 
exports. The following table reveals the predominance of the self-
management sector in the production of crops oriented towards market 
and exportation: 
The Share of the Self-Management Sector in the Area and Production 
of Major crops (1969-70) (7) 
Crops Area 000 h. % of the Total Production % 
Wine 262.3 87 7.7 m.hl. 88 
Citrus Fruits 40.9 87 4.4 m.q. 89.4 
Market Crops 48.6 45 4.0 m.q. 55 
Industrial Crops 13.0 65 648,000 q. 60 
Fruits 14.0 60 542,000 q. 68 
Olive 3.5 m.trees 35 342,000 q. 35 
Date Palms 0.8 m.trees 8 72,000 q. 10 
Cereals: 
summer Cereals 8.1 68.5 12,588 t. 78 
Rice 1.7 89.3 6,139 t. 91 
Winter Cereals 792.8 26.4 6.3 m.q. 34.6 
Hard Wheat 368.1 24.5 2.3 m.q. 32.7 
Soft Wheat 317.9 45.6 2.6 m.q. 55.1 
Barley 78.7 10.6 0.7 m.q. 15.7 
Oats 20.1 30.2 0.8 m.q. 51.3 
It appears from this table that despite the higher productivity of the 
self-management sector in cereals (8), the latter were essentially 
produced by the private sector except for some crops which were parti-
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cularly demanded by the market such as soft wheat or summer crops. 
In comparison to the private sector whose size was more than twice 
the size of the self-management sector, the latter was remarkably 
mechanized. It possessed in 1966 about three times more agricultural 
machinery than the private sector as revealed by the following table: 
Distribution of Agricultural Materials Between the Two Sectors (9) 
sector 
Self-Management 
Private 
Wheeled 
Tractors 
11,250 
3,100 
Caterpillars 
6,150 
1,900 
Combined 
Harvesters 
2,600 
100 
Moreover, the self-management sector monopolized almost all ferti-
lizers applied in 1965, with 85 per cent leaving the private sector 
with only 15 per cent. 
Despite the real importance of the self-management sector in 
agriculture in particular and in the economy in general, its contribu-
tion to employment was relatively limited especially in comparison with 
the private sector. In 1964-65 the self-management sector supported an 
agricultural population of 841,300, only 15 per cent of the total (10). 
This limited contribution was reflected more in the actual number of 
people employed in this sector. Thus while the agricultural sector 
provided employment for 1,293,413 persons or 56.7 per cent of the total 
active population (estimated at 2,280,972 persons according to the 
census of 1966), the self-management sector employed an average number 
of 252,360 workers in 1967-68 or only 19.5 per cent of the agricultural 
labour force. Those workers were composed of two categories: permanent 
and seasonal workers. The first category included those who were 
members of the workers' assembly after meeting the conditions set out 
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in the March Decrees, principally to have had uninterrupted work within 
the unit for more than six consecutive months. The second, on the other 
hand, was composed of workers who were recruited to perform occasional 
and seasonal tasks and who were not eligible for membership of the 
organs of management. The division into permanent and seasonal workers 
varied over time as the following table shows: 
Development of the Labour Force in the Self-Management sector (ll) 
Permanents 
seasonals 
Undetermined 
Total 
64-64 
134,430 
100,000 
234,430 
68-69 
133,020 
123,430 
13,390 
269,840 
72-73 
121,301 
117,991 
239,212 
76-77 
100,504 
99,610 
200,114 
In fact except for the change in the structure of ownership and 
management, the general characteristics of the self-management sector 
were inherited from the colonial period without any remarkable transfo-
rmation. Apart from its economic weight, the importance of the self-
managed sector lay in its political impact as a sector "controlled and 
managed" by the workers. Hence state policies towards this sector were 
shaped to a large extent by this factor and reflected the attitude of 
the ruling strata towards the potential of expanding workers control 
and management, as will be seen below. 
The Private Sector 
Despit the fact that the burden of the Liberation War was carried 
essentially on the shoulders of the peasants, the achievement of 
independence was not accompanied by any radical changes in the private 
agricultural sector. Extending over an area more than twice the size of 
370 
the self-management sector, where more than 5 million people lived, the 
private sector exhibited a great degree of diversity. Generally it was 
located in the less fertile parts of the country, utilizing backward 
techniques and methods of cultivation and producing essentially for 
subsistence. For the great mass of peasants the land was not sufficient 
to support their families, while at the same time a few landowners 
controlled very large land holdings. 
1-Structure of Land Ownership: 
Until the launch of the "Agrarian Revolution" in 1971 the general 
characteristics of this sector remained unaltered. However, some chan-
ges took place in the structure of land ownership over the years with-
out resulting in a radical shift in inequalities in land distribution. 
These changes can be intraced in the following table which shows the 
distribution of the lands in the private sector at three different 
periods: 
Distribution of Privately Held Land,in l963,1965,and 1973 (12) 
Size of Number of % Area h. % 
the Unit h. Units 
1963 
Less than 10 h. 450,000 69.8 1,390,000 19.3 
10 to 50 170,000 26.4 3,260,000 45.3 
50 to 100 16,000 2.5 1,050,000 14.6 
More than 100 8,450 1.3 1,500,000 20,8 
Total 644,450 100.0 7,200,000 100,0 
1965 
Less than 10 423,270 72 .l 1,318,125 22.6 
10 to 50 147,043 25.1 2,967,454 50.8 
50 to 100 ll ,875 2.0 765,585 13.1 
More than 100 4,665 8.0 786,905 13.5 
Total 586,843 100.0 5,839,660 100.0 
1973 
Less than 10 578,884 79.2 1,536,421 29.5 
10 to 50 138,528 19.0 2,492,485 47.9 
50 to 100 10,007 1.4 610,913 11.7 
More than 100 3,439 0.5 567,801 10.9 
-Total·· 730,858 100.0 5,207,611 100.0 
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The difficulty in carrying out an accurate census in a widely 
disorganized and scattered sector like the private sector in Algeria 
probably accounts for some of the discrepancies in the figures between 
from one census to another. However, the reduction of the area in this 
sector by more than 1.5 million hectares between 1963 (whose figures 
were based on the census of 1950) and 1965 can be attributed to reasons 
beyond the effects of erosion or random nationalizations of the proper-
ties of those who had collaborated with colonialism. This reduction, 
which affected mainly those units of more than 50 hectares, which lost 
about a million hectares, and specifically those more than 100 hectares 
(whose number was nearly halved, from 8,450 to 4,665), was almost 
certainly the result of a deliberate attempt on the part of the large 
landowners to prevent the expropriation of their properties. This 
becomes more plausible especially if we know that the 1964-65 census 
was completed amidst threats of carrying out the land reform promised 
in the Tripoli Programme. This indicates that the 1965 statistics 
underestimate the exact size of the large private holdings. Thus Raffi-
not and Jacquemot suggested that "to the 1.55 million hectares occupied 
by the exploitations of more than 50 hectares each, one should add 1.8 
million hectares together with 400,000 h. lost by the self-management 
sector from the global total of the colon land, thus indicating that 
large private proprietors (over 50 h. each) occupied more than 3 
million hectars prior to the "agrarian revolution" (13). 
Nevertheless, the figures presented in the table above still 
reveal stark inequalities in land ownership, since less than 3 per cent 
of owners ~ontrolled more than 26 per cent of the land, while the vast 
majority of peasants (72 per cent) scratched a living on less than 23 
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pee cent of the land. Nearly 32 per cent of the latter category 
(134,780 owners) owned less than 1 h. of land,too small to support an 
average family of six persons. Moreover, in 1964-65 an estimated 0.5 
million in the private sector were landless and were either employed as 
wage labourers or assisted their families working on lands they did not 
own (14). Furthermore, although it is quite difficult to determine, the 
amount of unemployment in the private sector was staggering. After 
calculating the demand for labour based on the working days needed for 
each crop (150 million working days for the private sector),and compar-
ing this figure with the effective labour supply (at least 30 million 
working days), Temmar estimated that the rate of unemployment was 
almost 50 per cent (15). This becomes much more alarming if we realise 
that this sector supported more than 5 million persons. 
This means that independence did not immediately bring the 
promised alleviation in the conditions of misery and poverty of the 
majority of the rural population. The persistence of these conditions 
accounted for a continuous and accelerated rural to urban migration 
which had the potential to cause serious social and political problems. 
2-Forms of Production: 
Unfortunately there are no precise statistics on the division of 
the private sector into specific forms of production which go beyond 
the differentiation in the size of properties to include types of 
operation, investment, production, etc. Nor there is any indication on 
the distribution of investment among the different farms in this sector 
which might give indications on the type of operation of the different 
forms. However, according to the descriptions in various sources (16), 
one can roughly divide the private sector into four categories: 
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1- Large and medium-sized farms, occupied according to Raffinot and 
Jacquemot one million hectares (each with over 50 h.), located in 
the relatively fertile zones of North Algeria. These belonged to 
the modern capitalist farmers, since it was engaged in productive 
investment and produces essentially to satisfy market needs. Modern 
equipment and waged workers are employed to perform the majority of 
the operations of production. 
2- Other large-scale farms using extensive cultivation on less 
productive land with little use of mechanization and only nominal 
investment. These properties were organized on traditional share-
cropping and renting terms that tended to parcel the land into 
small tracts renting it out to tenants and sharecroppers. Produc-
tion here was directed mainly towards subsistence crops using 
primitive methods of cultivation. 
3- Smaller farms whose size ranged between 10 to 50 hectares often 
using modern equipment for heavy operations such as ploughing and 
harvesting. This equipmentwas generally rented from capitalist far-
mers or state agencies, and seasonal workers were also employed. 
While production production was essentially directed for self sub-
sistence, a marketable surplus of crops was produced for covering 
the expenses of inputs. 
4- The majority of non-mechanized and very small plots of poor soil 
in remote mountainous areas. Holdings in this category were too 
small to provide sufficient incomes for their owners and supplemen-
tary employment was necessary. Agricultural production was direc-
,t-ed •towar-ds subsistence and very primitive methods of cultivation 
were practised. 
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This multiplicity of production forms implied that the Algerian 
peasantry was equally heterogeneous, comprising various socio-economic 
strata. At the top of the scale were about 5,000 capitalist farmers who 
owned sizable plots of land that were operated with modern machinery 
and paid workers, and who invested in the land in order to expand their 
various agricultural activities. They were followed by medium size 
owners who were engaged in activities described by Raffinot and Jacque-
mot as potentially capitalist which, besides insuring production for 
self consumption, were directed to the enlarged reproduction of their 
activities. There was also the ''half-owner, half-worker" category 
estimated at about 220,000 whose holdings were not sufficient to sup-
port their families, and were thus forced to search for complementary 
work outside their holdings. They were composed of 75,000 seasonal 
workers in the private sector and 120,000 temporary workers in the 
self-management sector. Finally besides the landless unemployed, there 
were 200,000 permanent salaried agricultural workers who derived their 
incomes from working in the private and the self-management sectors and 
who had no land of their own. Hence while the private sector was 
usually grouped under one heading simply to distinguish it from the 
self-management sector, it exhibited a great degree of heterogeneity in 
terms both of size of ownership and in type of operation. Evidence for 
the existence of an expanding capitalist sector within it was widely 
supported by the increase in the number of the permanent waged workers. 
This category doubled from 47,000 to 97,000 between 1954 and 1968. 
Moreover, larger farming units tended to absorb higher numbers of 
workers, especially permanent workers, indicating that capitalist farms 
had .been .established within the larger properties. Thus, as shown in 
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the following table the average farm of one hundred hectares and more 
employed four permanent workers and 30,500 permanent workers were 
employed by farm units of between 10 and 50 hectares. However, pre-
capitalist forms of agricultural organization reflected by share-cropp-
ing and renting in kind were still significant before the agrarian 
reform of 1971. They occupied 14 per cent of the total land area in the 
private sector. Direct owner operation of farms was highest within the 
50-200 hectares category where the capitalist farms were mainly located 
( l 7). 
Distribution of Wage Workers, by Size Category of Private Farm Unit, 
(1968) (18) 
Size Category 
of Farm Unit 
0-<10 ha. 
10-<50 ha. 
50-<100 ha. 
100 ha.and up 
Landless 
No. of 
Farms 
440,600 
89,300 
4,500 
3,500 
25,000 
Not Determined 5,000 
Total 567,900 
3-Production: 
No. of No of Per. No.of Tern. No.of Tem.Wor. 
Per. Wor. Wor.Per Farm Workers Per Farm Unit 
40,800 0.09 49,150 O.ll 
30,500 0.34 51,300 0.57 
6,300 1.40 6,000 1.33 
14,000 4.00 4,200 1.20 
4,000 0.16 350 0.08 
2,200 0.44 1,000 0.20 
97,800 0.17 112,000 0.20 
Given the components of production in the self-management sector 
and its share in total agricultural production, it is easy to see that 
the economic role of the private sector was essentially to feed the 
rapidly growing population. Hence more than half the self-managed area 
was allocated to the production of cereals, mainly winter cereals, for 
the immediate needs of the agricultural population. Even among the 
cereals hard wheat and barley constituted the dominant crops occupying 
more than 80 per cent of the cereal area and reflecting the importance 
of local consumption within this sector. Animal -production was also· 
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essential and was almost monopolized by the private sector with 90 per 
cent of total production. In fact it constituted about 42 per cent of 
the total value of agricultural production in this sector. As well as 
cereals and animal production, a variety of crops were also produced in 
the private sector, depending mainly on the climatic situation and on 
the orientation of production of the farm unit, either for subsistence 
or for commercial exchange. Thus market and industrial crops together 
with wine and fruits were produced in this sector in varying quanti-
ties. Hence, despite the fact that for the majority of private holdings 
production was oriented essentially towards producing food for the 
owners and their families, 60 per cent of the private sector's total 
output was sold on the market in the period between 1965 and 1971. 
Pfeifer estimated that in 1968 about 25 per cent of private farm units 
could be classified as "commercial" (that is selling more than 70 per 
cent of their output on the market), 44 per cent were in "subsistence" 
(selling less than 30 per cent), and 31 per cent were "in transition" 
(selling between 30 to 70 per cent of their output) (19). She also 
noticed that the larger the farm the more it was oriented towards the 
market. However, despite the fact that commercialization is not a 
sufficient condition for determining the nature of the form of produc-
tion, it does cast more light on the heterogeneity of the private 
sector and the existence of modern capitalist farms within it. 
Similarly, despite being generally at a low level, the use of 
mechanization and fertilizers was unequally distributed within this 
sector. Thus the 24,000 tractors owned by this sector, for example, 
were concentrated in 1.8 million hectares of North Algeria or on only 
26 per cent. of :private farms (20), and fertilizers were used on only 10 
per cent of thQse farms {21). 
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State Versus Agriculture 
Algeria shared the experience of most post-colonial societies in 
that the question of agriculture was a social and political problem 
rather than simply an economic one. However,Algeria differed in that 
its agricultural problems were usually socially and politically 
complex, as was clear from the existence of very contradictory pheno-
mena relating to the nature of the social structure in the countryside. 
on the one hand, agricultural workers controlled nearly one-third of 
Algeria's most fertile and modern agricultural sector in the self-
management movement. On the other hand the power of large landowners 
and the agrarian bourgeoisie in the remaining two thirds of the agricu-
ltural sector (known as the private or the traditional sector) remained 
persistent, and the conditions of the vast majority of landless 
peasants did not undergo any significant change between the end of 
colonialism and the agrarian reform of 1971. 
Given the nature of the ruling strata of the state, this represen-
ted a real dilemma at both ends of the scale. The mere existence of 
workers' control, let alone its potential expansion, and the possibili-
ty that it might jeopardize the authority and power of the ruling 
strata represented a large political problem. This problem could not be 
settled by the state in favour of its dominant forces without a consis-
tent and multi-dimensional process of undermining the autonomy and 
power of the workers' control of the means of production. The persiste-
nce of inequalities in the private sector meant that the large mass of 
peasants who had carried the brunt of the fighting, whose interests the 
ruling strata claimed to represent, were left without a share in the 
colonial legacy and remained in very poor circumstances. More importan-
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tly, despite the dismantling of the core of the rural bourgeoisie in 
the course of the self-management movement, the social and economic 
power of the large landlords and of rural bourgeoisie was by no means 
totally eliminated. The essential promises made before and after 
independence had not been yet fulfilled which constituted a further 
brake on the political and social power of the state and its ruling 
strata. 
Within the interplay of these factors the agricultural sector was 
assigned a specific socio-economic role in the global development 
strategy compatible with the interests of the ruling strata and the 
social classes connected to them. In other words, agriculture had to 
play an integral role in the transformations that were to be introduced 
within the framework of state capitalism. However, to enable it to play 
this role and for it to be integrated into the state capitalist economy 
in general, state policies towards agriculture became more complex and 
delicate, and had social and political aims as well as economic ones. 
Given the social and economic division of Algerian agriculture, these 
policies had different connotations and implied different emphases on 
the organization of each sector, with the general aim of incorporating 
the agricultural sector in the economy of state capitalism. 
The •confiscation' of Agricultural Self-Management 
words such as "mirage", "deformation", "distortion", "statiza-
tion", "submission", "failure", are commonplace in the description of 
the fate of the self-management experience in general and in agricul-
ture in particular. Fears for the future of self-management in its 
in~tial phase, following attempts to limit workers• control and their 
freedom to manage were soon to give way to a consistent and successful 
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policy of containment on the state's part and the incorporation of 
self-management and its transformation into state management. 
We have explained earlier the contradictions accompanying the 
constitution of self-management and the spheres in which the bureauc-
racy intervened and found itself in conflict with the workers. As the 
subject of the "statization" of self-management has been widely docu-
mented (22), we intend here only to describe the elements through which 
the divorce between the judicial forms of managing and controlling the 
means of production and the capacity of the workers to manage effecti-
vely was achieved, with the result that agricultural self-management 
was deprived of workers• control and the power of the bureaucracy 
finally asserted. This was achieved through policies covering the 
organization of management, the commercialization of inputs and outputs 
and the supply of credits to this sector. First of all, as asserted 
earlier, although threre certainly were contradictions in the texts 
which established the system of self-management, these were not prima-
rily responsible for, but only facilitated, bureaucratic control over 
the management and the suppression of workers' initiatives. This 
process in fact derived from the state's vision of development and the 
nature of the institutions that it created ostensibly to supervise and 
assist the functions of the self-managed farming units. 
It was clear from the early days of independence that the state 
sector rather than the self-management sector would be the core of 
Algerian economic reconstruction, and that agriculture under self-
management was to be an important source of capital for this. This was 
carried out by direct and indirect policies that aimed at incorporating 
iha~~management sector within the state sector. These policies were 
carried out by O.N.R.A.(Office National de la Reform Agraire), the 
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supreme body outside the Ministry of Agriculture created by the March 
Decrees, on the recommendations of Rene Dumont, with the aim of 
"organizing the management" of the self-managed farms (23). ONRA, 
built upon the former colonial network of SAP (Societe Agricole de 
Prevoyance) was soon to establish its authority and to become not only 
the supervising organ for the management committees in agriculture and 
a source of raw materials and technical aid, but also the main source 
of financial assistance and the organizer of marketing outputs. 
Because of its nature and its history, ONRA exhibited a great 
degree of hostility to the freedom of the workers to run their farms 
and made every effort to assume direct control over the organization 
and management of the self-managed farms. By exploiting the high level 
of illiteracy and the general ignorance of the texts of the March 
Decrees on the part of the workers, ONRA imposed its own candidates at 
the head of the self-management committees (24). At the level of 
organization ONRA followed a systematic concentration of holdings. Thus 
under the pretext of "technical necessity" and of the absence of the 
cadres capable of effective management, the 22,000 colonial farms were 
regrouped to become 2,800 and then 2,000, a number which has not great-
ly changed over the years (25). With an average size area of 1,231 
hectars, each self-managed farm regrouped several of the ex-colonial 
units. This concentration was carried out in a bureaucratic manner in 
which there was no attempt to consult the workers or to investigate 
their performances. There were no proper attempts to arrive at an 
optimal regrouping of the land, the rationalization of cultivation or 
the most efficient utilization of materials (26). In this way the farm 
unit~ became too large, oft~n regrouping 70 permanent workers, and too 
.diffiCUlt to be managed .ef.feativel·Y ·bY· the woriters and ·their· .elected 
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representatives who had little experience or knowledge of the newly 
constituted enterprises. However, the real effect of state policies on 
the decision making power of the workers and the autonomy of the self-
management sector emerged from the complex system of state organiza-
tions in charge of of marketing of inputs and outputs and supplying 
credits, technical materials and assistance, which were created 
immediately after the constitution of the self-management system. 
1-Marketinq: 
The marketing of agricultural produce was undertaken by specia-
lised state institutions concerned with particular products. The first 
of these institutions was O.A.I.C )Office Algerien Interprofessionel 
des Cereales) created in 1962. In the self-management sector the marke-
ting of outputs during the early years was carried out by two state 
institutions descended from the colonial SAP: C.O.R.E (Cooperative 
d'ecoulement) supplying the national market, and C.O.R.A. (Cooperative 
de la Reforme Agraire), charged with the collection of fruit and vege-
tables destined for export. Although the councils of CORA were formed 
of the presidents of the management committees, the officials of ONRA 
exhibited total control over matters of ploughing, harvesting, and 
marketing, as well as deciding how much was to be allocated to the 
units as seeds or for consumption. This enabled the state to impose an 
exchange system and a price policy Which did not take the interests of 
the self-management sector into account. 
Deficiencies and incompetence in marketing output and in payments 
were quite common, sometimes resulting in huge losses especially when 
products were left to perish because of delays in collection and trans-
port- ('"27-)-.--,In fact it was often the case that, as one source put it, 
....!~he- .se·J.;f ..... managed farms were neith,er _associated with the marketing of 
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their products nor informed about the conditions under which marketing 
takes place" (28). Instead, the state marketing institutions, which 
operated according to market laws, exhibited total control over market-
ing the output of this sector. The outcome was a continuous "separation 
of production from exchange and a denial of the rights of the workers 
to control conditions of sale of their products" (29). This was reflec-
ted in various demonstrations of workers' opposition; illegal consump-
tion of products became a regular practice, and some produce was sold 
secretly and illegally to private intermediaries. 
2-Supply of Credits: 
This was one of the principal ways in which the revolutionary 
character of self-management was neutralized. Through the credit 
policy, self-management farms became entirely dependent on the state to 
perform the simplest functions, but also faced a precarious financial 
situation which had a very negative impact upon their performance. In 
fact financing arrangements and regulations were continually changed 
and disrupted over the years, involving a multiplicity of institutions 
and a noticeable degree of confusion and complication. Until 1964 the 
B.C.A. (Banque Central Algerien), undertook this operation directly by 
according a global amount to the ONRA to be distributed on the farms 
through the Caisse Centrale de Societes Agricoles de Prevoyance 
C.C.S.A.P., and the Caisse Algerienne de Credits Agricoles Mutuels 
(C.A.C.A.M.). 
Actual distribution was carried out by a subsidiary of ONRA, the 
Societes Agricole de Prevoyance SAP (now under the name of Cooperatifs 
de la Revolution Agraire). For its part the Central Bank had access to 
the funds earned by ONRA from its marketing profits and exports (30). 
--Thi-s pelicy applied mainly .to -short- tenn operational -credit:s-.-DNRA ·was 
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charged with the task of assessing equipment credits and the allocation 
of medium and long-term investments. It operated in a very centralized 
way, making purchases and allocations on behalf of production units. 
Self-management committees had to deal and negotiate with ONRA to get 
their share of credits and equipment, in a way which made it impossible 
for them to manage their farms properly or to set up their own account-
ing system. (31). Before approving a credit, ONRA demanded the farm 
units to show proof of their profitability, a condition Which was quite 
difficult for newly established units to meet especially as they were 
functioning in hostile conditions. After the dissolution of ONRA in 
1966-67 the granting of credits was relatively decentralized when the 
self-management units started to deal individually with the CACAM 
(which used to finance the European sector during the colonial period). 
In 1967-68 the CACAM network was integrated into the National Bank 
of Algeria (BNA), which became the sole organization financing the 
self-managed units. However, complicated procedures for granting 
credits presisted involving long delays and sometimes a refusal of the 
grant. In many cases this meant the stoppage of agricultural activity 
or the inability of the unit to pay the workers' wages, thus creating 
formidable difficulties for the smooth running of the units and adver-
sly affecting their productivity and production (32). More important, 
the autonomy of workers in production and exchange was greatly affec-
ted, since on order to obtain credits the self-managed units had to 
meet certain criteria imposed by the state institutions. In asking for 
financial assistance the workers' representatives found themselves on a 
different footing from the ONRA or the representatives of other state 
'institutions. The-·-!latter were able, therefore, to intervene directly at 
many levels in the conditions of production of the units and often 
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became the effective managers of the farms. 
The difficulties encountered by the management committees in 
acquiring credits were reflected in the sizeable difference between the 
amount of credits allocated to the self-management sector by the state 
and the actual amounts it used. Thus in the years 1966, 1967, and 1968, 
the credits used by the self-management sector represented only 0.7, 
4.1, and 9 per cent of total credit allocated (33). 
Similar bureaucratic practices were carried out by the state 
agencies in supplying the self-managed sector with its agricultural 
equipment, materials, seeds, etc. which resulted in the gradual trans-
formation of the autonomous movement of self-management into a state 
sector whose relations with the environment in general were closely 
controlled and directed. Thus, the orientation of the socio-economic 
activities of the workers became increasingly determined at the central 
level by a power over which they had no influence. The bureaucratic 
practices were also strongly condemned by the workers themselves who 
demanded that more freedom should be assigned to them in the organiza-
tion of production which was to be the core of their responsibilities. 
3- Management Organs: 
Another aspect of the state's hold over the self-management sector 
was the internal function of the management committees at the level of 
production units. This cannot be isolated from the general environment 
in which the self-management sector was forced to operate but in fact 
was directly influenced by the state's endeavours to transfer the 
workers' rights to own and run the means of production to itself via 
its representatives-. -'l'hi&:-enta:i1:ed t:he~,pr,eservation of co-:1:-oni-al··pr:ac-·: 
tices relating to the relations of workers to the means of production 
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and hierarchical divisions between the workers. 
We saw how the March Decrees stipulated the insertion of the 
director as the representative of the state within the management 
committee in order to insure that the production plan of the farming 
units was compatible with the national plan. Together with the inherent 
contradictions that accompanied the Decrees, this played a major role 
in facilitating the implementation of the state's fundamental desire to 
empty self-management of its social content. 
The elected organs of the management became increasingly separated 
from the rest of the workers, as those minority of technically compe-
tent and qualified workers who controlled the management became distin-
guished from the majority of less or non-qualified workers. Control of 
the workers' collective was not particularly affected by this pheno-
menon since even under 'natural' conditions it is normal that the more 
knowledgeable, informed, and competent workers are elected to represent 
the others. What really had a negative effect on the workers' collec-
tive management was that the organs of management became a means of 
wage discrimination and upward mobility and of isolating those in 
charge of them from the mass of the workers, a phenomenon which was 
greatly enhanced when the workers were not able to assume their effec-
tive role and remained simply wage labourers with no control over the 
process or means of production. Hence instead of representing the 
collective interests of the workers against the bureaucracy and the 
exploiting classes, the organs of management became an element enhanc-
ing traditional forms of social solidarity in the sense explained by 
Clegg, whereby nepotism as an expression of the normal values of tradi-
tional -society became a·critert-on for employment and upward mobility 
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Nearly all commentators on the Algerian experience of self-manage-
ment have highlighted the monopolization of power by the state appoin-
ted managers on the management committees and have shown how because of 
the contradictions and vagueness of the Decrees, the latter were able 
to capitalize on the importance of their role and often behave as if 
they were the real proprietors. This created fundamental confrontations 
and divergences of interest between the manager and the management 
committee. 
However, the problem was not related to the appointment of the 
manager, since, as we asserted earlier, some kind of coordination 
between the nascent self-management and the state was necessary for the 
former to function properly. Neither does it lie entirely in the vague-
ness and lack of definition of the manager's role or, more importantly, 
in the definitive class character and values of the managers, as Clegg 
has suggested. In fact despite the importance of the latter, the fact 
remains that the relations between the state and the enterprise in 
general have been primarily responsible for the deformation of self-
management. The power of the manager was essentially derived from the 
position the state assigns to him. In the Yugoslav experience of self-
management, for example, the power of the General Manager, who was also 
appointed by the state, over the workers was at the highest when the 
state was responsible for "administrative-operational management",i.e. 
when state control over self-management was greatest (35). In these 
circumstances managers could pursue their interests and values, and 
their social background and ambitions were immediately reflected in 
their actions. 
-. :Jn Algeria, a· large number of committee managers were appointe.d 
.fr~ among the~inor officials of the colonial SAP. In the administra-
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tive vacuum created by the colons' departure and the general lack of 
technical and administrative qualifications, the appointment to the 
post of manager needed only the lowest educational qualifications, the 
Certificat d'Etudes Primaires, together with the appropriate connec-
tions. Hence it would have been difficult to trace homogeneous class 
values and a degree of unified ideological commitment that would group 
the managers under one class. Their hostility towards the workers stems 
from their position as appointees of the state which ultimately aimed 
to contain self-management and transform it into state management. 
Therefore, if conflict dominated the relationship between the state 
managers and workers' representatives, it was mainly because this was 
an inevitable consequence of specific state policies whose general 
effect would be to enhance the managers' pursuit of material satisfac-
tion. It can be seen, therefore, that the inner functioning of manage-
ment at the level of the production units was also subordinated to a 
policy of depriving the collectivity of workers from effective manage-
ment. 
While managers behaved as if they were the real proprietors of the 
self-managed agricultural units, imposing their will and control over 
the most important aspects of management including production, the 
number of workers, and wages, the other management organs were 
separated from the workers and thus could not perform their assigned 
tasks effectively. In many cases the presidents of the committees were 
referred to by the workers as new caids who were detached from the 
interests of the workers. The functions of the management organs became 
too formal. Meetings of the General Assembly became very rare, and if 
- they took plaC-e-- much_ :.concern_ was paid to the workers' immediate prob-
·lelfts -r:elat:Lrigc to -appoj;ntillertt•, wages.,- d:i.v.ision. of~WDri. and so_ on ( 36). -
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In a word, self-management was transformed through the mechanisms 
discussed above into state management and the workers' autonomy was 
lost. 
The Self-Management Reform of 1969 
This state's containment of the self-management system was carried 
out during a period of political instability during which a clear and 
coherent economic policy was not yet elaborated. It involved neverthe-
less a high degree of centralization and bureaucratization, and state 
institutions gradually carne to intervene directly in almost every 
aspect of self-management. 
This has resulted in widescale inefficiencies and bottlenecks at 
different levels of activity in the self-management sector, concerning 
financing, the supply of materials, and the marketing of produce which 
was immediately reflected in the level of production and productivity. 
Thus while this sector was looked upon as a major source of capital for 
the economy in general, the level of production was a disappointing and 
even fell in the years following independence. 
1964 
100 
Index of Agriculture Production in the Self-Management Sector 
(1964=100) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
100 70 57 70 
Cereal productivity in the self-management sector recorded a sharp 
fall in comparison to the colonial period falling from an average of 10 
to 6.7 Quintals per hectare (37). 
Despite the confusion that followed the Bournedienne coup, especia-
lly with regard to the government's attitude towards the self-manage-
- ' - ~ 
-... ~ 
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ment sector, repeated assurances were made for its preservation. 
However, it was emphasised that its reorganization must be more effec-
tive. It was also recognized that rigid centralization was a major 
cause for paralysis of the most important activities in this sector. 
Thus the necessity of introducing some form of autonomy into self-
managed production units was also recognized. However this did not 
derive form an understanding of the essential basis of self-management, 
the workers' autonomy in running the means of production, but from the 
desire for an effective and efficient control by the state over the 
self-managed unit. Hence "for better control of the self-management 
sector, we should decentralise and put an end to abuses" (38). 
Thus in November 1965 the Council of the Revolution issued a 
decree which drew up the broad lines of action to be undertaken by the 
new government, emphasising the need for more autonomy for the self-
managed units. However,apart from the dissolution of ONRA in September 
1966 and the administrative regrouping of the self-management sector 
under the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, few modifica-
tions of substance were made (39). These related mainly to the assign-
ment of various ONRA tasks concerning marketing and the supply of 
agricultural materials to a number of newly created state agencies and 
offices (40). At the end of 1968 an ordinance was passed dealing with 
the management of the farms in the self-management sector, which was 
later explained in a series of decrees on 15 February 1969. The 
declared aim of these decrees was to clarify the roles of the manage-
ment bodies and to introduce more autonomy to the workers by correcting 
and completing the 1963 decrees. The major concern of these decrees was 
the definition of the membership of the workers colTe,..,ctiva.on farms 
.under ,selT-management. (.decree :no.69--l5,. ~S..Feb~.j-~ JJT the pOlrlers and · 
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functions of the management bodies (decree no.69-l6,15.Feb.), and of 
the income of the farms under self-management and its allocation 
(decree no. 69-17, 15 Feb.) (41). on 5 April 1971, an ordinance 
explained in a series of decrees of the same date was passed recognis-
ing the rights of the workers to social security, invalidity,maternity, 
and family allowances (42). 
The major change introduced in the 1969 decrees was the elimina-
tion of the differentiation between the full-time and the part-time 
workers within the enterprise. This gave the rights of a full-time 
worker and thus the membership of the workers collective to any person 
who worked for a total of 200 days per year in the enterprise. on 
holdings cultivating a single crop (that is any unit where 80 per cent 
of its income was derived from one crop), the minimum working days 
needed for qualification for collective membership was 160 days (43). 
This provision of the decree put an end to the previous rule whereby 
six successive months of work were required for full membership, which 
had been widely abused by the directors who would sack unwanted workers 
before they become eligible. In consequence the number of full-time 
workers immediately increased from 133,000 in 1969 to 173,770 in 1970 
( 44). 
Management bodies established since 1963 were retained by the 
decrees of 1969 with almost no changes in their assigned tasks. The 
only change introduced in this respect related to the organization of 
the meetings of these bodies. The number of members of the workers' 
council was changed to range between 18 and 45 members, at a rate of 6 
members for every 15 voters. The presidency of the management committee 
became a full .... tiJne.:job# and the president, who, was to be elected by 
the General Assembly, with a vote between two candidates, was to be 
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nominated by an outside administrative unit, the Communal Commission 
(45). He was also elected to serve a term of three years. The state was 
still represented within the management committee by the director, who 
retained his right to veto any decision by the committee which he 
considered not to conform with the national plan. He also retained th 
main functions assigned to him by the March Decrees without any signi-
ficant changes. The Wilaya Directorate of Agriculture provided the 
technical advisors and controllers of the self-managed farms, now with 
more flexibility than during the period of ONRA since they now dealt 
with each farm individually. Financial arrangements were to be carried 
out directly with the BNA, and state control over this section 
remained. 
The reform stated explicitly that the Ministry of Agriculture held 
the ultimate responsibility for the direction of the self-management 
sector. This was to be implemented through the intervention of the 
Wilaya Directorate of Agriculture in determining levels of production 
investment. The text stated that "the Minister of Agriculture deter-
mines the technical and economic direction of the agricultural self-
managed enterprise; he supervises and decides the technical assistance 
granted to the production units ..•• ,he indicates to the specialized 
bodies of the agricultural self-management the designed objectives that 
conform to the national development plan" (46). Thus the power of the 
state was retained in the determination of the most important activi-
ties of the self-managed farm especially production and cultivation. 
Despite the fact that the self-management reform was supposed to 
introduce more autonomy to workers' management, its impact in this 
respect remained negligible. In fact this autonomy and decentralization 
cwas carried outc by .streanrli-ning state control over 'the workers iri -order 
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to avoid the rigidity and inefficiency that had previously character-
ized the state's relationship with the self-management sector. In 
other words, the main concern of the reform was to change the shape of 
state control over self-management by making it more efficient in order 
to avoid the difficulties created in marketing and the supply of 
credits and agricultural equipment. The fact that the reform was 
initiated by the state on its own initiative without any significant 
participation of the workers may explain why it was more concerned with 
increasing production than in freeing the workers' initiatives. It was 
a state affair, largely concerned with the modernization of the methods 
integrating the self-management sector within the state economic sec-
tor. Thus it was mostly concerned with the clarification of the roles 
of the management bodies, particularly that of the director, asserting 
their submission to the state. In this sense the reform was a technical 
and not a social one trying to avoid the negative effects of state 
control over self-management without eliminating it. 
Thus despite the resentment of the workers, self-management gra-
dually and finally lost its social content. From being an achievement 
which promised a radical transformation of Algeria's social and econo-
mic structure, the self-management movement was reduced to a mere 
transfer of colonial properties to the state. Workers' management was 
practised within the confines delimited by the state and gradually 
management bodies submitted to the organs of the state institutions 
through various mechanisms. Capitalist laws now dominated the environ-
ment within which self-management had to function; this was reflected 
in production and exchange activities and in the status of the workers 
as simple wage labourers (47). 
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CHAPTER NINE AGRARIAN REFORM WITHIN THE FRAME\\ORK OF ALGERIA'S 
DEVELO~ STRATEGY 
The importance of the ''Agrarian Revolution" launched in 1971, 
nearly ten years after independence, lay not only in the provisions of 
the laws it introduced, but also, and more significantly, in the fact 
that it was the first measure by the state which implied a direct 
change in the social and the class structure of society and transcended 
previous measures such as the nationalization of foreign capital and 
the assertion of political and national independence. Even the consti-
tution of the self-management system, despite its social implications, 
was driven mainly by nationalistic motives expressed in the confisca-
tion of the lands and properties owned by Europeans and transforming 
them into Algerian hands. In fact since the achievement of independence 
the state did not address itself to any restructuring of social rela-
tions within Algerian society. The process of erecting the state 
economic sector depended primarily on the implementation of broad 
national tasks expressed in building an independent national economy 
and required the nationalization of the properties owned by metropoli-
tan capital. If the nationalization process had affected some indige-
nous elements, it was also motivated by the same nationalist factors 
since those whose properties were nationalized had been collaborators 
with the colonial system. Thus ten years elapsed for the major and long 
promised restructuring of the social balance in Algeria's most socially 
important sector,i.e. the private agricultural sector. 
As much as this delay in carrying out the agrarian reform (1), 
could be explained by the nature of the ruling strata and the dominancl;! 
of certain classes, the enactment of the reform and its timing threw-~ 
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further light on this. Besides analysing the extent and impact of the 
changes brought about by this reform in socio-economic relations in 
agriculture, these general features of economic and political condi-
tions and in particular the role assigned to agriculture in the state's 
development strategy, are essential factors in understanding the nature 
of this reform in its explicit and implicit goals. This in its turn 
gives further insight into the character and nature of the leading 
social forces in control of the state and its development programme. 
Despite differences in emphasis, nearly all commentators agree on 
the combination of factors that induced the state to undertake these 
measures. These factors can be summarized as being economic, social, 
and political. We will dismiss, however, the argument presented by some 
commentators (2), which attribute the delay in the initiation of the 
agrarian reform to "administrative unpreparedness" and the lack of 
cadres to carry out the reform. This would imply that the reform could 
be launched because Algeria had attained some level of administrative 
skill and experience. In fact we think that the importance of the above 
factor lay more in the way how efficiently the agrarian reform was 
carried out and did not extend to the intention and preparedness of the 
state to direct a blow to one faction or more of the propertied class. 
The latter hinged on more important social, economic, and political 
factors which will be described below. Moreover, Algeria's lack of 
skilled cadres was obvious even during the time when the agrarian 
reform was enacted. In 1969, only two years before the launch of the 
reform, Viratelle estimated that out of 30,000 specialists needed in 
agriculture, Algeria had only 2,000 and many of them were foreigners. 
The Institute National Agronomique had not trained more than 107 engi-. 
neers ...s.i,IU;e .:independence., (3) ._ The "~dlflinistrati ve. _uii.pr_eparruln.ftSS.':~=:: 
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argument was still valid but did not prevent the enactment of the 
reform. 
In order to situate the agrarian reform within its proper context, 
in an attempt to examine its goals and impact, we have to look briefly 
at the global development programme of Algeria, the role and the place 
assigned to agriculture within this programme, and the effects of this 
upon agriculture which in its turn played a part in the institution of 
the agrarian reform. 
The Algerian Development Strategy 
Within the institutional framework of state capitalism, the ulti-
mate goal of Algerian development strategy was the achievement of 
economic independence by freeing the economy from subordination to the 
economies of Western Europe and other capitalist countries. Changing 
the material base of society through rapid industrialization was empha-
sised as a vital precondition for breaking with all forms of economic 
dependence. 
The economic policy to achieve this development became clear only 
under the regime of Boumedienne. It was formulated between 1966 and 
1967 and was mainly influenced by the theoritical work of the French 
economist Destane de Bernis. After combining the theory of growth poles 
with that of industrialization in the U.S.S.R., Perroux and especially 
de Bernis came up with a specific development model for the Third World 
in general and Algeria in particular. This model was essentially based 
on the development of "industrializing industries" (4). The ultimate 
aim of this model was to develop a productive sector capable, by utili-
zing national resources, of generating development in other sectors.of 
the etoholliy :in~afuh"TT<m to· :sat!my-"l'Ong termcpubiic l:OJ1SUmption. needs. 
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According to this model,"some industries, particularly the power produ-
cing ones,have stimulating capacities: that is to say in the countries 
where they have developed they give rise to a series of associated 
industries, both up-stream and down-stream. The entire economy is 
thereby stimulated" (5). The priority of this model is, therefore, the 
development of industry rather than agriculture and the development of 
heavy and capital intensive industry directed towards producing the 
means of production, rather than light industry directed towards the 
production of consumer goods. 
This model was adopted by the Algerian development strategists 
and soon came to represent official doctrine in its various speeches, 
charts, and codes. The nature of industrialization presented by this 
model was seen not only as a formidable cure for the problem of unem-
ployment through the creation of secondary industries, although in the 
long term, but also as a means of diversifying the country's exports. 
Algerian produced commodities would be competitive in the external 
market since they would be produced with cheap labour from by the 
traditional sector. Thus Boumedienne asserted on more than one occasion 
that rapid heavy industrialization would not only enable the country to 
diversify its exports, but also to export the people's labour instead 
of exporting raw materials at low prices (6). 
In the context of Algeria the "industrializing industries" were 
hydrocarbon processing, metallurgical and other mineral processing, 
mechanical engineering, and the production of organic and inorganic 
chemicals. These were to act as the "motor" of the development process 
producing raw materials and machinery for other sectors of industry and 
for. agriculture. In doing so, and by backward and forward linkages, 
they would stimulate development in the backward sectors of the economy 
401 
until the entire economy would become highly advanced and modernized. 
Oil and gas revenues were to be the major source for funding the higher 
rate of investment, with foreign loans and the currency earned by 
migrant labour in Europe designed to play a significant role in the 
process of accumulation (7). 1980 was targetted as the year when 
Algeria would attain the phase of innovation, by which time a complete 
industrial system would be installed, supplying employment for 40,000 
persons annually (8). In that year, according to predictions made by 
Algerian planners, the Algerian economy would be capable of producing 
anything it chose. 
This strategy was to be implemented through a series of Develop-
ment Plans; the Three-Year Pre-Plan (l967-69),the first Four-Year Plan 
(1970-73), and the second Four-Year Plan (1974-77). 1978 and 1979 were 
to be the years of transition and re-assessment before the introduction 
of the Five-Year Plan (1980-84). 
After 1967 and throughout the years of the implementation of this 
strategy, investments were concentrated primarily in the industrial 
sector, with heavy industry receiving the lion's share of the capital 
allocated to the latter. Thus while industry received 49, 44.5, and 
43.5 per cent of total investment during the three-year plan (1967-69), 
the four-year plan (1970-73), and the four year plan (1974-77) respec-
tively, heavy industry in the hydrocarbon sector and capital and inter-
mediate goods were allocated 80, 87.6, and 88.5 per cent respectively 
of total funds directed to the industrial sector in these plans. 
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Structure of Investment 1967-1977 
(in Percentages) (9) 
Sector 1967-69 Plan 1970-73 Plan 
Hydrocarbon 24 16.5 
Productive Industry 15 22.5 
Consumption Industry 10 5.5 
Agriculture and 
Irrigation 17 14.5 
Infrastructure 10 12 
Housing 3.5 5 
Education 9.5 12.5 
Health 2.5 3.5 
Collective Equipment 8.5 0 
TOTAL 100 100 
o:) 11 for agriculture and 4 for irrigation 
1974-77 Plan 
17.5 
21 
5 
15 ,. 
14 
7.5 
9 
0 
5 
100 
Furthermore, the absolute amount of investment increased twice 
between the plan of 1967-69 and that of 1970-73 (from AD 10,3 to AD 
30.6 billion). It also increased more than three times between the plan 
of 1970-73 and that of 1973-77 (from 30.6 to 109.4 billion AD) (10), 
mainly due to increases in oil revenues, especially at the end of 1973. 
In fact as a result of this increase the size of the second four year 
plan (1974-77) was doubled "overnight" from 54 to AD 110 billion. 
Light industries were considered by the Algerian development stra-
tegy as of insignificant importance for the first stage since their 
development would take on momentum only after the heavy industrial 
sector was erected. 
In fact the strategy contained different contradictions and either 
overestimated or under-estimated certain important factors relating to 
its implementation. We are not concerned to discuss these contradic-
tions and deficiencies here (11); we will look at the impact of this 
s:tri!_t_~_j!I)on the aqric_ulturaL sector in general through the role 
403 
assigned to it which gradually combined to make the introduction of the 
agrarian reform an urgent necessity. 
Agriculture in the Development Strategy 
A quick glance at the figures in the table above suggests that a 
deliberate choice not to invest in agriculture was an important part of 
the development strategy. In fact this was the case despite the state's 
continuous emphasis on the balanced development between agriculture and 
industry expressed in the often cited slogan: "marcher sur deux 
jambes". The development and modernization of agriculture was to be 
carried out by giving "priority to industrial investment which does not 
produce the means of consumption, but contributes to the construction 
of the basis of the industrial sector and will, in the same time, 
supply the necessary products for the modernization of agriculture" 
(12). The development of the agricultural sector, therefore, would take 
place as part of the development of heavy industry, which would itself 
have various backward and forward impacts on stimulating agricultural 
production and productivity. The huge differences in investment between 
agriculture and industry were explained by the argument that agricul-
ture was already an ongoing sector "with its base in the soil" whereas 
industry had to be built from practically nothing (13). 
However, if agriculture was neglected in terms of investment, it 
was assigned a quite distinct and multi-faceted role by the development 
strategy in order to achieve the objectives of economic independence 
and sustained growth. Agriculture was to play five major important 
functions: 
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1- To supply the cities and urban centres with food at lowest 
cost in order to minimize industrial expenses. This supposes 
the achievement of national self-sufficiency in the production 
of basic food products. 
2- To maintain the work force which cannot be absorbed by indus-
try. 
3- To provide the economy with an investable surplus. 
4- To provide an outlet for industrial products in the form of 
agricultural equipment, tractors, threshers, fertilizers, 
pesticides, or in the form of consumer goods for the rural 
population. 
5- To supply the industrial sector with the necessary raw mate-
rials such as fibres, textiles, sugar beet, tobacco, etc. 
(14). 
It was believed that with the expansion of industry, farms in both 
the self-management and private sectors would raise output to feed the 
burgeoning urban work force and would respond to the availability of 
mechanization by increasing their productivity. In other words, the way 
in which the agricultural sector would increase its production and 
productivity, in itself a precondition for the success of the strategy, 
would at the same time be an embodiment of industrial expansion and its 
response to the needs of the internal market. 
However, Algerian development strategy inherited many difficulties 
were reflected in one way or another in agriculture, exacerbating its 
problems. Lack of investment meant that the technological level 
remained unchanged and in some cases even deteriorated. Projects to 
briflq-mor:e-land into~ultivation were not successful. Moreover, the 
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internal terms of trade of agriculture were deteriorating, since the 
prices of basic agricultural products under the control of the state 
remained stable throughout the 1960s. This had serious consequences for 
the responsiveness of the agricultural sector to the demands of the 
development strategy concerning the total integration of agriculture in 
the economy. In the light of these problems we will discuss briefly the 
general problems of agriculture until the introduction of the "Agrarian 
Revolution", and difficulties they placed in the way of the implementa-
tion of the development strategy which constituted the social and 
economic base for the launch of the reform. 
The Situation of Agriculture before 1971 
On the eve of the agrarian reform, of Algerian agriculture was 
divided into two contrasting sectors as regards both structure of 
ownership and production. This division together with the passive role 
assigned to agriculture in the development strategy meant at least 
theoretically that only the self-management sector could be respond to 
the expansion of industrialization. Despite the enhancement of modern 
capitalist farming, the prvate sector remained relatively less integ-
rated into the rest of the economy, and imposed strong constraints on 
the development of the modern capitalist sector. The non-capitalist 
landlords who controlled the majority of the land in this sector pre-
fered extensive cultivation and indirect tenure because they did not 
want to invest in agriculture, with the result that few improvements 
were introduced on these properties (15). Small holdings, which 
accounted for the majority of agricultural production units in the 
private sector, were generally unable to improve the conditions of 
production or to invest in their lands, and remained largely unaffected 
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by the develop-ment of the economy. Self-sufficiency in production 
remained their ultimate and major goal. In general, despite the exist-
ence of increasingly developing capitalist farming, non-capitalist 
production remain-ed predominant in agriculture. 
In these circumstances, until the launch of the agrarian reform, 
state credits and prices policies were characterized by a deliberate 
neglect of agriculture in general. Credits assigned to the agricultural 
sector were very small in comparison to total credits allocated to 
other sectors of the economy. Thus in the period of the three plans 
1967-69, 1970-73, and 1974-77, agriculture received only 18.6, 11.9, 
and 7.5 per cent of total state credits (16). Moreover, despite its 
higher capacity to utilize the credits allocated, the private sector 
was discriminated against in the absolute amount of credits being 
assigned to and utilized by it in comparison to the self-management 
sector. The table below reveals that in the years up to the agrarian 
reform, the private sector was allocated less than half the credits 
allocated to the self-management sector, yet the latter occupied less 
than 30 per cent of the useful agricultural area of the country. 
Within the private sector, credits tended to favour mainly the 
low-risk higher income cultivators who were able to meet the conditions 
put forward by the granting agencies. The most important of these 
conditions was that the cultivator should have an exact account of 
quantity, size, number, etc. of his products and that he should sell 
his produce to the state marketing agencies. These besides other condi-
tions (17), meant that only rich farmers and especially those who were 
willing to invest in their farming units could receive the credits. 
Hence the number of private cultivators who managed to acquire some 
form of creeit did not exceed 15,000 ·in 1966 and 20,000 _in_l967 (18), a 
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number even less than the credit beneficiaries in 1958 under the colon-
ial order (19). In fact if it is assured that there was a positive 
correlation between the average value of the credits and the size of 
the holdings, it can be stated that large holdings have received 66.5 
per cent of the total sums loaned by the SAP and the BNA during the 
period between 1966-67 and 1972-72 (20). Moreover, credits received by 
wealthy farmers tended to cover essentially the expenses of investment 
in agricultural machinery, while those allotted to poor peasants were 
destined to prevent further deterioration in their living standards. 
The difficulties encountered by those attempting to acquire credits 
(caused by the bureaucratic practices of the state granting agencies) 
also contributed to reducing the size and extent of the credits distri-
buted to private cultivators. 
Allocated and Used credits Per Sector 1966-1974 
(in Million current AD) (21) 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Allocated 
credits 
State Sector 95 200 273 270 210 315 400 
Private sector 100 130 130 130 100 60 40 
Coop.Sector 155 
Total 195 330 403 400 310 375 595 
Share of Private 
Sector(%) 51 39 32 32 32 16 7 
Used Credits 
State Sector 1 10 17 113 171 229 308 
Private sector 90 113 102 150 110 61 24 
Coop. Sector 105 
Total 91 123 119 263 281 290 437 
Share of Private 
Sector(%) 98 92 86 57 39 27 6 
1973 
485 
60 
155 
700 
9 
475 
14 
105 
594 
2 
Between 1963 and until after the launch of the agrarian reform, 
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1974 
485 
250 
735 
245 
9 
161 
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the prices of basic agricultural products, the principal products of 
the majority of farming units, remained stable. This was due to a 
deliberate state pricing policy of keeping the cost of food for the 
urban population at low levels in order not to make the reproduction 
process of the industrial workers a barrier to the accumulation of 
capital, as shown in the table below. 
Price Index of Some Agricultural Products 1963-1978 (1965=100) (22) 
Year Soft Hard Barley Lentils Wine* Olives** Olive 
Wheat Wheat Oil 
1963 100 100 100 
1965 100 100 100 100 
1967 100 100 100 100 
1969 108 106 105 92 127 
1971 108 106 105 92 127 100 100 
1973 118 108 105 92 127 
1975 144 128 135 102 139 145 172 
1977 221 200 199 275 138 160 198 
*) 1968 100 
**) 1971 = 100 
The price index of cereals increased from 100 in 1964 to only 105 
in 1971, while that of wine had hardly increased at all (100 in 1966 
to 101 in 1970) (23). In fact only the products which escaped state 
control, such as garden vegetables and poultry, saw their prices 
increasing in response to growing urban demand. These products were 
mainly produced on a minority of holdings, usually belonging to the 
modern capitalist category of the private sector. 
The table above shows that the prices of basic agricultural pro-
ducts did not rise significantly until after 1974. The prices of inputs 
rose rapidly during the same period, making the terms of prices 
unfavourable towards agriculture. Between 1969 and 1973, the cost of 
machinery for cultivation, irrigation, and planting (excluding tractors 
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and harvesters), increased by 37 per cent. The price index of a 65 h.p. 
tractor of 100 in 1969 had increased to 180 by 1973, that of a combined 
harvester to 135 in 1973, and that of a seeder (6 meter) to 205 in 1973 
(24). Despite the subsidies, prices of fertilizers rose similarily 
during the same period, far more than the increase in the price of 
agricultural products. As a result of the increase in the demand for 
labour in the non-agricultural sector within the framework of the 
development plans and the subsequent departure of part of the agricul-
tural labour force into other activities, the cost of labour in agricu-
lture increased by 55 per cent between 1969 and 1973, contributing 
further to distorting the terms of exchange between agriculture and 
other sectors of the economy as the prices of agricultural products 
remained static. 
These factors had a strong impact in limiting the expansion of 
capitalist farming in the private sector by discouraging investment and 
resulting in the deterioration of production and living conditions of 
the majority of peasant farmers. Partly due to these factors and partly 
due to the continuous threat of agrarian reform, investment in the 
private sector as reflected in the purchase of tractors declined consi-
derably over the years. 
Purchase of Tractors by the Private Sector (1962-1973) (124) 
(Unit = Tractor) 
Type 1962- 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 Total 
1966 
Wheeled } 
Tractors } 1730 1385 lllO 753 38 57 17 15,090 
}4400 
} 
Caterpillars } 100 348 161 39 24 20 l 693 
_____ 'l'otal 
-~·--· ~~00 1830 1733 1271 :7_92 62 77 18 10,183 
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The self-management sector was driven into debt and its production 
units were unable to make a profit mainly because agricultural prices 
decided at the centre were kept low. Despite the fact that credit was 
made available to this sector in increasing amounts in comparison to 
the private sector, there was very little new investment. Workers in 
this sector became increasingly disenchanted with their conditions of 
production and refused to make greater efforts to increase their produ-
ctivity. Practices such as hoarding part of their output for their own 
consumption became common, and increasing numbers of workers abandoned 
their work in the self-managed units and left for the cities (26). 
The overall picture was stagnation, and indeed decline, in 
agricultural production in a quite appalling fashion and as population 
growth registered its highest rate, agricultural production per capita 
deteriorated drastically as revealed by the following table: 
Index of the Agricultural Production 1966-1974 (27) 
(1952-56 100) 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
64 77 93 89 94 91 108 93 88 
Per Capita Production 
59 70 81 75 76 7l 82 68 62 
With great variation from year to year depending mainly on clima-
tic conditions, cereals production in 1972 was the same as that of 1962 
(slightly over 20 million quintals), whereas the population had 
increased considerably. This meant that agriculture production became 
increasingly and drastically incapable of satisfying local demand. 
Since the latter was increas·ing considerably, not only because popula-
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tion was expanding at one of the world's fastest rates (between 3.2 and 
3.3 per cent per annum), but also because of the increase in the level 
of consumption resulting from the monetarization of the economy (28) 
and the general rise of incomes in the urban centres, Algeria became 
unable to feed itself (29). 
Thus while Algeria's food production met 70 per cent of consupm-
tion in 1969,it met 55 per cent in 1973 and only 35 per cent in 1977 
(30). Thus imports became an essential means of feeding the growing 
population. Food imports have greatly disrupted the Algerian commercial 
balance, increasing in 1974 by nearly four times the figure in 1967. In 
1971 the value of food imports constituted about 40 per cent of the 
value of oil and gas exports (31). Since that year agricultural imports 
have greatly exceeded agricultural exports. The ratio of the cost of 
importsto that of exports, after being positive during the three year 
plan (98 per cent), deteriorated considerably to reach only 15 per cent 
during the second four year plan (1974-77) (32). 
Cereal imports increased drastically from 200,000 tons annually 
between 1963-66 to more than 350,000 tons in 1970 and to more than 
double this amount in 1971. In fact imports of food were so large that 
even the rural population became increasingly dependent on imported 
food for its own consumption. An inquiry carried out by AARDES in 1967-
69 showed that the population of the rural communes purchased 67 per 
cent of the grains they consumed and a similar percentage of flour. The 
rate was 75 per cent for potatoes, 80 per cent for vegetables, 66 per 
cent for fruits, and 69 per cent for meat (33). 
With prices of imported food fixed at the international level at a 
drastically increasing rates, the dramatic increase of imports was 
bound teO have an adverse ef£ee;t un the .i-mpl-ementation Of .. the :.develop.-
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ment strategy. Algeria ''is eating one-third of its oil in food", accor-
ding to the Algerian Finance Minister (34). This shows not only that 
agriculture had failed to meet one of the most important functions 
assigned to it by the development strategy, namely that of feeding the 
growing population at the lowest cost, but also that food imports acted 
as a serious brake on the implementation of this strategy, so that some 
solution to redress the agricultural situation became an absolute 
necessity . 
The effects of agricultural failure were not only economic but 
social and political as well. The deterioration of living conditions in 
the rural areas as a direct result of agricultural stagnation, coupled 
with a very high rate of population growth, led to a massive exodus of 
the rural population to the cities. Between 1966 and 1973 nearly one 
million left the rural areas, almost 120,000 migrants every year (35). 
This meant that the agricultural sector was deprived of the most comp-
etent, qualified, and youthful part of the labour force, since it is 
often the case that migration attracts those who are able or willing to 
find jobs in the non-agricultural sector. As a result the age of the 
agricultural labour force became higher than the national average. The 
census of 1977 shows that while the national average age of the labour 
force was 34 , the average age of the agricultural labour force was 39, 
and that 12 per cent of the agricultural work force were over 60 (36). 
More importantly, massive migration brought serious social and politi-
cal problems in the cities, since the capacity for industrial expansion 
was too limited to absorb the increasing number of rural migrants. It 
also meant that agriculture became unable to contain the rural popula-
tion, so that another major function assigned to the agricultural 
sector within ·the development • strategy had not '-baen -achi.e.v~d .._ _" '-
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This situation was the background of the urgent need for a pro-
found restructuring of the agricultural sector. It became increasingly 
apparent that the stagnation of agriculture was due to the prevailing 
conditions of production and mainly to the structure of landownership. 
This was later expressed in the introduction of the Agrarian Revolu-
tion. However, this situation had existed long before the reform was 
launched, although it was aggravated drastically at the end of the 
1960s and the begining of the 1970s. This implies that other factors 
relating to the state's recognition of the necessity of agricultural 
restructuring played their part in the launching of the agrarian 
reform. In other words a new situation had developed and new objectives 
had emerged to make the launch of the long promised agrarian reform a 
reality. 
The Objectives of the Agrarian Reform 
The official objective of the Agrarian Revolution was to 
"eliminate the exploitation of man by man and to organize the use of 
land and means of production in a way that would ameliorate production 
by the application of efficient techniques which would also insure a 
just distribution of revenues in agriculture" (37). 
However, it would be misleading to take the officially announced 
objective of the "Agrarian Revolution" at its face value, since there 
were as many implicit aims to be achieved by the reform as explicit 
ones (38). From the nature of the agrarian reform introduced in 1971, 
its aims and implementation, and its socio-economic impact upon agricu-
lture, it can be discerned that the objectives of the reform were not 
.merely.to overcome.the dislocation of the private agricultural sector 
from the rest of the economy and the economic and politicar problems 
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which this posed, but also to achieve a particular social and political 
rationale desired by the social strata in control of the state appara-
tus. In other words, the task of redressing the situation of agricul-
ture to facilitate its more active participation in the development 
strategy also constituted an opportunity to achieve certain social and 
political objectives because of the interrelation of economic transfor-
mation with social and political srtuggle. This implies, contrary to 
some arguments, that agrarian reform had several interrelated, long and 
short term, economic, social, and political objectives (39). 
!-Economic Objectives: 
Given the nature of the Algerian development strategy and its 
primary emphasis on heavy industrialization, together with the situa-
tion in agriculture, an urgent restructuring of agriculture to improve 
its performance became essential if the state was to stick to its 
industrialization programme. Thus agrarian reform also had the definite 
economic objective of transforming the agricultural sector in such a 
way that it would respond more positively to the needs of this stra-
tegy. In the words of one Algerian economist, "if the agrarian revolu-
tion is before all a demand for social justice, it is also, in the 
present conditions of our country a primary economic necessity" (40). 
However, the objective was more to provide the state industries with 
the outlets for their products which they desperately needed than 
simply to contribute to capital accumulation by financing investment. 
Between 1971 and 1973 the fertilizer factories produced four times more 
than the quantity consumed, and that tractor factories produced more 
t-racbors than the number possessed by t-he self•management sector ( 41) • 
.:Tll.i.S .:meanL.that without. a .restr.ucturing .. of .. agr.i.culture .i.n._arway_wh.ieh 
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would facilitate the absorption of local industrial products, the 
industrialization process would be seriously hampered. Hence the stated 
objective of the Charter of the Agrarian Revolution that this revolu-
tion constitutes a stimulant for industry. 
"The modernization of agriculture and the elevation of living 
standards in the rural areas will expand the internal market 
and favour the growth of industry. The creation of production 
units practising modern methods of cultivation will increase 
demand in the mechanical and chemical industries" (42). 
Moreover, despite the validity of the contention presented by 
M.Ollivier (see note 39), and shared somehow by H.Roberts (43), that 
oil revenues could pay for food imports, or in other words that the 
effective contribution of agriculture in the process of capital accumu-
lation (by providing cheap hard currency) was less important than 
providing a market for industrial products, one should not overestimate 
such ability. First, as we saw earlier, the cost of food imports became 
higher than could be tolerated by a developing economy. Second, oil and 
gas revenues at the time of launching the reform were not as high as 
few years later, when the increase in the prices of oil after 1973 had 
many times multiplied their revenues. In 1969 oil revenues were $ 267 
million, about 17 times less than the revenues in 1976. Hydrocarbon 
participation in the composition of GDP in that year was 16 per cent 
only, compared with that of 1976 when oil revenues were $ 4,589.1 
million and its GDP participation was 25.2 per cent. Hence the poor 
performance of the agricultural sector and the subsequent drain of 
capital resulting from the massive imports of food constituted a 
serious brake on the process of capital accumulation and on the success 
of industrial expansion. Finally one could also argue that the avail-
abi~ity- of oil ·revenues gave .the state the neans to iHcr_ease the inves-
tnients needed· for the modernization of· agriculture. 
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The economic objective of the agrarian reform, therefore, besides 
the expansion of the internal market for industrial products, was to 
increase agricultural production and decrease dependency on the outside 
world in feeding the growing population. Another factor which prompted 
agrarian reform was the fact that, given the capital intensive nature 
of the expanding industrial sector, Algeria desperately needed to 
expand employment opportunities. Through the intensification of produc-
tion, agrarian reform could absorb part of the unemployed or underem-
ployed labour force and reduce rural to urban migration. 
Thus behind the stated objective by the Charter of the "moderniza-
tion of agriculture, through increasing the consumption of fertilizers 
and selected seeds and the use of agricultural materials", in order to 
increase production and productivity to reach self-sufficiency in the 
production of basic foodstuffs, lay an implicit objective, the commer-
cialization of agriculture. In order for peasants to be able to consume 
the inputs produced by industry, they would have to turn over all or 
most of their produce to be marketed. In this way, besides increasing 
productivity, the agricultural sector was to be integrated with the 
industrial sector. 
2-Social Objectives: 
In order to achieve this objective, i.e. the opening up of the 
agricultural sector to the economy, certain social forces and forms of 
ownership had to be eliminated. These forces were mainly absentee 
landlordism and pre-capitalist forms of production, whose continuing 
existence constituted a brake on the development of agriculture in that 
instead of investing in their holdings; those landowners generally 
diver.ted t.lle ag&icu~tural surplus"towaros sectors· .outside agricultural 
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(44). Hence they contradicted the objective of the accumulation of 
industrial capital to reduce the purchasing power of agricultural 
producers as far as industrial means of production and consumption were 
concerned. Moreover, their properties were not only run according to 
archaic forms of tenure and methods of cultivation but were stark 
evidence of maldistribution of land and of inequality in the country-
side. Hence besides removing some fetters on increasing investment and 
agricultural productivity, the reform aimed to put an end to inequality 
and social injustice in the Algerian countryside. This meant that the 
agrarian reform had the social objective of directing a blow at those 
landowners who were less affected by developments during the ten years 
of independence. 
Besides the argument of social justice and economic efficiency, 
the reform represented a certain trend in the development of socio-
political forces and an emergence of new contradictions among them. In 
this sense given the fact that it was imposed by the state, the reform 
"reflects much more a development , at a given moment, of the balance 
of forces within the Algerian leading class than a positive response to 
the demands clearly expressed by the poor peasants" (45). It was a 
manifestation of the fact that further developments of the dominant 
forces within the state and the state capitalist sector were being 
impeded by the existence of the landed bourgeoisie, mainly in the form 
of absentee proprietors within the Algerian social structure. 
In trying to achieve this social objective, the agrarian reform, 
or at least its text, was, as we will see shortly, indeed only radical 
in the sense that it aimed not only at the liquidation of absentee 
ownership, but also "the limitation to a narrow degree the category of 
agricultural epterpreneurs eQgaged in one form or another ip capitalist 
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relations" (46). However, the radicalism of the reform text does not of 
course determine the nature of the reform and its real impact. This 
would be determined essentially by the prevailing social relations, the 
nature of the social forces in charge of its imple-mentation, and the 
nature of the state's agricultural policies accompanying and following 
the reform. Furthermore, instead of dismissing any radicality that the 
text of the reform might have implied, as Raffinot and Jacqumot seem to 
suggest (47), one should stress that radicalism does not necessarily 
mean the elimination of capitalist relations of production. It is 
often the case that the capitalist incorporation of agriculture can be 
achieved most efficiently within the framework of small family farms. 
Here we think that, given the protection of the private property in 
agriculture implied in the reform text, an implicit objective lying 
behind the expropriation of large land owners was the enhancement of 
family merchant farming based on the commercialization of production, 
alongside production cooperatives operating on the same basis. 
3- Political Objectives: 
The reform had equally important political objectives. The issue 
of agrarian reform was as old as the Algerian national movement, and 
was one of the basic promises which it had made. Despite this and 
despite the emphasis of both the Tripoli Programme and the Algiers 
Charter on the urgency of conducting radical agrarian reform, nothing 
had materialized in the first ten years of independence. Apart from the 
relatively few agricultural workers on the ex-colonial farms, the 
Algerian peasantry did not experience any significant changes in their 
social and economic lives during the years following independence. 
Attempts to-carry out an agrai."ian reform in 1964 and 1966 did not 
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result in concrete action despite a lot of public discussion (48). One 
reason for this was probably that the projects were drawn up by the 
Party and not by the Ministry of Agriculture. Another was that an 
immediate agrarian reform might jeopardize the new alliance brought by 
Boumedienne regime which was formed on the basis of opposing the regime 
of Ben Bella, thus grouping heterogeneous social and political 
factions. 
However, the idea of introducing structural changes in the private 
agricultural sector did remaine alive in official speeches and program-
mes, although the accent was changed from an "agrarian revolution" 
developed in the Algiers Charter into "agrarian reform" during the 
early years of Boumedienne (49). 
The result of this stalemate together with the neglect of the 
countryside was the increasing disenchantment and immobilization of the 
Algerian peasantry, which was not expressed in open political opposi-
tion but in a continuous revival of their conservatism expressed in a 
spate of mosque building and a renewal of interest in religious brot-
herhoods and traditionalism (50). With their history of militant 
political struggle, the peasants could undermine government calls for 
improving production, as well as continuing to swell the congested 
cities demanding welfare services, or provide the nucleus for a new 
form of political insurgency (51). This situation constituted a poten-
tial threat that might be mobilized by any existing urban-based oppos-
ing group, thus contributing to the long term destabilization of the 
country (52). 
Hence it became imperative to "incorporate the somewhat refrecto-
ry population uf the countryside into~tile national political community 
by re.sponQing to its _material ~spirations~'--(~3). The regime also sought 
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to enhance its legitimacy and popularity by drawing on the support of 
the peasantry whose interests it claimed to represent. This, in fact, 
is very crucial for a regime which assumed power after having deposed a 
popular leader,in order to improve its image not only amongst the 
peasantry, but also, given the popularity of an issue like agrarian 
reform, amongst intellectuals and left wing organizations. Thus the 
agrarian reform represented a process of 'rapprochement' between the 
regime and an important part of the intelligentsia (54). 
The political importance of the agrarian reform was expressed 
vigorously in the course of its implementation. This allowed the Boume-
dienne regime to assert its authority by breaking off with the elements 
associated with the agrarian bourgeoisie. Its popularity was enhanced 
through the mobilization of great popular support expressed in the 
involvement of mass organizations and students in the implementation of 
the reform. Therefore,it is often argued that the "agrarian revolution" 
constituted a watershed in Algeria's political and social life marking 
the country's radical transformation and the deepening of its struggle 
in the direction of socialism. 
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CHAPTER TEN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRARIAN REFORM 
The ~in Principles of the Reform 
On 8 Nov. 1971 H.Boumedienne signed ordinance no.7l-73 of the 
Agrarian Revolution composing 280 articles and proceeded by the Charter 
of the Agrarian Revolution in which its general aims were defined. The 
main principle of the "revolution'' was formulated in the slogan that 
"the land belongs to those who till it" (article 1). This was defined 
by the introduction of a chain of structural changes which concerned 
the juridical, institutional, and socio-economic organization of the 
private agricultural sector. The main changes were: 
1- The restructuring of the area of an individual's landed prope-
rty to the upper limit of what could be tilled, taking into 
account variations in climatic and social conditions, and the 
abolition of all indirect exploitation of land. This meant the 
limitation of large properties and the total nationalization 
of absentee properties. 
2- The distribution of nationalized land to landless peasants, 
who were to be grouped in various forms of production coope-
ratives. 
3- The redistribution of land were to be accompanied by a cam-
paign of rural development; new villages, schools, health 
centres, communications, administrative services etc. 
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Regulations of Implementation 
!-Nationalization 
The National Fund of the Agrarian Revolution (F.N.R.A.) was 
created by the text to take charge of the nationalized land to be 
distributed afterwards. All communal land and that belonging to the 
state was to be transformed to the FNRA. Habous land (religious 
property) was also to be nationalized and put under the control of this 
institution. The nationalization of privately held land was to be 
carried out in two ways: the total nationalization of the properties of 
the "non-exploitant", owners who for one reason or another did not 
directly operate their land, and the partial nationalization or limita-
tion of private property which exceeded the limit of ownership establi-
shed by the reform. To be considered as "non-exploitant" or an absen-
tee, and thus as the owner of indirectly exploited land and thus to be 
nationalized a landowner would not be participating effectively in 
agricultural production (article 2). In article 30 he was defined as 
the person "who does not live directly and personally on the exploita-
tion of the agricultural or potentially agricultural land on which he 
has a right of ownership". This included those who lived outside the 
commune where their properties were located, and those who had non-
agricultural activities which rendered them an annual income between AD 
9,000 and AD 13,000. 
General and specific exceptions were made for those who either 
owned very little land (less than 0.5 ha. irrigated and 5 ha. dry 
farming), or who had been forced to leave their land during the war of 
independence, or who were physically unable to exploit their land 
directly (articles 50-54). The ascendants and the descenOants of the 
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martyrs of the independence war were also exempted from nationali-
zation, although exempted "non exploitants" were not allowed to keep 
properties above the established ceiling of ownership. 
In establishing the maximum area of ownership of privately owned 
land, the text suggested first that the income of a private owner 
should not exceed three times the annual salary of a full-time farm 
worker in the self-management sector. However, the level of this income 
was allowed to rise by one-third for one dependent child, and by 50 per 
cent for two or more dependent children, so that the farm income could 
be supplemented by up to 13,500 AD per year. Another criterion for 
limiting private land was that the size of the area should not exceed 
three times the size of land distributed to the beneficiaries of the 
reform in similar conditions. According to these two criteria ,the 
average size of area retained by private owners will represent about 43 
hectares per private farm unit (1). 
The text provided that a private owner "who personally and direct-
ly exploit an agricultural land could resort waged workers "d'appoint"" 
(article 95). Given that the notion "d'appoint" was not defined, the 
use of waged labour could be very broadly interpreted (2). The text 
also provided for compensation to be paid to the owners of the nationa-
lized land at 2.5 per cent interest, realizable in equal instalments 
over a period of 15 years. 
As we can see, the elimination of absentee landlordism was the 
main aim of the reform. Private property in land was preserved and 
protected and inequality of ownership was allowed to persist in the 
form of the three-fold disparity in the size between the unexpropriated 
part of the large and medium holdings and the holdings distributed to 
the beneficiaries. 
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2-Distribution 
The beneficiaries of the agrarian reform were to be chosen from 
the landless peasants and the small owners. Priority in allocating the 
nationalized land by the FNRA was in the following order: agricultural 
workers and sharecroppers on the nationalized lands, landless anciens 
Moudjahidines and the sons of the martyrs of the independence war who 
had not benefited from any measure since independence, the landless and 
the small owners whose ownerships were smaller than that to be distri-
buted among the beneficiaries of the reform. The distribution of land 
was to be determined in a form that the minimum income of the average 
family living solely on the products of the distributed lot, was to be 
equivalent to the income of the family of a worker in a self-managed 
agricultural enterprise, working 250 days a year. (article 110). 
The beneficiaries were required to join one form or other of the 
state organized cooperatives depending on the nature of the coopera-
tives created. While membership of cooperatives was compulsory for the 
beneficiaries, it was optional for the private owners who were already 
established before the reform. In the case of the total nationalization 
of the property, the agricultural workers employed on such property 
were to constitute the membership of the cooperative (article 111). The 
distributed land could only be operated individually where the economic 
and social conditions for exploitation under a form of cooperation were 
too difficult to attain. However, if such conditions could be met 
affiliation to a cooperatives was compulsory. 
A three-level structure of cooperatives was to be established: 
1- Pre-Cooperative Groupings: three types of grouping within this 
category were to be erected; if the beneficiaries received land 
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that was abandoned, or of insufficient fertility and was in a 
need of preparatory work in order to become productive, they were 
to be organized in a "Groupement de mise en Valeur" GMV whose aim 
was to improve the land until a reasonable level of production 
was achieved. During the period of improving the quality of the 
land the beneficiaries were to receive help from the state, the 
amount and nature of which was to be decided by subsequent dec-
rees. In order to maintain the unity of an expropriated property 
where the beneficiaries did not wish to divide the land for the 
time being, the beneficiaries can form a "Groupement d'Indivi-
daires" GI. Another pre-cooperative form was the "Groupement 
d'entraide Paysanne" GEP, which was to be formed from among the 
beneficiaries of already existed holdings. Here each member 
cultivates his land and appropriates his production individually, 
but within the framework of a single plan of cultivation, organi-
zing the hiring of machines and exchanging work. 
2- Cooperative Groupings; They represent a more organized forms of 
cooperation than was to be attained by the previous forms after 
fulfilling the necessary conditions. Two forms of cooperative 
were to be created: 
a) cooperative Agricole d'Exploitation en Commun, (CAEC) 
where the land and the production remain individually approp-
riated, and that only the means of production other than the 
land were to be commonly owned. Each member of this form of 
cooperative had to follow a cultivation plan decided by all 
members who could include small holders established prior to 
'the reform. 
b) Cooperative Agricole de Production de la Revolution Ag-
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raire (CAPRA) in which both the land and the means of produc-
tion are owned and operated collectively. The members were to 
organize and carry out collectively the plan of cultivation 
and all matters relating to the marketing of produce and the 
acquisition of credits and materials. The income is divided 
among the members according to the number of working hours 
and days performed by each member. This form of cooperation 
is very much like the organization of the self-management 
farms, and only the legal status of the land is different. It 
was regarded as the optimal form of cooperation and all other 
forms had to aim to reach this level of organization in the 
future. 
3- Service Cooperatives; The organization of the above forms of 
cooperative was to be completed by the institution of service 
cooperatives at the level of the rural communes, la Cooperative 
Agricole Polyvalent Commercial de Service (CAPAS). These large 
cooperatives were responsible for providing all the necessary 
services for agricultural production such as marketing, finance, 
hiring of machines, supply of seeds and fertilizers, etc. These 
cooperatives, organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, were open 
to all agriculturalists with membership being obligatory for the 
beneficiaries of the reform as well as for the older-established 
Cooperative d'Anciens Moudjahidines and the self-management 
farms. For the reform beneficiaries they also functioned as an 
intermediary for state assistance and as a watchdog to ensure 
adherence to the text of the reform. 
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The Institutional Bodies of Execution 
The reform was to be executed by various institutions at three levels: 
1- At the local level, the main organ was the Enlarged Communal and 
Popular Assembly APCE which was formed from the local APC, estab-
lished in 1967 and re-elected in 1971, with the addition of a 
local representative of the Party, and a representative of the 
newly created Union National du Paysans Algeriens UNPA. The APCE, 
aided by a technical committee formed from among the local APC, 
the local organ of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and 
Finance, was charged with the task of administering the execution 
of the reform text at communal level. This would include tracing 
the map of the commune, nationalizing and insuring the transfer 
of the land to the FNRA, establishing the criteria for land 
llmitation, drawing up the list of beneficiaries (including 
admitting new members to the production units and expelling old 
ones) and organizing them and their lands into various types of 
cooperative units. 
2- At the regional level, the Assembly Populaire de Wilaya APW and 
its executive organs were to organize the operations of the 
reform at the level of the Wilaya. They were to supervise and 
approve the work of propositions of the APCE, mainly concerning 
the criteria of nationalization and limitation and the lists of 
candidates. The executive organs of the APW include in their 
meetings, concerning the operations of the reform, representa-
tives of the Party, the Army, and a delegate from the Ministry of 
Agriculture who was assigned the task of providing to the APW and 
APCE all the necessary information relating to the execution of 
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the agrarian reform. 
3- At the national level, there was the Commission Nationale de la 
Reform Agraire (CNRA), presided by the Minister of Agriculture 
including representatives from the majority of the ministries, 
the Party, the UGTA, and the president of the Council. This 
Commission was charged with elaborating and proposing all admini-
strative and legal measures, establishing the budget for execu-
tion, and providing all the material means necessary to facili-
tate the smooth execution of decisions at the local level. 
The Execution of the Reform 
The agrarian reform was to be implemented in three phases, each 
with a different emphasis on the kind of land to be nationalized and 
distributed. The first phase which was to commence on 1st January 1972 
and to end on 16th June 1973, consisted of two elements; on the one 
hand, to conduct a general census of lands that belonged to the private 
sector, and on the other hand, the nationalization and partial distri-
bution of communal, habous, and public lands. The second phase, between 
17 June 1973 and 16 June 1975, entailed the nationalization of the 
lands that were indirectly exploited together with the limitation of 
the large land holdings by nationalizing the part exceeding the estab-
lished limits. Phase three which was to begin on 17 June 1975, was to 
concern the nationalization of all public pasture lands which would 
involve about 15,000,000 hectars. Herds of absentee owners and large-
scale animal proprietors were to be expropriated and redistributed to 
the herdless wage workers and share herders employed by the formers. 
Since the third phase has not yet been completed and was officially 
postponed in 1979 for an indefinite period, especially as regards the 
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process of nationalization, our discussion of the agrarian reform will 
be limited to the impact of the nationalization and distribution of the 
agricultural lands i.e. the first and the second phase. 
Before looking at the actual changes brought by the two phases, the 
following are the findings of the census carried out by the Ministry of 
Agriculture demonstrating the inequalities in land ownership before the 
reform which was published in the Charter of the reform: 
16,500 owners of more than 50 ha.controlling 25% of the private 
sector's land. 
147,000 owners of between 10 to 50 ha. controlling 50 per cent. 
114,000 owners of between 5 to 10 ha. controlling 15 per cent. 
310,000 owners of less than 5 ha. controlling 10 per cent (3). 
Against this background and with the official announcement of the 
begining of the "Agrarian Revolution", the government, in an attempt to 
promote the idea of "national solidarity" and of a society without 
classes together with the notion that the reform does not run counter 
to the interests of any group, made an appeal to large-scale proprie-
tors to donate their lands to the reform bodies without compensation. 
However, the results of the donation campaign, which received a large 
amount of publicity, were insignificant. By January 1973 donations of 
60,000 ha. of land shared amongst 1,232 individuals, or 48.7 ha. per 
donor were received by the FNRA together with 4,000 fruit trees and 
4,000 date palms (4). Two years later in 31 July 1975, the number of 
donors increased by 1,453 donating 22,285 ha., bringing the total 
number of the donators to 2,685 and that of the donated land to 82,285 
ha.(5). As we will see, this campaign was in actual fact overshadowed 
by strenuous efforts on the part of private ownen:.-l:o evttde-both 
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nationalization and limitation of land by various means. Moreover, the 
donation of lands, whose quality has never been revealed and was 
naturally an "off-loading" of the less fertile land, was in fact used 
by certain groups of owners to be better in a better position to avoid 
nationalization or limitation by virtue of the reputation they have 
made in the course of the donation campaign (6). 
Phase one 
Despite the enormous land area affected during this phase, the 
actual cultivated land included in the category of public ownership was 
relatively small. The impact of this phase on the transformation of the 
structure of ownership lay essentially in the elimination of pre-
capitalist forms of tenure and arrangements which were already under-
going a process of erosion and decay. 
The dominant form of appropriation of public land before the 
agrarian reform was that the best located and most fertile lands were 
generally controlled by large landlords or wealthy farmers. These lands 
were then leased and worked under the auspices of those owners, either 
in association with middle and poor peasants, or through the employment 
of wage labour or share-croppers. After the announcement of the reform, 
significant holdings that were locally known to be under the control of 
rich farmers were erased from the registry (7). 
This phase started effectively in March 1972 with a general census 
of all the agro-pastoral land except that of the self-management sec-
tor. Following this census, which covered 8 million hectares, three 
million hectares of cultivable and potentially cultivable land was 
tran$fered -t.-o the FNRA. Little more. than quarter of this amount or 
800,000 ha. was currently cultivated. An additional 3.5 million ha. of 
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pasture land and 1.5 of forests and grasslands were added to the Fund. 
The first distribution of land started on 17 June 1972 at Khemis el 
Khechna and the first phase ended officially in 31 January 1973 (8). 
However, the figures of the operations during this phase varied 
quite considerably. In 1975, the count had fallen from 3 million to 1.6 
million hectares concerning the land transfered to the FNRA, of which 
no more than 600,000 ha. were currently cultivable. Pfeifer attributed 
this decline in the size of the land to the reason that "some influen-
tial leaseholders had pressured their communes into refusing to actual-
ly give up the land" (9). The size of the distributed area also under-
went continual variations. It has varied between 1973 and 1974 from 
730,756 ha. to 675,000 ha. then to 788,284 ha. and the number of 
cooperatives constituted during this passed from 2,614 to 2,489 and 
then to 2,921. N.Abdi sees that the main reason for this fluctuation 
could be traced to the phenomenon of "desistement" or withdrawal of the 
beneficiaries from their distributed lots. Thus in 1973 out of a total 
number of beneficiaries of 50,040, 3,842 or 7.7 per cent have withdrawn 
from their lands (10). This phenomenon was explained by various 
factors, the most important of which were the rigid and authoritarian 
integration of the beneficiaries into cooperatives particularly CAPRA 
without sufficient process of preparation, the bad quality of the 
distributed lands, the attraction of the non-agricultural sectors, and 
the insufficience of the installation premium of AD 150 per month (11). 
By the end of 1975, approximately 303,127 palm trees on public 
lands had been nationalized. The results of this first phase were 
presented by Raffinot and Jacquemot as follows (12): 
437 
Number of beneficiaries 
Size of distributed area 
Number of CAPRA 
Number of CAEC 
Number of GMV 
53,674 
788,284 ha. 
1,748 
601 
572 
Number of individual distribution 2,316 
Those who received land during this phase represented only 25 per 
cent of the registered 200,284 candidates. The average size of the 
distributed land was 14.7 ha. per person, a relatively large area 
mainly because the majority of this land was cultivated with cereals. 
About 75 per cent of the distributed land in this phase was usable for 
cultivation. The remainder was to be made into usable agricultural land 
by the beneficiaries themselves who were organized in GMVs and were 
aided by the state in supplying them with the means of production and a 
minimum wage of AD 150 until the land became productive. 
Phase Two 
This was the most crucial phase of the agrarian reform since it 
was politically sensitive and included the major changes implied in the 
reform and thus the nature of the reform in general was expressed 
during this phase. Its objectives were the abolition, through the total 
nationalization, of the property rights of the "non-exploitants", and 
the limitation of large properties. 
Before we look at the outcome of the nationalization and distribu-
tion process of this phase, we must recall the figures in the table on 
page 371. The census of 1973, conducted for the purpose of carrying 
out the agrarian reform showed that the total amount of agricultural 
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land in the private sector had shrunk by nearly 2 million ha. since 
1963, when there had been an inquiry based on the agricultural census 
of 1950. With no structural changes in land ownership in the private 
sector having taken place during this period, this could be attributed, 
as Pfeifer rightly does, to deliberate attempts on the part of land 
owners to conceal the true ownership of their land because of the 
threat of an agrarian reform. The figures of 1965 recorded a consi-
derable decline in the total of land to 5.8 million ha. from 7.2 
million ha. in 1963. The latter figures had also been produced for the 
purpose of introducing an agrarian reform, although this had not 
materialised. The table shows that the most significant part of the 
land which has disappeared was within the category that was more 
exposed and threatened by the nationalization of the agrarian reform 
i.e. owners of more than one hundred hectares. The land in this 
category was reduced by 62 per cent, from 1.5 million ha. to 0.8 
million in 1965 and then to 0.6 million in 1973. The holdings in this 
category witnessed a similar reduction by 59 per cent, from 8,450 in 
1963 to 4,665 in 1965 and to 3,439 in 1973. Hence the percentage of the 
share of this category in private sector land dropped from 20.8 per 
cent in 1963 to 13.5 per cent in 1965 and then to only 11.3 per cent in 
1973. The number of units of less than 10 ha. saw a considerable 
increase by 32 per cent between 1963 and 1973, while the land area that 
belonged to this category increased by only 19 per cent for the same 
period. This suggests that "large-scale proprietors were at least half 
undercounted in 1973 and that therefore half of them remained entirely 
outside the reform framework" (13). Moreover,in certain regions, the 
system of "indivision", had permitted certain large local families to 
limit the effects of nationalization (14). Because of this tradition of 
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"indivision'' which allowed one large farm, under one rich farmer's 
control, to be officially registered as a set of parcels each belonging 
to different family members, many large agricultural units were in fact 
disguised as small units each with different owner. This inflated the 
number of the small holdings and allowed a significant number of large 
owners to escape the regulations of the agrarian reform. 
The operation of this phase commenced on the basis of the statis-
tics produced by the 1973 census which, as we saw, undercounted, the 
large-scale proprietors. Two surveys of private holdings were made. An 
initial one was done in 1972-73 collected information from all land-
owners, relating to their place of residence and the type and extent of 
their holdings. This was followed by a more detailed census carried out 
by the local authority, namely the APCE, concerning the verification 
and obtaining of further data relevant to the criteria of nationaliza-
tion and limitation. The results of the first survey, in which all 
prpperty holders were required to make a "declaration of residence" 
together with information on their main source of income and their 
properties, were presented by listing the property holders surveyed 
into four categories: 
1- Those not concerned, whose directly worked holdings were too 
small to be considered in the reform. 
2- Absentees, whose properties were to be expropriated in full. 
3- Limitable owners, whose properties were judged to be larger 
than they could work themselves. 
4- The "non-touches" or those not affected who were either absen-
tees or large-scale owners whose properties were exempted from 
the reform. 
The results of this survey wit'h their extrapolation at -the nat:io-:: 
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nal level was presented by K. Pfeifer in the following table: 
Lists of Property Holders in Algeria, Pre-Reform 
(Recensement General de l'Agriculture,l973) (15) 
Lists 
(Types of Pro- No.of Hol- % of Hal- Land Area % of Land Avg.Size of 
perty holders) ders ders Held(ha.) Area and Area ha 
1- Not concerned 809,441 69.52 1,274,494 15.90 1. 57 
2- Absentees 34,096 2.93 243,057 3.03 7.13 
3- Limitables 25,904 2.22 1,398,033 17.45 53.97 
4- Not affected 294,937 25.33 5,099,467 63.63 17.29 
Total 1,164,378 100.00 8,015,051 100.00 6.88 
Given the provisions of the reform texts which clearly stated that 
the properties of all the "non-exploitants" should be nationalized, N. 
Abdi, following the publication of the text, estimated the area avail-
able for nationalization at at 2,300,000 ha., since, according to him, 
a third of the private agricultural area was exploited indirectly (16). 
However, in the course of the reform which was an outcome of government 
initiative only, and in the absence of initiatives taken at the base 
level by the peasantry, this objective was too difficult to achieve 
( 17). 
Thus, according to the table above, and on the assumption that 
each limitable proprietors would be left with an average 30 hectare 
property and that the properties of the absentees would be nationalized 
integrally, only 900,000 ha. of private land was potentially nationali-
zable. Those potentially affected (categories 2 and 3 ) turned out to 
be only about 5.2 per cent of all proprietors, holding about 20.5 per 
cent of all registered lands. Hence, according to Abdi (18), the number 
of "non-exploitants" was considerably restricted for two reasons: 
1- The system of exemptions provided in various articles, especially 
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those exempting war veterans together with the ascendants and 
descendants of the martyrs of the liberation war from being 
considered as "non-exploitants" permitted a large number of 
absentees to escape the nationalization of their properties. 
Given the extent of the human losses in the Algerian countryside 
during the war, very many landowners were related to one or more 
martyrs, so that this escape clause to stay outside available to 
a large number of owners. Furthermore, exemptions were also 
granted to the elderly (those over sixty years old), invalids, 
miners, migrant workers, and youth on national service, thus 
enlarging the base for many landowners to evade the nationaliza-
tion of their properties. 
2- The "non-exploitant'' category was further reduced by the decrees 
concerning the application of the agrarian reform. They have 
opened a possiblities for landowners not "living exclusively" on 
the income derived from their agricultural activities. This has 
allowed the agricultural income from the farm (which was in the 
range of 9,000 to 13,500 AD) to be supplemented with extra non-
agricultural income of between 9,000 to 13,500 dinars a year, 
depending on the number of dependent children. As well as being 
difficult to insure that this extra-agricultural income did not 
exceed its established limits, it allowed a certain degree of 
integration between agricultural and non-agricultural activities. 
It also allowed the total income of the owner to be six to nine 
times higher than the average salary of an agricultural worker in 
the self-management sector or that of the reform beneficiary. 
Moreover, the 1965 agricultural survey shown on page 371, indi-
cated that holdings of 50 ha. and more covered 1.5 million ha •• While 
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half the land (750,000 ha.)in this category belonged to city dwellers 
(19), the 1973 census showed that the average size of the farms owned 
by the absentees was only 7.13 ha., indicating that only small holding 
absentees were affected by the reform, often those whose proprties were 
too small to be worth returning to the countryside to work or who did 
not have the means of influence and manipulation to evade nationa-
lization. Hence the bulk of the absentees especially those that owned 
middle size properties were able to find ways of staying outside the 
reform framework. 
However, the undercounting of the large-scale owners and the 
absentees was not confined to the results of the statistics of 1973 on 
which the operations of nationalization and limitation were based. The 
actual lists used to carry out the reform were modified by the local 
authorities, namely the APCE in each commune, in 1974-75 to suit local 
conditions as they surveyed them. On average, across the country as a 
whole, 13 per cent of all proprietors disappeared in this second sur-
vey, an epidemic comparable in magnitude to the erosion of the proper-
ties themselves in earlier surveys, so that they were left outside the 
framework of the reform altogether (20). Hence the percentage of poten-
tially affected absentees and large-scale proprietors was further 
reduced from 5.15 per cent to just 3.36 per cent of all property 
holders with the result that potentially nationalizable land in the 
whole country was reduced from 900,000 ha. to under 600,000 ha (21). 
As well as the system of exemptions and the recognition of the 
right to extra-agricultural income which permitted large number of 
property holders whether absentees or limitables to escape nationaliza-
tion, many ways were followed by the holders that enabled them to be 
considered not affected. Bytaking advantage of the system of "indivi-
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sion", many limitable owners resorted to parcelling up large-scale 
property into several parts registered in the names of family members 
in order to escape nationalization. False information concerning the 
size and extent of the properties and the concealment of evidence on 
fertility and technical levels were common practices on the part of 
owners of limitable properties. Large scale proprietors who knew that 
they would not escape nationalization responded to the donation cam-
paign submitting part of their lands to the FNRA and thus were in a 
better position to impose their influence on the bodies charged with 
the reform implementation in a way that would guarantee that they kept 
the better plots for themselves. When all else failed, the proprietors 
made legal appeals for the revocation of the nationalization decrees. 
By June 1975, 5,000 such appeals were being heard nationwide. In the 
Wilaya of Setif, for example, out of 94 appeals, 26 decrees were annul-
led, returning 1,007 hectares to their original proprietors (22). 
Moreover, besides the official exemption of a large number of absentees 
under various titles, those who did not find any way of being recog-
nized under one of these titles were able simply to declare their 
residence on the land they owned thus avoiding the nationalization of 
their properties. However, the attempts of the landowners to avoid 
expropriation did not stop at trying to forge and fabricate evidence 
and information on their properties. As we will see shortly, they were 
engaged in a direct political and ideological struggle to discredit the 
reform and empty it of its contents in order to lessen its effects. 
By July 1973, after the completion of the two surveys, the moneta-
ry values of the maximum income of the the property holders were tran-
slated into real terms with the publication of the decree no.73-78 .of 
17 July 1973 establishing ~the ·"fourchett'es~'-# or niaxim.um. and minimum·. 
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holdings permissible for large landowners. Excess holdings above the 
specified limits were expropriated against the indemnity specified in 
the reform Charter. 
For the reasons stated above, which demonstrate that the lando-
wners were quite prepared for the reform and had exhibited ingenious 
methods of evading expropriation, it was quite understandable that the 
concrete results of the operations of this phase fell far short of 
expectations. They did not only fall short of the pre-independence 
estimate of 2.8 million hectares held by 25,000 proprietors of 50 
hectares or more, but also of that of the authors of the reform texts 
who estimated that 25 per cent of the private sector land belonged to 
only 16,500 proprietors of more than 50 ha. 
By September 1973 the first results of the second phase of the 
reform were being published. In the Wilaya of Constantine 56, 000 ha., 
belonging mainly to absentees, had been nationalized. 26,000 ha. of 
these had been redistributed to 1,600 beneficiaries grouped into 75 
production cooperatives (23). Redistribution of some lands took into 
account the nature of the crops planted so as not to disrupt the 
process of production. At the national level the results of this phase 
varied from time to time and from one state body to another, but by 
1977 about 500,000 hectares and 649,770 palm trees had been nationa-
lized and redistributed to the beneficiaries of the reform who were 
grouped into various cooperative units. This brought the total of land 
distributed in the course of the agrarian reform to 1.2 million 
hectares of land, of which around 900,000 hectares were agriculturally 
useful. This has represented about 13.3 per cent only of the total 
registered agriculturally usable land in the country (24). The total 
nurnberof·palm trees nationalized at the end of 1977 was 837,410 or 11 
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per cent of the total (25). 
General Results of the Agrarian Reform Operations (26) 
(June 1978) 
Phase one 
Area Transfered to FNRA 
of which: 
Agriculturally Useful Area 
Area to be Put in Use 
Distributed Area, 
of which: 
Agriculturally Useful Area 
Area to be Put in Use 
Number of Nationalized 
Palm Trees* 
Number of the Distributed 
Palm Trees* 
Number of Beneficiaries 
Organized in: 
CAPRA 
CAEC 
G.M.V. 
G.E.P. 
Individual Beneficiaries 
CAPCS* 
1,224,200 
683,300 
540,900 
640,200 
176,300 
392,522 
52,202 
31,404 
4,825 
11,011 
790 
4,172 
Phase Two 
510,400 
438,800 
71,600 
368,600 
81,300 
711,537 
38,569 
26,590 
1,318 
5,497 
1,855 
3,309 
Total 
1,734,600 
1,122,100 
612,500 
1,008,800 
257,600 
1,103,879 
1,083,528 
90,771 
57,994 
6,143 
16,508 
2,645 
7,381 
(No. ) * 
4,873 
614 
497 
1,569 
645 
Average Area Per BeneficiarY** 13.3 ha 
* 1980 
** 1977 
In all, by 1978 25,867 private proprietors were affected by the 
expropriation process, less than half (43 per cent) of those estimated 
as being potentially affected in the survey of 1973. They were divided 
into a majority of wholly expropriated absentees, forming 80 per cent 
of the total or 20,611 proprietors,and a minority of 5,256 larger 
owners. Since the average size of an absentee holding, according to the 
survey of 1973, was 7.13 ha. while that of the limitable property was 
53.97 ha., it is easy to notice that those most affected bY .the expro'p-
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riations were the small-scale absentees whose properties were not 
enough to support them and their families and who were forced to work 
outside their holdings, while large-scale owners were little affected 
during the second phase of the reform. A regional study by !NEAP in the 
Daira, (the administrative unit between commune and department 
[wilaya]), of Sour El Ghozlane in the Tell Atlas,supports this conten-
tion (27). The following table below from this study shows clearly that 
small proprietors lost relatively larger parts of their land than 
larger proprietors. 
The Effects of Land Nationalization on Different Categories of Farming 
Units in the Daira of Sour El Ghozlane in Tellatlas (28) 
Category of 
Units 
Less than 10 ha 
10 to 50 ha 
50 ha and more 
Average Nationaliza-
tion per Unit (1978) 
l. 34 ha 
1.25 ha 
5.90 ha 
Change in Average 
Unit Since 1973 
-19.85 % 
- 5.13 % 
- 7.73 % 
We can see therefore that the relative average area decreased among the 
smaller agricultural units following the agrarian reform (minus 20 per 
cent in the category 1-10 ha.) exceeded that of the larger agricultural 
units (only minus 5 per cent in the category 10-50 ha.). 
However, the aggregate figures of the size of expropriation many 
not reveal the exact impact of the reform in changing the structure of 
ownership in the private sector and in the creation of the new coopera-
tive sector. The quality of the nationalized and distributed land and 
the types of crops planted in it is of great importance in indicating 
the nature of the land in the new cooperative sector. Government 
statistics indicate that the majority of the nationalized land in the 
agr:a-rian ref"Orm sectpr -was-:composoo either of:·:J.and~planted with cereals 
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(46 per cent) or of fallow land (39 per cent), as shown by the follo-
wing table: 
Distribution of Private Sector Land According to Type of Crop 
(1970-71/1977-78) (29) 
(in hectares) 
1970-71 1977-78 
Crops Private Sector Coop.Sector Private Sector 
Cereals 2,300,000 508,510 1,533,880 
Fallow Land 2,410,000 424,390 2,647,960 
Natural Meadow 20,000 3,450 13,650 
Wine 40,000 9,380 34,350 
Fruit Plantations 211,000 59,870 242,380 
Unproductive Land 299,000 45,870 268,710 
Total 5,280,000 1,051,470 4,740,930 
This shows that the major part of the land in the agrarian reform 
sector was planted with cereals, which means that capitalist private 
sector was not as much affected by the reform as might have been 
expected. Although there was no indication on the level of crop produc-
tivity of the land in this sector, the choice was left to the limitable 
proprietor to determine the part of his land that would be exprop-
riated, which suggests that this part would be of lower fertility and 
productivity than the part which remained under his control. Apart from 
the creation of the sector of the "agrarian revolution" on a small part 
of the private sector, the organizational system of production and 
ownership both in the remaining part of the private sector and in the 
self-management sector remained unchanged. 
However, despite the relatively small amount of land which 
materialized from the operations of the two phases of the reform and 
its apparent low quality, the major effect of the reform was the rear-
ganization of ownership and cultivation of public land and the lands of 
absentee owners. Through the reform these lands were transformed from 
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being controlled by renters and run by share-croppers on a pre-capita-
list basis into a different mode of operation characterized by the new 
cooperative organization with its new orientation of production using 
modern means of cultivation. Since the amount of transformed public 
land exceeded that taken from the absentee owners, it may be suggested 
that, despite the importance being given to the second phase of the 
reform and the publicity that was expressed in its course, the major 
structural change introduced by the agrarian reform lay in its first 
phase. Thus the main thrust of the reform was in the reorganization of 
the structure of ownership and mode of cultivation in the direction of 
freeing lands that were tied to low productivity methods of cultivation 
and backward tenancy arrangements and their reorganization into the 
newly commercialized cooperative sector. The second phase, on the other 
hand, apart from capturing the land that belonged to small-scale 
absentee owners, was more oriented towards political change than 
towards introducing solid changes in the organization of cultivation 
and production. This meant that the second phase, unlike the first, did 
not disturb the prevailing mode of production in its target area of 
operations which was predominantly commercialized, with the greater 
enhancement of the capitalist form of production. It also meant that 
the commercialization of agricultural sector was the most important 
goal of the reform. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN TONARDS AN EVALUATION OF TilE AGRARIAN REFORM 
The Effects of the Reform on the Organization of the Labour Force 
If the reform seemed to have some impact in transforming the 
organization of cultivation and ownership in parts of the rural areas, 
and if it aroused a certain degree of political debate and expectation, 
its effects in changing the living standard of the rural population and 
their conditions of production were minimal. The small amount of land 
already nationalized meant that only a small number of beneficiaries 
were affected. We saw that the number of the beneficiaries in the first 
phase represented only a tiny fraction of the applicants for the reform 
plots. With the completion of the redistribution operations in the 
second phase the total number of beneficiaries reached about 90,000. 
Even with the persistence of the phenomenon of "withdrawal", where many 
beneficiaries replaced others who withdrew from their allotted plots, 
this number still represented less than half the number of the appli-
cants, let alone of potential beneficiaries, if the reform was to meet 
its goal of improving the living standards of the poor and landless 
members of the rural population (1). 
In fact, if land redistribution in the course of the reform had 
solved anything, it did not solve the chronic problems of unemployment 
and under-employment in the rural sector. According to the statistics 
of 1964, the number of landless peasants was estimated at 400,000 and 
that of the poor peasants (with less than 10 hectares) was 425,000. 
Taking demographic growth into account which was at its highest rate 
amongst the rural population, there were at least 900,000 potential 
beneficiaries at the time of the launching of the agrarian reform. Thu~ 
if 10 ha. per beneficiary would provide the minimum for nourishing the· 
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beneficiary and his family, about 5 million hectares were required for 
distribution to the landless rural dwellers and a further 3 million 
hectares to complement the properties of the small-scale owners who 
constituted the total number of potential beneficiaries. In the 
conditions of the availability of agricultural land in Algeria, even a 
"radical" agrarian reform could not distribute more than 2.5 million 
hectares, including the communal and public lands sequestrated during 
the first phase,and even this would satisfy only half the landless (2). 
However, due to the high ceilings of ownership and to the many 
outlets for avoiding nationalization which permitted large landowner-
ship to continue to exist, the total nationalized area was too restric-
ted to allow a larger number of beneficiaries to be incorporated in the 
newly created sector of the agrarian reform. Thus only slightly more 
than one million hectares were nationalized in the course of the two 
phases of the reform. Until 1978 the beneficiaries of the reform repre-
sented less than 10 per cent of potential candidates. 
Grouped in a total number of 5,261 cooperative units at the end of 
1974 each with an average size of 217 ha and an average membership of 
15, each beneficiary had on average 14.3 ha. (3). This was slightly 
reduced in 1977 to 13.3 ha, and represented the minimum necessary for 
the subsistence of the beneficiary and his family. 
With this scarcity of land for distribution, one would have expec-
ted that great competition would take place among the applicants or the 
beneficiaries to hold on their allotted plots. However, like the first 
phase of the reform, the problem of "withdrawal" continued to persist 
all along the period of implementing the reform. A total of 4,885 
during the first phase and 3,155 in the second withdrew from their 
plots • The total number of beneficiaries of 85 ,_7B8 at the end".o.f .. J.97.4: 
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declined to 82,500 in 1976, because a number of beneficiaries had 
renounced their allotments and left their cooperatives. The official 
figures of the percentage of withdrawal vary between 8 to 10 per cent 
of the beneficiaries. While this phenomenon was general, the most 
affected Wilayas were Algiers, Blida, and Constantine (4). Most studies 
on this subject show that there was some correlation between the 
phenomenon of withdrawal and the process of industrialization-urbaniza-
tion which was accelerated at the end of the first four-year plan, 
together with the various problems Which the new beneficiaries were 
facing (5). The immediate effect of this phenomenon was that it contri-
buted further to limiting the impact of the agrarian reform in radical-
ly changing the structure of employment in the agricultural sector. 
Thus,even adding in the landless herders organized into coopera-
tives on state lands in phase three (who had received 3,837 rams and 
102,7'70 ewes by 1976), the total employed directly in agricultural 
production in the reform sector came to only 110,000 persons, about 7.2 
per cent of the active rural male population (6). 
With a total agricultural population of 8.2 million in 1980 and an 
annual increase of 550,000 persons between 1974-77, of which 85,000 are 
economically active, the reform did not have even a temporary pallia-
tive impact on the problem of employment in the agricultural sector 
(7). The number of beneficiaties was of the same order of the annual 
increase in the active agricultural labour force. Since many of the 
beneficiaries or at least 50 per cent of them were already working, as 
the priority of distributing the land was given essentially to those 
who were working on it, the impact of the reform on improving the total 
members employed was minimal • 
. on the contrary, · cer::tain aspects of. the. ·r-eform had :.ev.en:. campli-· 
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cated life for the small peasants (8). The area of sharecropping or 
"association" cherka, had been reduced since the property of the absen-
tee landowners had been nationalized. "This substantial reduction in 
the area available to small peasants under the "association" system 
might have caused greater rather than lesser structural differences in 
rural Algeria" (9). Thus the number of the reform beneficiaries was 
lower than the former employees on the land of waged workers, Khammas, 
or the tenants of public and communal lands who were replaced by the 
new beneficiaries. 
By 1976 there were still 940,000 poor and landless agricultural 
workers untouched by the reform, divided into 630,000 landless and 
310,000 owners with less than 5 ha (10). Some of them were dependent 
either on occasional employment in the non-agricultural sectors or on 
remittances from emigrant workers abroad (11). Others found seasonal 
employment in the three sectors of agriculture including the sector of 
the agrarian reform. 
By 1978, after the completion of the agrarian reform, the number 
of the people employed by the state agricultural sector, that is the 
self-management sector together with the cooperative sector created by 
the agrarian reform, was in the range of 300,000, divided approximately 
equally between the two sectors. Together they supported a population 
of 2 million. This meant that the conditions of 6 million or three 
quarters of the agricultural population, had hardly been affected 
either by the agrarian reform of by independence. 
The minimal, or rather the negative, effects of the reform on 
employment in the agricultural sector together with increasing employ-
ment opportunities in the non-agricultural sectors which were greatly 
enhanced a£ter the ••.o.i·l crisis" ·o-f -197-3-, -meant -the pe-rsistence of the 
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problem of rural to urban migration. This migration, which was in a 
range of 50,000 to 100,000 per year, was not ameliorated with the 
introduction of agrarian reform. Since the expansion of employment in 
the non- agricultural sector was based much more on the expansion of 
construction and administration than of industry (12), and since emplo-
yment in these activities became limited after the basic industrial 
infrastructure had been installed, the gravity of the migration problem 
has continued to persist. 
The Politics of Implementation 
Part of the deficiencies in the implementation of the reform and 
its the generally insignificant results with both regard to the confis-
cated areas and its impact on employment related to the way that the 
reform was implemented and the nature of the institutions charged with 
its implementation. 
From the outset the agrarian reform was presented as an embodiment 
of "national solidarity" in which all Algerians had an immediate and 
long term interest. "The Agrarian Revolution will never be a class 
struggle, but will achieve national solidarity" (13). And if such 
"national solidarity" implied some form of struggle it was a "struggle 
between the revolutionary forces who have faith in the destiny and the 
future of the people and certain category of counterrevolutionary 
forces which work for its particular interest" (14). Opposition to the 
reform was never linked with other than certain counter-revolutionaries 
which had no faith in the future of Algeria. Those forces or elements, 
on the other hand, according to the Charter and the official speeches, 
could be found anywher.e in society and were not identified with parti-
~ular -soctarcclasses or fractinns of classes -since :the existence- of · 
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classes was rejected. And if the reform aimed at limiting large proper-
ties and eliminating archaic and backward forms of production and 
tenure, it did not run counter to the interests of any social group. In 
other words, according to the official view, if there was opposition to 
the agrarian reform, it was a political one expressed by people who had 
no faith in the Algerian revolution or who had misconceived ideas about 
the future of Algeria. 
Thus no attempt was made to identify opposition to the reform with 
the agrarian bourgeoisie as a socio-economic class, which by definition 
would oppose any reform that aimed not only at the "elimination of the 
exploitation of man by man", but also any Which would result in even a 
partial expropriation of its properties. On the contrary, not only were 
assurances made, whether in the Charter or in the President's speeches, 
to proprietors that the reform would preserve their properties, but 
they were even invited to participate actively in the operations of the 
reform. In its first pages the Charter drew attention to the fact hat 
"the agrarian revolution aims at the modernization of agriculture ••.. It 
does not aim at the abolition of the rights of property as such ...• On 
the contrary, it confirms the rights of the small and medium propriet-
ors ••• It will compensate the owners of nationalized properties" (15). 
In the belief that the landowners would support the reform (and that if 
some did oppose it, this was because of their lack of faith in the 
people and not because they were objectively against the aims of the 
reform) they were invited to participate in the operations of the 
reform through the "campaign of donations" launched at the begining of 
the reform. Moreover, although the reform was made in the name of the 
poor and landless peasants and not in that of the large and medium 
landowners-,- the former did not find any means: o£·-expressing their. 
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interests or willingness to implement the reform. Thus, in the words of 
Zghal, "the agrarian reform seemed to mobilize certain radical elements 
in the city rather than the poor peasantry" (16). The poor peasants and 
the agricultural workers remained outside the framework of the reform 
implementation and had no significant influence upon it. On the 
contrary, the landed proprietors, merchants and other enterpreneurs, 
and state and party officials, who formed the backbone of support for 
the national ruling class, constituted the authorities responsible for 
implementing the reform (17). 
The organ chiefly responsible for the reform implementation was 
the elected APCE which held wide powers, cited earlier, in translating 
the reform text into reality. These organs included various representa-
tives from the army, the peasants union (UNPA), the state services and 
marketing network (CAPCS), the local branches of the national bank 
(BNA), and members of the original APC (the communal Popular Assembly), 
who were elected locally after having been nominated by the party. The 
former representatives were added to the APC mainly in order to 
"compensate for the weakness of the expertise of the technical cadres" 
(18). It was also officially propagated that such an enlargement would 
democratize the process of the reform implementation. However, as 
asserted by Etienne: "this enlargement was not necessarily done to 
benefit the landless peasants. In the region of Oran in particular, •••• 
on the contrary, it has permited the "internal enemies" (feudalists, 
absentiest bourgeois) to infiltrate and to participate in making the 
lists of beneficiaries" (19). 
In fact the Charter of the agrarian reform provided in article 
·174, that "the persons Who are invited to participate i.n the implemen-
tation.of .the Agrarian Re!llolution shoqld .not hold any interest liable 
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to be affected by measures of total or partial nationalization". How-
ever, this provision was never respected."The members of the elected 
APCE or the APW (at the regional level), the party, and the state 
functionaries, were quite often landed proprietors themselves, and some 
of them put the defence of their interests before any concern for 
socialist solidarity" (20). 
Hence if potentially affected landowners were not directly 
present, they were effectively represented through various means or 
connections within the local and regional authorities. The elected 
members of the APC, for example, were mainly middle-level proprietors, 
shopkeepers, rural intellegentsia such as schoolteachers, and civil 
servants (21). Moreover, as Weexsteen remarked "it is not unusual that 
the presidents of the APCs, who appoint the presidents of the Enlarged 
Popular Communal Assemblies, are themselves big or middle landowners. 
The cleavages between partisans and opponents of the Agrarian Revolu-
tion erupt frequently in these Assemblies" implying that these clea-
vages discourage new reforms and initiatives (22). 
Although representatives of the peasants union were present in the 
APCEs, the ratio of peasant representation was much lower than that of 
middle property owners. At the regional and national level, this lack 
of representation could hardly escape notice. Furthermore, the peasants 
union, in which membership was categorized into rich and poor peasants 
or between employing farmers and wage labourers (23), was in fact 
formed from small and middle owners. Far from being able to take the 
agrarian reform into its hands it was in fact constituted in the same 
time as the reform operations launched. Thus it "had only a symbolic 
rcle,and i"Ooked very much like the peasants mouthpiece of the FLN and 
the army_" (2-1-), contributing more to the predominan~ of the interests 
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of the landowners within the organs of the reform. 
These shortcomings were reflected in the sluggishness of the APCEs 
in carrying out the reform. In the operations of expropriation the APCs 
allowed generous exemptions to be made, so that large absentee proprie-
tors who were threatened with expropriation were often allowed to sell 
part of their properties, while potentially limitable proprietors were 
allowed to choose which lands to give up. This explains why those 
most severely affected by the reform were the small-scale absentees who 
were not present to defend their properties. on some occasions the 
cooperatives which were constituted by the APCs were formed from among 
the bad candidates so as to distort the cooperative experience and to 
ensure its control by middle and rich peasants (25). 
The manipulations of the implementation of the reform by suppor-
ters of rich farmers aroused a great deal of opposition from the 
spontaneously organized student volunteers who surveyed the countryside 
every year as part of a volunteer programme to help peasants acquire an 
adequate knowledge of the "agrarian revolution". They exposed and 
condemned in many occasions such manipulations on many occasions. 
One student volunteer wrote exposing the way the reform was introduced 
by the APC to the poor peasants, that: 
"The APCEs, which was to care for diffusing and implemen-
ting the agrarian revolution, were controlled by the landed 
proprietors who had done all things to sabotage the 
(revolution's) operations. Meetings were organized to 
inform the peasants about the revolution, but they 
were held .•.. in classical Arabic and not in the (Alge-
rian) dialect. Moreover, the reading of certain articles 
was omitted. In some regions where the rate of rural 
illiteracy reached 90 per cent, information was given on 
posters. These manoeuvres were often accompanied by 
pressures on poor peasants not to register in the 
lists of beneficiaries. A counter-propaganda has deve-
lepeen { 26) • 
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Moreover, the influence of the landowners on the bodies responsib-
le for implementing the reform which allowed them to avoid having their 
properties expropriated, did not prevent them from engaging in politi-
cal and ideological struggles against it. When expropriation seemed 
inevitable for some they resorted to means of open resistance and 
ideological campaigns designed to discredit the reform and to provide a 
hostile ground against it. Reports by Algerian Student Volunteers even 
spoke of a "counter-revolution on the part of large landowners. One 
report stated that "the big landowners do not hesitate to distort the 
fundamental principles of the agrarian revolution to threaten and 
directly intimidate the poor and landless peasants so that they do not 
put their names down in the lists of recipients (of distributed land)" 
(27). There were cases when the large landowners forcibly prevented 
some potential beneficiaries from signing up for the reform, or allowed 
them to sign up on the agreement that the landowners would then 
purchase the titles and destroy them (28). In trying to mobilize the 
peasants against the reform by invoking their traditional Islamic 
millitancy, the large landowners tried very hard to portray the reform 
as an infringement of the law of Islam and the teachings of the Qur•an 
in that it was designed to abolish private property. Hence the drought 
of 1973 and the floods of 1974 were presented as evidence of God's 
anger at the agrarian reform. 
We can see therefore that the denial of class struggle and the 
emphasis on national solidarity did not prevent the landowners from 
engaging in this struggle mainly through their connections with, and 
frequently control of, the bodies responsible for implementing the 
objectives of the agrarian reform or through direct means aiming at 
limiting the effects of the reform upon their interests. The result was 
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a drastic restriction of the land area over which the reform operated 
and the preservation of inequality in landownership. This meant that 
although some capitalist farmers had the limitation of their properties 
limited, capitalist forms of production were still preserved. 
The Establisrument of the Cooperative System 
''The land to those who till it", represented one part of the 
agrarian reform. Another important aspect was "to organize the use of 
the land and the means of production in a way that will permit the 
amelioration of production by the application of efficient techniques". 
The latter was simply viewed as the organization of agricultural 
production and its integration in a new cooperative system. Hence the 
reform text stipulated that all the beneficiaries should join a coope-
rative of some kind. 
For the authors of the reform text the cooperative system represe-
nted the optimal form, outside self-management, of the intensification 
of agricultural production. Its choice reflected not only the state's 
disenchantment with the system of self-management, whose existence was 
tolerated rather than supported or enhanced, but also the peasants' 
opposition to collective exploitation. A wide section of the peasantry 
were familiar with the problems with which the workers in the self-
management sector were faced with, and it was therefore quite predicta-
ble that they would resist affiliation to a new system of extended 
self-management (29). 
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The C.A.P.C.S 
The establishment of the cooperatives was proceeded by the crea-
tion by the Ministry of Agriculture at the level of the rural commune 
of the Cooperative Agricole Polyvalente Communal de Services 
(C.A.P.C.S.), designed to articulate and coordinate the functions of 
entire cooperative units. The function of the CAPCS was "to put at the 
disposal of its members all the services necessary for the best exploi-
tation of the land on which they work, the intensification and diversi-
fication of the production of these lands, and, eventually, for the 
marketing of these products under the supervision of the bodies concer-
ned" (30). The CAPCS was to "constitute one of the technical-economical 
supports of the state within the policies of rural development on the 
communal level" (31). Therefore, it had the function of organizing the 
reform beneficiaries, making sure that each one farmed his allotted 
lands, conformed to the production requirements of the national plan, 
and participated in public work projects. It was also charged with the 
task of providing agricultural inputs and marketing the produce of the 
cooperative units. It was to act as extension agency, service station, 
agricultural credit institute and sales agent. In short, CAPCS was to 
be a supervisor and an organiser of the cooperative units (32). Once 
established, it was to participate actively in the implementation of 
the agrarian reform. Furthermore, its functions were not to be confined 
to the agrarian reform sector but were also to include the self-managed 
and the private agricultural sectors. Hence membership in the communal 
service cooperative was compulsory for the state agricultural sector 
(that is the self-managed and the agrarian reform sector), and optional 
for the private sector. 
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It was planned to establish 600 CAPCS, one for each rural commune. 
Physically this involved the construction of an office, two storage 
barns, and a repair workshop. Later on further buildings would be added 
according to the local agricultural specialisation (33). By 1973 the 
first service cooperatives were being inaugurated. One of the first was 
at Ameur el Ain, 80 km west of Algiers. Its members are ten self-
managed estates, one "cooperative des anciens moudjahidines", and one 
agrarian reform cooperative, established during the first phase (34). 
By 30 June 1979, 674 CAPCS were created in a total of 703 rural 
communes. In the course of the second four-year plan (1974-1977), the 
CAPCS acquired about 4,000 tractors, 1,300 combined-harvesters, 1,400 
disk ploughs, more than 1,300 ploughshares, and 1,260 lorries (35). 
The administrative hierarchy of the CAPCS was composed on the one 
hand of a Management Council including a President who were to be 
democratically elected by the members, and on the other of a Technical 
Council including a treasurer and a director who were appointed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The director and not the president of the 
CAPCS was to assure that the running of the cooperative conformed with 
the national plan. This was the same dual structure that had been 
institutionalized within the self-managed farms and the reform produc-
tion units; it ensured the close supervision by unelected local repre-
sentatives of the national government. On this subject P. Knauss 
commented that: 
"Like the history of the self-management bureaucratiza-
tion (the control of vital offices by the state), is 
another example of the government's desire to keep the 
peasants within the constraints of its rather narrow 
objectives: namely, to increase levels of agricultural 
production and to slow down the rural-urban exodus".(36) 
The Management Councils of CAPCS were formed from among the bene-
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ficiaries of the agrarian reform and the workers of the state agricul-
tural sector who represented 46 and 23 per cent of the councils members 
respectively in 1977 (37). The representation of the private sector was 
limited by factors such as the requirement that private farmers who 
chose to join the CAPCS agreed to coordinate their production with the 
communal and national plan, and that as the operations of the reform 
were not yet officially ended many private owners could not join. 
However, the percentage of the representation of private farmers within 
the management councils was relatively significant (23 per cent). The 
remaining 9 per cent of representatives were divided equally into 
employees of state and local agencies, representatives of the UNPA, and 
a collection of artisans, merchants, members of APC, teachers, adminis-
trators, etc. 
Given the close state supervision of the functions and the struc-
ture of its administration, the CAPCS represented another state agency 
organising and supervising the functions of the state agricultural 
units and to some extent the private farms. S.Bedrani agreed with the 
conclusion of one journalist who wrote that "in a number of cases, the 
management council of the CAPCS existed only on paper, the affairs were 
steered, often in an authoritarian manner, by the director ...•• The 
democratic functions of the CAPCS was also blocked, and the peasants' 
only relation with the CAPCS straightforwardly commercial ones" (38). 
The work of the CAPCS was also open to the manipulation and 
influence of the rich farmers and the state bureaucracy. In fact some 
researchers directly observed cases in which the personnel of the CAPCS 
used its facilities for their own private gain (39). In practice, the 
CAPCS acted as " the employer of the "cooperators" of the Agrarian 
revolution, working for monthly pay, and it had very little to do with 
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a ''Cooperative" (if this means that its operations are controlled by 
the producers)" (40). 
The first CAPCS did not seriously begin operations until September 
1975. During the first years of its functions CAPCS concentrated its 
activities on the support of the state agricultural sector. With a 
relatively large technical and material base CAPCS was able to meet the 
demand of the state agricultural sector and to some extent that of the 
private sector. This resulted in limiting the activities played by 
agricultural enterpreneurs (who are often the large landowners) in 
renting out agricultural material. They faced strong competition from 
CAPCS, since the latter possessed relatively new materials hired at 
stable and low prices (41). 
However, private suppliers of agricultural materials and wholesa-
lers were not totally replaced by the activities of CAPCS. When the 
state opened the financial flow to the private sector at the end of the 
1970s, after a period of neglect and in a bid to increase agricultural 
production, the work of the CAPCS was soon to run into problems as the 
demand for inputs increased in a dramatic way. It became increasingly 
incapable of meeting demands for inputs and for the efficient marketing 
of agricultural produce. Structural problems relating to the location 
of the CAPCS offices and their distance from the farms, inadequate 
transport and storage facilities, and the lack of trained personnel, 
affected the capacity of the CAPCS to supply the agricultural sector 
adequately with its needs. Private suppliers and wholesalers who were 
often themselves large landowners were encouraged to undertake the 
tasks which CAPCS was too slow or unable to achieve. They dealt with 
the private sector-and, illegally, with part of the state sector by 
supplying .them with materials.and.marketing produc~, charg;ing and 
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paying in both cases higher prices than that of CAPCS. 
In dealing with agricultural farms whether in the private or state 
sector, CAPCS followed strictly economic criteria which tended to 
favour the most efficient and profitable farms. As far as the private 
sector was concerned, this meant that rich farmers were better situated 
to take advantage of the services provided by CAPCS. As emphasized by 
s.Bedrani; 
"The agrarian capitalists are certainly much more fa-
voured than the subsistence or semi-subsistence produ-
cers. In fact, their social relations, the prestige and 
the authority that are embedded in their fortunes, make 
the CAPCS, whose management as we have seen is not very 
democratic, give them priority over other private produ-
cers in that their credits and machinery orders are much 
more easily granted" (42). 
The Cooperative Units 
The establishment of the cooperative units went hand in hand with 
the operations of the reform. It was carried out by the APCEs from 
among the beneficiaries chosen by the same bodies. The beneficiaries 
had no say in deciding which cooperative to join or the number of 
workers in each unit. The APCE decided these matters. It also retained 
the authority to admit new members and expel old ones from the coopera-
tive unit. 
By 1977-78, the area occupied by by the agrarian reform sector and 
under some form of cooperative system reached 1,005,600 hectares or 
little more than 13 per cent of the total useful agricultural area of 
the country, estimated at 7.5 million hectares. With nearly 100,000 
beneficiaries and 10,000 seasonal workers the reform sector employed 
~abO~t 8.2 -per. cent :o.f: -the active agricultural population in that year. 
At t:he level of production, the reform sector produced in l977-7B 13.6 
467 
per cent of total cereal production in Algeria (2.1 million quintals), 
11.8 per cent of dry vegetables, and 8.2 per cent of market crops. 
Among the five types of the cooperative, the CAPRA was designed as 
the most advanced form of cooperation that was to be achieved by the 
other types after a period of development. The management arrangement 
of the cooperative units varied according to the type of cooperation. 
In the advanced form of CAPRA the management was organized in the same 
way as in the self-management sector, where the workers were to elect 
their own president and management council from among themselves, while 
the Ministry of Agriculture was to appoint a technical director and 
supply an extension agent, and the national bank was to assign an 
accountant to audit the finances. The same organization was to be 
followed by other types with differences in the representation of the 
state within the cooperative unit. 
By the end of the reform operations, more than 90 per cent of the 
beneficiaries were organized into production cooperatives. The indivi-
dual beneficiaries represented exceptional cases since their numbers 
did not exceed more than 7,481 or little more than 8 per cent of the 
total beneficiaries (224). The table below shows the distribution of 
the beneficiaries over the different types of cooperative together with 
the number of cooperatives created in the course of the reform: 
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Formation of Cooperatives,l974-l977 (44) 
Units of lst Phase 2nd Phase Both Phases Total 
Production 31/12/1974 31/12/1974 31/12/1974 31/3/1977 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
CAPRA 1,748 60 1,854 79 3,602 68 4,203 72 
CAEC 601 20 214 9 815 15 528 9 
GMV 572 20 186 8 758 14 930 16 
GEP 86 4 86 2 170 3 
GI 10 0.2 
Total Coops. 2,921 2,340 5,261 5,841 
Individual 
Allotments 2,316 3,907 6,223 9,814 
The size of land area and the number of beneficiaries of each form 
in 1977 were as follows: (45) 
Unit Area (ha) % Members % 
CAPRA 735,906 82.0 52,000 65 
CAEC 58,334 6.5 5,650 7 
GMV 90,964 10.0 18,400 23 
GEP+GI l3 ,462 1.5 3,95(: 5 
TOTAL 898,666 100 90,000 100 
The tables above show that CAPRA represented the predominant form 
of cooperation established by the reform. Apart from the GMVs, which 
were required because of the scarcity of cultivable lands and, because 
of the poor quality of some parts of the distributed land, which needed 
improvement and preparation, other forms of cooperation were quite 
negligible. The GEPs and the Gis, which were designed to include the 
small and the middle peasants of the private sector, represented a very 
small part of the cooperative units or only 3.2 per cent. Private 
peasants were reluctant to join the cooperative system and preferred to 
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stay independent of state control even if this meant, especially for 
small owners, that their incomes remained lower than that of the reform 
beneficiaries (46). For the majority of the private peasants staying 
outside the cooperative system meant that they could determine the 
consumption and sale of their products. It also meant that they were 
free to move to other occupations inside or outside agriculture. The 
predominance of the CAPRA form of cooperation and the tiny fraction of 
cooperatives in the GEP and GI reflected the reform's preference for 
larger, more productive and more profitable units (47). This is demon-
strated by the table above in showing the decline by 35 per cent in the 
number of CAECs as transitional units between 1974 and 1977 which meant 
that some CAEC cooperatives were pressured by the Ministry of Agricul-
ture to become CAPRAs. 
The Cooperative System in Practice 
This description e situation of the cooperative system suggests 
that despite the different types of cooperative units that the reform 
was supposed to establish, only the form of CAPRA was in fact encou-
raged, regardless of whether the conditions necessary for its establi-
shment were present. This reflected above all the interest of the 
reform in expanding state control over the agricultural sector and 
production, since this system was the only way of providing maximum 
state control over the peasantry (48). The imposition of this form of 
cooperation was mainly a result of a technocratic vision which 
considered that only the regroupment of land under the form of 
cooperative production could provide the outlets necessary for the 
industrial programme (49). 
However, the predominance of CAPRA implied that the cooperative 
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system would face various structural problems and conflicts which might 
be reflected negatively upon the performance of the production units. 
First of all the beneficiaries who composed the membership of the 
cooperative units were remarkably heterogeneous. They had different and 
sometimes conflicting material interests and they lacked the social and 
economic cohesion necessary for the formation of the cooperative unit. 
There were those beneficiaries who were small or even medium owners and 
who retained their properties within the cooperative units in which 
they were members, and there were the landless beneficiaries who did 
not own any land. Within the latter there were also ex-sharecroppers 
and ex-agricultural workers (50). This diversity of the socio-economic 
background of the beneficiaries was the source of conflicting material 
interests between "those who owned private parcels and those who did 
not own, between those who draw concurrently extra-agricultural incomes 
and those who live solely on working the cooperative land" (51). This 
conflict and lack of cohesion had a serious effect on the performance 
of the units. 
Other problems that faced the running of the cooperatives related 
mainly to the nature of the work force employed by the cooperative 
sector with regard to its age and technical and educational qualifica-
tions and training. A sizable part of the working force in the coopera-
tive sector over 50 years old and had lacked the optimal physical 
capacity to undertake the jobs assigned to it in an efficient manner or 
to acquire the necessary training for the efficient use of modern 
techniques. Also, according to many studies, the level of qualification 
was noticeably low; 38 per cent of the beneficiaries were illiterate, 
ana had less experience in the use of the advanced methods and techni-
ques~ot:--cult-i-Va~i-On--{ 52-}. F0rmer sharecroppers, renters, and wage 
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workers often did not have enough knowledge of modern farming to avoid 
making costly errors in soil preparation, seed planting, and plant 
growth supervision. 
Moreover, the lands distributed to the beneficiaries were not of 
equal quality in terms of fertility, location, proximity to the market 
and to the CAPCS centres, and the availability of trained cadres. The 
variation among the cooperative units in the possession of these faci-
lities was reflected in the variation of their incomes. Thus, some 
units were able to make profits mainly because they had more fertile 
land or better access to the facilities and services necessary for the 
production process, while other units were in serious deficit. Hence in 
1974 out of 3,164 cooperatives, only 1,233 or 39 per cent were showing 
profit, while the remaining 61 per cent were in deficit (53). This 
difference in profitability was much more related to the initial endow-
ments of the units than to the actual efforts made by the beneficia-
ries. 
Although the initial distribution of land was undertaken on the 
basis that the size of the distributed plot would provide a determined 
level of income, many cooperatives proved unproductive and could not 
reach the estimated income after their creation.This was either because 
the land was not properly prepared to become productive or because it 
was unsuitable for mechanization. It was often the case that the 
cooperatives established in the lands recovered during the first phase 
of the reform faced many problems relating to fertility and the avail-
ability of water resources. Hence a number of CAPRA were soon converted 
to GMV cooperatives when it became obvious that they were still in a 
situation where -.the land needed extensive preparation befare it could 
become productive. This· might explain why the number of the' coopera-
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tives under the form of GMV in the table above only changed slightly 
between 1974 and 1977, since although many GMVs were converted into 
CAPRAs, as many CAPRAs were converted back into GMVs. 
Other problems that faced the newly established cooperatives 
related to a variety of factors such as the location of the work places 
and their proximity to the residences of the cooperators which was in 
some cases too far to make daily labour practicable. Serious difficul-
ties faced the supply of materials and equipment and the marketing of 
products resulting in regular delays which all affected the ability of 
the cooperatives to achieve a satisfactory level of performance (54). 
As a result of these difficulties, which were mainly due to the 
generally poor quality of the land in the reform sector compared to 
that of the self-management sector or to the unaffected part of the 
private sector, which meant that it was extremely difficult to attain a 
level of high productivity, the cooperators resorted to many practices 
regarded as illegal by the state which run counter to the spirit of 
cooperation. Low wages induced the cooperators to carry out activities 
similar to those noticed in the self-management sector such as self-
consumption of the produce instead of selling it to the state marketing 
agencies, or keeping their animals on the cooperative land illegally 
and independently of the other members. Other cooperators sought, also 
illegally, temporary employment outside the cooperative, since wages on 
their holdings were not enough to support their families. 
The most serious consequence of these problems was the intensifi-
cation of the phenomenon of withdrawal where the beneficiaries 
abandoned their cooperatives altogether to either join the stream of 
rural to urbanmigrat-icm or·to find some..sort.of.other employment in 
the ag~icultural sector. Withdrawal took~J>.J.-ac_e i11llllediate-ly· after the 
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distribution of the lands when beneficiaries found that their assigned 
plots were inadequate and therefore sought employment elsewhere. How-
ever it continued even after the beneficiaries had accepted membership 
of the cooperatives when they found that working conditions were too 
hard and that it was difficult to attain a desired level of income. 
Withdrawal of the cooperators was at its highest near the large urban 
centres following the increase in the demands of urban employment that 
took place after the reform. In the region of Algiers the withdrawal 
rate was around 40 per cent in 1974. Officially, for a total number of 
withdrawal up to 1977 of 8,040, only 4,665 replacements had been found. 
The scale of the withdrawal phenomenon was reflected in headlines in 
the national press: "land without beneficiaries, why?","the withdrawal, 
a consequence of the bureaucracy", "Mahema, a commune seeking benefi-
ciaries" (55). The size of this phenomenon in certain regions was quite 
apparent to the extent that the Walis (Governors) of El-Asnam,Oran, and 
Annaba provinces, ordered that any reform beneficiary who had withdrawn 
from his cooperative should be barred from employment in other sectors 
of the economy (56). 
The Socio-economic Nature of the Reform Cooperatives 
The general structure and organization of the cooperative units 
were bound to be influenced by the nature of the tasks which they were 
supposed to fulfill. One of the major aims of the agrarian reform was 
the greater incorporation of the agricultural sector in the economy 
through the creation of modern, profitable, and productive agricultural 
units together with the expansion of state control over this sector. 
This, would have a real effect on the general nature of the reform and 
·ttre -status of the beneficiaries and their power vis-a-vis the state .. 
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Our discussion on the nature of the cooperative sector will cover the 
period until 1982. 
1-The Decision making Power 
The text of the reform and the organization of the cooperative 
system stipulated that the General Assembly of the cooperators was 
responsible for determining the distribution of the means of production 
and the plan of cultivation. However, in deciding these matters the 
Assembly was to operate within the confines of the communal plan elabo-
rated by the representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture. This meant 
that the latter was able to modify the plan of cultivation if, as in 
the case of the self-management sector, it was thought to be contradic-
ting the national or the communal plan. 
Translated in real terms, the cooperators were only able to carry 
out the orders of the state representatives. The decision on the nature 
and quantity of crops to be cultivated was taken by the state although 
this was often concealed by the fact that, the wishes of the latter in 
the matter of the cultivation plan frequently coincided with those of 
the producers. In fact natural conditions and the amount of labour 
available offered little choice of possible alternatives (57). State 
control also extended to decisions regarding investment and the supply 
of credits and their use. Members of the cooperatives could not decide 
on the distribution of their capital without authorization from the 
state banking or administrative agencies.The use of the credits granted 
by the state was specified in detail. The cooperators could not, for 
example, buy a motor pump with the money granted for the purchase of a 
seeder, and all expenses, even less important ones had to be authorized 
by the BNA (58). This applied also to the manner in which the revenues 
of the cooperatives were distributed, where the General Assembly could 
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only put up proposals to the administrative or banking authorities. 
Despite the relative freedom of the cooperatives in comparison to the 
self-management sector, marketing was carried out through the CAPCS and 
other state marketing institutions. The division of the surplus into 
consumption and investment was also outside the control of the coopera-
tors and was decided in a bureaucratic fashion by the representatives 
of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
The organization of labour within the cooperative units differed 
from that in the self-management sector in that with the exception of 
the president there was no labour hierarchy matched with differentia-
tion in income remuneration. Apart from the seasonal workers employed 
in the cooperatives, all the cooperators possessed equal rights and 
duties regarding the division of work and the distribution of revenues. 
The relatively small size of the cooperative units compared with that 
of the self-managed production units favoured a better management of 
the enterprise and ensured an easy organization of the labour. 
However, despite the relative freedom of decision enjoyed by the 
cooperators in comparison with the self-management sector, it is not an 
exaggeration to speak of them, especially in units which faced problems 
or were in deficit, simply as waged workers with no influence over the 
means or the process of production. In fact, they were considered by 
the state representatives, especially at the local level as waged 
labourers who were incapable of comprehending the "general interest" 
(59). The power of the technical director appointed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture exceeded that of the workers and he was accountable to no 
one in the cooperative, as he reported directly back to the planning 
a,uthorities at' the Wilaya level (60). The president of the unit who was 
-requrredtobe -litErate and to have some education was often a rich 
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farmer who possessed various links and connections with the administra-
tive authorities. He and the members of the managing council often did 
no physical labour themselves but directed the labour of others. 
Thus the structure of the cooperatives did not prevent some form 
of differentiation among their members. In the areas recovered during 
the first phase in particular, the rich peasants, who became reform 
beneficiaries because they had formerly been farmers, managers or 
renters of the nationalized public and private lands, tended to use the 
cooperative unit as a base for furthering their own interests. Through 
continuing to work alongside the former wage workers and sharecroppers 
whom they had supervised on the very same land in the pre-reform 
period, they were able to use their profits from agricultural and non-
agricultural activities to purchase more means of production and extend 
their commercial and processing operations (61). 
2-The Aim and Orientation of Production 
The creation of the cooperative was viewed as a technical aspect 
of raising agricultural production and productivity. It was not con-
ceived as a part of a whole operation aiming at the employment of the 
available labour force in the countryside, but as a policy aiming to 
create units of production which were profitable in purely financial 
terms and which would provide each member of the cooperative with an 
annual income of AD 3,000. For this reason the main concern of the 
production process was to minimize costs and to maximize profits. 
This meant that the cooperatives were to be operated as capitalist 
enterprises whose prime aim was profits, with no solidarity between the 
cooperators and the landless workers or the small owners. The coopera-
tivesceven acted as capitalist employers of seasonal workers who were 
.often hired to performed the hardest of jobs with very low wages. Jn 
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fact seasonal labour constituted very important part of the labour 
force in the majority of cooperatives. In some cooperatives where the 
members used no more than 56.6 per cent of their available time working 
in their units, the percentage of working days performed by seasonal 
workers reached 53 per cent of the total working days. During the 
agricultural year 1974-1975 the 95 CAPRA in the departments of Alger, 
Tizi-Ouzou, Bouira, Adrar, and Tamanrasset which grouped 1,182 benefi-
ciaries, employed 725 seasonal workers, or to 61 per cent of the 
permanet members (62). 
Although natural conditions limited the choices of crops in this 
sector, the general policy of the state was to impose through various 
means the production of marketable crops. Self-consumption of the crops 
produced was widely denounced and prevented. Production, therefore, 
remained oriented to price levels and market demand. 
Finally one can qualifY the cooperative sector simply as an expan-
sion of the state agricultural sector under a different form. If the 
cooperators possessed some form of freedom, it was only within the 
framework of the state's imperatives which effectively decided the plan 
of cultivation, the amount and direction of investment, and the distri-
bution of revenues. The cooperative sector was in general the product 
of a state capitalist policy which aimed primarily at the integration 
of agriculture within the economy. It represented the means through 
which the state was able to replace pre-capitalist forms of tenure and 
ownership with market-oriented and profit-seeking agricultural enter-
prise. The nature of the cooperative sector was in fact determined by 
this role which meant that despite having minimal impact on the struc-
tur~ of crural_employment and land and income inequality in the country-
·s±de:, :i:t :was ·a :.Stimulus for activating the agricultural sect{)r.-- This 
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was to be done by by expanding state control over that part of the 
private sector which was run under archaic and backward forms of 
production. The beneficiaries of the reform constituted, under the form 
of cooperation, state employees charged with implementing the integra-
tion of agriculture into the state capitalist economy. The creation of 
the cooperative sector was carried out not through the eradication, but 
rather through the maintenance, and indeed encouragement, of private 
property in agriculture, since the accompanying state credit and pric-
ing policies favoured the most successful and profitable agricultural 
enterprises whether under state control or in the private sector. 
Agrarian Reform Failure or Success? 
Answering a question like this will depend entirely on one's 
expectation and understanding of the nature of agrarian reform under 
state capitalism. We warned earlier of the danger of taking officially 
stated objectives at their face value since the reform had equally 
important implicit aims. Given the discussion above, there is no 
definite answer to this question. The reform was a failure in certain 
aspects and a success in others. 
We saw that the reform's impact on rural employment and in chang-
ing the structure of ownership in the direction of greater equality was 
undermined by various factors including the resistance of the proper-
tied class. Only a small amount of poor quality land was taken away 
from the private sector, mostly either public land or owned by absentee 
landlords. Even within the last category only a small fraction, usually 
tiny plots, was affected by the reform. However, the reform was succes-
sful, ·through affecting mainly these lands., in. tackling the prohlem qf 
pre-capitalist rent.a:Land sharecropping tenures which had prevented a 
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significant part of the private sector from being integrated in the 
economy and responding to the increasing urban demand for food. By 
nationalizing these lands and establishing the cooperative sector upon 
them, the reform achieved its stated objective of eradicating backward 
forms of production and ridding the peasants of the exploitation and 
debt bondage of the landlords. 
However, the reform hardly touched the private capitalist form of 
production. If the properties of some agrarian capitalists had been 
affected, the reform together with the state agricultural policies 
which accompanied it actually encouraged private production. The land 
nationalized in the course of the second phase belonged mostly to small 
absentee owners. Despite the emphasis of the reform text that only 
direct exploitation of the land would be preserved, wage labour persis-
ted and has by no means been abolished. It became clear that the slogan 
of "the land belongs to those who till it" was translated in the actual 
fact into that "the land belongs to those who (efficiently) exploit 
it". The most productive and profitable agricultural enterprises, 
whether in the state or private sector, were encouraged and supported. 
This was clear through the policies of the state institutions servicing 
the agricultural sector which, in seeking to enhance competition and 
profitability, and therefore economic inequality, in fact favoured and 
encouraged those units which were able to achieve profits through 
various means. 
Moreover, the small size of the land sequestrated by the reform 
operations meant that only a small fraction of the potential beneficia-
ries would acquire nationalized land under one form or another. Hence 
--ttre--prob:tem--of--unemployment in agricul--tur.e was hardly affected by the 
reform. The real importance of this "however, Ts that ttris .nUlllber -is -
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much smaller than the numbers who worked on the nationalized lands in 
the pre-reform period and who were displaced by the nationalization. 
This implies that the number of waged workers available for hire by the 
capitalist units has increased contrary to the emphasis on direct 
exploitation. Moreover, for the majority of the agricultural workers 
and, indeed, even the small owners, the effects of urban expansion and 
the increase in the oil money had a much stronger impact on their 
living conditions and future than the agrarian reform, since these 
factors played a far more decisive role in determining their future. 
The changing patterns of consumption and work which followed have 
resulted in a situation in which a wage income was necessary for a 
standard of living above basic needs in 1972, by 1982 a wage income was 
the base, and that agriculture became the means of increasing non-basic 
consumption (63). Hence the commercialization of agriculture was one of 
the direct achievements of the reform, in that it not only meant the 
integration of agriculture with industrial development through an 
increase in the use of inputs which was explicitly aimed at by the 
reform, but also the enhancement of capitalist exploitation and differ-
entiation. 
Even if the reform's effectiveness was measured by purely economic 
criteria expressed by production and productivity increases, the 
results are disappointing. Algeria in the 1980's, with 20 million 
inhabitants is producing less cereals than it did with 5 million at the 
begining of the 20th century. Hence it remaind heavily reliant on 
imports and food subsidies to feed its population. While national food 
production met 70 per cent of consumption in 1969, it only met 55 per 
----cent 1.n 1973, 35 per cent in 19'77, and only 30 per ·cent in 1983 (64). 
Imports and state subsidies of foodstuffs cost the Algerian budget in 
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1980 $3 billion, nearly one quarter of export earnings (65). 
What did the reform represent for the state and its leading stra-
ta? We stated earlier that political objectives and realignments of 
social classes and strata was at the heart of the reform. The delay in 
its launch can be explained by particular class interests, in that 
Boumedienne's regime included within its alliance a fraction of the 
landed bourgeoisie. The initiation of the reform indicated that such an 
alliance was no longer viable. The petty bourgoisie now could not only 
afford to dispense with this group, but also it was urgently necessary 
for it to proceed with a development programme which implied the aboli-
tion of the non-capitalist landowning class. 
However, the limited application of the reform even in own terms 
reveals the contradictory nature of the petty bourgeoisie and its non 
hegemonic character in the sense that its class domination was hampered 
by its structural heterogeneity. such a heterogeneity meant that even 
if it aimed at the elimination of the landed bourgeoisie, its common 
boundaries and the various structural and ideological links with this 
fraction has limited its ability to implement this objective. The wide 
range of devices that the big proprietors were allowed to use and the 
complacency shown by the implementing bodies towards evasion and exemp-
tion were signs of these links. 
one should not, however, over-emophasize the deficiencies in the 
application of the reform as deliberate attempt by its enemies to 
paralyse it and to empty it of its social content; such deficiencies 
are inherent in the nature and the objectives of the reform and the 
economic and social context in which it was introduced. The reform did 
not represent a total break With· .the. existing sncial Structure but a 
·Shift .of- ,emphasis -away· f·rom ·contro-l cof land as the basis of power 
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towards tne necessity of industrial development within the framework of 
state capitalism which follows the logic of profit. It was an expres-
sion of the state's attempt not only to expand its social base by 
incorporating the peasantry but also of extending its sources of 
accumulation to agriculture. This meant that the agrarian fraction 
within the state's leading strata whose power was based essentially on 
the ownership of land had to be dismantled. Agrarian activities had to 
be in line with the industrial programme in the sense that agricultural 
units had to follow the logic of profit and, therefore to rely heavily 
on the inputs produced by industry. By definition this would not imply 
a radical transformation of the ownership structure but only a reorien-
tation of production and changes in methods of cultivation in a way 
that would enhance capitalist exploitation. It would also imply that 
some of the material base of certain landlords would be eroded by the 
reform. 
The resistance which certainly existed did not necessarily reflect 
opposition to the basic structure of economic power. That some indivi-
dual interests were affected by the reform did not mean that the latter 
would act as a brake on capitalist development in agriculture. "In any 
capitalist society, the role of the state is not necessarily to protect 
individual capitalists, but to maintain the system as a whole, which 
may sometimes require the sacrifice of some particular interests" (66). 
Rather, both resistance to and support for reform was motivated to a 
large degree by political and ideological factors expressed in diffe-
rent forms and was certainly pushed by those who were most affected by 
it. 
Politically, the reform was "primari-ly a political and ideolog·ical 
·operation, made·possible by awiculture's rather modest rol~ in·nation-
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al development plans from a purely economic point of view'' (67). It 
opened the way for the elimination of the landed bourgeoisie from state 
power. As concrete evidence, high state officials such as Walis (gover-
nors), and more importantly, members of the Revolutionary Council, well 
known as big proprietors, were removed from office once they refused to 
donate their lands to the FNRA (68). It also provided the leading state 
strata with the political means to demonstrate its revolutionary 
credentials. Hence, besides the mobilization of popular support by 
involving mass organizations and student volunteers in the operations 
of the reform application primarily under the control of the state 
administration (69), the state fully exploited the implementation of 
the reform for revitalizing the party and ridding it of the undesirable 
elements.Through the implementation of the reform, a temporary parallel 
administrative structure was developed, designed to outflank the 
influence of vested interests. The army was given more explicit and 
increased participation in the reform thus improving its popularity 
after its repressive role in 1962-67 (70). All these measures had 
boosted the revolutionary image of the regime and enhanced its politi-
cal reputation. Thus, despite its weak material results, the reform was 
one of the most politically important measures undertaken by the Boume-
dienne regime. 
Therefore, judging by its outcome and its repercussions at various 
levels within the framework of state capitalism, one could conclude 
that the agrarian reform did not fall short of its most important 
objectives. In the following section we will examine the effectiveness 
of the reform on the new rural structure in the light of the agricultu-
. -ral pol·icies ·that folloWed it. 
- ·- • ~ -- -----... ··•·• -·.-.. •• - . • • • • • •t • 
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CHAPTER 1WEL VE AGRICULTURAL POLICIES SINCE 1971; 
STATE CAPITALIST AND CAPITALIST PENETRATION 
One of the most important characteristics of the state's agricul-
tural policies after the reform was the emphasis on increasing produc-
tion and productivity. Within the framework of state coordination of 
production and its control of credit allocations, marketing, and 
distribution of the means of production, the state looked at agricultu-
ral units in both the state and the private sector as economic and 
profit-maximizing enterprises which were to be encouraged to increase 
production and productivity. Through the creation of CAPCS at the local 
rural level, the state aimed at decentralizing decision making and at 
reducing power at the national level in favour of giving more autonomy 
to agricultural enterprises. 
Investment and Credits 
The financing of investment for agricultural enterprises was pro-
vided by two sources: the state and the enterprises themselves. State 
financing of investment was carried out through two channels: current 
government expenditures which concerned primarily the building of the 
agricultural infrastructure and its distribution by the public treasu-
ry, and credits distributed by the bank to agricultural enterprises for 
their equipment and current expenditure. 
The state's bias in favouring its agricultural sector which was 
expanded by the reform remained the most obvious feature of its policy 
regarding the provision of credits and agricultural investment. This 
was because the state sector contained the units most likely to in-
crease their productivity and to direct their output towards the mar-
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ket. However, within this policy the state sought to encourage agricul-
tural enterprises to make their own investments out of their own 
projects. This explains why only a minor increase in public investment 
in agriculture took place after the reform. Thus current expenditure on 
agriculture by the central government declined from over 4 per cent to 
less than 3 per cent of total expenditure from 1970 to 1977. Investment 
expenditures on agriculture by the central government rose to a peak of 
17.6 per cent in 1973 (during the reform) and then declined to 6.7 per 
cent in 1977. While gross fixed investment by the public sector only 
doubled in the first six years of the land refrom (1970-1976), invest-
ment in hydrocarbons increased sevenfold and in manufacturing sixfold 
(1). This was reflected in the small size of the credits allocated to 
the agricultural sector in general during the seven years between 1970 
and 1977. Hence, with a total amount of allocated credit of AD 3,990 
million of which AD 2,900 million were actually used, less than AD 50 
annually in credits was allocated to each hectare of agricultural land 
(2). Out of this the private sector received a very small amount, AD 
490 million. In fact this sector did not receive any credits during 
1974 and 1975 because of the application of the agrarian reform, and 
between 1974 and 1977, it received only AD 90 million of which only 40 
million AD were used. Moreover, while the credits allocated to agricul-
tural enterprises increased only by 22 per cent between the first four 
year plan (1970-1973) and the second four year plan (1974- 1977), the 
global volume of investment for the whole economy increased by more 
than 60 per cent for the same period {3). 
The state had,in fact, encouraged agricultural units in the three 
sectors (self-managed, agrarian reform, and private) to finance their 
investments either -with their accumulated capital ·or -by bor-r-o~i-ng from 
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the national bank. Hence as well as the equipment and the materials 
owned by CAPCS to be hired to the units, the state increased the supply 
of agricultural machinery and inputs produced by the internal indus-
trial sector. Agricultural units in the state or private sector could 
apply directly to the BNA at the Wilaya level for credit to purchase 
their own equipment, independent of CAPCS, if they chose. After the 
agricultural year 1974-1975, the national bank adopted a new method of 
financing the state sector by negotiating directly with the representa-
tives of the agricultural enterprise the amount and the terms of 
settling the credit (4). The rate of interest on the credits was, in 
fact, very low. Given an annual rate of inflation of 13.9 per cent in 
the 1970s, real rates of of interest were negative for loans and, in 
effect, constituted subsidies to agricultural producers (5). 
The granting of credits still favoured those units that were able 
to show that they were more productive and that such credits would 
increase their revenues. The criteria for granting the credits for 
purchasing equipment were whether the equipment already in place was 
being used efficiently (that is, profitably), the level of outstanding 
debt (if old debts were not repaid, new credits were not forthcoming), 
and the maximum profitability which could be expected from the unit in 
the future. This implies that credits were used as an inducement for 
the units to market their produce in order to be able to compensate for 
their investment and to repay the granting agencies. 
While short-term credits were directed essentiallY to small agri-
cultural units which were in desperate need of cash to manage their 
operations until the next harvest, long-term credits went mainly to the 
larger. capital intensive units which-- could afford to be accumulating 
capit.aJ.~.and ~anding production •. In:,general_, .the amount.. and terms of_ 
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credits represented the means of maximizing the incomes of the 
mechanized and profit-seeking agricultural enterprises in the three 
sectors and provided the ground for the integration of agriculture into 
the economy. Thus while the agrarian reform maintained private property 
in land, state investment policy also encouraged it and enhanced 
economic differentiation in agriculture. 
Pricing and N.mrketing Policies 
We saw earlier that before the agrarian reform state pricing 
policy was aiming at favouring industrial accumulation by deliberately 
keeping down agricultural prices. We also saw that the prices of 
agricultural inputs and materials were rising considerably. This has 
resulted in unfavourable terms of exchange between agriculture and 
other sectors of the economy and contributed, besides other factors, to 
the disinvestment process which began after the last years of 
colonialism. 
The prices of agricultural products were kept low mainly because 
of the state's almost total control over the institutions and agencies 
of product marketing which decided the level of the prices. They were 
in fact fixed by decree for the majority of products and especially of 
those of the state sector. Thus, despite the increasing demand for 
agricultural products and particularly for foodstuffs, state marketing 
agencies paid low prices for the basic products to the agricultural 
units (6). In many cases the prices of some agricultural products paid 
to the producers did not even cover the actual costs of production (7). 
Following the state's emphasis on increasing production and 
poductivity of agriculture after the agrarian reform a major switch in 
the state's pricing policy took place after 1974. In order to increase 
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the income of the farming units as an inducement for production 
increases and for the use of advanced mothods of cultivation, thus 
providing cash crops for the market, the state allowed the prices of 
agricultural products to increase rapidly and considerably. Thus prices 
for raw agricultural outputs rose dramatically after 1974. Overall they 
rose by about 90 per cent from 1973 to 1976 (8). However, this increase 
was only possible because of the dramatic increase and diversification 
of demand for these products which had exceeded the supply. This in its 
turn was due to the fast urbanization process and to increases in the 
level of income of the population. Rising production costs and the 
continuous existence of the private "Parallel market" contributed fur-
ther to the increase. 
Increases in prices, however, did not occur in a uniform fashion 
for all agricultural products. Market crops, which were more likely to 
escape the control of state marketing agencies and were usually 
produced by rich farmers, had their prices increased in a more rapid 
way than other crops, implying that price increase had benefitted the 
rich farmers more than the state or the small producers. Moreover, with 
a rapid increase in the cost of production, the rise in the price of 
agricultural products meant that only those units which were able to 
cover the the rising costs of production and inputs through raising 
their marketable output could benefit. They were mainly those efficient 
and market oriented units which were somehow capable of acquiring the 
necessary capital to finance the use of inputs and materials. On the 
other hand, smaller units which were directed for subsistence and 
produced small quantities for the market were to face difficulties in 
meeting the costs of production and to make fu-1-1 ·use of the r-ising 
pr: ices .. of tl19 mJt pu~. · This was 4 :in~ fact,. · i:n line With- tne state •-s new 
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policy of increasing the commercialization of agriculture and favouring 
efficient and market-oriented enterprises. 
The state's control over agricultural prices was, as we stated 
above, made possible by the functions of the state's marketing institu-
tions and their deliberate policy of purchasing and distributing 
agricultural outputs at low prices in favour of the urban sector. The 
existence of these agencies restricted the activities of private 
merchants and intermediaries. However, it has not abolished these 
activities altogether. Rather, private networks of marketing are legal 
and remain active, taking full advantage of the deficiencies and diffi-
culties that faced the work of the state agencies and have full control 
over crops whose production was too cpmplicated to be controlled by the 
latter. They used to pay higher prices to producers, making marketing 
through their networks easier and more profitable. They also charged 
the consumers higher prices than the state distribution taking advan-
tage of the limited supply and the rapidly increasing demand. Their 
favourable terms of exchange with the producers expressed mainly by 
higher prices attracted larger numbers of units within the state 
agricultural sector to sell their products to these networks secretly 
and illegally, while the producers in the private sector were allowed 
to market their products freely through private channels. This has 
expanded their sphere of activity and made their existence complementa-
ry to and interdependent with that of the state marketing sector. 
Moreover, private merchants and intermediaries, who were often 
rich farmers themselves, did not restrict their activities to the 
marketing of the agricultural products, but were also engaged in 
various activities :such as-acting-as creditors to small private produ-
.cers and small t£ttailers and as leasors. of, ag;ricu-ltural machinery. In 
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1974 private commerce controlled 65 per cent of fruit and vegetable 
distribution and almost all meat and fish distribution. In 1973 less 
than half of all cereals produced were sold through the OAIC (Office 
Algerien Interprofessionel des Cereales) channels. 
With the launch of the agrarian reform and the creation of CAPCS, 
the state aimed at decentralizing and organizing the process of output 
marketing more efficiently. Thus, instead of limiting state control 
over this sphere and expanding the already flourishing private market-
ing networks, the state tried to modernize and expand its marketing 
agencies even more. Hence new regulations were issued extending the 
public circuts of marketing at the expense of private commercial 
capital and governing the marketing of specific agricultural crops. The 
marketing and the distribution of the fruits and vegetables, for examp-
le, were to be carried out by CAPCS, COFEL (Cooperative des Fruits et 
Legumes de la Wilaya),and OFLA (Office des Fruits et Legumes d'Algerie) 
( 9). 
However, this did not abolish the private circuits of marketing, 
and in fact they remained quite important. Private merchants were even 
allowed to export (10). Private food processing factories could buy 
their inputs either directly from the producers or from the state 
marketing agencies, benefitting to a large extent from the state's 
pricing policies. Their activities in this sphere demonstrated the 
interweaving of the private and public economic structures (11). 
Moreover, the structural inefficincies of the state's marketing 
institutions were not overcome by the new regulations. Irregular supply 
and delays remained commonplace. From the producers' point of view, 
they were :the source of production loss and financial disruption (12). 
They still had no power over the· ·marketing inS"e.i:tutions which.,:de.cided 
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the time and amount of the harvest according to their own interests. 
From the consumers point of view, the state marketing agencies always 
failed to satisfy their needs by providing regular and diversified 
supply of all the necessary agricultural goods. Fluctuations in supply 
and food shortages were very frequent especially in regard to the 
market crops. State marketing circuts failed to reach the retailers and 
the direct consumers who often turned to the private circuts which 
charge higher prices. Since 1974, the CAPCS and the COFEL established 
centres for direct sale to the consumers in the large cities. These 
centres, however, remained very few and were often far from the popular 
quarters where those in most need of goods at low prices actually live 
(13). Detrmining the actual amount of imported agricultural goods, and 
particularly of cereals, by the state agencies was subject to wide 
fluctuations due to a lack of accurate knowledge of the amount of 
nationally produced crops and in the supply of the world market. This 
has resulted in frequently irregular supply of the most necessary 
crops. 
These difficulties had contributed to a large extent in attribut-
ing an increasing importance to private marketing networks and boosting 
their activities. It was often the case that due to the above difficul-
ties the producers in the state sector turned to the private sector to 
sell their products (14). They exhibited a high degree of efficiency 
and had a better terms of exchange with both producers and the 
consumers. They paid higher prices to the former and provided the 
latter with regular supplies of good quality. Those merchants who owned 
an agricultural exploitation were in an ideal situation since the 
·producers -In the private sector were allowed to market their prodtict·s 
freely without passing through CAPCS networks. Tilis· has led to the·· 
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submission of the small owners to the dictation of private commercial 
capital, ready to exploit the difficulties encountered and created by 
the state agencies. 
Liberalization a Solution for Capitalist Organization 
The inefficiencies in marketing and the frequent shortages in the 
supply of basic agricultural goods together with the general stagnation 
of agricultural production have been a source of great popular frus-
tration. All fingers were pointing to the structural weaknesses of the 
state marketing agencies and their rigid and bureaucratic handling of 
their functions. In fact the problem of agricultural performance as a 
whole was linked mainly with the organization of marketing. This 
implied that any solution to the current problems in this sphere could 
only be found by reducing the power and influence of the state institu-
tions established to service the agricultural sector. 
By 1980 the first measures of liberalization which were initiat-
ed after the death of Boumedienne were reflected as it was generally 
anticipated in reducing the sphere of intervention of the state's 
marketing agencies. Agricultural exploitations whether in the private 
or in the state sector were allowed to sell part of their crops on the 
free market without going through the state agencies (15). Private 
wholesalers and middlemen were allowed to have full legal rights, for 
the first time since independence, to market all agricultural products. 
This meant that CAPCS, which were created, as we saw, in the course of 
the reform, lost their monopoly of the sales of the production of the 
cooperatives and the state farms. 
However,· these ·measures were not isloated ones. They were in 
£act-part of a whole policy Which was materializing by the end Of the 
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Boumedienne regime, involving the mobilization of private initiatives 
in almost all sectors of the economy (16). In 1980 a serious and a wide 
ranging debate within the FLN took place concentrating on the organiza-
tion and nature of Algeria's future development. The most important 
issue was whether to systematize the scattered and uncoordinated 
measure of liberalization and the elevation of the status of the 
private sector in the economy, or to proceed with tight state control 
and central planning. It soon became clear that the first option would 
be adopted. 
Liberalization in the form of reducing the influence of the 
central planning and of allowing a more scope to market forces were the 
most important charactestics of the development programme of 1980-1984. 
In 1980 the FLN's Central Committee adopted a resolution which urged 
the state to assist the private sector in all domains, technical, 
human, legislative and financial (17). On 13 March 1982, a new invest-
ment code which incorporated the Central Committee's above resolution 
was enacted. The code provides a legal framework "to stimulate, guide 
and control" the "non-exploitative private sector". In particular, 
private investment in housing, construction materials, hotels, 
resturants, and light industry was to be encouraged. In April another 
law provided tax exemptions for joint venture companies with minority 
foreign partners (18). State corporations in heavy and light industry 
and in public works witnessed in the same year a far-reaching reorgani-
zation involving their being split up into smaller units with their 
management decentralized away from Algiers. Emphasis in efficiency and 
profitability was the driving force behind such reorganization. This 
implied that-the economic criteria wer.e to be more effective. 
These measur·es were --taken amidst a fierce campaign against 
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corruption and bureaucratic rigidity, as these phenomena were directly 
linked to the state's tight control (19). In other words the liberali-
zation measures and the relaxation of the restrictions on private 
capital in the economy were viewed primarily as a response to the 
urgent need for efficiency and to curtail the problem of the bureaucr-
atic red tape. They were to be legitimized by with the new regime that 
followed Boumedienne by crackdowns on corruption and embezzlement which 
became the most obvious features of the state's intervention in the 
economy. In the context of state capitalist development this reflected 
the realization that state intervention had come to constitute a 
hindrance, not only to the smooth running of the economy and to the 
efficient provision of goods and services to the people, but also, and 
more importantly, to the socio-economic development of private capital 
which was accumulated by various means within the framework and, 
indeed, protection and encouragement of the same intervention. Corrup-
tion and bureaucratic practices were issues which the private capital 
attempted to expose in order to justify its claim for more room and 
freedom in which to operate. 
In the agricultural sector this policy was reflected in a number 
of ways • The self-management system was the object of severe criti-
cisms by the Central Committee of the FLN after its third session in 
1980. The latter did not hesitate to question the efficiency of the 
self-management which "remains to show that it is a worthwhile and 
operatable form in the sphere of economic management" (20). The orga-
nization of production and the cooperative forms which were introduced 
by the reform were also a subject of great deal of criticism on the 
part of the FLN. Thus r -one -Gf -the- latter's resolutions demanded from 
the govenment and legi-slative ·organs ::t•to .attempt to .. introduce . the forms 
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of management which are most suitable for the concrete realities" (21). 
Growing emphasis was placed on the need to relax the state's 
control over agricultural activities in all the three sectors and to 
open more room for the private sector to take into its hands the 
activities that were controlled by the state institutions. A further 
attempt at agrarian reform, Which was already scaled down, was aban-
doned. Hence, "It was not an act of God that made the "Agrarian Revolu-
tion" disappear from the name of the Ministry of Agriculture which, 
under Chadli Bendjedid, became the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries" (22). Distribution of land ceased to be the prime concern of 
the state and emphasis was placed more on the efficient organization of 
land to obtain higher productivity. 
One of the criticism of the previous agricultural policies which 
started to appear in the official press and evaluations was their 
neglect of the private sector. The National Preparatory Commissions's 
report of the Fifth FLN congress, issued in September 1983, explicitly 
attributed most of the agricultural problems to the previous policies 
that neglected the private agricultural sector and put clear emphasis 
clearly on the need for further encouragement of this sector as a 
remedy for problems of low productivity and production (23). Before 
that the Central committee of the FLN adopted a resolution on the 
private agricultural sector in December 1981 which gave producers and 
enterpreneurs in this sector total legitimacy and encouraged the gover-
nment to provide every possible help for them (24). Hence the aim of 
increasing agricultural production was gradually linked with encourag-
ing the private sector and facilitating its functions. The previous 
.random measures of liberalization and reducing the interventions of.the 
;s~t.~ .nat.4onal-•off,ices and .marketing boar:ds.:in ·.favour of the private 
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sector's freedom were transformed into a consistent policy of explicit 
encouragement for the private sector. The process of restructuring 
public enterprises and decentralizing their decision making which had 
started at the begining of the 1980's, was reflected in curtailing 
their influence and monopolies over vital activities such as marketing, 
supply of materials, and even export and import. This meant that 
private farmers started increasingly to assume, under conditions of 
support for profitable and commercialized units, a larger role in 
determining the conditions of production and to see the scope of their 
activities expanding rapidly. 
A new bank for agricultural and rural development was entrusted 
with the job of constraining the credit system to respond solely to 
profit criteria and to apply those criteria uniformly to all farms in 
all the agricultural three sectors. The amount of credit accorded to 
the private producers had risen substantially since 1979. With the 
fast growing urban demand for agricultural products together with the 
relaxation of state control over prices, capitalist forms of produc-
tion in activities where the capital turn-over is the fastest 
experinced rapid expansion. Hence, full free rein has been given to 
producers of poultry, eggs, meat, dairy products, fruit and vegetables, 
in order to curb imports and promote exports through market mechanisms 
(25). This was reflected in noticeable increases in the production of 
these products which are in fact more consumed by the privileged groups 
in society (26). State control over agricultural exports and imports was 
also relaxed for the benefit of both the private merchants and the 
urban higher income groups who became able to find what they needed in 
the market even at in-t-lat:e.tLprices;· -Fol:lowing the advice of the World 
-Bank-., it was: beli:eved, that the influx of competition from 'for_eign · -
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products would stimulate Algerian producers to improve their pro-
ducts and processes of production (27). 
The state agricultural sector was equally affected by the new 
policies of liberalization and the emphasis on raising production and 
productivity. Self-managed units were seen as too large to permit the 
efficient utilization of resources. Hence new organizations were 
introduced enabled these units to be broken down into a larger number 
of much smaller units. Competition among these units was allowed to 
take place through policies Which favoured the most productive and 
efficient units. This even involved the sale of marginalized and and 
underused public land to private owners. Private distribution of land 
that were occupied by the dissolved CAPRAs became frequent (28). 
450,000 hectares of land nationalized during the agrarian reform has 
been redistributed to individuals as private property (29). Relaxation 
on the ceilings of land ownership became apparent when the operation of 
land reform were ended, so that private owners could buy and sale lands 
freely. Briefly, with these measures market forces became the dominant 
factors in organizing Algerian agriculture; a phenomenon which 
manifests clearly that the sequence of state capitalism has ended up in 
a full incorporation of Algerian agriculture into the capitalist market 
and its laws of operation. Such incorporation had become constrained by 
state intervention in a wide range of activities. Thus in order to 
release the forces of production, state control had to be limited, 
which was the essence of the liberalization policies. 
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(l) Pfeifer, op. cit., pp.223-224. 
(2) Nadir, M.T., L'Aqriculture dans la Planification en Algerie 
de 1067-1977, 
OPU, Algiers, 1982, pp.454-455. 
(3) Ibid., p.456. 
(4) Bedrani, op. cit., p.213. Before that year the director of the 
agricultural office at the level of wilaya, negociates with the 
bank the amount of credits allocated to each unit without the 
presence of the unit's representatives. 
( 5) As of June 1977, these annual money rates of interests were 
applied to agriculture: 
Short-term (less than one year) 4.0% 
Medium-term (l-5 years, 2 years grace) 3.5% 
Long-term (5-10 years, 2 years grace) 3.0% 
Long-term (ll-20 years, 2 years grace) 2.5% 
Long-term (to reform cooperatices only) 2.0% 
Pfeifer, op. cit., p.224. 
(6) To cite one example, in 1969 the prices proposed by the private 
merchants in the Haut Cheliff varied between AD 4.5 to AD 5.5 for 
the kilogram of live sheep, while the ONAD (the state marketing 
agency for meat) used to pay AD 4.80 for the same amount. The 
prices of fruits and vegetables paid by the OFLA were 40-50 per 
cent lower that that paied by private merchants to the producers. 
Bedrani, op. cit., p.l42. 
(7) See Ibid., pp.l40-l41. 
(8) These increase, however, were not passed on directly by the 
marketers as increased retail prices for food, which rose only 30 
to 40 per cent in the same years, bcause they would have forced 
urban industrial wages up sooner or later as well. Rather, the 
central government covered most of the differences out of its 
current budgets in the form of subsidies from general revenues to 
the processor agencies, OIAC (for cereals), ONAPO (for sugar and 
vegetable oils), and SN-SEMPAC (for flour milling). 
(9) The CAPCS receives the output at the level of the commune from 
the producers in the three sectors, it then distributes it on 
retailers of the commune and sells the surplus to the COFEL. 
CAPCS also distributes on the retailers the products which are 
not produced in the commune that it purchases from the COFEL. The 
latter receives the surplus of the CAPCSs at the level of the 
wilaya and distributes them on the CAPCSs which lacks such pro-
du~ts~~~na then sells the surplus to the OFLA after purchasing 
from the latter the products which are not produced at the level 
--~c~e-;~-il-aya. The OF'LA, after receiving the surplus from each 
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instead products that are not produced in ALgeria. 
Bedrani, op. cit., pp.4l-342. 
(10) Ibid. 
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as the most revealing one for this interdependence: 
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tion of the remationship between agricultural producers 
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the first of a buyer and the second of a supplier. The 
major processor to which OAIC sold was SN-SEMPAC, the 
national miller.There remained, besides, private millers 
who sold their grain products either back to OAIC or on 
private market. State pricing policy benefited the pri-
vate processors as part of its rationalization programme 
after 1074. OAIC's policy was to charge the processors 
prices less than its costs, in effect subsidizing the 
costs of transport and storage, and taking a loss which 
it recouped out of general state revenues". 
Pfeifer, op. cit., pp.231-232. 
(12) A famous scandal of potatos in Mascara at the end of 1977 broke 
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OIAPTEll nn llTEEN CONCLUSION 
Between 1962 and 1982, the social, political, and economic struc-
ture of Algeria underwent a series of profound transformations. The 
extent and nature of this process was rooted in the impact of 130 years 
of French colonialism, and particularly in the nature of the social 
forces Which arose during the colonial period. It became clear at the 
end of the two decades which followed independence that Algeria had 
lost much of its apparently •socialist' momentum and that political 
rhetoric, even when accompanied by major economic and infrastructural 
achievements, is not equivalent to the creation of a classless society. 
Although three different regimes came to power between 1962 and 
1979, they all adopted policies which formed a natural continuation 
from those of their predecessors. In reality the regimes were the 
natural consequence of the socio-economic structures created in the 
course of the decolonization process under the leadership of the 'petty 
bourgeois' social strata. In other words Algeria's development and its 
shifts in political and economic emphasis can be seen more as inherent 
in the broad nature of state capitalism, itself a product of the rule 
of the petty bourgeoisie, than as the result of particular political 
changes, either in 1965 or in 1979. 
This is a feature which Algeria shares with other state capitalist 
societies in the Third World. However, what distinguishes its experien-
ce from that of most of its counterparts is the nature and composition 
of its ruling socio-political forces. First, the. indigenous petty bour-
geois strata came into existence during a period Of deep economic and 
political crisis and in consequence came to adoPt a genuinely anti-
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colonial stand. They entered into direct armed confrontation with the 
colonial power in order to obtain independence, and became the leaders 
of the national liberation movement. Their origins and the circumst-
ances under which they rose to political power largely determined the 
nature of subsequent changes. 
Secondly, the way in which independence was achieved and the 
events that surrounded it ensured that the petty bourgeoisie, which was 
then in control of the most autonomous apparatus in society (the state 
administration), came under direct popular pressure to bring about 
greater equality and a fairer distribution of resources. These two 
factors played a major role in radicalizing Algerian state capitalism 
and in expanding its egalitarian dimension. Hence the claim that 
•socialist' policies were being pursued was valid to the extent that it 
was impossible to implement policies which flagrantly favoured certain 
social classes or strata at the expense of others. Thus in addition to 
their function in building up the national economy, state capitalist 
policies which expanded the role of the state economic sector and 
nationalized foreign-owned enterprises could be adduced as evidence 
that Algeria was constructing socialism. 
However, because of the nature of the social strata and their 
limitations, more concrete social developments were taking place. These 
can be summarised as the development Within the ranks of the petty 
bourgeoisie, who were now in control of the state apparatus, of certain 
interests which were in direct confrontation with the construction of 
•socialism•. Their position in the administration, together with the 
continuation of capitalist relations of production, enabled them to 
manipulate the state's role in the economy in order to enhance their 
own positions and to _develop beneficial link.S,with,privat-e capital. The 
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administration managed to frustrate the working class initiatives which 
had been expressed in the self-management movement and its policies 
gradually came to be considered as seriously 'deficient' from a social-
ist point of view. However all this took place in an atmosphere in 
which the ruling strata were desperately in need of revolutionary 
legitimacy, which explains why the frustration and 'deficiencies' could 
not develop to a point at which widely accepted popular goals came 
under open attack. 
'Promise fulfilled and promise breached' became a commonplace 
description of the state's social and economic policies. Therefore, 
although Algeria was able to erect a modern national economy under 
state capitalism whose infrastructural facilities were developed far 
beyond the levels attained under colonialism, its social structure 
remained highly stratified and permitted the development of interests 
which favoured the development of •conventional' capitalism. 
As well as being economically vital, control of the Algerian 
agricultural sector was socially and politically important for the rule 
of the petty bourgeoisie. After having managed to empty the agricultur-
al self-management system of its ideological content, and having submi-
tted it to effective state management, the state's ability to proceed 
with its development programme now appeared to be threatened by the 
situation in the private sector, the only part of agriculture which had 
so far escaped state control. 
By the end of the 1960's it was clear that the dislocations in 
agriculture were acting as major constraints on economic growth. This 
unsatisfatory situation was accompanied by constant tensions in the 
countryside, and the continuing uncertainty seems to have been instru-
mental- i·n -pr-ompting· ·the· ruling strata to take measures which affected 
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the social forces connected with large landownership, in other words to 
inaugurate an agrarian reform. However, the reform failed to bring 
about a major restructuring of social relations in the countryside, 
since most of those likely to be affected were able to take steps to 
avoid the nationalization and limitation of their properties. 
The reform had only very limited success in changing the structure 
of rural employment. Its main effect was to incorporate a major part of 
the agricultural private sector into capitalist production by elimina-
ting pre-capitalist forms of production, such as sharecropping and 
absentee landlordism, and putting it under the control of the state 
economic sector through the establishment of production cooperatives. 
As an expression of the economic, social and political objectives of 
the ruling strata, the deficiencies in the implementation of the reform 
clearly revealed the linkages between the leadership and the landowning 
classes, which explains the very limited amount of land affected by the 
reform. 
Thus while the reform abolished most pre-capitalist forms of 
production in the private agricultural sector, it did not eradicate 
capitalist inequality and exploitation. Instead it even enhanced such 
exploitation, since wage labour was expanded rather than abolished. 
Furthermore, those workers who 'benefitted' from the reform and were 
incorporated into the cooperative system were treated mainly as wage 
labourers in profit-maximizing units. 
To put it in a wider perspective, the reform represented another 
way of expanding state control within the framework of state capital-
ism. various economic and political factors made the initiation of such 
measures an urgent necessity. As the reform preserved, and indeed 
enhanced, capitalist relations in agriculture while securing the 
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state's control at the same time, new contradictions emerged. Hence 
while opportunities for accumulation expanded rapidly for capitalist 
farmers, their activities became increasingly limited by the state's 
intervention in the provision of inputs and credit and in the marketing 
of outputs. The outcome was a major process of disinvestment especially 
in basic food production and a noticeable shift towards activities that 
escaped the state's control, including non-agricultural ones. 
Moreover, the extent and nature of state control also came to pose 
problems for the satisfaction of urban demand for agricultural and 
consumer goods. Urban private capital which was accumulated through 
various means, including the use of official positions in the adminis-
tration, increasingly came to feel that such thorough-going domination 
of the economy by state enterprises acted as a crucial limitation for 
the expansion of its activities. In particular, potentiallY profitable 
investment opportunities were limited by the development strategy's 
emphasis on heavy industry. 
By the end of the 1970's state capitalism had produced more con-
tradictions than could be solved in its own terms. Different social 
classes and strata became disenchanted with the new developments for 
different reasons. State control itself led to the development of 
socio-economic forces within the state whose interests gradually became 
threatened by it. In fact state capitalism came under fire both from 
the right for its inefficiency and bottlenecks and from the left for 
its inequality. 
The death of Boumedienne came at a time when a major change in 
Algeria's development strategy had to be made. By then it was clear 
that the advocates of an openly capitalist approach were the most 
~-inf1uential-""in -c.etermining the future course· of event-s. ··Hence liberali-
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zation was gradually transformed from a series of random measures 
designed to overcome particular inefficiencies and difficulties created 
by state enterprises into a consistent policy of opening wider opportu-
nities for private capital. It was therefore not the death of 
Boumedienne as such that initiated Algeria's change of direction, but 
the conditions for this new development were certainly inherited from 
his era. Nevertheless his death accelerated the process of change since 
it set in motion a political reshuffle whose general effect was to 
assign a more important role to the advocates of open capitalism. 
The changes that were introduced in agriculture by the new regime 
in the general direction of assigning a more important role to capital-
ist farming came to conform with the new approach which Algerian 
development has since assumed. In general, the later development of 
Algeria has been very similar to that of the experience of other state 
capitalist regimes where, despite the achievements and the rhetoric 
surrounding them, state capitalism has served as a transitional phase 
for the nurturing and establishment of a 'conventional' capitalist mode 
of production. 
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